Monday, March 17, 2014

evidence in criminal matters, can also be by video conference

                                                             Supreme Court of India

CASE NO.:   Appeal (crl.) 476 of 2003
Appeal (crl.) 477 of 2003

PETITIONER: The State of Maharashtra
  P. C. Singhi

RESPONDENT: Dr. Praful B. Desai
     Dr. Praful B. Desai and another

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/04/2003

BENCH:
S.N. Variava & B.N. Agrawal

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6814 of 2001)
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6815 of 2001)

Variava, J.

1. Leave granted

2. Heard parties

3. These Appeals are against a Judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 23rd/24th April 2001. The question for consideration is whether in a criminal trial, evidence can be recorded by video conferencing. The High Court has held, on an interpretation of Section 273, Criminal Procedure Code, that it cannot be done. Criminal Appeal (arising out of SLP (Criminal) No 6814 of 2001) is filed by the State of Maharashtra. Criminal Appeal (arising out of SLP (Criminal) No 6815 of 2001) is filed by Mr. P. C. Singhi, who was the complainant. As the question of law is common in both these Appeals, they are being disposed of by this common Judgment. In this Judgment parties will be referred to in their capacity in the Criminal Appeal (arising out of SLP (Criminal) No 6814 of 2001). Mr. P. C. Singhi will be referred to as the complainant.

4. Briefly stated the facts are as follows:

The complainant's wife was suffering from terminal cancer. It is the case of the prosecution that the complainant's wife was examined by Dr. Ernest Greenberg of Sloan Kettering Memorial Hospital, New York, USA, who opined that she was inoperable and should be treated only with medication. Thereafter the complainant and his wife consulted the Respondent, who is a consulting surgeon practising for the last 40 years. In spite of being made aware of Dr Greenberg's opinion the Respondent suggested surgery to remove the uterus. It is the case of the prosecution that the complainant and his wife agreed to the operation on the condition that it would be performed by the Respondent. It is the case of the prosecution that on 22nd December 1987 one Dr. A. K. Mukherjee operated on the complainant's wife. It is the case of the prosecution that when the stomach was opened ascetic fluids oozed out of the abdomen. It is the case of the prosecution that Dr. A. K. Mukherjee contacted the Respondent who advised closing up the stomach. It is the case of the prosecution that Dr. A. K. Mukherjee accordingly closed the stomach and this resulted in intestinal fistula. It is the case of the prosecution that whenever the complainant's wife ate or drank the same would come out of the wound. It is the case of the prosecution that the complainant's wife required 20/25 dressings a day for more than 3 1/2 months in the hospital and thereafter till her death. It is the case of the prosecution that the complainant's wife suffered terrible physical torture and mental agony. It is the case of the prosecution that the Respondent did not once examine the complainant's wife after the operation. It is the case of the prosecution that the Respondent claimed that the complainant's wife was not his patient. It is the case of the prosecution that the bill sent by the Bombay Hospital belied the Respondent case that the complainant's wife was not his patient. The bill sent by the Bombay Hospital showed the fees charged by the Respondent. It is the case of the prosecution that the Maharashtra Medical Council has, in an inquiry, held the Respondent guilty of negligence and strictly warned him.

5. On a complaint by the complainant a case under Section 338 read with Sections 109 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code was registered against the Respondent and Dr. A. K. Mukherjee. Process was issued by the Metropolitan Magistrate, 23rd Court, Esplanade, Mumbai. The Respondent challenged the issue of process and carried the challenge right up to this Court. The Special Leave Petitions filed by the Respondent was dismissed by this Court on 8th July 1996. This Court directed the Respondent to face trial. We are told that evidence of six witnesses, including that of the complainant and the investigating officer, has been recorded.

6. On 29th June 1998 the prosecution made an application to examine Dr. Greenberg through video-conferencing. The trial court allowed that application on 16th August 1999. The Respondent challenged that order in the High Court. The High Court has by the impugned order allowed the Criminal Application filed by the Respondent. Hence these two Appeals.

7. At this stage it is appropriate to mention that Dr. Greenberg has expressed his willingness to give evidence, but has refused to come to India for that purpose. It is an admitted position that, in the Criminal Procedure Code there is no provision by which Dr. Greenberg can be compelled to come to India to give evidence. Before us a passing statement was made that the Respondent did not admit that the evidence of Dr. Greenberg was relevant or essential. However, on above-mentioned facts, it prima-facie appears to us that the evidence of Dr. Greenberg would be relevant and essential to the case of the prosecution.

8. Ms. Jaisingh, senior counsel argued for the State of Maharashtra. The complainant, except for pointing out a few facts, adopted her arguments. On behalf of the Respondent submissions were made by Senior Counsels Mr Sundaram and Mr Ashok Desai.

9. It was submitted on behalf of the Respondents, that the procedure governing a criminal trial is crucial to the basic right of the Accused under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. It was submitted that the procedure for trial of a criminal case is expressly laid down, in India, in the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was submitted that the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down specific and express provisions governing the procedure to be followed in a criminal trial. It was submitted that the procedure laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure was the "procedure established by law". It was submitted that the Legislature alone had the power to change the procedure by enacting a law amending it, and that when the procedure was so changed, that became "the procedure established by law". It was submitted that any departure from the procedure laid down by law would be contrary to Article 21. In support of this submission reliance was placed on the cases of A. K. Gopalan versus State of Madras reported in AIR 1950 S. C. 27, Nazir Ahmed versus Emperor reported in AIR 1936 Privy Council 253 and Siva Kumar Chadda versus Municipal Corporation of Delhi reported in AIR 1975 S.C. 915. There can be no dispute with these propositions. However if the existing provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code permit recording of evidence by video conferencing then it could not be said that "procedure established by law" has not been followed.

10. This Court was taken through various sections of the Criminal Procedure Code. Emphasis was laid on Section 273, Criminal Procedure Code. It was submitted that Section 273, Criminal Procedure Code does not provide for the taking of evidence by video conferencing. Emphasis was laid on the words "Except as otherwise provided" in Section 273 and it was submitted that unless there is an express provision to the contrary, the procedure laid down in Section 273 has to be followed as it is mandatory. It was submitted that Section 273 mandates that evidence "shall be taken in the presence of the accused". It is submitted that the only exceptions, which come within the ambit of the words "except as otherwise provided" are Sections 284 to 290 (those dealing with issue of Commissions); Section 295 (affidavit in proof of conduct of public servant) and Section 296 (evidence of formal character on affidavit). It is submitted that the term "presence" in Section 273 must be interpreted to mean physical presence in flesh and blood in open Court. It was submitted that the only instances in which evidence may be taken in the absence of the Accused, under the Criminal Procedure Code are Sections 317 (provision for inquiries and trial being held in the absence of accused in certain cases) and 299 (record of evidence in the absence of the accused). It was submitted that as Section 273 is mandatory, the Section is required to be interpreted strictly. It was submitted that Section 273 must be given its contemporary meaning (Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimm - The contemporaneous exposition is the best and the strongest in law). It was submitted that video conferencing was not known and did not exist when the Criminal Procedure Code was enacted/amended. It was submitted that presence on a screen and recording of evidence by video conferencing was not contemplated by the Parliament at the time of drafting/amending the Criminal Procedure Code. It was submitted that when the Legislature intended to permit video conferencing, it has expressly provided for it, as is evident from the Ordinance passed by the State of Andhra Pradesh in December 2000 permitting the use of video conferencing u/s 167(2) CrPC in remand applications. It is pointed out that a similar amendment is being considered in Maharashtra. It is submitted that Section 273 is analogous to the Confrontation Clause set out in the VIth Amendment to the US Constitution. It is submitted that Courts in USA have held that video conferencing does not satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.

11. This argument found favour with the High Court. The High Court has relied on judgments of various High Courts which have held that Section 273 is mandatory and that evidence must be recorded in the presence of the accused. To this extant no fault can be found with the Judgment of the High Court. The High Court has then considered what Courts in foreign countries, including Courts in USA, have done. The High Court then based its decision on the meaning of the term "presence" in various dictionaries and held that the term "presence" in Section 273 means actual physical presence in Court. We are unable to agree with this. We have to consider whether evidence can be led by way of video-conferencing on the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, what view has been taken by Courts in other countries is irrelevant. However, it may only be mentioned that the Supreme Court of USA, in the case of Maryland vs. Santra Aun Craig [497 US 836], has held that recording of evidence by video-conferencing was not a violation of the Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause).

