no 498a jurisdiction - Sonu and Ors. Vs Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Anr.

                               IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
                                         W.P (Crl.) No.1266 of 2007
                                             Reserved on: 26.9.2007
                                          Date of Decision: 10.10.2007


Sonu and others                                                                       .......Petitioners
Through : Mr.Tarun Sharma, Advocate

Versus
Govt. of NCT of Delhi and another                                         ...... Respondents
Through : Ms.Mukta Gupta, StandingCounsel for the State.

CORAM:
JUSTICE SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA
1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? YES.
2.To be referred to the Reporter or not? YES.
3.Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? YES.

: JUDGMENT
This petition has been filed by the petitioners under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India r/w section 482 Cr.P.C for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing of FIR No.1367/2006 registered at PS Malviya Nagar or in the alternative for issuance of mandamus for the transfer of the said FIR alongwith the consequent investigation to the jurisdiction of the Police Station Ragho Majra Kotwali, District Patiala, Punjab.

2. The petitioners have submitted that the above FIR was filed by the complainant under sections 406/498A at PS Malviya Nagar, while perusal of FIR would show that no offence was  committed within the jurisdiction of NCT of Delhi. Respondent-wife alleged that petitioners subjected her to cruelty at matrimonial home in Patiala (Punjab). Marriage in this case was solemnized in U.P. Neither the marriage was solemnized in Delhi nor the offence was committed in Delhi. The registration of FIR in Delhi at PS Malviya Nagar was contrary to the provisions of sections 177 and 181 (4) of the Cr.P.C. The FIR should be quashed or the same be transferred to the State where offence was committed.

3. A perusal of FIR lodged at PS Malviya Nagar shows that complainant alleged that her marriage was solemnized with petitioner No.1 on 22.11.2005 at Shamli, Tehsil Kerana, Muzzafarnagar, U.P. according to Muslim rights. After marriage, she went to matrimonial home at Gurudwara Wali Gali No.3, Patiala (Punjab). She stated that behaviour of her husband and in-laws towards her from the very beginning was rude and non-cooperative and they were not happy with the dowry articles given in the marriage and she was taunted for bringing less dowry and Rs.50,000/-, one scooter and 5 tolas of gold was demanded. No where in the FIR she stated that any part of offence was committed in Delhi. Neither entrustment of dowry articles had taken place in Delhi nor the alleged misappropriation of dowry articles had taken place in Delhi. She filed the FIR with PS Malviya Nagar alleging that she was now living at Hauz Rani within the jurisdiction of PS Malviya Nagar.

4. In (1999) 8 SCC 728 Satvinder Kaur vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and another, the question of registration and investigation of an FIR lodged at the place of residence was dealt with and considered by the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court made the following observations:-
8. In our view, the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant requires to be accepted. The limited question is whether the High Court was justified in quashing the FIR on the ground that Delhi Police Station did not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the offence. From the discussion made by the learned Judge, it appears that learned Judge has considered the provisions applicable for criminal trial. The High Court arrived at the conclusion by appreciating the allegations made by the parties that the SHO, Police Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi was not having territorial jurisdiction to entertain and investigate the FIR lodged by the appellant because the alleged dowry items were entrusted to the respondent at Patiala and that the alleged cause of action for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC arose at Patiala. In our view, the findings given by the High Court are, on the face of it, illegal and erroneous because:
(1) The SHO has statutory authority under Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code to investigate any cognizable case for which an FIR is lodged.
(2) At the stage of investigation, there is no question of interference under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the ground that the investigating officer has no territorial jurisdiction.
(3) After investigation is over, if the investigating officer arrives at the conclusion that the cause of action for lodging the FIR has not arisen within his territorial jurisdiction, then he is required to submit a report accordingly under section 170 of the Criminal Procedure Code and to forward the case to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence.
9. This would be clear from the following discussion. Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers the police officer to investigate any cognizable offence. It reads as under :
(1) 156 Police officer's power to investigate cognizable case ? (1) any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate
any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to enquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.
(2) No proceedings of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be
called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was
not empowered under this section to investigate.
(3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an
 Investigation as above-mentioned.?
10. It is true that territorial jurisdiction also is prescribed under subsection (1) to the extent that the officer can investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such police station would have power to enquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. However, sub-section (2) makes the position clear by providing that no proceedings of the police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered to investigate. After investigation is completed, the result of such investigation is required to be submitted as provided under Sections 168, 169 and 170. Section 170 specifically provides that is, upon an investigation, it appears to the officer in charge of the police station that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a magistrate, such officer shall forward the accused under  custody to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a police report and to try the accused or commit for trial. Further, if the investigating officer arrives at the conclusion that the crime was not committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the police station, then FIR can be forwarded to the police station having jurisdiction over the area in which the crime is committed. But this would not mean that in a case which required investigation, the police officer can refuse to record the FIR and/or investigate it.

5. The law laid down by the Supreme Court is that in the event of the investigating officer arriving at a conclusion that crime was not committed within his jurisdiction, the FIR should be forwarded to the PS having the jurisdiction. However, the police officer cannot refuse to register the FIR in respect of a crime which requires investigation.

6. In the present case there is no allegation made in the FIR itself that a part of the crime was committed in Delhi. The parties never lived in Delhi. Marriage took place in U.P. Matrimonial home was in Patiala and alleged crime of dowry demand was allegedly committed in Patiala (Punjab). No investigation is needed to come to the conclusion that no part of crime was committed in Delhi and the alleged crime was committed either in U.P. or Patiala. PS Malviya Nagar even if registered the FIR should have transferred it to the Police Station of Patiala where the offence was committed. Normally in all such cases, zero FIR is registered at a Police Station at Delhi and FIR is transferred to the concerned police station where crime is committed. Though there is no illegality in registration of FIR, but retaining of this FIR with PS Malviya Nagar raises doubt about bonafides of SHO.

7. It is to be noted that half of the criminal writ petitions filed in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and Section 482 Cr.P.C. are in respect of refusal of the Delhi Police to register FIRs. People have to rush to the High Court seeking mandamus that police should be given directions for registration of FIR. In most of these writ petitions cognizable offences are disclosed in the complaints but police refuses to register FIR. Similarly, in most of the complaints filed before Metropolitan Magistrate, the allegation is that police refuses to register FIRs. On the one hand, police refuses to register FIRs of the people living in Delhi about commission of crime which had taken place in Delhi and on the other hand the SHO of PS Malviya Nagar had registered an FIR in Delhi regarding crime committed in Patiala. This
attitude of the police is surprising. Such registration of FIR only seems to be result of some pressure or as a result of consideration and needs an enquiry to be conducted as to what was the reason for the SHO for obliging with the registration of FIR at Delhi and not transferring the same to concerned area police station when no offence was committed at Delhi. Police Commissioner also needs to issue guidelines to the SHOs in those cases, where FIR is registered in  respect of crime committed outside Delhi and where no part of the offence has been committed within the jurisdiction of Delhi that such FIRs should be transferred to the State concerned and also there should be no refusal of registration of FIR. In all those cases where there is a refusal of registration of FIR, even where cognizable offence is reported, disciplinary action should be taken against such police officers. The Courts are unnecessary being burdened with complaints or writ petitions, where directions are sought for registration of FIRs.

8. I consider that this writ petition should be allowed. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. SHO Police Station Malviya Nagar,  New Delhi is directed to transfer the FIR in question to the concerned Police Station at Patiala (Punjab) where offence was committed.

October 10, 2007 SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA,J.

no 498a jurisdiction - SATVINDER KAUR Vs STATE (GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI) AND ANR

                                      IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.)  1031 of 1999

PETITIONER:
SATVINDER KAUR

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
STATE (GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI) AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/10/1999

BENCH:K.T. THOMAS & M.B. SHAH
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
1999 Supp(3) SCR 348
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHAH, J. Leave granted.
The appellant-wife contends that she had married to Rajinder Singh-Respondent no. 2 on December 9, 1990. Her parents were resident of Delhi  and the marriage was performed at Delhi. A daughter was born on 19th December, 1991. It is her contention that on 19th January, 1992, she was thrown out from the matrimonial home in Patiala with 4 weeks baby girl and that at that time, she had only wearing apparel.
On the same day, that is, 19th January, 1992 at 3.40 p.m., a complaint bearing no. DD no. 18 was lodged by her at P.S. Kotwali, Patiala making various allegations of torture and dowry demand against her husband and parents-in-law. Thereafter, she came to Delhi to live with her parents.
Within that time also, threats by her husband continued. On 30th April, 1992, a complaint was lodged against her husband in the Women Cell, Delhi. Subsequently, on 23rd January, 1993, the impugned FIR no. 34 of 1993 under Sections 406 and 498A I.P.C. for the alleged occurrence dated 9th December, 1990 at Patiala was lodged at Police Station, Paschim Vihar, New Delhi.

