Saturday, March 31, 2012

TEP (Tax evasion Petition) against 498a FIL (Father-in-law) and MIL (Mother-in-law)

                                                                                                Date:

Lr. No. TEP/R/1/2012-13                                                        From: Petitioner(498a Victim)


                                                                                           
To:
The Director (Investigation)
O/o Income Tax
Your City.



Sir,

       Sub:Tax Evasion Petition against Sri FIL and  Smt. MIL

                        1) Sri FIL,  S/o: Sri FILs Father Name
                        2) Smt. MIL , W/o: Sri FIL

                       Both are R/o:  Sri FIL and  Smt. MIL address

I, ...... submit the following information for action against Sri FIL and  Smt. MIL

I submit that Sri FIL and  Smt. MIL performed their daughter  Smt. 498a [aka: 498a-wifename ]   marriage on ...........                   .........

I further submit that Smt. 498a wife (de facto complainant) D/o Sri FIL has framed and filed a false complaint against me and my family members with allegations of dowry.

It has been claimed by the de facto complainant in her own submissions that her Parents Sri FIL and  Smt. MIL  had spent nearly Rs. 6.5 Lakhs (inclusive of all, as submitted in Statement of Legal Witness-1 and Complaint Copy) for her marriage on ........ .....(in financial year ............).

Even if we assume that same amount of money was spend in her marriage as alleged in the Complaint Copy and Statement of Legal Witness-1(enclosed as Annexure -1 & Annexure - B1). It needs to be verified how her parents Sri 498a FIL  and  Smt 498a MIL amassed such an amount for this marriage.

It becomes my duty as a citizen of India to ask the authorities to verify the source of income and tax returns filed by Sri FIL and  Smt. MIL

It is further submitted that Sri FIL was a retired (month & year ) school assistant from a Government aided school and Smt. MIL is working in a private un-aided school. From where they bought such amount of money for their daughter marriage and has carried other liabilities of family besides having other liabilities is a matter of investigation which your esteemed department has the jurisdiction to investigate.

Please investigate as to whether Sri FIL and  Smt. MIL has ever shown such an amount as their income and paid taxes on the same (this income does not include only amount allegedly spend on their daughter marriage but also amount spend on other liabilities of their family and invested/spend on the property owned by them) and if they had purchased the gold, marriage related items and house hold articles from shops/showrooms after paying proper taxes for their purchase.

GROUNDS FOR COMPLAINT

As Sri FIL and  Smt. MIL  (as claimed by them) had spent nearly Rs. 6.5 Lakhs in the financial Year ............ so their income tax returns and source of fund of Rs 6.5 Lakhs may be verified and tax should be collected as per provision of Income Tax. If I am not mistaken, the tax would be around
Rs. 25,000 to 1,25,000/- only for the year 2009-2010 and how about the other financial years?

Further, careful perusal of complaint copy, hints provision of section 68, 69, 69A & B, 69C & D and section 133(5) of Income Tax Act, 1961 are applicable to Sri K.S.Sarma and Smt. K. Anuradha as far as my knowledge. However, there may be many other provisions of income tax which is best known to Honorable Income tax authorities.

Section 68 of Income Tax Act, 1961 deals with cash credits proving identity of the creditor, capacity of the creditor, genuineness of the transaction are the important things of this section.

Section 69, 69A & 69B of Income Tax Act, 1961, deals with unexplained investment, unexplained money & investment not fully disclosed in books of accounts.

Section 69C, of Income Tax Act, 1961deals with the unexplained expenditure, the important requirement of this section is that an expenditure has been found to have been incurred by an assessee in any financial year and the assesses fails to indicate satisfactory source of such expenditure.

Section 133(5) , of Income Tax Act, 1961 it is mandatory to file income tax return on the expenditure incurred on any function or ceremony

PRAYER - RELIEF SOUGHT

Sri FIL and  Smt. MIL  income and source of funds should be verified for expenditure of Rs. 6.5 Lakhs in financial year 2009-2010 to recover tax and start proceedings against Sri FIL and  Smt. MIL as per provision of Income Tax and the authority is under bounden duty to investigate  since it relates and its refusal may prejudice the appellant upon which an FIR has been registered.