12. Considering the question on the basis of Criminal Procedure Code, we are of the view that the High Court has failed to read Section 273 properly. One does not have to consider dictionary meanings when a plain reading of the provision brings out what was intended. Section 273 reads as follows:

"Section 273: Evidence to be taken in presence of accused. Except as otherwise expressly provided, all evidence taken in the course of the trial or other proceeding shall be taken in the presence of the accused, or, when his personal attendance is dispensed with, in the presence of his pleader.

Explanation : In this section, "accused" includes a person in relation to whom any proceeding under Chapter VIII has been commenced under this Code.

Thus Section 273 provides for dispensation from personal attendance. In such cases evidence can be recorded in the presence of the pleader. The presence of the pleader is thus deemed to be presence of the Accused. Thus Section 273 contemplates constructive presence. This shows that actual physical presence is not a must. This indicates that the term "presence", as used in this Section, is not used in the sense of actual physical presence. A plain reading of Section 273 does not support the restrictive meaning sought to be placed by the Respondent on the word "presence". One must also take note of the definition of the term 'Evidence' as defined in the Indian Evidence Act. Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act reads as follows:

"Evidence----Evidence means and includes------

(1) all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry;

such statements are called oral evidence

(2) all documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the Court;

such documents are called documentary evidence"

Thus evidence can be both oral and documentary and electronic records can be produced as evidence. This means that evidence, even in criminal matters, can also be by way of electronic records. This would include video- conferencing.

13. One needs to set out the approach which a Court must adopt in deciding such questions. It must be remembered that the first duty of the Court is to do justice. As has been held by this Court in the case of Sri Krishna Gobe versus State of Maharashtra [(1973) 4 SCC 23] Courts must endeavour to find the truth. It has been held that there would be failure of justice not only by an unjust conviction but also by acquittal of the guilty for unjustified failure to produce available evidence. Of course the rights of the Accused have to be kept in mind and safeguarded, but they should not be over emphasized to the extent of forgetting that the victims also have rights.

14. It must also be remembered that the Criminal Procedure Code is an ongoing statute. The principles of interpreting an ongoing statute have been very succinctly set out by the leading jurist Francis Bennion in his commentaries titled "Statutory Interpretation", 2nd Edition page 617:

"It is presumed the Parliament intends the Court to apply to an ongoing Act a construction that continuously updates its wordings to allow for changes since the Act was initially framed. While it remains law, it has to be treated as always speaking. This means that in its application on any day, the language of the Act though necessarily embedded in its own time, is nevertheless to be construed in accordance with the need to treat it as a current law.

..........

In construing an ongoing Act, the interpreter is to presume that Parliament intended the Act to be applied at any future time in such a way as to give effect to the original intention. Accordingly, the interpreter is to make allowances for any relevant changes that have occurred since the Act's passing, in law, in social conditions, technology, the meaning of words and other matters.. That today's construction involves the supposition that Parliament was catering long ago for a state of affairs that did not then exist is no argument against that construction. Parliament, in the wording of an enactment, is expected to anticipate temporal developments. The drafter will foresee the future and allow for it in the wording.

.

An enactment of former days is thus to be read today, in the light of dynamic processing received over the years, with such modification of the current meaning of its language as will now give effect to the original legislative intention. The reality and effect of dynamic processing provides the gradual adjustment. It is constituted by judicial interpretation, year in and year out. It also comprises processing by executive officials. "

15. At this stage the words of Justice Bhagwati in the case of National Textile Workers' Union v. P.R. Ramakrishnan, (1983) 1 SCC 228, at page 256, need to be set out. They are:

"We cannot allow the dead hand of the past to stifle the growth of the living present. Law cannot stand still; it must change with the changing social concepts and values. If the bark that protects the tree fails to grow and expand along with the tree, it will either choke the tree or if it is a living tree, it will shed that bark and grow a new living bark for itself. Similarly, if the law fails to respond to the needs of changing society, then either it will stifle the growth of the society and choke its progress or if the society is vigorous enough, it will cast away the law which stands in the way of its growth. Law must therefore constantly be on the move adapting itself to the fast changing society and not lag behind."

16. This Court has approved the principle of updating construction, as enunciated by Francis Bennion, in a number of decisions. These principles were quoted with approval in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay versus M/s Podar Cement Pvt. Ltd. [(1997) 5 SCC 482]. They were also cited with approval in the case of State versus S. J. Chowdhury [(1996) 2 SCC 428]. In this case it was held that the Evidence Act was an ongoing Act and the word "handwriting" in Section 45 of that Act was construed to include "typewriting". These principles were also applied in the case of SIL Import USA versus Exim Aides Silk Exporters [(1999) 4 SCC 567]. In this case the words "notice in writing", in Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, were construed to include a notice by fax. On the same principle Courts have interpreted, over a period of time, various terms and phrases. To take only a few examples:- "stage carriage" has been interpreted to include "electric tramcar"; "steam tricycle" to include "locomotive"; "telegraph" to include "telephone"; "bankers books" to include "microfilm"; "to take note" to include "use of tape recorder"; "documents" to include "computer database's".

17. These principles have also been applied by this Court whilst considering an analogous provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. In the case of Basavaraj R. Patil v. State of Karnataka [(2000) 8 SCC 740] the question was whether an Accused needs to be physically present in Court to answer the questions put to him by Court whilst recording his statement under Section 313. To be remembered that under Section 313 the words are "for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to explain" (emphasis supplied). The term "personally" if given a strict and restrictive interpretation would mean that the Accused had to be physically present in Court. In fact the minority Judgment in this case so holds. It has however been held by the majority that the Section had to be considered in the light of the revolutionary changes in technology of communication and transmission and the marked improvement in facilities for legal aid in the country. It was held, by the majority, that it was not necessary that in all cases the Accused must answer by personally remaining present in Court.

18. Thus the law is well settled. The doctrine "Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimm" has no application when interpreting a provision of an on-going statute/act like the Criminal Procedure Code.

19. At this stage we must deal with a submission made by Mr Sundaram. It was submitted that video-conferencing could not be allowed as the rights of an accused, under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, cannot be subjected to a procedure involving "virtual reality". Such an argument displays ignorance of the concept of virtual reality and also of video conferencing. Virtual reality is a state where one is made to feel, hear or imagine what does not really exists. In virtual reality one can be made to feel cold when one is sitting in a hot room, one can be made to hear the sound of ocean when one is sitting in the mountains, one can be made to imagine that he is taking part in a Grand Prix race whilst one is relaxing on one sofa etc. Video conferencing has nothing to do with virtual reality. Advances in science and technology have now, so to say, shrunk the world. They now enable one to see and hear events, taking place far away, as they are actually taking place. To take an example today one does not need to go to South Africa to watch World Cup matches. One can watch the game, live as it is going on, on one's TV. If a person is sitting in the stadium and watching the match, the match is being played in his sight/presence and he/she is in the presence of the players. When a person is sitting in his drawing-room and watching the match on TV, it cannot be said that he is in presence of the players but at the same time, in a broad sense, it can be said that the match is being played in his presence. Both, the person sitting in the stadium and the person in the drawing-room, are watching what is actually happening as it is happening. This is not virtual reality, it is actual reality. One is actually seeing and hearing what is happening. Video conferencing is an advancement in science and technology which permits one to see, hear and talk with someone far away, with the same facility and ease as if he is present before you i.e. in your presence. In fact he/she is present before you on a screen. Except for touching, one can see, hear and observe as if the party is in the same room. In video conferencing both parties are in presence of each other. The submissions of Respondents counsel are akin to an argument that a person seeing through binoculars or telescope is not actually seeing what is happening. It is akin to submitting that a person seen through binoculars or telescope is not in the "presence" of the person observing. Thus it is clear that so long as the Accused and/or his pleader are present when evidence is recorded by video conferencing that evidence is being recorded in the "presence" of the accused and would thus fully meet the requirements of Section 273, Criminal Procedure Code. Recording of such evidence would be as per "procedure established by law".

Recording of evidence by video conferencing also satisfies the object of providing, in Section 273, that evidence be recorded in the presence of the Accused. The Accused and his pleader can see the witness as clearly as if the witness was actually sitting before them. In fact the Accused may be able to see the witness better than he may have been able to if he was sitting in the dock in a crowded Court room. They can observe his or her demeanour. In fact the facility to play back would enable better observation of demeanour. They can hear and rehear the deposition of the witness. The Accused would be able to instruct his pleader immediately and thus cross- examination of the witness is as effective, if not better. The facility of play back would give an added advantage whilst cross-examining the witness. The witness can be confronted with documents or other material or statement in the same manner as if he/she was in Court. All these objects would be fully met when evidence is recorded by video conferencing. Thus no prejudice, of whatsoever nature, is caused to the Accused. Of course, as set out hereinafter, evidence by video conferencing has to be on some conditions.