Rajinder Singh, respondent no. 2 was arrested on 4th February, 1993 at Patiala and certain recoveries were effected and he was brought to Delhi and produced before the Metropolitan magistrate, who remanded him to judicial custody and, thereafter, released him on bail on 9th February, 1993.

Thereafter, the husband (R-2) filed petition in Delhi High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the FIR no. 34 of 1993 on the ground that the allegations made in the complaint were false and mala fide and no part of the cause of action for   investigation or trial of an offence arose within Delhi. On 12th October, 1993, after hearing the Counsel for the parties, the High Court held "since the return of stridhan and accounting thereof is being sought in Delhi, the Courts at Delhi will have the jurisdiction to try the case." Hence, the petition was dismissed. That order was challenged before this Court. By Order dated 4th April, 1995, the order passed by the High Court was set aside and matter was remitted for fresh consideration on the points raised by the respondent in the petition. This Court observed:

"The High Court dealt with only the territorial jurisdictional question and did not go into the merits of the matter. Ex-facie, it appears there a clear prayer of the appellant in his petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. is to the effect seeking proceedings to be quashed. The claim apparently is based on the aforesaid memorandum recorded at the Police Station, Patiala. In the face of it, it is claimed that criminal proceedings could not be initiated at Delhi after settling the matter out of Court. As said before, there is no discussion on the merit of the matter in the order of the High Court."

After remand, the High Court heard learned counsel for the parties and quashed the F.I.R. on the ground that Investigating Officer at Delhi was not having territorial jurisdiction. The Court further clarified that the alleged compromise arrived at between the parties on 19.1.1992 cannot be a ground for quashing the FIR because it would depend upon the evidence which may be led by the parties with regard to the articles returned by the in-laws. That order is challenged before us in this appeal by special leave.

At the time of hearing of this appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that after rightly holding that the alleged settlement of 19.1.1992 cannot be a ground for quashing the F.I.R., the High Court materially erred in holding that the alleged cause of action for lodging the F.I.R. had not arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi Police Station. He further pointed out that the matter was remanded by this Court for deciding the effect of the alleged settlement and the findings given by the High Court on the question of territorial jurisdiction to investigate the matter by Delhi Police was not disturbed.

As against this, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the alleged offence took place at Patiala and that the articles given at the time of marriage were returned at Patiala on the basis of the F.I.R. dated 19th January 1992 lodged by the appellant at Patiala. A compromise was arrived at between the parties on the same day and is recorded at the Police Station as DD no. 28. He further submitted that as husband has filed petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights, as a counter blast appellant filed complaint to the DCP (Women Crime Cell), Delhi on 10th June, 1992 in which she never stated that she had not received back all dowry articles or her Stridhan. Thereafter, impugned FIR no. 34 dated 23rd January, 1992 was lodged in which she has made material improvements. On the basis of the said FIR, husband and his family members were harassed and arrested. Various other statements are made in the affidavit in reply filed by the respondent-husband and also in rejoinder filed by the appellant.
In our view, the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant requires to be accepted. The limited question is whether the High Court was justified in quashing the FIR on the ground that Delhi Police Station did not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the offence. From the discussion made by the learned Judge, it appears that learned Judge has considered the provisions applicable for criminal trial. The High Court arrived at the conclusion by appreciating the allegation made by the parties that the S.H.O., Police Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi was not having territorial jurisdiction to entertain and investigate the F.I.R. lodged by the appellant because the alleged dowry items were entrusted to the respondent at Patiala and that the alleged cause of action for the offence punishable under Section 498A I.P.C. arose at Patiala. In our view, the findings given by the High Court are, on the face of it, illegal and erroneous because :

(1)    The S.H.O. has statutory authority under Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code to investigate any cognizable case for which an F.I.R. is lodged.
(2)    At the stage of investigation, there is no question of interference under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the ground that the Investigating Officer has no territorial jurisdiction.
(3)    After investigation is over, if the Investigating Officer arrives at the conclusion that the cause of action for lodging the F.I.R. has not arisen within his territorial jurisdiction, then he is required to submit a report accordingly under Section 170 of the Criminal Procedure Code and to forward the case to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence.
This would be clear from the following discussion. Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers the Police Officer to investigate any cognizable offence. It reads as under :
" 156. Police Officer's power to investigate cognizable case : -
(1)    Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.
(2)    No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate.
(3)   Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above-mentioned."
It is true that territorial jurisdiction also is prescribed under sub-sec-tion (1) to the extent that the Officer can investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such police station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. However, sub-section (2) makes the position clear by providing that no proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered to investigate. After investigation is completed, the result of such investigation is required to be submitted as provided under Sections 168, 169 and 170. Section 170 specifically provides that if, upon an investigation, it appears to the Officer in charge of the police station that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, such officer shall, forward the accused under custody to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a police report and to try the accused or commit for trial. Further, if the Investigating Officer arrives at the conclusion that the crime was not committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the police station, then F.I.R. can be forwarded to the police station having jurisdiction over the area in which crime is committed. But this would not mean that in a case which requires investigation, the police officer can refuse to record the FIR and/or investigate it. 

Chapter XIII of the Code provides for "Jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts in inquiries and trials". It is to be stated that under the said Chapter there are various provisions which empower the Court for inquiry or trial of a criminal case and that there is no absolute prohibition that the offence committed beyond the local territorial jurisdiction cannot be investigated, inquired or tried. This would be clear by referring to Sections 177 to 188. For our purpose, it would be suffice to refer only to Sections 177 and 178 which are as under :-
"177, Ordinary place of inquiry and trial - Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.
178. Place of inquiry or trial. –
(a). When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or
(b). Where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or
(c). Where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or
(d). Where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas."

A reading of the aforesaid sections would make it clear that Section 177 provides for `ordinary' place of inquiry or trial. Section 178 inter alia provides for place of inquiry or trial when it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed or where the offence was committed partly in one local area and partly in other and where it consisted of several acts done in different local areas, it could be inquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Hence, at the stage of investigation, it cannot be held that S.H.O. does not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the crime.

The Court in the State of West Bengal v. S.N. Basak, [1963] SCR 52, dealt with a similar  contention wherein the High Court had held that the statutory powers of investigation given to the police under Chapter XIV were not available in respect of an offence triable under the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949 and hence the investigation was without jurisdiction. Reversing the said finding, it was held thus :-
"The powers of investigation into cognizable offences are contained in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 154 which is in that Chapter deals with information in cognizable offences and Section 156 with investigation into such offences and under these sections the police has statutory right to investigate into the circumstances of any alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate and this statutory power of the police to investigate cannot be interfered with by the exercise of power under Section 439 or under the inherent power of the Court under Section 561A of Criminal Procedure Code. As to the powers of the Judiciary in regard to statutory right of the police to investigate, the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, (1944) L.R. 71 I .A. 203, 212 observed as follows :-
"The functions of the judiciary and the police arc complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the Court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then. It has sometimes been thought that Section 561A has given increased powers to the Court which it did not posses before that Section was enacted. But this is not so, the section gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the Court already inherently possesses shall be preserved and is inserted as their Lordships think, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the Court are those expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code and that no inherent powers had survived the passing of that Act."

With this interpretation, which has been put on the statutory duties and powers of the police and of the powers of the Court, we are in accord. The High Court was in error therefore in interfering with the powers of the police in investigating into the offence which was alleged in the information sent to the Officer-in-charge of the police station."