Since criminal jurisprudence, it is clear that innocent person should not be convicted and a person is presumed innocent unless found guilty/convicted.

Honorable Justice S. N. Dhingra has also given voice to my feelings in para 4 of his Judgment Neera Singh Vs. The State (State Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Others in CRL.M.C.7262/ 2006 - 23.02.2007
                “Now-a-days, exorbitant claims are made about the amount spent on marriage and other ceremonies and on dowry and gifts. In some cases claim is made of spending Crores of rupees on dowry without disclosing the source of income and how funds flowed. I consider time has come that courts should insist upon disclosing source of such funds and verification of income from tax returns”

It is therefore requested that necessary investigations may kindly be made against Sri FIL and  Smt. MIL in the interest of justice and requirements’ of law.

Sri FIL and  Smt. MIL  provides the details of money being spend as gifts received from the relatives, friends etc, the flow of money should also be verified as there is every apprehension that they may provide false information and cheat the Tax Authorities.

As per Income tax rules, the source of Sri FIL and  Smt. MIL income must be checked and recovery should be made from them against the expenditures they had made for their daughter marriage. I may be given the due prize money as per income tax guidelines for revealing this to the authorities.

In the light of foregoing, I request you to kindly take cognizance of my complaint and honor the aforesaid judgment (enclosed as Annexure - E)  to verify their expenditure and initiate and take action to be ordered and taken against Sri FIL and  Smt. MIL for tax evasion if any.  

Kindly expedite your investigation and keep me posted with details of investigation report.


Thanking you,                                                                                 Yours faithfully,

                   
              
                                                                                                       [Petitioner(498a Victim)]

Enclosures: 1). True copy of complaint (Annexure - A) 
                  2) Statement of Legal Witness-1, 2 & 3(Annexure - B1, B2 & B3)  
                  3). True copy of FIR (Annexure - C)      
                  4). True copy of charge sheet (Annexure - D) 
                  5). Copy of judgment Neera Singh Vs. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors in CRL.M.C.
                  No. 7262/ 2006, dated 23.2.2007 ordered by Honorable Justice S. N. Dhingra (Annexure - E)
   

Copy to:         1) The Director General (Investigation)
                      O/o Income Tax, Aayakar Bhawan, Basheer Bagh, L.B. Stadium Road, Hyderabad - 004.
                     
                      2) Member (Investigation) CBDT
                      R.No.-148, Department of Revenue, North Block, New Delhi - 110011

                      3) The Secretary (Investigation) Ministry of Finance,
                      O/o Department of Revenue, Room No.55, North Block, New Delhi - 110011


Sri FIL previous employement details:
......
....

Smt. MIL employement details:
......
........

Thursday, March 29, 2012

Complaint to Vigilance against 498a Father-in-law(FIL) / Mother-in-Law(MIL) Or Vigilance complaint against 498a Father-in-law(FIL) or Mother-in-Law(MIL)



Date:                                                                                From:
                                                                                        498a Accused-Victim
                                                                                        Address & Contact No.



To
The Chief Vigilance Commissioner
O/o Andhra Pradesh Vigilance Commission
North Wing, 'H' Block, Secretairat, Hyderabad - 22.

Sir,

Ref:   (i)  Rule 25(A),  9(2) & 9(7) of  A.P.C.S (Conduct) RULES, 1964
         (ii) Circular Memo No.695/Ser.C/2006, Dated: 12-10-2006
         (iii) Circular Memo No.15486/Ser.C/2007, Dated :30-7-2007
         (iv)  G.O.Ms.No.528, Dated:19-08-2008.                                        

Sub: Vide references cited (i to iv) above, this is a complaint against under-mentioned retired Government for employee U/s 10   r/w sections 8 & 9 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and  violation of
A.P.C.S. (Conduct) Rules 1964.

Name:                      498a FIL/MIL
Office Address:         498a FIL/MIL 's Office
Residential Address:  498a FIL/MIL 's Residence

I, complainant  submit that following information for action against retired Government employee as hereunder:


I submit that 498a FIL/MIL  performed his/her daughters[de facto complainant] marriage on date ..............     at Place............