Reliance was then placed on Ss. 274 and 275 of CrPC which require that evidence be taken down in writing by the Magistrate himself or by his dictation in open Court. It was submitted that video conferencing would have to take place in the studio of VSNL. It was submitted that that this would violate the right of the Accused to have the evidence recorded by the Magistrate or under his dictation in open Court. The advancement of science and technology is such that now it is possible to set up video conferencing equipment in the Court itself. In that case evidence would be recorded by the Magistrate or under his dictation in open Court. If that is done then the requirements of these Sections would be fully met. To this method there is however a draw back. As the witness is now in Court there may be difficulties if he commits contempt of Court or perjures himself and it is immediately noticed that he has perjured himself. Therefore as a matter of prudence evidence by video-conferencing in open Court should be only if the witness is in a country which has an extradition treaty with India and under whose laws contempt of Court and perjury are also punishable.

20. However even if the equipment cannot be set up in Court the CrPC contains provisions for examination of witnesses on commissions. Sections 284 to 289 deal with examination of witnesses on commissions. For our purposes Sections 284 and 285 are relevant. They read as under:

"284 WHEN ATTENDANCE OF WITNESS MAY BE DISPENSED

WITH AND COMMISSION ISSUED.

(1) Whenever, in the course of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, it appears to a Court or Magistrate that the examination of a witness is necessary for the ends of justice, and that the attendance of such witness cannot he procured without an amount of delay, expense or inconvenience which, under the circumstances of the case, would be unreasonable, the Court or Magistrate may dispense with such attendance and may issue a commission for the examination of the witness in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter : Provided that where the examination of the President or the Vice-President of India or the Governor of a State or the Administrator of a Union Territory as a witness is necessary for the ends of justice, a commission shall be issued for the examination of such a witness.

(2) The Court may, when issuing a commission for the examination of a witness for the prosecution, direct that such amount as the Court considers reasonable to meet the expenses of the accused, including the pleader's fees, be paid by the prosecution.

285 COMMISSION TO WHOM TO BE ISSUED.

(1) If the witness is within the territories to which this Code extends, the commission shall be directed to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or Chief Judicial Magistrate, as the case may be, within whose local jurisdiction the witness is to, be found.

(2) If the witness is in India, but in a State or an area to which this Code does not extend, the commission shall be directed to such Court or officer as the Central Government may, by notification, specify in this behalf.

(3) If the witness is in a country or place outside India and arrangements have been made by the Central Government with the Government of such country or place for taking the evidence of witnesses in relation to criminal matters, the commission shall be issued in such form, directed to such Court or officer, and sent to such authority for transmission, as the Central Government may, by notification, prescribe in this behalf. "

Thus in cases where the witness is necessary for the ends of justice and the attendance of such witness cannot be procured without an amount of delay, expense or inconvenience which, under the circumstances of the case would be unreasonable, the Court may dispense with such attendance and issue a commission for examination of the witness. As indicated earlier Dr. Greenberg has refused to come to India to give evidence. His evidence appears to be necessary for the ends of Justice. Courts in India cannot procure his attendance. Even otherwise to procure attendance of a witness from a far of country like USA would generally involve delay, expense and/or inconvenience. In such cases commissions could be issued for recording evidence. Normally a commission would involve recording evidence at the place where the witness is. However advancement in science and technology has now made it possible to record such evidence by way of video conferencing in the town/city where the Court is. Thus in cases where the attendance of a witness cannot be procured without an amount of delay, expense or inconvenience the Court could consider issuing a commission to record the evidence by way of video conferencing.

21. It was however submitted that India has no arrangement with the Government of United States of America and therefore commission cannot be issued for recording evidence of a witness who is in USA. Reliance was placed on the case of Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 3 SCC 793]. In this case a commission was issued for examination of witnesses in Germany. The time for recording evidence on commission had expired. An application for extension of time was made. It was then noticed that India did not have any arrangement with Germany for recording evidence on commission. At page 798 this Court observed as follows:

"25. The provisions contained in Sections 504 and 508-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure contain complimentary provisions for reciprocal arrangements between the Government of our country and the Government of a foreign country for

Commission from Courts in India to specified courts in the foreign country for examination of witnesses in the foreign country and similarly for Commissions from specified courts in the foreign country for examination of witnesses residing in our country. Notifications Nos. SRO 2161, SRO 2162, SRO 2163 and SRO 2164 all, dated November 18, 1953, published in the Gazette of India Part II, Section 3 on November 28, 1953, illustrate the reciprocal arrangements between the Government of India and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Canada for examination of witnesses in the United Kingdom, Canada and the examination of witnesses residing in India.

26. In the present case, no notification under Section 508-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been published specifying the courts in the Federal Republic of West Germany by whom commissions for examination of witnesses residing in India may be issued. The notification, dated September 9, 1969, in the present case under Section 504 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not based upon any existing complete arrangement between the Government of India and the Government of the Federal Republic of West Germany for examination of

witnesses residing in West Germany. The notification, dated September 9, 1969, is ineffective for two reasons. First, there is no reciprocal arrangement between the Government of India and the Government of the Federal Republic of West Germany as contemplated in Sections 504 and 508-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Secondly, the notification under Section 504 is nullified and repelled by the affidavit evidence adduced on behalf of the State that no agreement between the two countries has yet been made.

27. In the present case, extension of time was granted in the past to enable the State for examination of witnesses in West Germany and return of the commission to this country. The State could not obtain the return of the commission. Now, a question has arisen as to whether any extension of time should be made when it appears that reciprocal arrangements within the contemplation of Sections 504 and 508-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not made. The courts do not make orders in vain. When this Court finds that there are no arrangements in existence within the meaning of Sections 504 and 508-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure this Court is not inclined to make any order."

This authority, which is of a Constitution Bench of this Court, does suggest that no commission can be issued if there is no arrangement between the Government of India and the country where the commission is proposed to be issued. This authority would have been binding on this Court if the facts were identical. Ms. Jaising had submitted that notwithstanding this authority a difference would have to be drawn in cases where a witness was not willing to give evidence and in cases where the witness was willing to give evidence. She submitted that in the second class of cases commissions could be issued for recording evidence even in a country where there is no arrangement between the Government of India and that country.

22. In this case we are not required to consider this aspect and therefore express no opinion thereon. The question whether commission can be issued for recording evidence in a country where there is no arrangement, is academic so far as this case is concerned. In this case we are considering whether evidence can be recorded by video-conferencing. Normally when a Commission is issued, the recording would have to be at the place where the witness is. Thus Section 285 provides to whom the Commission is to be directed. If the witness is outside India, arrangements are required between India and that country because the services of an official of the country (mostly a Judicial Officer) would be required to record the evidence and to ensure/compel attendance. However new advancement of science and technology permit officials of the Court, in the city where video conferencing is to take place, to record the evidence. Thus where a witness is willing to give evidence an official of the Court can be deported to record evidence on commission by way of video-conferencing. The evidence will be recorded in the studio/hall where the video-conferencing takes place. The Court in Mumbai would be issuing commission to record evidence by video conferencing in Mumbai. Therefore the commission would be addressed to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai who would depute a responsible officer (preferably a Judicial Officer) to proceed to the office of VSNL and record the evidence of Dr. Greenberg in the presence of the Respondent. The officer shall ensure that the Respondent and his counsel are present when the evidence is recorded and that they are able to observe the demeanour and hear the deposition of Dr. Greenberg. The officers shall also ensure that the Respondent has full opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Greenberg. It must be clarified that adopting such a procedure may not be possible if the witness is out of India and not willing to give evidence.

23. It was then submitted that there would be practical difficulties in recording evidence by video conferencing. It was submitted that there is a time difference between India and USA. It was submitted that a question would arise as to how and who would administer the oath to Dr. Greenberg. It was submitted that there could be a video image/audio interruptions/distortions which might make the transmission inaudible/indecipherable. It was submitted that there would be no way of ensuring that the witnesses is not being coached/tutored/prompted whilst evidence was being recorded. It is submitted that the witness sitting in USA would not be subject to any control of the Court in India. It is submitted that the witness may commit perjury with impunity and also insult the Court without fear of punishment since he is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court. It is submitted that the witness may not remain present and may also refuse to answer questions. It is submitted that commercial studios place restrictions on the number of people who can remain present and may restrict the volume of papers that may be brought into the studio. It was submitted that it would be difficult to place textbooks and other materials to the witness for the purpose of cross-examining him. Lastly, it was submitted that the cost of video conferencing, if at all permitted, must be borne by the State.