Further, the legal position is well settled that if an offence is disclosed the Court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to be completed. If the F.I.R., prima facie, discloses the commission of an offence, the Court does not normally stop the investigation, for, to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences. (Re: State of West Bengal v. Swapna Kumar, [1982] 1 SCC 561.) It is also settled by a long course of decision of this Court that for the purpose of exercising Us power under Section 482, Cr. P,C. to quash an FIR or a complaint, the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the same per se; it has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations. (Ref. Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and another, [1985] 2 SCC 370 at 395).

Hence, in the present case, the High Court committed grave error in accepting the contention of the respondent that investigating officer had no jurisdiction to investigate the matters on the alleged ground that no part of the offence was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of police station at Delhi. The appreciation of the evidence is the function of the Courts when seized of the matter. At the stage of investigation, the material collected by an investigating officer cannot be judicially scrutinized for arriving at a conclusion that police station officer of particular police station would not have territorial jurisdiction. In any case, it has to be stated that in view of Section 178(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code, when it is uncertain in which of the several local areas an offence was committed, or where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, the said offence can be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Therefore, to say at the stage of investigation that S.H.O., Police Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi was not having territorial jurisdiction, is on the face of it, illegal and erroneous. That apart, Section 156(2) contains an embargo that no proceeding of a police officer shall be challenged on the ground that he has no territorial power to investigate. The High Court has completely overlooked the said embargo when it entertained the petition of respondent no. 2 on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction.

Lastly, it is required to be reiterated that while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code of quashing and investigation, the Court should bear in mind what has been observed in the Stale of Kerala & Ors. Etc. v. O.C. Kuttan & Ors. Etc., JT (1999) 1 SC
486 to the following effect :-
"Having said so, the court gave a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing the criminal proceedings should be exercised very sparingly with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an inquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice. It is too well settled that the first information report is only an initiation to move the machinery and to investigate into a cognizable offence and, therefore, while exercising the power and deciding whether the investigation itself should be quashed, utmost care should be taken by the Court and at that stage it is not possible for the Court to shift the materials or to weigh the materials and then come to the conclusion one way or the other. In the case of State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma, JT (19%) 2 SC 488, a three Judge Bench of this Court indicated that the High Court should be loath to interfere at the threshold to thwart the prosecution exercising its inherent power under Section 482 or under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, as the case may be and allow the law to take its own course. The same view was reiterated by yet another three Judges bench of this Court in the case of Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada, JT (1996) 11 SC 175, where this Court sounded a word of caution and stated that such power should be sparingly and cautiously exercised only when the Court is of the opinion that otherwise there will be gross miscarriage of justice. The Court had also observed that social stability and order is required to be regulated by proceeding against the offender as it is an offence against the society as a whole".

In the result, the appeal is allowed. The order passed by the High Court quashing the FIR is set aside. The Investigation Officer is directed to complete the investigation as early as possible.

no 498a jurisdiction - Manish Ratan Vs State of Madhya Pradesh

                                              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 210 of 2000

PETITIONER:
Manish Ratan & Ors.

Vs

RESPONDENT:
State of M.P. & Anr.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/11/2006

BENCH:
S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju

JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
S.B. SINHA, J :
Application of Sections 177 and 178 of Code of Criminal Procedure (Code) is involved in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 1.09.1998 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Crl. Revision No. 98 of 1998.

Appellant No. 1 was married with Meena, Respondent No. 2 herein at Niwari, Distt. Tikangarh. They were living at their matrimonial home at Jabalpur. Allegedly, a complaint was lodged by father-in-law of Appellant No. 1 with the police station, Jabalpur on 19.04.1997 alleging that the appellants have been ill-treating his daughter and demanded dowry.

Meena allegedly lodged another First Information Report against the appellants at the Police Station, Datia on 25.05.1997 whereupon a criminal case was registered. In the said complaint, the place of incident was said to have taken place in House No. 151, Adarsh Nagar Narbada Road, Jabalpur. The period during which the incident took place was said to be before November, 1995 till 25.08.1997. It was alleged:
"7. That during the time of Dusshera the complainant's husband Manish, Father in law S.S. Rattan, Mother in law Smt. Kiran and sister in law Menaka (Minni) illtreated her so much that she left her house and saved her life by some means and reached in her Mama's house at Bhopal and from there she reached her house and since then she has been staying with her father."

A criminal revision was filed by the appellants questioning the jurisdiction of the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia. By reason of the impugned judgment, the said criminal revision application has been dismissed opining that the offence being a continuing one, Datia Court had  jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence.

The High Court did not consider the question on the touchstone of Sections 177 and 178 of the Code. It is interesting to note that while arriving at the decision the High Court distinguished the decision of this Court in Sujata Mukherjee (Smt) v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee [(1997) 5 SCC 30], stating:
" The High Court held that excepting against the husband, the complaint against other respondents related to the incidents taking place at Raigarh and as such, the criminal case on the basis of complaint made by the appellant was not maintainable against the said other respondents at Raipur but it was maintainable so far as the husband of the appellant was concerned. On these facts, the Apex Court took the view that the complaint reveals a continuing offence of the mal-treatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant in the hands of all the accused   respondents, and in such continuing offence, on some occasions all the respondents had taken part and on other occasion, one of the respondents had taken part. It was, therefore, held that in view of clause (c) of Section 178 of Cr.P.C., the High Court was not right. The order passed by the High Court was set aside and the learned CJM, Raipur had jurisdiction to try the case. The facts of the present case are different. There is nothing in the complaint to show that any mal-treatment was given to the complainant at Datia. The allegations, which I may repeat here, are that the mal-treatment was given within a specific period at Jabalpur. There is nothing to show that any mal-treatment was given by any of the petitioners at Datia and under these ircumstances, this case of Sujata Mukherjee does not help the learned counsel for the complainant in this case."

By a curious process of reasoning, however, it was held:
" They demanded a sum of Rs. 7.00 lakhs and forced her to write a letter to her parents in that regard. She was beaten and kept starving. Somehow she managed to escape and went to her Mama's place at Bhopal and from there she went to father's place and was living there. Thus these facts go to show that she was forced to go to her father's place on account of the fact that she was mal-treated; as demand of Rs. 7.00 lakhs was not fulfilled. As laid down in the aforesaid decision of this Court, the word 'cruelty' is not only the physical cruelty, the lady was forced to live at her father's place on account of the torture of the inlaws and as such it can safely be said that there was also a mental cruelty. The cruelty and the terror of the in-laws continued even at the place of the father where she was living. In this view of the matter, it can safely be said that the harassment continued at the place where she was residing with her father. In view of the provision of Section 178 Cr.P.C., the offence may be inquired into and tried by a Court where the physical harassment, marpeet had taken place i.e. the in-laws' place and also where the harassment continued i.e. the place where she was residing. Thus in view of the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid authority with which I respectfully agree, the Court at Datia had also jurisdiction to try the case."

It is not denied or disputed that no part of cause of action arose within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Datia Court. Section 177 of the Code ordains that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. Interpretation of the term "ordinarily" will have to be considered having regard to the provisions contained in Section 178 thereof which reads as under:
"178. Place of inquiry or trial.(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in nother, or (c) where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas."

Clause (c) of the said provision, thus, has been applied in the instant case. Whether the allegations made in the complaint petition would constitute a continuing offence, thus, is the core question. In a case of this nature, an offence cannot be held to be a continuing one, only because the complainant is forced to leave her matrimonial home.

In State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi and Another [(1972) 2 SCC 890], it was stated:
"A continuing offence is one which is susceptible  of continuance and is distinguishable from the one  which is committed once and for all. It is one of  those offences which arises out of a failure to obey  or comply with a rule or its requirement and which  involves a penalty, the liability for which continues  until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or  complied with. On every occasion that such  disobediance or non-compliance occurs and  reoccurs, there is the offence committed. The  distinction between the two kinds of offences is  between an act or omission which constitutes an  offence once and for all and an act or omission  which continues, and therefore, constitutes a fresh  offence every time or occasion on which it  continues. In the case of a continuing offence,  there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the  offence which is absent in the case of an offence  which takes place when an act or omission is  committed once and for all."