I further submit that 498a de facto complainant filed a complaint against me and my family members with allegations of  dowry on the file of .............Police Station, Palce and a Criminal case was registered Vide Crime No.........


In this connection it is submitted for your kind information that “dowry giving and abetment” is a cognizable offence U/s 3 of DP Act, 1961. I need not emphasize or over state this aspect as the authorities are well versed.


I submit that as per the complainant allegations,  498a FIL/MIL  admitted that he allegedly given dowry and abetted for his daughter’s marriage, which is gratification on his/her part, U/s 10 r/w sections 8 & 9 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.


I submit that the offence was committed when  498a FIL/MIL was in service, as a Government employee.


I further submit that  498a FIL/MIL  had violated A.P.C.S. (Conduct) Rules 1964, which is a misconduct on his/her part for not filing any declarations (dowry and property) or intimation to the government, despite doing such transactions in the marriage year ....


In the light of the foregoing, I request you to initiate and take action to be ordered and taken against the said retired Government employee 498a FIL/MIL


Kindly expedite your investigation and keep me posted with details of FIR.


Thanking you,                                                                                Yours faithfully,


      
                                                                                               [498a Accused-Victim]


Encl: 1) Complaint Copy ( Exhibit A)
        2) Legal Witness – III Statement of de facto complainant's Father (Exhibit B)
        3) Charge Sheet (Exhibit C)
        4) PIO’s reply from 498a de facto complainant's father's office about non declaration of
            Rule 25(A) & 9 of A.P.C.S(C) RULES, 1964 (Exhibit E)
        5) reference ii [GO on strict compliance of Rule No 9(7) & 9(8)
           of APCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 - Exhibit F]),
        6) reference iii [ GO on strict compliance of Rule No 9(7) of
           APCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 - (Exhibit G)]
        7) reference iv [GO on strict compliance of Rule No 9(2) & 9(7) of
           APCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 -(Exhibit H)] .

Thursday, March 22, 2012

Directions by UP High Court on interpretations of new amendment against arrest in 498a cases

498a Arrest - New Amendment Interpretation/Directions by UP HC  applicable to UP only

                   IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
                 Case:- CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 3322 of 2010

Petitioner:- Re: In The Matter Of Matrimonial Disputes
Petitioner Counsel :- P.N. Gangwar

Vs

Respondent:- State Of U.P. & Others
Respondent Counsel :- Govt. Advocate,Abhay Raj Singh,Pankaj Naqvi
Hon'ble Amar Saran,J.
Hon'ble Shyam Shankar Tiwari,J.

On 8.8.2011, there was an extensive hearing in this case when Ms. Leena Jauhari, Secretary (Home), Government of U.P. Lucknow, Smt. Poonam Sikand, Additional L.R and Tanuja Srivastava, I.G.( Public Grievances), Ms. G. Sridevi, Secretary, U.P. State Legal Services Authority, Sri Ashok Mehta, Organising Secretary, Allahabad High Court, Mediation and Conciliation Centre, Sri Pankaj Naqvi, Sister Sheeba Jose Advocates on behalf of the intervenor 'Sahyog,' Sri D.R. Chaudhary, learned Government Advocate and Sri Bimlendu Tripathi, learned A.G.A appeared and were heard at length.
An affidavit has also been filed on behalf of the Director General of Police on 10.8.2011. Another affidavit was also filed on behalf of Special Secretary (Home), U.P. on 12.8.2011. An application was also moved by the intervenor 'Sahyog.'
This Court appreciates the positive contributions and suggestions of all the aforesaid advocates and other State officials and that this pro bono litigation is being taken up in the right non-adversarial spirit, with the aim to ensure that wherever allegations are not very grave, in order to save families, and children and indeed the institution of marriage, an effort be first made for reconciling matrimonial disputes by mediation before steps can be taken for prosecuting offenders, if they are called for.
In Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand, AIR 2010 SC 3363 the learned members of the bar have been reminded of their noble profession and their noble tradition and of their responsibility to ensure that the social fibre of family life is preserved by desisting from over-implicating all in-laws and their relations as accused persons in 498-A IPC reports, and from filing exaggerated reports. They are also to make an endeavour to bring about amicable settlements to this essentially human problem. It has also been rightly pointed out in Sushil Kumar Sharma v Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3100 (para 18) whilst upholding the vires of section 498-A IPC, that it should be ensured that complaints are not filed with oblique motives by unscrupulous litigants so that a "new legal terrorism" is not unleashed, and that the well-intentioned provision is not misused.