24. To be remembered that what is being considered is recording evidence on commission. Fixing of time for recording evidence on commission is always the duty of the officer who has been deputed to so record evidence. Thus the officer recording the evidence would have the discretion to fix up the time in consultation with VSNL, who are experts in the field and who , will know which is the most convenient time for video conferencing with a person in USA. The Respondent and his counsel will have to make it convenient to attend at the time fixed by the concerned officer. If they do not remain present the Magistrate will take action, as provided in law, to compel attendance. We do not have the slightest doubt that the officer who will be deputed would be one who has authority to administer oaths. That officer will administer the oath. By now science and technology has progressed enough to not worry about a video image/audio interruptions/distortions. Even if there are interruptions they would be of temporary duration. Undoubtedly an officer would have to be deputed, either from India or from the Consulate/Embassy in the country where the evidence is being recorded who would remain present when the evidence is being recorded and who will ensure that there is no other person in the room where the witness is sitting whilst the evidence is being recorded. That officer will ensure that the witness is not coached/tutored/prompted. It would be advisable, though not necessary, that the witness be asked to give evidence in a room in the Consulate/Embassy. As the evidence is being recorded on commission that evidence will subsequently be read into Court. Thus no question arises of the witness insulting the Court. If on reading the evidence the Court finds that the witness has perjured himself, just like in any other evidence on commission, the Court will ignore or disbelieve the evidence. It must be remembered that there have been cases where evidence is recorded on commission and by the time it is read in Court the witness has left the country. There also have been cases where foreign witness has given evidence in a Court in India and that then gone away abroad. In all such cases Court would not have been able to take any action in perjury as by the time the evidence was considered, and it was ascertained that there was perjury, the witness was out of the jurisdiction of the Court. Even in those cases the Court could only ignore or disbelieve the evidence. The officer deputed will ensure that the Respondent, his counsel and one assistant are allowed in the studio when the evidence is being recorded. The officer will also ensure that the Respondent is not prevented from bringing into the studio the papers/documents which may be required by him or his counsel. We see no substance in this submission that it would be difficult to put documents or written material to the witness in cross-examination. It is now possible, to show to a party, with whom video conferencing is taking place, any amount of written material. The concerned officer will ensure that once video conferencing commences, as far as possible, it is proceeded with without any adjournments. Further if it is found that Dr Greenberg is not attending at the time/s fixed, without any sufficient cause, then it would be open for the Magistrate to disallow recording of evidence by video conferencing. If the officer finds that Dr. Greenberg is not answering questions, the officer will make a memo of the same. Finally when the evidence is read in Court, this is an aspect which will be taken into consideration for testing the veracity of the evidence. Undoubtedly the costs of video conferencing would have to be borne by the State.

25. Accordingly the impugned judgment is set aside. The Magistrate will now proceed to have the evidence of Dr. Greenberg recorded by way of video conferencing. As the trial has been pending for a long time the trial court is requested to dispose off the case as early as possible and in any case within one year from today. With these directions the Appeals stand disposed of. The Respondent shall pay to the State and the complainant the costs of these Appeals.

Thursday, March 13, 2014

Spouse Salary to disclose to another Spouse

                                    CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION
        (RoomNo.315, B-Wing, AugustKrantiBhawn, BhikajiCamaPlace, New Delhi-66)

                                            File No.CIC/AD/A/2012/003341-SA
                             
                                   (Jyoti Seherawat Vs. Home (General) Dept., GNCTD)

Appellant :                 Ms.Jyoti Seherawat
Respondent :              Home (General) Department
Date of hearing :         7.1.2014
Date of decision :       7.1.2014

Information Commissioner : Prof. M. Sridhar Acharyulu
                                                                 (Madabhushi Sridhar)

Referred Sections : Sec.4(1)(b)(x), 8(1)(j) and 11(1) of the RTI Act.

Result : Appeal allowed

Headnote
i) Information about the salary of an employee of a public authority is not third party information. Such information has to be voluntarily disclosed u/s 4(1)(b)(x) of the RTI Act.
ii) Every spouse has a right to information about the particulars of salary of other spouse especially for the purpose of maintenance. More so, wife has a right to know the salary particulars of the husband, who is an employee of the public authority.

FACTS
Heard today dated 7.1.14. Appellant not present. The Public Authority is represented by Shri Anil Agrawal, Supdt. Home (General) Department and Shri Sunil Kumar, Law Officer.

2. The Appellant filed an RTI application dt.2.6.12 with the CPIO, Home General Department, GNCTD seeking the following information with regard to her husband Shri Sudhir Singh Seherawat:

Salary slip for the month of May 2012 including all allowances like TA, DA and HRA.

On not receiving any response, the Appellant filed an appeal dt.11.9.12 with the Appellate Authority. The CPIO replied to the RTI application vide letter dated 18.6.12 stating as follows:

It is informed that information can not be supplied as Shri Sudhir Singh, Warder 642 has given in writing to this department that any information regarding him will not be supplied.

The CPIO’s reply dt.18.6.12 was dispatched to the Appellant on 20.9.12 and received by the Appellant on 23.9.12.

The Appellate Authority disposed of the appeal vide his order dt.26.9.12 upholding the decision of the PIO.

Being aggrieved with the reply, the Applicant filed a second appeal dt.5.10.12 before CIC.

3. During the hearing, the Respondent submitted that information was denied since the third party has objected to its disclosure. He, however, admitted that same does not belong to third party and agreed to disclose the same.

4. The Commission in various cases has directed the Public Authority to disclose the salary particulars of its employees to the information seeker irrespective of whether the information seeker is related to the employee or not. Earlier too, CIC has directed public authorities to disclose salary particulars of husband to the wife. For instance, in Ritu Sharma v NTPC No. 1016/IC/(A)/2007 dated 11th July 2007, Prof MM Ansari held that denial of salary information about husband by public authority invoking Section 8(1)(j) was not enable. Under the RTI Act, the public authorities have the obligation to disclose the monthly emoluments paid to their employees. U/s 4(1)(b)(x) of the Act, “the monthly remuneration received by each of its officers and employees, including the system of compensation as provided in its regulations” should be published. A similar order is given by Mrs Sushma Singh (present Chief Information Commissioner) in Smt Rita Aeri v Air India in CIC/SS/A/2010/001145 dated 21.3.2011. In Lakshmi Ramesh Sawekar v Dept of Posts, No.CIC/LS/A/2011/00276, Mr M L Sharma, IC held on 23rd January 2012 that a legally wedded wife is entitled to information about the salary of her husband.

5. The respondent Home Department in this case denied the salary information of the husband, it’s employee to his wife. At two stages of RTI, the PIO and Appellate Authority simply considered the salary information as third party; same was also contended by the Law Officer before the Commission.

6. In spite of specific decisions and directions by the CIC, the PIOs and AAs are repeatedly denying the salary particulars to the wife contending that this information belonged to third party, or being a personal information that could be refused under Section 8(1)(j) etc. The PIOs and AAs are disposing of the petitions in a routine manner like general office file, without applying the reasons and their orders of rejection also disclose no reasons. This also explain the lack of understanding and training on the issues pertaining to access law and various judgments rendered on the subject among the designated officers of Public Authorities.