In Sujata Mukherjee (supra) this Court held the offence to be a  continuing one as specific allegations had been made against the husband  that he had also gone to Raipur where the complaint was filed and had  assaulted the appellant therein. It was in the aforementioned fact situation,  this Court set aside the judgment of the High Court holding that the incident  at Raipur was not an isolated event stating:
"At the hearing of these appeals, Mr Gambhir, the  learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has  submitted that it will be evident from the  complaint that the appellant has alleged that she had been subjected to cruel treatment persistently  at Raigarh and also at Raipur and incident taking  place at Raipur is not an isolated event, but  consequential to the series of incidents taking place at Raigarh. Therefore, the High Court was  wrong in appreciating the scope of the complaint and proceeding on the footing that several isolated  events had taken place at Raigarh and one isolated incident had taken place at Raipur. Hence, the  criminal case filed in the Court of the Chief  Judicial Magistrate, Raipur was only maintainable  against the respondent husband against whom  some overt act at Raipur was alleged. But such  case was not maintainable against the other  respondents."

This Court having regard to the peculiar fact situation obtaining  therein held:
" We have taken into consideration the complaint filed by the appellant and it appears to us that the complaint reveals a continuing offence of maltreatment and humiliation meted out to the  appellant in the hands of all the accused respondents and in such continuing offence, on some occasions all the respondents had taken part  and on other occasion, one of the respondents had taken part. Therefore, clause (c) of Section 178 of  the Code of Criminal Procedure is clearly attracted. We, therefore, set aside the impugned  order of the High Court and direct the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur to proceed with  the criminal case "

Sujata Mukherjee (supra) was distinguished by a Division Bench of  this Court in Y. Abraham Ajith and Others v. Inspector of Police, Chennai  and Another [(2004) 8 SCC 100] where noticing the interpretation of the  expression "cause of action", it was held that the expression "ordinarily"  need not be limited to those specially provided for by the law and exceptions may be provided by law on consideration or may be implied from the  provisions of law permitting joint trial of offences by the same Court. In  that case the complaint itself disclosed that after 15.04.1997, the respondent  left Nagercoil and went to Chennai and was staying there. Thus, having  regard to the fact that all allegations according to the complainant took place at Nagercoil, it was held that the courts at Chennai did not have the  jurisdiction to deal with the matter. It was held:
"This Court held in that factual background that  clause (c) of Section 178 was attracted. But in the  present case the factual position is different and the  complainant herself left the house of the husband  on 15-4-1997 on account of alleged dowry  demands by the husband and his relations. There is  thereafter not even a whisper of allegations about  any demand of dowry or commission of any act  constituting an offence much less at Chennai. That  being so, the logic of Section 178(c) of the Code  relating to continuance of the offences cannot be  applied."

Yet again in Ramesh and Others v. State of T.N. [(2005) 3 SCC 507],  Abraham Ajith (supra) was followed by this Court stating:
"In the view we are taking, it is not necessary for  us to delve into the question of territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Trichy in detail. Suffice it to say that on looking at the complaint at its face  value, the offences alleged cannot be said to have  been committed wholly or partly within the local  jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court at Trichy.  Prima facie, none of the ingredients constituting  the offence can be said to have occurred within the  local jurisdiction of that court. Almost all the  allegations pertain to acts of cruelty for the  purpose of extracting additional property as dowry  while she was in the matrimonial home at Mumbai  and the alleged acts of misappropriation of her  movable property at Mumbai. However, there is  one allegation relevant to Section 498-A from  which it could be inferred that one of the acts  giving rise to the offence under the said section  had taken place in Chennai. It is alleged that when  the relations of the informant met her in-laws at a  hotel in Chennai where they were staying on 13-10-1998, there was again a demand for dowry and  a threat to torture her in case she was sent back to  Mumbai without the money and articles  demanded.

Thus the alleged acts which according to the petitioner constitute the offences under Secions  498-A and 406 were done by the accused mostly in  Mumbai and partly in Chennai. Prima facie, there  is nothing in the entire complaint which goes to  show that any acts constituting the alleged  offences were at all committed at Trichy."

The said decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the present  case.
Our attention was drawn to the fact that no criminal case was lodged at Jabalpur. Our attention was further drawn to the fact that the investigation of the case is complete. 

We, therefore, are of the opinion that, interest of justice would be  subserved, while setting aside the order of the High Court, if in exercise of  our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we direct  transfer of the criminal case pending in the Court of Chief Judicial  Magistrate, Datia to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur. We  accordingly do so.

Although the complainant has filed an application before us for impleading herself as a party, nobody has appeared on her behalf. We, therefore, direct the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur to issue notice to her. Keeping in view of the fact that Respondent No. 2 is residing at Datia, we would request the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur to accommodate her in the matter of fixing the date (s) of hearing as far as possible.

The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned directions.

no 498a jurisdiction - Bimla Rawal and Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.

                              IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
                                            W.P.(Crl.) No. 1541/2007
                                             Reserved on: 30.11.2007
                                            Date of Decision: 03.1.2008

Bimla Rawal and Ors. …….Petitioners
Through : Mr. N.Hariharan,Advocate

Versus
State (NCT Of Delhi) and Anr. ……… Respondents
Through : Ms. Rajdipa Behura,Advocate
with Mr. Vishal Garg, Advocate for State
Mr. H.M.Sethi, Advocate for R-2


JUSTICE SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA
JUDGMENT
This Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed for quashing of FIR No. 598/2007 PS Rajouri Garden, Delhi. This FIR was got registered at Delhi by complainant Smt. Chanderkanta @ Pammi Rawal, widow of Late Mr. Ajay Rawal after more than 02 years of death of her husband against her in-laws living at Mumbai. Her husband died on 18th February, 2005 at Mumbai. A reading of FIR shows that marriage between the parties had taken place at Mumbai. Parties lived together at Mumbai. All her in-laws were living at Mumbai.

Her allegations of cruelties and not giving her jewellery and other assets etc. are in respect of Mumbai. No part of alleged crime had taken place in Delhi. The only averment made in her complaint about Delhi is that she and her husband came to Delhi in June, 2005 (it seems that the year is wrongly typed as 2005, it should be 2004 or prior to that) and both stayed with her father for three months and her husband tried to keep her comfortable and happy. During this period her husband also tried his hand on some business in Delhi but could not succeed. Thereafter,relatives of her husband visited them at Delhi and threatened to break her matrimonial home and despite her resistance took away the complainant’s husband with them. No other instance at Delhi is mentioned. Then she received a call on 18th February, 2005 about death of her husband.

2. This Court in Sonu and Ors. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Anr. W.P.(Crl.) No.1266/2007 decided on 10.10.2007 in a similar situation had observed that where there were no allegations in the FIR that a part of crime was committed in Delhi,the FIR should not be registered by Delhi Police. In Satvinder Kaur vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (1999) 8 SCC 728 Supreme Court had considered the question of registration of FIR at length and taking note of different Sections of Cr.P.C. observed that the territorial jurisdiction was prescribed under Sub-Section 1 of Section 156 Cr.P.C. to the extent that a Police Officer can investigate any cognizable case, which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of said Police Station would have power to enquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. However, Sub Section (2) of Section 156 Cr.P.C.makes it clear that proceedings of Police Officer in any case cannot be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such Officer was not empowered to investigate. The Supreme Court further observed that Section 170 Cr.P.C. specifically provides that if, upon investigation, it appears to the Officers In-charge of the Police Station that crime was not committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Police Station, that FIR can be forwarded to the Police Stating having jurisdiction over the area in which crime is committed.

3. It is clear that the law is that police can register an FIR of commission of a cognizable crime but after registration of FIR, if on scrutiny or investigation, it is found that crime was not committed within the jurisdiction of that Police Station but was committed within the jurisdiction of some other Police Station, the FIR should be transferred to that Police Station. However, if at the time of registration of FIR itself, it is apparent on the face of it that crime was committed outside the jurisdiction of the Police Station, the Police after registration of FIR should transfer the FIR to that Police Station for investigation. Normally a ‘Zero’ FIR is registered by Police in such cases and after registration of FIR, the FIR is transferred to the concerned Police Station. However, it seems that Delhi Police had invented another reason of invoking jurisdiction for registration of FIR and that reason is if somebody has influence or high connections in Delhi FIR can be registered in Delhi and investigation can be done by Delhi Police irrespective of fact whether the crime was committed outside Delhi. Not one, but several Writ Petitions have come to this Court where FIR under Section 498A/406 IPC have been registered in Delhi only because someone had influence or approach with Delhi Police or was close to the persons in power in Delhi. FIR is registered even if no part of the crime is committed in Delhi.