In Kans Raj v State of Punjab, AIR 2000 SC 2324, it has been held that there is a tendency in cases of 498-A IPC and 304 B IPC to rope in a large number of in-laws of the victim wife, and not only the husband. In para 5 of the law report it has been observed: "....In their over enthusiasm and anxiety to seek conviction for maximum people, the parents of the deceased have been found to be making efforts for involving other relations which ultimately weaken the case of the prosecution even against the real accused as appears to have happened in the instant case."

Specifically as a result of the interaction and suggestions which emerged after a dialogue with the Advocates and officials, this Court requires to formulate its opinion on the following points:
1. Whether registration of an FIR is mandatory once an aggrieved woman or the eligible family members as specified under section 198A Cr.P.C approaches the police station giving information that an offence under section 498A IPC or allied provisions such as under section � D.P. Act or under section 406 I.P.C have been committed by the husband or other in-laws and their relations.

2. Should the concerned police officers immediately proceed to arrest the husband and other family members of the husband whenever such an FIR is lodged.

3. Can a distinction be made between the cases where arrest is immediately necessary and other cases where arrest can be deferred and an attempt be first made for bringing about mediation between the parties.

4. What is the appropriate place where mediation should be conducted.

5. Should a time frame be laid down for concluding the mediation proceedings.

6. Who should be the members of the mediation cell in the district.

7. What is the procedure to be followed by the police when a report of a cognizable offence under section 498A IPC or allied provisions is disclosed.

8. Is training of mediators desirable and who should conduct the training?

9. Should the offence under Section 498A be made compoundable and what steps the State Government may take in this direction.