7. Hence this question needs specific explanation for the better understanding of rights and duties and implementation of RTI with reference to this aspect.

a) The salary paid to the public servant by the public authority is sourced from the tax paid by the people in general. The scale of salary is also fixed by the Public Authority based on certain reasonable fixation in an open exercise by Pay Revision Commissions which later would be generally approved by the Government, which is the representative of the people. Thus the information belongs to public and they have a right to access to it as per RTI Act. It has to be disclosed under Section 4 voluntarily by the Public Authority and if a member of public seeks it, it cannot be denied.

b) The information about salary of employee/officer of the same Public Authority cannot be considered as ‘third party information’. The employee of the public authority is part of that public authority and hence he is not the third party. Hence there is no need to obtain the consent of the particular employee for disclosure of that information as provided under the RTI Act, unless it falls under any exception. It may be recalled that even in case of third party information, if the Commission considers the public interest demands, such information can be given in spite of refusal by the third party. Public Authorities cannot reject such RTI applications about salary under the pretext of third party information.

c) Based on above two reasons, every member of general public is entitled to know the salary of the employee of public authority. The wife of that particular employee is also entitled to know it as a member of general public. Hence irrespective of her marital status, she has every right to know the particulars of public servant’s salary.

d) As per the provisions of various personal laws applicable to people of different religions, the husband as an earning member of family has a legal duty to maintain the wife and children. It is an undisputed fact that the dependents such as wives and children can seek a direction from the Courts of Justice. Even after the divorce, the family law ordains that Husband has a duty to provide for necessary maintenance of the wife and children. Section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code mandated that husband has a general duty to maintain wife and children. The wife’s entitlement to know the salary particulars of her husband gets further fortified by all the above legal provisions.

e) Especially when the wife is seeking the salary particulars of the Husband, from the public authority where he is working as public servant, it is the duty of the public authority to render required assistance by providing necessary information to her to secure justice. Denial of such information to wife is thus, highly unreasonable, not justified and it will also amount to breach of legal obligation.

f) The maintenance of spouse and children of the family is the legal responsibility of the earning member of the family. Depending upon the situation a husband if dependent or incapable of earning might seek similar information about the salary of the wife, if she is an employee of the public authority.

g) In most of the cases, the denial of information about salary might amount to denial of justice with mala fide intentions either to harass the spouse or delay the process of justice or to avoid payment of money necessary for maintenance through giving wrong information or denying correct information to the court of law. The public authority or its PIO or AA, cannot, inadvertently be a party to this mala fide denial of justice to the spouse.

h) In addition to above, under Section 20, Right to Information Act 2005, such a denial of information will be wrongful denial which could incur the penalty.

8. In view of the above, Commission directs the PIO to supply the salary slip as sought by the Appellant within one week of receipt of this order.
                                                                                         (M. Sridhar Acharyulu)
                                                                                        Information Commissioner
Authenticated true copy
(Tarun Kumar)

Additional Registrar
Address of parties
1. The CPIO
Home (General) Department
Govt. of NCT of Delhi
5th level, A Wing, Delhi Secretariat
I.P.Estate, New Delhi

2. Ms.Jyothi Seherawat
W/o Shri Sudhir Singh Sehrawat
H.No.62, Madangir Village
New Delhi 110 017

Sunday, August 18, 2013

High Courts do not have jurisdiction over conusmer cases

                                                                                                    REPORTABLE

                                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                                           S.L.P.(C) No.24228-24229 of 2012
                                              (CC Nos. 12891-12892 of 2012)

Cicily Kallarackal        …Petitioner

Versus

Vehicle Factory …Respondent

O R D E R
1. These special leave petitions have been filed against the impugned judgments and orders dated 16.9.2008 in Writ Appeal No. 2518 of 2007 and 17.12.2009 in Review Petition No. 380 of 2009. In order to decide the controversy it is not necessary to make the reference to the factual controversy involved herein.
The basic issue has been raised in the petitions that the Kerala High Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition against the judgment and order passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter called ‘the Commission’). The said order could be challenged only before this Court in view of the provisions of National Consumer Protection Act, 1986, thus, the order passed by the High Court impugned herein is a nullity for want of jurisdiction.

2. So far as the issue of jurisdiction is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioner is right that the High Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter against the order of the Commission. However, while dealing with a similar issue this Court in Mohammad Swalleh & Ors. v. IIIrd All. District Judge, Meerut & Anr., AIR 1988 SC 94, observed:
“7. It was contended before the High Court that no appeal lay from the decision of the Prescribed Authority to the District Judge. The High Court accepted this contention. (sic no appeal lay)… On that ground the High Court declined to interfere with the order of the learned District Judge. It is true that there has been some technical breach because if there is no appeal maintainable before the learned District Judge, in the appeal before the learned District Judge, the same could not be set aside. But the High Court was exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The High Court had come to the conclusion that the order of the Prescribed Authority was invalid and improper. The High Court itself could have set it aside. Therefore in the facts and circumstances of the case justice has been done though, as mentioned hereinbefore, technically the appellant had a point that the order of the District Judge was illegal and improper. If we reiterate the order of the High Court as it is setting aside the order of the Prescribed Authority in exercise of the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution then no exception can be taken. As mentioned hereinbefore, justice has been done and as the improper order of the Prescribed Authority has been set aside, no objection can be taken.” (Emphasis added)

In view of the above, it is not always necessary to set aside an order if found to have been passed by an authority/court having no jurisdiction. Despite this, we cannot help but to state in absolute terms that it is not appropriate for the High Courts to entertain writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the orders passed by the Commission, as a statutory appeal is provided and lies to this Court under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Once the legislature has provided for a statutory appeal to a higher court, it cannot be proper exercise of jurisdiction to permit the parties to bypass the statutory appeal to such higher court and entertain petitions in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Even in the present case, the High Court has not exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with law. The case is one of improper exercise of jurisdiction. It is not expected of us to deal with this issue at any greater length as we are dismissing this petition on other grounds.

3. So far as these petitions are concerned, there is an inordinate unexplained delay of 1314 days in filing the petition against the order dated 16.9.2008 and of 851 days against the order dated 17.12.2009. Cause shown for not approaching this Court within limitation is stated that petitioner was not physically fit and for some days remained in  hospital. The cause shown is not  ufficient as it was not necessary for the petitioner to come here personally.

4. This Court in Anshulal Aggarwal v. NOIDA, (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has explained the scope of condonation of delay in a matter where the special courts/tribunals have been  constituted in order to provide expeditious remedies to the person aggrieved and Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is one of them. Therefore, this Court held that while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in such cases the court must keep in mind the special period of limitation prescribed under the statute (s).

5. In the instant case, condoning such an inordinate delay without any sufficient cause would amount to substituting the period of limitation by this Court in place of the period prescribed by the legislature for filing the special leave petition. Therefore, we do not see any cogent reason to condone the delay.

6. Hence, in the facts and circumstance of the case as explained hereinabove, we are not inclined to entertain these petitions. The same are dismissed on the ground of delay.

7. While declining to interfere in the present Special Leave Petition preferred against the order passed by the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, we hereby make it clear that the order of the Commission are incapable of being questioned under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, as a statutory appeal in terms of Section 27 A(1)(c) lies to this Court. Therefore, we have no hesitation in issuing a direction of caution that it will not be proper exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts to entertain writ petitions against such orders of the Commission.
A copy of this order may be sent to the Registrar General of all the High Courts, for bringing the same to the notice of Hon'ble the Chief Justices and Hon'ble Judges of the respective High Courts.


………..……………………….J.
(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

……….………………………..J.
(SWATANTER KUMAR)

New Delhi,
August 6, 2012

Thursday, June 27, 2013

administrative difficulties & short of human resources cannot be reason for denying information


                                                            Madras High Court
                                        W.P.NO.20372 of 2009 and M.P.NO.1 OF 2009
                                                           DATED : 07.01.2010

CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.CHANDRU

Public Information Officer/ Dy Commr of
Archives and Historical Research,
Tamil Nadu Archives, Egmore, Chennai-8. .. Petitioner

Vs.

1.State Chief Information Commissioner, TNIC,
Kamadhenu Super Market 1st Floor, Teynampet, Chennai-18.

2.-do-

3.S.Thanuskodi, M.D.
Kandamanur Zameen Wealth Developer, Madurai-625 014. .. Respondents

This writ petition has been preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari to call for the records pertaining to the order dated 4.5.2009 passed by the first respondent in Case No.2242/Enquiry/2009 and to quash the same.

For Petitioner:                Mr.R.Neelakandan, GA
For Respondents:           Mr.G.Rajagopal, SC for
M/s.G.R.Associates for  R1

                                                                              - - - -

ORDER
Heard both sides.

2.The petitioner is the Deputy Commissioner of Archives and Historical Research of Tamil Nadu Archives, Chennai. They have filed the writ petition seeking to challenge the order, dated 29.4.2009 issued by the first respondent.

3.It is seen that the third respondent claiming to be a Managing Partner of a Real Estate firm, asking for certain information from the office of the petitioner, relating to old maps, settlement records and title deeds and also the details of court of wards. On receipt of the requisition from the third respondent, the petitioner informed the Central Land Survey Office, Chepauk that they should send two staff for one month period to take over the records from the Archives. They have also stated that they should provide the District, Taluk and village numbers and a complete records, for which records are required. A copy of the letter, dated 31.10.2008 was also marked to the third respondent. Further, a letter was also sent to the Land Reforms Department, Chepauk with reference to providing settlement records, title deeds and court of wards index. They have sought for permission from the department to provide such information.

4.The Commission, after notice to the petitioner Archives and also to the Central Survey Office, held that Archives cannot refuse to furnish any information unless it is covered by Sections 8 and 9 of the Right to Information Act.