4. Present case is an example of that. In this case, the FIR has been registered against family of deceased husband though the parties lived only in Mumbai. Marriage was performed in Mumbai. Wife (Complainant) all along lived with her husband in Mumbai except for a short period when she lived with her father and her husband in Delhi and she made no allegations against her husband’s behaviour during her stay in Delhi. All allegations are in respect of her stay in Mumbai. I consider that even if Delhi Police had registered FIR, this FIR should have been transferred forthwith to Mumbai. It is a fit case where petition should be allowed.
The petition is allowed to the extent that FIR No. 598/2007 PS Rajouri Garden registered in Delhi should be transferred to Mumbai. The State is directed to transfer FIR No. 598/2007 PS Rajouri Garden to Mumbai Police.

Sd/-
SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA,J.

No 498a jurisdiction - Niraj Trivedi Vs State of Bhihar

                                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

WP(Crl.)No. 415/04
Reserved on: 22.10.2007
Date of Decision: 04.01.2008

Niraj Trivedi ……. Petitioner
Through : Mr.Sushil Kumar, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Himanshu Shekhar and Ms.Anita, Advocates.

Versus
State of Bihar and Ors. … Respondents
Through : Mr. Ranjeet Kumar, Advocate

WP(Crl.)No. 235/04
Parimal Trivedi and Anr. ……. Petitioners
Through : Mr.Sushil Kumar, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Himanshu Shekhar and Ms.
Anita, Advocates.

Versus

State of Bihar and Ors. … Respondents
Through : Mr. Ranjeet Kumar, Advocate

SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA, J.
1. The above writ petitions have been filed by the petitioners under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing of an FIR No. 0188/02, P.S. Digha, Patna, Bihar registered against the petitioners in respect of offences under Section 498-A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. It is stated by petitioner Niraj Trivedi that he was a permanent resident of Delhi and was working in USA. Petitioners Parimal Trivedi and Anju Trivedi state that they were permanent resident of Delhi but were working for gains at Aruba, Holland. An FIR was got registered against the petitioners being FIR No.0188/02 at P.S. Dhiga, Patna, Bihar under Section 498-A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act by Mr. Vijay Kumar Singh, father-in-law of Niraj Trivedi. In the FIR, he alleged that his daughter Shweta was seen and liked by the family of the petitioners at Patna before marriage, so marriage was finalized between Niraj Trivedi and Shweta. He decided to give gifts worth Rs.8 Lac at his daughter’s marriage to be delivered at New Delhi. On 18th June, 1998, marriage between Shweta and Niraj took place at Delhi and after marriage she went to her in-laws’ house at Delhi. He (father of Shweta) alleged that after 2 days of marriage mother-in-law, husband’s elder brother and his wife and husband started harassing Shweta for dowry. Shweta and Niraj came to Patna for two days and Niraj told him (Mr. V.K. Singh) that he will go to USA on 11th July. On 11th July Niraj went to USA alone. Shweta lived at Delhi. Shweta left for USA on 15th January, 1999. On 22nd January, 1999, Shweta telephoned him that her in-laws (mother-in-law, brother-in-law Parimal Trivedi and his wife Anju) living in USA all gave beatings to her and abused her in USA and took away her ornaments and she was turned out from the house. She asked her father to send some money to them (in-laws) or she would be killed. After some time, Shweta from USA informed him (Mr.V.K. Singh) on phone that she was made to abort against her wishes. She was told that unless her father gives money she cannot become mother. On 26th November, 2000, Shweta came to India and lived at Delhi at her in-laws’ house. Her father alleged that she told that her inlaws again gave her beatings. As she was pregnant, she left her in-laws home in Delhi and came to her uncles’ home at Lodi Road, Delhi wherefrom her father brought her to Patna. On 27th July, 2001, Shweta gave birth to a baby girl and her father talked to Niraj in USA on telephone and asked her to take Shweta to USA, as Shweta wanted to go to USA since she had no differences with her husband. Shweta’s father got her visa ready and sent her to USA. When Shweta went to USA nobody came to airport to pick her up. However, she went to husband’s house at USA where she came to know that her husband had left that house and shifted somewhere else. She was told by neighbours that some girl used to live with her husband. She took help of a friend of her father and got arranged an accommodation for her in USA. She also learnt about her husband’s address through her father’s friend. Complainant V.K.Singh reported to the police that he was sure that Shweta’s mother-in-law would soon dispose of her property in Delhi and after selling ornaments of his daughter would flee to USA.

2. It is stated by the petitioners that on 14th November, 2002 when this FIR was lodged, Shweta was in USA and her father in Patna lodged this FIR. Niraj, Shweta’s husband had filed a divorce petition in New Jersey, USA against Shweta Trivedi on 8th October, 2002. Shweta returned from USA to Patna on 21st November, 2002. She made statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. On 8th December, 2002, Patna Police came to Delhi and arrested Prabha Trivedi, mother- in-law of Shweta from Delhi. She was granted transit bail by learned MM, Delhi. After getting her mother-in-law arrested, on 8th December, 2002, Shweta flew back to USA and contested divorce suit of husband. On 16th December, 2002 Shweta filed reply to the marriage dissolution complaint filed by Niraj in Superior Court of New Jersey, USA and also filed a counter claim against the petitioner, Niraj.

3. The petitioners seek quashing of the FIR in the alternate transfer of this FIR to Delhi on the ground that even if all the allegations made in the FIR are accepted on the face value, the Patna Police had no jurisdiction to investigate the matter since no part of the alleged offence was committed within the jurisdiction of Patna Police. It is also stated that the allegations made by Mr. V.K. Singh, father of Shweta were without any basis and criminal proceedings instituted in Patna were only malafide. Alleged incidents had taken place either in Delhi or USA. No part of alleged crime had taken place in Patna. The alleged dowry admittedly was given at Delhi not in Patna. It is submitted that Patna Police had illegally registered FIR and undertaken investigation.

4. The statements made by Ms. Shweta u/S 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. are also on record. In her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. recorded before the Judicial Magistrate, Patna, she narrated that her marriage with Niraj was solemnized on 18th June, 1998 (at Delhi). After marriage she went to her in- laws’ place (at Delhi). For 2-3 days the behavior of her in-laws was okay. Thereafter, her in-laws started asking money from her. They used to abuse and slap her and pull her hairs. She used to be pushed against the wall. These incidents occurred in June 1998 itself. Her husband was a graduate. He was a journalist living in USA. He never cared for her disease. Her father gave dowry worth Rs. Eight lakh. She had a daughter aged 16 months. Her husband got her aborted without her consent. Her in-aws made dowry demands. People from her in-laws gave her mental harassment. Mr. Sushil Tiwary and Mrs. Pramila Tiwary (her husband’s elder brother’s) gave her physical trouble. She wanted to live with her husband.

5. Reply to the Writ Petition was filed by the respondent no. 3, who opposed the petition and stated that Writ Petition was not maintainable. It was also stated that petitioner was absconding and non-bailable warrants as well as process under Sections 82 and 83 Cr.P.C. had been issued against the petitioner by a Court of competent jurisdiction. Patna Police was competent to investigate the matter. The factual situation was denied but it was stated that in view of the atrocities met to Shweta at the hand of accused persons and the fact that she was left alone and helpless, she had no alternative but to take recourse to law at Patna where she was born and brought up and which was her shelter in distress.

6. It is alleged by the respondent that the petitioner Niraj had come to Patna and told V.K. Singh, father of the girl that in case he gives some money, Shweta could go to USA within a month. It is submitted that this was sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of Patna police. It is further stated that father of Shweta had also arranged a conciliation meeting at Patna and this was another ground for invoking jurisdiction of Patna.

7. It is not disputed that petitioner Niraj had filed a divorce petition at New Jersey, USA and Ms. Shweta, daughter of the complainant V.K.Singh had contested the petition. Reply filed by Ms. Shweta in USA Court also contained allegations against Niraj, her husband, though, the nature of allegations differ. In order to see as to what was the controversy between the parties, it would be appropriate to have a look at the reply filed by Ms. Shweta in US Court to the divorce petition of Mr. Niraj. Her reply reads as under :- COUNTERCLAIM The defendant, Sweta Trivedi, by way of Counterclaim against the plaintiff says:-
1.That she was lawfully married to plaintiff Niraj Trivedi, on June 18, 1998, in a religious ceremony in New Delhi, India.
2.That defendant has resided in New Jersey from January 1999 to November 26, 2000; from October 7, 2002 to November 14, 2002; and from December 8, 2002 to present.
3.That since the cause of action arose, plaintiff has been a bona fide resident of the State Jersey and has ever since and for more than one year next preceding the commencement of this case, continued to be such a bona fide resident.
4.That plaintiff now resides at 82 Liberty Ave, in the city of Jersey City, County of Hudson and State of New Jersey.
5.The plaintiff has perpetrated acts of extreme mental cruelty against the defendant that in the past and present both endanger her health and make it improper and unreasonable for the defendant to cohabit with the plaintiff under the same roof. All of the acts that are stated below occurred more than three months prior to the filing of this suit and any acts that are included below which occurred thereafter are merely to demonstrate the continued nature of the plaintiff’s acts.
(a) Defendant traveled from India to United states to join her husband in January 1999. Thereafter, on or about April 1999, plaintiff was diagnosed with Hepatitis. B. Several weeks later, defendant learned that plaintiff had transmitted virus to her. Despite defendant’s illness, plaintiff failed to show any warmth or affection towards the defendant. Plaintiff’s actions caused defendant much humiliation and distress.
(b) During the course of defendant’s treatment for Hepatitis B, defendants learned she was pregnant. Upon learning of the pregnancy, plaintiff insisted that defendant get an abortion. Although defendant expressed her desire to have the baby, plaintiff pressured defendant to undergo an abort ion procedure on or about June 1999.
(c) On or about February 2000, plaintiff and defendant learned that defendant was again pregnant. Despite defendant’s wishes, plaintiff again pressured her to undergo an abortion procedure.
(d) On or about November 2000, when defendant learned that she was pregnant, plaintiff initially insisted that defendant have an abortion. As defendant refused, plaintiff initially suggested that defendant spend time in India to improve her health. Due to the fact that defendant was afraid she would be pressured to have a third abortion, she decided to travel of India to spend a few months with her family. Although plaintiff purchased what defendant assumed was a roundtrip ticket of India, she later learned that he had actually purchased a one way ticket of India.
Plaintiff’s actions caused defendant to feel deceived and humiliated.
(e) Although defendant attempted to contact her husband during the course of the pregnancy, plaintiff avoided all communication with defendant. Plaintiff’s lack of support caused defendant much distress and humiliation during her pregnancy.
(f) On or about March 2001, plaintiff emailed the defendant and informed her he had not want  her to join him in the United State. Plaintiff also informed her that defendant would not be able to return to the United State unless he wanted her to plaintiff’s actions caused defendant to feel severely depressed.
(g) Defendant gave birth to a baby girl on July 27, 2001 in India. After giving birth, defendant immediately emailed her husband to inform him of the birth. Although plaintiff responded by email to the defendant, he merely informed her that he was very busy in the United State and would call her when he found some time. Plaintiff’s lack of response cause defendant much stress.
(h) Defendant remained in India after giving birth to the baby because plaintiff and his family informed defendant that plaintiff was scheduling a trip of India to see her. However, plaintiff postponed many schedule trips and ultimately never traveled to India to see the defendant and the baby.
(i) On or about September 2002, defendant attempted to contact the plaintiff to arrange for financial support documents to allow defendant and the baby to apply for a visa and join the plaintiff in the United States. However, plaintiff did not return defendant’s email or telephone calls. Plaintiff’s abandonment caused defendant to experience sever depression and distress.
(j) Or on about September 2002, defendant managed to attain a visa to allow her to travel to the United States. As the plaintiff failed to provide financial support and immigration documents, the baby was unable to attain a visa and remained in India with the defendant’s parents. Plaintiff’s lack of support for his daughter caused defendant much distress.
(k) Upon arrival to the United State on October 7, 2002, defendant went to her marital home in Jersey City, New Jersey. At this point she discovered through neighbours that the plaintiff had moved to new location without informing the defendant. Plaintiff’s actions caused defendant much humiliation.
(l) On or about October 2002, defendant learned through neighbors that the plaintiff was residing with a female during the time that defendant was abroad in India.
(m) Although family friends attempted to intervene and arrange for mediation between the plaintiff and the defendant, plaintiff has never inquired about the welfare of his daughter.
(n) To date, plaintiff has not provided any financial support for the defendant and their daughter,Nandini Trivedi.
8. It is apparent from perusal of the FIR, statement made by Shweta under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Judicial Magistrate, Patna and from the counter claim lodged by her in USA Court that at no point of time parties lived together in Patna, the marriage was performed in Delhi. Parties lived together either in Delhi or in USA. Except a short visit of two days to Patna made by her husband Niraj, there has been no other allegations of her husband visiting Patna after marriage. Living of Shweta before marriage at Patna, her father’s arranging gifts of Rs. 8 lac for Shweta to be given in her marriage or receiving telephone calls by her father from Shweta about her matrimonial life or alleged atrocities on her, does not create jurisdiction of Patna Police. The alleged criminal acts either were committed in Delhi or in USA Instead of getting an FIR registered at Delhi, girl’s father who was living at Patna chose to get an FIR registered at Patna while the girl herself was not in Patna and was living in USA.
9. The question of registration and investigation of an FIR has arisen in 1999 SC 3596 Satvinder Kaur vs. State (Government of NCT, Delhi) wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that if the crime was not committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Police station, though the FIR can be registered by that Police Station but FIR in such cases should be forwarded to the Police Station having jurisdiction over the place where crime is committed.
10. An argument has been advanced that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the Writ Petition for quashing of FIR registered at Patna. I consider this argument must fail. This Court can exercise jurisdiction in all those cases where though the crime should have been registered in Delhi because the cause of action arose in Delhi but under influence the Police of some other State registers the crime in that State.
11. Cr.P.C. specifically provides for the jurisdiction of Police Stations regarding registration of FIR and investigation of case. The FIR can be registered even if a part of the crime has taken place within the jurisdiction of that Police Station. If the crime is spread over the various Police Stations, then FIR can be registered at any of the Police Station within which the crime has taken place. Crime cannot be registered on the basis of residence of the complainant or the residence of the father of the complainant or the effect of the crime. If the murder is committed in Delhi and the effect is that the wife of the deceased living at Mumbai has become widow, the crime cannot be registered at Mumbai Neither if the alleged matrimonial atrocities have been committed in Delhi, the crime can be registered in Patna in respect of those atrocities because the parents of the wife were living in Patna. In the present case, the wife had either lived in Delhi or in USA. She had contested her divorce petition in USA and had made allegations of cruelties done on her in USA. Thus, place of crime was either Delhi or USA and FIR could have been registered either in Delhi or in USA.
12. In view of above discussion the petitions are allowed to the extent that FIR No. 0188/02, P.S. Digha, Patna, Bihar registered against the petitioners in respect of offences under Section 498-A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act be transferred by the Police of Patna to Commissioner of Police, Delhi, who shall mark it to the appropriate Police Station for further investigation and action. Both the writ petitions stand disposed of.


Sd./-
SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA, J.
January 04, 2008

no 498a jurisdiction - Balchand & Poonam Chand Chhaparwal & Ors Vs Inspector of Police, Coimbatore

                        IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

                       Crl.O.P.No.18774 of 2005 & Crl.M.P.No.5527 of 2005

CORAM : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K.N. BASHA

DATED : 20.08.2008
1. Balchand & Poonam Chand Chhaparwal
2. Chanda Devi Chhaparwal
3. Krishna Jhanwar
4. Gopal Chhaparwal                                                          .. Petitioners/Accused

Vs.