5.In the present case, the claim of the petitioner Archives was that they are only the custodian of records in terms of the Madras Secretariat Office Manual as well as Archieval Policy Resolution adopted by the State Government and approved by G.O.Ms.No.1, Education (W1) Department, dated 2.1.1990 and hence they are not bound to provide any information to any one. The policy resolution adopted by the State in paragraph No.xvii reads as follows: "(xvii)All non-confidential public records, over 30 years old transferred to the State Archives will be open to bonafide Research Scholars, subject to such exceptions and restrictions as may be found necessary by the Departments concerned in consultation with the Commissioner of Tamil Nadu Archives and Historical Research."

6.However, as rightly overruled by the first respondent, Section 22 of the RTI Act has an overriding effect. Section 22 reads as follows: "22.Act to have overriding effect.-The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (19 of 1923), and any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act."

7.Therefore, the petitioner cannot contend that the documents cannot be furnished without the concerned department's consent. To obviate this difficulty, the Commission in the impugned order had stated that in order to ascertain the concerned department's objection, the petitioner Archives must notify to those department. Such department in case of any objection should submit their objection within 10 days in the normal circumstances. However, in case of documents which are more than 20 years old, since Section 8(3) itself de-classifies those documents, there is no difficulty for the Archives to provide those documents even without consulting the concerned department.

8.Section 8(3) reads as follows:

"8(3)Subject to the provisions of clauses (a),(c) and (i) of sub-section (1), any information relating to any occurrence, event or matter which has taken place, occurred or happened twenty years before the date on which any request is made under section 6 shall be provided to any person making a request under that section: Provided that where any question arises as to the date from which the said period of twenty years has to be computed, the decision of the Central Government shall be final, subject to the usual appeals provided for in this Act."

9.It is this impugned order, the petitioner has chosen to challenge in the writ petition. The writ petition was admitted on 08.10.2009 and an interim stay was granted.

10.The contention raised by the petitioner was that the petitioner archives is not the owner of the documents. The archives is a very small department and cannot handle if such requests are made to them as they are maintaining approximately 65 lakhs records. They also placed reliance upon Section 6(3) of the RTI Act, wherein a transfer of request of any applicant to the concerned department can be made. It was also stated that they cannot act as a public information officer for over 45 departments of the Government. Only the parent department will know the details of the documents sought for.

11.Since the Commission under Section 8 is entitled to overrule any objection if larger public interest warrants disclosure of such information, the question of taking umbrage under the exemption clause will not arise. Any objection will have to be raised before the Commission by the Department of Archives or on notice by the archives the concerned department. Even then, the Commission can decide disclosure of such information was required in public interest. The Commission has clearly stated that the so-called owner of the document can only be like a third party and subject to provisions of Section 11 of the RTI Act and that they can forward the objections made by the concerned department.

12.In so far as documents which are more than 20 years old, Section 8(3) itself declassifies those documents. The petitioner Tamil Nadu Archives is a "public authority" within a meaning of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act. Since they are empowered to retain records, subject to provisions of Sections 8 and 11, they cannot object to the disclosure of such information. Further, the Commission has safeguarded the interests of the concerned departments as they will be put on notice by the Archives about their objection in terms of law.

13.The other objections that they are maintaining a large number of documents in respect of 45 departments and they are short of human resources cannot be raised to whittle down the citizens' right to seek information. It is for them to write to the Government to provide for additional staff depending upon the volume of requests that may be forthcoming pursuant to the RTI Act. It is purely an internal matter between the petitioner archives and the State Government. The right to information having been guaranteed by the law of Parliament, the administrative difficulties in providing information cannot be raised. Such pleas will defeat the very right of citizens to have access to information. Hence the objections raised by the petitioner cannot be countenanced by this court. The writ petition lacks in merit.

14.In the result, the writ petition will stand dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected MP also stands dismissed.

vvk

To

1.State Chief Information Commissioner, TNIC
Kamadhenu Super Market 1st Floor, Teynampet, Chennai-18.

2. -do-

Wednesday, June 26, 2013

Information from non-Public Authority can be obtained directly u/s 2(J) & 2(F)

                                    CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION
                                 Complaint No.CIC/WB/C/2006/00302 dated 27.12’07
                                    Right to Information Act 2005 – Section 18


Appellant:     Shri Jarnail Singh,
Respondent: Registrar, Coop. Societies, GNCT, Delhi.

Facts
By an application of 10-11-2006 Shri Jarnail Singh of Pitampura, New Delhi applied to the Registrar of Cooperative Societies (RCS) as follows:
“As per the DDA order No. F-23(23)81/Bldg. Dy. 6616 dated 9.3.92, sealing and demolition orders 4 March, 1992 by Director P.C. Jain, DDA Bldg. For LIG 24 stilt flats in parking zone of MIG-II. Please
provide me action taken report for inspection.”

In his response of 8-12-2006 Shri G.K. Singh, Asstt. Registrar (NW) SPIO has sent the following response:
“Shri Jarnail Singh applicant requested action taken report in reference DDA order No.23(23)81/Bldg Dy. No. 616 dated 9.3.92 in respect of Sealing & demolition order issued by Director P.C.Jain, DDA Building for LIG 2 stilt flats in parking zone of MIG-II. This letter is not available on the file. However, correspondence made in the file in respect of demolition unauthorized construction. The same can be inspected and obtained the copy of the same. Copy can be obtained from the Asstt. Registrar DRI/RTI after
depositing the requisite fees. However, the applicant can inspect the file as desired by him.”

Not satisfied with this response appellant Shri Jarnail Singh made his first
appeal before Addl. Registrar on 18-12-2006 wherein he specified that action
taken copy may be obtained from the Ghalib Memorial C.G.H.S. Pitampura, Delhi
office.

In his second appeal before us dated 22-12-06 Shri Jarnail Singh refers to first appeal before Addl. Registrar dated 14-12-06 at 3.00 p.m. attended by his daughter Ms. Gursharan Kaur to which he had not received a reply. His request, therefore, was as follows:
“Now my request is for justice as per my membership HIG flat in the approved list of members RCS & DDA. Society did not give G.F. flats on medical grounds please. According to DUAC Ground floor
is on the stilts. All blocks were to be constructed on stilts. Culprits allotted me illegal construction in Parking Zone, when the M.C., RCS, DDA allotted flats to non-members against the resigned members using their original membership numbers unlawfully. Under the above circumstances, you are requested to help me for
getting justice i.e. HIG flat which I had booked on becoming member while I am without proper flat after 30 years membership. They had allotted me illegal construction with the cheating intention. Concerned authorities all hidden information about wrong allotment and never took action on my representations. Matter with RCS.”

In response to the appeal notice Asstt. Registrar in his letter of 2.4.’07 had stated as follows:
“In this connection Shri Jarnail Singh was intimated that the letter is not available in the file. However, some correspondence made in the file in respect of demolition of unauthorized construction is available which can be inspected by the applicant. The applicant was also intimated that she can inspect any file including the ones she has mentioned in her application.

As regards his grievances that he has not been allotted HIG flats in the society in spite of bonafide membership No.39 and he deserved a HIG flat. In this connection it stated that Shri K. Mahesh, the then D.RCS was appointed as enquiry officer for investigating the matter. The said report has been submitted by Shri K. Mahesh vide letter No.118 dated 28-7-06. The enquiry officer concluded that:-
`On the basis of records produced and submissions made by both the sides cumulatively and collectively it is abundantly clear that it was very much in the knowledge of the complainant that he was allotted an MIG-II flats and the possession of MIG-II was handed over to him on 1-10-89 which the complainant accepted it and has since been physically occupying this flat. The question of any wrong allotment of MIG-II flat instead of HIG flat does not arise and any such claim in this regard is baseless and self-created on the basis of records produced. As the plans and designs of construction of flat No.199 was already approved by DDA, the Delhi Urban Arts Commission and the MCD and later on the basis of reports submitted by Shri C.R. Kashyap, Asstt. Registrar (E) and the society Architect M/s Cambow Associates, I have firm reasons
to believe that the poor living conditions as described by the complainant have arisen due to ill maintenance and illegal encroachments by the occupant of the house over a period of time. In fact such encroachments are not only by the complainant, but also by other flat owners. It is not for me, but for the authorities to
take note of the same and initiate appropriate action in this regard”

The report submitted by enquiry officer has been accepted by the RCS / Competent Authority. The copy of the report has already been sent to Shri Jarnail Singh for his comments. Moreover, Shri C.P.Kashyap, AR (E) was directed to inspect the premises of the society along with architect and President/Secretary of the society vide letter No. 1508 dated 15.9.06 (copy enclosed). Shri Kashyap in his report concluded that flat No. 199 allotted to Shri Jarnail Singh was poorly maintained by the occupant Shri Jarnail Singh no white wash was done for years and the draining system was found to be chocked due to non clearness of same”

A copy of the report was enclosed. The appeal was heard on 9-4-2007. The following are present:

Appellant:
Shri Jarnail Singh
Ms. Gursharan Kaur, assisting appellant

Respondents:
Shri G.K. Singh, Asstt. Registrar (NW)
Shri D.D. Sharma, Asstt. Registrar (NW)

Shri Neeraj Kumar was present as observer. Ms. Gursharan Kaur clarified with reference to the hearing of 14-12-06 before the appellate authority that this was only on the question of seeking advice of the Department about the procedure for making a first appeal, which was subsequently moved on 18-12-2006. An order has been passed by Shri Mohan Lal, Addl. Registrar on 28-12-2006, copy of which has been taken on record. Shri Mohan Lal, Addl. Registrar, and Appellate Authority has as per this order directed as follows:
“On the basis of their submissions it appears that the reply of the SPIO is specific and the grievance of the appellant can better be solved by the SPIO providing facility of inspection of the file up to 15-1-2007 to the appellant. SPIO agreed to that and if on that basis the appellant needs/requires copy of any paper available in the office of the SPIO the SPIO will provide that to him on his proper application. Decided accordingly.

While noting the proceedings Smt. Gursharan Kaur mentioned that “It is requested that kindly provide this order and action taken report from society management as earlier order of Shri V.K. Bansal, AR (NW) dated 27-1-06 letter No. F.47/163/Coop/GH/NW/249 Letter to President regarding inspection of records of the society till date not provide for inspection. It is humble request kindly provide letter and action taken report from society.

As no such order dated 27-1-06 is there on this file, this order issues with the direction to the SPIO as decided above.”

It was clarified to both the parties that allotment of HIG flats and the quality of up-keep of the flat at present occupied by appellant, which is the subject of inquiry referred to by Asstt. Registrar are not the concern of this Commission which is concerning with ensuring that information sought in this case must be
provided, if permissible under the RTI Act 2005.

                                                       DECISION NOTICE:
The key issue before us, therefore, is the question of inspection of record with regard to action taken on the directions of DDA. Asstt. Registrar and PIO Shri G.K. Singh has held that the original directions from DDA are not on their file but the file may be inspected. Nonetheless, Ms. Gursharan Kaur representing appellant Sh Jarnail Singh has argued that whereas promises have been made, no opportunity has actually been given to her for inspection of record nor has the record from the Society been obtained for inspection.

Since, the question pertains to a particular direction from the DDA which in the view of appellant had not been complied with by the office of RCS the most obvious course would have been to obtain a copy of the directions of the DDA referred to by appellant and then determine whether any follow up was required
to be taken by the office of Registrar or by the Cooperative Societies under its direction. Because of the failure in this initial stage a good deal of inconvenience has been caused to appellant.

It is possible that the Society is not a public authority as defined u/s 2 (h) of the RTI Act. However, because the information is available to the Registrar under the Delhi cooperative Societies Act, such information as is sought by Shri Jarnail Singh will be accessible to him u/s 2 (f) and 2 (j). Because this was not arranged in response to the first appeal despite first Appellate Authority having recognized this matter, these records will now be obtained by the Office of Registrar for the inspection of appellant. Now, therefore, Asstt. Registrar and PIO in the Office of RCS is directed to obtain copies of the record from the Ghalib Memorial C.G.H.S. Society and arrange an inspection by appellant and her representative on 16-4-2007 in the office of RCS at 10.00 a.m. when a representative of this Commission will also be present to ensure that such records as are held by the Society and the department with regard to the specific directions issued by DDA referred to by appellant are made available and copies of documents identified by him provided to appellant Sh Jarnail Singh or his authorized representative.

Note: It is possible that Society is not a public authority under the declaration of Section 2 (h) of the RTI Act. Because of that such information as is sought by Shri Jarnail Singh will be accessible to him u/s 2 (f) and 2 (j). Because this was not arranged in response to the first appeal despite first Appellate Authority having recognized this matter, these records will now be obtained by the Office of Registrar for the inspection of appellant.

Announced in the hearing. Notice of this decision be given free of cost to the parties.
(Wajahat Habibullah)
Chief Information Commissioner
9-4-2007

Authenticated true copy. Additional copies of orders shall be supplied against application and payment of the charges prescribed under the Act to the CPIO of this Commission.

(L.C.Singhi)
Addl. Registrar
9-4-2007

Tuesday, June 25, 2013

RTI Application to be transferred to appropriate Public Authority

                                CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION
                             Appeal No. CIC/WB/A/2006/00365 dated 5.6.2006
                                   Right to Information Act 2005 – Section 19

Appellant: Shri Shyam Singh Thakur
Respondent: Deptt. of Science & Technology.

Facts:
Shri Shyam Singh Thakur of Shahpura, Bhopal applied to PIO, Deptt. of Science & Technology on 5.1.06 seeking the following information :
1. How many Projects on “Aapda Anusandhan” have been proposed and sanctioned, which will be getting financial assistance of the Govt. of India. Detailed information along with the name and amount be given.

2. On the basis of “Theory of uncertainty” that the simultaneous calculations of status and dynamics of nature cannot be done has been proved. No research can be scientific in absence of the mathematical principle. However, in this case if there is any principle, ‘fair use’ certificate may be given.

3. As per clause 9.2 of the Copyright and Related Rights Act of WTO within TRIPPS, ‘fair use’ has been defined. How many projects have been certified with ‘fair use’ as per the clarification of TRIPPS ?

4. If the policies at Sr. No. 2 & 3 have not been followed then all outcome of research becomes illegal. Keeping this in view why the FIR has not been registered with the police as the matter is of national security.
From the letter of Shri A.K.Barua, it is clear that by 26.12.2005 the concerned authority had full knowledge of this, yet why an FIR could not be registered, should be clarified. In response to this application vide his letter dated 3.2.06, Shri A.K.Barua, CPIO Deptt. of Science & Technology sent the following reply :
1. In reference to item No. 2 of your application, it is informed that the information asked for is not related to any theory. As far as “fair use” is concerned, it is used as per the Copyright Act of 1957, in which it has a very specific meaning. If any person uses the work of others with a copyright for educational and research purposes, it is not a violation of the original work. In all cases related to the implementation of the Copyright Act MoHRD is the nodal ministry. You are advised to contact the MoHRD in respect of item Nos. 2 & 3 of your application.
2. In light of the above, therefore, your suggestion at Sr. No. 4 does not merit any action.

Aggrieved, Shri Thakur moved a first appeal with the Jt. Secretary, Deptt. of Science & Technology on 12.4.06 stating that the information sought was in compliance with the policies of the Govt. of India of which the Deptt. of Science & Technology is a part, impediments had been placed in supply of information. In his orders of 28.3.06 Shri Sanjiv Nair, Appellate Authority and Jt. Secretary stated that whereas Shri Shyam Singh Thakur has sought information on Disaster Research on its fair use and infringement of copyright and the CPIO has stated in response that in matters concerning disaster research and copy right etc. the department had no role whatever, so the answers to the questions of appellant Shri Thakur were given as zero, in respect of questions 1 & 3, and questions 2 & 4 did not constitute information as defined in Sec 2(f).

In response to our appeal notice, issued by us on receiving the second appeal from appellant Shri Thakur on 25.5.06, Appellate Authority Shri Sanjiv Nair has responded as follows in a letter of 21.11.06:
(i) “No relief could be given to the applicant during the appeal filed against the order of the CPIO, DST because the issues raised were so generic and broad that it was difficult to pinpoint what exact information the applicant desired. For example, he had sought information on disaster research. There is no specific project/scheme, as far as information brought to my notice, about the disaster research being carried out by DST. Further, disaster research is such a vast area which encompasses early warning system, mitigation exercises and communication system. Therefore, the appeal was disallowed.
(ii) The second issue on which he wanted information was the principle of uncertainty. There is a vast field of literature on uncertainty both in the fields of science and economics, and other fields and it was difficult to comprehend what exactly could be given to him on uncertainty. The ground work in this area will have to be done by the applicant because of the vast quantity of literature that is available and, as an appellate officer; no specific direction could be issued for providing information.”