1. State rep. by Inspector of Police,
All Women Police Station (C),Coimbatore City.              .. Respondent/Complainant
2. Kanchan @ Kanchan Devi                                                         .. Respondent
Impleaded as per the order of this Court
dated 3.2.2007 in M.P.No.93 of 2007
                                                                  * * *
Prayer : Criminal Original Petition filed under section 482 of Cr.P.C. to call for the records relating to C.C.No.1202 of 2005 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No.III, Coimbatore, and quash the same. * * *
For Petitioners : Mr.S.Ashok Kumar, SC for M/s.Giridhar Associates
For Respondent-1 : Mr.Babu Muthu Meeran
Additional Public Prosecutor
For Respondent-2 : Mr.M.Subramani


O R D E R
The petitioners have come forward with this petition seeking for the relief of quashing the proceedings initiated against them in C.C.No.1202 of 2005 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.III,Coimbatore, for the offences under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC and under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.

2. Mr.S.Ashok Kumar, learned senior counsel for the petitioners mainly contended that the entire allegations contained in the complaint and other materials available on record clearly shows that the petitioners said to have committed the offences only at Burhanpur, Madhya Pradesh State and no cause of action arises within the State of Tamil Nadu and as such the learned Judicial Magistrate No.III, Coimbatore, ought not to have taken cognizance of the case and the entire proceedings is liable to be quashed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In support of his contention, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the following decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court : (1)Ramesh V. State of T.N. reported in (2005) 3 SCC 507 ; and (2)Manish Ratan v. State of M.P. reported in (2007) 1 SCC 262 ;

3. Per contra, learned counsel for the defacto complainant, who has impleaded as second respondent, contended that a complaint was preferred before the Madhya Pradesh State police and on the basis of the compromise, action was dropped. It is further submitted that thereafter the second respondent/defacto complainant came back to her parental house and again the petitioners/accused said to have caused cruelty to the defacto complainant by contacting over the phone. It is submitted even assuming that the offence was alleged to have taken place at Madhya Pradesh the proceedings are not liable to be quashed and on the other hand, the case may be transferred to the competent Court at Madhya Pradesh. The learned counsel for the defacto complainant placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of M.P. V. Suresh Kaushal reported in (2003) 11 SCC 126 in support of his contention.

4. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor fairly submitted that as per the materials available on record the petitioners alleged to have committed the offences within the jurisdiction of Madhya Pradesh Court as the allegation levelled against the petitioners shows that the defacto complainant was subjected to cruelty while she was residing at Madhya Pradesh. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the defacto complainant is entitled to initiate proceedings before the concerned competent Court at Madhya Pradesh.

5. I have carefully considered the rival contentions put forward by either side and also perused the materials available on record including the complaint and the charge sheet and other statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C.

6. The undisputed fact remains that the defacto complainant was residing along with her husband namely, the first accused at Burhanpur, Madhya Pradesh State and the perusal of the entire materials available on record clearly discloses that the defacto complainant, the second respondent was subjected to cruelty only while she was residing at Madhya Pradesh State. Therefore, it is crystal clear that only Madhya Pradesh Court is having jurisdiction to entertain the case.

7. The learned senior counsel rightly placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramesh V.State of T.N. reported in (2005) 3 SCC 507. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held in that decision that,
“10. The next controversy arising in the case is about the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Court at Tiruchirapalli to try the cases. As already noted, the High Court was of the view that the questions raised in the petition cannot be decided before trial. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the issue relating to the place of trial can be decided even at this stage without going beyond the averments in the complaint filed by the respondents and the High Court should have, therefore, decided this point of jurisdiction, when it is raised before the trial has commenced. Our attention has been drawn to a recent decision of this Court in Y.Abraham Ajith V. Inspector of Police [(2004) SCC (Cri.) 2134]. In that case, the Madras High Court refused to interfere under Section 482 CrPC when the issue of territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate concerned to take cognizance of the offence was raised. This Court did not endorse the approach of the High Court for not recording the finding on the question of jurisdiction. On reading the allegations in the complaint, the Court came to the conclusion that no part of the cause of action arose in Chennai and therefore the Metropolitan Magistrate at Chennai could not have taken cognizance and issued summons. On this ground, the criminal proceedings were quashed and the complaint was directed to be returned to the respondent who was given liberty to file the same in an appropriate court. That was also a case of complaint for an offence under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC filed by the wife against the appellant therein.
11. In the view we are taking, it is not necessary for us to delve into the question of territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Trichy in detail. Suffice it to say that on looking at the complaint as its face value, the offences alleged cannot be said to have been committed wholly or partly within the local jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Court at Trichy. Prima facie, none of the ingredients constituting the offence can be said to have occurred within the local jurisdiction of that court. Almost all the allegations pertain to acts of cruelty for the purpose of extracting additional property as dowry while she was in the matrimonial home at Mumbai and the alleged acts of misappropriation of her movable property at Mumbai. However, there is one allegation relevant to Section 498-A from which it could be inferred that one of the acts giving rise to the offence under the said section had taken place in Chennai. It is alleged that when the relations of the informant met her in-laws at a hotel in Chennai where they were staying on 13-10-1998, there was again a demand for dowry and a threat to torture her in case she was sent back to Mumbai without the money and articles demanded.
12. Thus the alleged acts which according to the petitioner constitute the offences under Sections 498-A and 406 were done by the accused mostly in Mumbai and partly in Chennai. Prima facie, there is nothing in the entire complaint which goes to show that any acts constituting the alleged offences were at all committed at Trichy.”

8. In the above said decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court ultimately transferred the case from Trichy to Chennai holding that part of cause of action arises at Chennai. In yet another decision as relied by the senior counsel for the petitioners in Manish Ratan v. State of M.P. reported in (2007) 1 SCC 262, the Hon’ble Apex Court has taken a similar view by placing reliance on the decision of Ramesh V. State of T.N. reported in (2005) 3 SCC 507, as cited supra.

9. In the decision relied by the learned counsel for the second respondent/defacto complainant in State of M.P. V. Suresh Kaushal reported in (2003) 11 SCC 126 also the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that once there is lack of jurisdiction for a particular Court to entertain or to take cognizance of a case, the said case is to be transferred to the concerned jurisdiction Court. It is to be seen that in the decision cited supra, the other competent jurisdiction Court comes well within the State of Madhya Pradesh.

10. In the instant case, as already pointed out, the entire cause of action arises only at the State of Madhya Pradesh and as such there is a total lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Court of Judicial Magistrate No.III, Coimbatore. It is pertinent to be noted that this Court while exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.cannot transfer the instant case pending on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.III, Coimbatore, to the competent Court at Madhya Pradesh.

11. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Y.Abraham Ajith V.Inspector of Police reported in (2004) SCC (Cri.) 2134. In that decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held in paragraphs 12 & 13 as follows : “..

12.The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the court concerned. In terms of section 177 of the Code, it is the place where the offence was committed. In essence, it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings against the accused.

13.While in civil cases, normally the expression “cause of action” is used, in criminal cases as stated in section 177 of the Code, reference is to the local jurisdiction where the offence is committed. These variations in etymological expression do not really make the position different. The expression “cause of action”, is therefore, not a stranger to criminal cases.”
12. The Hon’ble Apex Court has ultimately held in paragraph 19 as follows :”…
      19.When the aforesaid legal principles are applied, to the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant  
in the complaint petition, the inevitable conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in Chennai, and therefore, the Magistrate concerned had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The proceedings are quashed. The complaint be returned to respondent 2 who, is she so chooses, may file the same in the appropriate court to be dealt with in accordance with law.”
      13. In yet another decision in Bhura Ram V. State of Rajasthan reported in 2008 AIR SCW 4449 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that, “4. The facts stated in the complaint disclose that the complainant left the place where she was residing with her husband and in-laws and came to the city of Sri Ganganagar, State of Rajasthan and that all the alleged acts as per the complaint had taken place in the State of Punjab. The Court at Rajasthan does not have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. On the basis of the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant in the complaint, the inevitable conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in Rajasthan and, therefore, the Magistrate concerned has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. As a consequence thereof, the proceedings before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sri Ganganagar are quashed. The complaint be returned to the complainant and if she so wishes she may file the same in the appropriate court to be dealt with in accordance with law.”