Appellant’s rejoinder to this dated 1.12.06 has been taken on file. He has stated as follows:
1. In respect of question No. 1, the Appellate Authority in his orders dated 3.2.06 and 28.3.06 informed that the Govt. of India has not been supporting any of the projects, hence the information is zero.
2. The clarification given by the Joint Secretary MoS&T in respect of the “Theory of uncertainty” violates the proposition of the “vision on the Science & Technology, Serial No. C & D” announced by the Hon’ble President of India on 25.1.06.
3. In respect of the “fair use” as defined in TRIPPS the reply is Zero. This amounts to contempt of TRIPPS by a Joint Secretary to the Govt. of India.
4. RTI is a Civil Right whereas FIR is used to curb the criminal activities of the criminals. RTI is essentially applicable to the officers/officials including the Central Information Commission.
5. Since I have filed an affidavit, I will request the Commission to arrange the replies of the respondents in the affidavit for the right of equality as is applicable to both the parties.

The appeal was heard by us on 4.12.06. Following are present:
1. Sh. Shyam Singh Thakur, appellant
2. Sh. Rakesh Bhartiya Dy.Secy. M/o Sc. & Tech.
3. Sh. Davinder Nath, Dy.Secy. Deptt. of Sc.& Tech.
4. Sh. N.K.Gupta, U.S., Deptt. of Sc. & Tech.

It was pointed out to respondents that u/s 6(3)(1) of the Act, if they receive an application requesting information which is held by another public authority, they are required to transfer the application or such part of it as may be appropriate to that other public authority and inform the applicant immediately on such transfer. Moreover, such transfer was to be effective in no case later than 5 days from the date of receipt of the application. The Ministry has indeed asked the applicant to approach the HRD Ministry for
information against point 2 & 3 the answer to which is are also related Q. No. 4 but it was required to transfer the case as provided in the Act.

During the hearing appellant Shri Thakur argued that as we have pointed out in relation to questions 2 & 3, so in the case at Point 1, the department is required either to answer and provide the information sought or
to transfer it to the concerned public authority. Neither has been done.

DECISION NOTICE
As agreed by appellant, the information sought against point No.1, refers to all departments of Govt. of India. If this information was not available with Dep't. of Science & Technology Shri Thakur’s application should have been referred to the concerned authority/authorities that could have provided him the information he had sought. However, we find on a simple reading of the application that the information sought seems to have been directed specifically to the department to which it is addressed. The department has, therefore, rightly stated “it has no such programme in  operation in its jurisdiction”.

With regard to Points 2 & 3, respondents have admitted that because this was a new case, they have neglected to transfer it but simply referred the appellant to the appropriate authority. Although there is no penalty u/s 6(3), in such matters, the Department is cautioned that on receiving applications of this nature of which it feels a part pertains to another public authority, this is to be transferred to the concerned public authority within 5 days of the receipt of the application. In the instant case the application is now referred to the CPIO, Ministry of Human Resources Department to provide applicant Shri Thakur the information sought by him in regard to points 2, 3 & 4 of his application.

Announced in hearing. Notice of this decision be given free of cost to the parties.

(Wajahat Habibullah)
Chief Information Commissioner
22.1.2007

Authenticated true copy. Additional copies of orders shall be supplied against application and payment of the charges prescribed under the Act to the CPIO of this Commission. The copy file together with the application is transferred to the Ministry of Human Resource Development for examination and
disposal within the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005

(L.C.Singhi)
Addl. Registrar
22.1.2007

exemption u/s 8(1) cant be applied if information is 20 yrs old

                                      CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION
                                 BLOCK IV, OLD JNU CAMPUS, NEW DELHI 110067
                                                                                              Appeal No.37/ICPB/2006
                                                                                              June 26, 2006

  In the matter of Right to Information Act, 2005 – Section 19.

 Appellant:           Shri S.R. Pershad,
                                        Dy. Director of Supplies, DGS&D.

Public Authority:         Directorate General of Supplies & Disposals
                                Ms. Asha Makhijani, CPIO  &        
                                        Shri Subodha Nath Jha, DG – AA.

FACTS:
By  an  appln dt21.2.2006  to  PIO,  appellant,  an  officer  of  Indian Supply Service, presently on suspension, sought for copies of notifications  issued  by  POI  in  terms of Allocation of Business Rules  regard decentralization of purchase  & disposal  functions  of  DGS&D  authorizing  various Mins/Depts. to make their own arrangements for purchase of their  requirements  in yrs 1974, 1984, 1985, 1991 & 1999. By communication dt 7.3.2006,  CPIO  informed  appellant  that  info sought for  in respect of yrs 1974, 1984 & 1985 being related to a period beyond 20 years need not  be furnished in terms of S. 8(3) of RTI Act.  Further, since all 5 items sought  for  were  policy  matters,  they  were  not  dealt  with  in admin. of Dir. of DGS&D.   Aggrieved with  this decision,  appellant  filed an appeal before  AA on  3.4.2006. In  his  decision  dated  24.4.2006,  AA has pointed out that since Allocation of Business is notified by  President  through  Cabinet  Secretariat,  CPIO  should  have  fwd appln of  appellant  to  Cabinet Secretariat  in terms of S. 6(3) of RTI Act.   He has also further stated in his decision that since these notifications are published in Gazette of India, appellant could get copies of same from market/ libraries & these are not privy to DGS&D.

GROUNDS OF APPEAL:
2.  Stand of  DGS&D  that  info sought for  is available only  in Cabinet Secretariat is wrong.  Without initiative/involvement of DGS&D & its admin. min., on  its  own  Cabinet  Secretariat  doesn’t initiate  any proposal  for  reallocation of  business  relating to DGS&D.   Therefore,  copies  of  notifications  should  be  available  with  DGS&D  & as  such, CPIO  should  be directed to furnish same

DECISION :
3. Comments were called for from CPIO. In  a  most  cryptic  & short comments that this Commns has ever received, CPIO has intimated that in her letter  to   appellant  on  7.3.2006,  she  only  conveyed  info that she  had received from Admin of Dir Gen. of Supplies & Disposals & if  concerned Dir is able to provide any such  document to  her, same could be provided to appellant as per direction of AA

4.  In terms of RTI Act, it is responsibility of designated CPIO to furnish info sought for by a citizen, if said information is in custody of PA.  It is quite  possible  that  info sought  for  may  not  be available  with  CPIO  himself/  herself,  but  if  it  is  available  within   PA,  it  is  responsibility  of  CPIO  to  collect/gather  said  info from concerned person/section of PA & furnish same to  info seeker. In  present case, neither  CPIO nor AA has  categorically  stated  whether  copies  of  notifications  are available  within DGS&D or not.  If they are not available, a simple communication to appellant to that effect could have sufficed. Observation of  AA appellant could get copies of notifications from libraries/shops is uncalled for as in terms of RTIA, a citizen is entitled to get info from PA which is in its possession/ custody even if same is in public domain.

5. Further, PA has erred in interpreting S 8(3) of Act to state that since some of info related to period  prior to 20 yrs, same need  not  be  furnished.  S. 8(3) is part of S. 8, which deals with ‘exemption from  disclosure  of  info”. S. 8(1) specifies classes of info which are exempt from disclosure. What S. 8(3) stipulates  is that, exemption u/s 8(1) cant be applied if info sought related to a period prior to 20 yrs except those covered in S. clauses (a), (c) & (i) of sub-s.8(1). In other words, even if info sought is exempt in terms of other subclauses of sub-s.(1) of S. 8, & if same relates to period 20 yrs prior to dt. of appln., then same shall be provided.  In present case, since part of info sought, even though related to period prior to 20 yrs, relate to notifications, DGS&D is bound to furnish same, if same is available with  it. It is also stated by CPIO that info sought  relates to policy matters  not dealt with  in admin. of Dir.  What appellant seeks is only copies of notification &, therefor, question of same being related to policy matter doesn’t arise.

6.  I dispose of this appeal with the direction to CPIO to furnish copies of notifications  as  sought  for  by  appellant,  if  available within DGS&D, within  15 days of receipt of  this decision.   If not available, an affidavit to that effect should be filed before Commn & appellant should be informed accordingly within said period.

7.  Let a copy of this decision also be sent to appellant and CPIO.

Sd/-
(Padma Balasubramanian)
Information Commissioner

Authenticated true copy :

 ( Prem K. Gera )
     Registrar

Address of parties :
1.  Ms. Asha Makhijani, Central Public Information Officer, Directorate General
of Supplies & Disposal, Jeevan Tara Building, 5 Sansad Marg, New Delhi.

2.  Shri  S. R.  Pershad, GP-18, CPWD Officers Transit Hostel & Guest House,
Aliganj Colony, Lodi Road, New Delhi-110003.