14. The principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the decisions cited supra are squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case. As already pointed out that the entire cause of action arose only at the State of Madhya Pradesh and as such there is total lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Court of Judicial Magistrate No.III, Coimbatore. As such this Court is left with inevitable conclusion that the proceedings initiated against the petitioners is liable to be quashed and accordingly, the proceedings initiated against the petitioners in C.C.No.1202 of 2005 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No.III, Coimbatore, is hereby quashed.

15. The learned Magistrate is directed to furnish certified copies of the relevant documents available on record including the statements of witnesses in the event of second respondent/defacto complainant filing such application for certified copies. It is made clear that the second respondent/defacto complainant is at liberty to prefer a complaint before the concerned jurisdiction police at Madhya Pradesh State, if he so desires.

16. This petition is ordered accordingly. Connected M.P. is closed.


To
1. The Judicial Magistrate No.III,Coimbatore.
2. The Inspector of Police,All Women Police Station (C),Coimbatore City.
3. The Public Prosecutor, High Court, Madras

No 498a jurisdiction - Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors. Vs Inspector of Police, Chennai & Anr.

                                                       SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                                                (Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No. 4573/2003)

CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.)  904 of 2004


PETITIONER:
Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors.    

Vs

RESPONDENT:
Inspector of Police, Chennai & Anr. 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/08/2004
BENCH:
ARIJIT PASAYAT & C.K. THAKKER
JUDGMENT:
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

 Leave granted.

 Appellants call in question legality of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court whereby the appellants'  prayer for quashing proceedings in CC 3532 of 2001 on the file of the  Court of XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate Saidapet, Chennai, by exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in  short the 'Code') was rejected. Background facts sans unnecessary  details are as follows :
Respondent no.2 as complainant filed complaint in the Court of  the concerned magistrate alleging commission of offences punishable  under Sections 498A and 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short  the 'IPC') and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 ( in short the 'Dowry Act'). The magistrate directed the police to investigate and  after investigation charge-sheet was filed by the police.  When the  matter stood thus, the appellants filed an application under Section  482 of the Code before the High Court alleging that the concerned magistrate has no jurisdiction even to entertain the complaint even if  the allegations contained therein are accepted in toto.  According to  them, no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of  the concerned Court.  The complaint itself disclosed that after  15.4.1997, the respondent left Nagercoil and came to Chennai and was  staying there.  All the allegations which are per se without any basis took place according to the complainant at Nagercoil, and therefore, the Courts at Chennai did not have the jurisdiction to deal with the  matter.  It was further submitted that earlier a complaint was lodged  by the complainant before the concerned police officials having  jurisdiction; but after inquiry no action was deemed necessary. 

In response, learned counsel submitted that some of the offences  were continuing offences. The appellant no.1 had initiated proceedings  for judicial separation, the notice for which was  received by her at  Chennai and, therefore, the cause of action existed. 

The High Court unfortunately did not consider rival stands and  even did not record any finding on the question of law raised regarding  lack of jurisdiction.  It felt that legal parameters were to be  considered after a thorough trial after due opportunity to the parties  and, therefore, the factual points raised by parties were not to be  adjudicated under Section 484 of the Code. 

In support of the appeal Mr. T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, learned senior  counsel, submitted that the approach of the High Court is clearly  erroneous.  A bare reading of the complaint would go to show that no  part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Court  where the complaint was filed. Therefore, the entire proceedings had no  foundation.

In response, learned counsel for respondent no.2-complainant submitted that the offences were continuing in terms of Section 178(c)  of the Code, and therefore  The Court had the jurisdiction to deal with  the matter.
Section 177 of the Code deals with the ordinary place of inquiry  and trial, and  reads as follows:

"Section 177:  ORDINARY PLACE OF INQUIRY  AND TRIAL:
Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and  tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it  was committed."
            
Sections 177 to 186 deal with venue and place of trial.  Section 177 reiterates the well-established common law rule referred to   in Halsbury's Laws of England (Vol. IX para 83) that the proper and ordinary venue for the trial of a crime is the area of jurisdiction in  which, on the evidence, the facts occur and which alleged to constitute  the crime.  There are several exceptions to this general rule and some  of them are, so far as the present case is concerned, indicated in Section 178 of the Code which read as follows:
"Section 178 PLACE OF INQUIRY OR TRIAL
(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or
(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or
(c) where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or
(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas."
"All crime is local, the jurisdiction over the crime belongs to  the country where the crime is committed", as observed by Blackstone. A  significant word used in Section 177 of the Code is "ordinarily". Use  of the word indicates that the provision is a general one and must be read subject to the special provisions contained in the Code. As  observed by the Court in Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State of West Bengal   (AIR 1961 SC 1589), L.N.Mukherjee V. State of Madras (AIR 1961 SC 1601), Banwarilal Jhunjhunwalla and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. (AIR 1963 SC 1620) and Mohan Baitha and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr.  (2001 (4) SCC 350), exception implied by the word "ordinarily" need not  be limited to those specially provided for by the law and exceptions  may be provided by law on consideration or may be implied from the provisions of law permitting joint trial of offences by the same Court.  No such exception is applicable to the case at hand. 

As observed by this Court in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi and Anr. (AIR 1973 SC 908), continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is  committed once and for all, that it is one of those offences which  arises out of the failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, liability continues till  compliance, that on every occasion such disobedience or non-compliance  occurs or recurs, there is the offence committed. A similar plea relating to continuance of the offence was  examined by this Court in Sujata Mukherjee (Smt.) v. Prashant Kumar  Mukherjee (1997 (5) SCC 30).  There the allegations related to  commission of alleged offences punishable under Section 498A, 506 and  323 IPC.  On the factual background, it was noted that though the dowry demands were made earlier the husband of the complainant went to the  place where complainant was residing and had assaulted her. This Court held in that factual background that clause (c) of Section 178 was attracted.  But in the present case the factual position is different  and the complainant herself left the house of the husband on 15.4.1997 on account of alleged dowry demands by the husband and his relations.  There is thereafter not even a whisper of allegations about any demand of dowry or commission of any act constituting an offence much less at  Chennai.  That being so, the logic of Section 178 (c) of the Code  relating to continuance of the offences cannot be applied.

The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the concerned  Court.  In terms of  Section 177 of the Code it is the place where the offence was  committed.  In essence it is the cause of action for initiation of the  proceedings against the accused.

While in civil cases, normally the expression "cause of action" is used, in criminal cases as stated in Section 177 of the Code,   reference is to the local jurisdiction where the offence is committed. These variations in etymological expression do not really make the  position different. The expression "cause of action" is therefore not a  stranger to criminal cases.

It is settled law that cause of action consists of bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a court of law.  In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken  with the law applicable to them, gives the allegedly affected party a  right to claim relief against the opponent. It must include some act done by the latter since in the absence of such an act no cause of  action would possibly accrue or would arise.

The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially settled meaning.  In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action.  In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the proceeding including not only the  alleged infraction, but also the infraction coupled with the right  itself.  Compendiously the expression means every fact, which it would  be necessary for the complainant to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or grievance to the judgment of the Court.  Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove such fact, comprises in "cause of action".

The expression "cause of action" has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole  bundle of material facts.

The expression "cause of action" is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for sitting; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person.  (Black's Law Dictionary a "cause of action" is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment.  In "Words and Phrases" (4th Edn.) the meaning attributed to  the phrase "cause of action" in common legal parlance is existence of  those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf.

In Halsbury Laws of England (Fourth Edition) it has been stated as follows:
"Cause of action" has been defined as meaning simply  a factual situation the existence of which entitles  one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against  another person.  The phrase has been held from  earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and  every fact which a defendant would have a right to  traverse.  "Cause of action" has also been taken to  mean that particular act on the part of the defendant  which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or  the subject matter of grievance founding the action,  not merely the technical cause of action".

     When the aforesaid legal principles are applied, to the  factual scenario disclosed by the complainant in the complaint  petition, the inevitable conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in  Chennai and, therefore, the concerned magistrate had no  jurisdiction to deal with the matter.  The proceedings are quashed. The  complaint be returned to respondent No.2 who, if she so chooses, may  file the same in the appropriate Court to be dealt with in accordance  with law. The appeal is accordingly allowed.