Discussions on the points requiring formulation by the Court:
1.       Whether registration of an FIR is mandatory?
Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure mandates that when any information regarding information of a cognizable offence is given orally to the officer in charge of the Police Station, he is required to reduce it in writing and to enter it into the general diary. The said provision gives no option to the concerned Police Officer to refuse to lodge the F.I.R. once information of a cognizable offence is given to the police officer.
In paragraph No. 30 and 31 in State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Cri. L.J. 527, it has been laid down that section 154 (1) of the Code provides that whenever an information is given that a cognizable offence has been committed, the Police Officer cannot embark upon an inquiry to ascertain as to whether the information was reliable or genuine or refuse to register the case on that ground. The officer in charge of the Police Station is statutorily obliged to register the case and then to proceed with the investigation, if he even has reason to suspect the commission of an offence.
(2) Whether arrest of husband and family members mandatory once FIR is lodged .
It is noteworthy that section 154 Cr.P.C. which deals with the powers of investigation and the necessity of lodging an FIR when a cognizable offence only speaks of "information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence" given to an officer. No pre-condition, as pointed out above, is placed under this provision for first examining whether the information is credible or genuine. In contrast section 41(1)((b) Cr.P.C dealing with the powers of the police to arrest without a warrant from a Magistrate requires the existence of a "reasonable complaint," or "credible information" or "reasonable suspicion" of the accused being involved in a cognizable offence as pre-conditions for effecting his arrest.
The two provisos to section 157 also speak of two exceptions when investigation (and consequent arrest) may not be necessary. These two situations are:
(a) when information as to the commission of any such offence is given against any person by name and the case is not of a serious nature, the officer in charge of a police station need not proceed in person or depute a subordinate officer to make an investigation on the spot;
(b) if it appears to the officer in charge of a police station that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he shall not investigate the case. However in such situations the police officer is to mention in his report the reasons for not investigating the case. In the second case, where a police officer is of the opinion that there is no sufficient ground for investigating a matter, he is to also inform the informant of his decision.
The proviso (b) to section 157 (1) Cr. P. C. has been discussed in paragraphs No. 53 and 54 in Bhajan Lal (supra). The law report clarifies that clause (b) of the proviso permits a police officer to satisfy himself about the sufficiency of the grounds even before entering on an investigation. However, at that stage, the satisfaction that on the allegations, a cognizable offence warranting investigation is disclosed, has only to be based on the F.I.R. and other materials appended to it, which are placed before the Police Officer. Therefore, if it appears to the Police Officer that the matrimonial dispute between the spouses is either not of a grave nature or is the result of a conflict of egos or contains an exaggerated version, or where the complainant wife has not received any injury or has not been medically examined, he may even desist or defer the investigation in such a case.
Recently by Act No. 5 of 2009, the newly introduced section 41 (1) (b), has been given effect to from 1.11.2010. This sub-section provides that if some material or credible information exists of an accused being involved in a cognizable offence punishable with 7 years imprisonment or less with or without fine, the Police Officer has only to make an arrest, if he is satisfied that such arrest is necessary (i) to prevent such person from committing any further offence, (ii) for proper investigation of the offence; (iii) to prevent such person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tampering with the evidence in any manner; (iv) for preventing such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to a witness to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or the Police Officer (v) or unless such a person is arrested, he may not appear in the Court when required. This new provision has forestalled any routine arrests simply because a person is said to be involved in a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years. The arrest is only to be effected if any or all of the five conditions abovementioned are fulfilled. For making or for not making such arrest, the Police Officer has to record his reasons. In contrast to this provision, under section 41 (1) (ba) such a limitation has not been provided for those cases, where credible information has been received that a person has committed an offence punishable with imprisonment of over 7 years.
A new provision, section 41 A Cr.P.C has also been added by Act No. 5 of 2009 (with effect from 1.11.2010) which gives powers to a Police Officer to issue a notice directing the person against whom a reasonable complainant has been made or credible information or reasonable suspicion exists to appear before him or at any place that he may specify in the notice where the police officer is of the opinion that the arrest is not required under the provisions of section 41(1) Cr.P.C. but the accused is to comply with the notice and he would not be arrested, if he continues to comply with the terms of the notice. However, where the person fails to comply with the notice, the police has all powers to arrest him, unless there is some order of the Court granting him bail or staying his arrest.
Now an offence under section 498A IPC is punishable with imprisonment only up to three years and fine. If there are no injuries on a victim, in our opinion, it constitutes a fit case for the police officer to exercise powers conferred by the newly introduced section 41(1)(b) read with section 41 (A), where instead of straight away arresting the accused, it would be a better option at the initial stage for the police officer to require the said person to appear before him or before the Mediation Centre. As pointed out above section 41 A Cr.P.C. permits calling the person concerned before the police officer himself or to any specified place. Hence a notice can be given to the accused to appear before the mediation centre. This restraint on arrest, and placing of conditions or terms for arrest would also apply a fortiori to the accused family members of the husband of the aggrieved wife.
It may be pointed out that if the FIR is immediately registered that will placate the concerns of the aggrieved wife to some extent that action is being taken on her complaint, and it has not been put on the back burner.
(3)      Whether distinction possible between cases necessitating immediate arrest, and cases where attempt for mediation should first be made.
Arrest may be necessitated, if the husband or other in-laws have given a grave beating to the wife endangering her life or where the wife has been subjected to repeated violence or there are any other circumstances of exceptional cruelty against the wife, where future recurrence of violence or cruelty seems likely, or for preventing the husband and his accused family members from trying to browbeat witnesses or to tamper with the course of justice, or for ensuring the presence of the husband or his accused family members at the trial, or for effective investigation. In all other cases, we are of the opinion that an attempt should be first made for bringing about reconciliation between the parties by directing the complainant wife and her natal family members and the husband and other family members to appear before the Mediation Centre when the wife or other eligible relations under section 198-A Cr.P.C. approaches the police station for lodging the report.
The advantage of not immediately arresting the accused husband and his family members in a trivial case where there appear to be no injuries on the aggrieved wife, is that in sudden matrimonial disputes, because of clash of egos between the wife and her natal family members and the husband and in-laws, the wife's side at the initial stage usually insists on effecting the arrests of the husband and other in-laws. Once the husband or his family members are arrested, and subsequently bailed out, little motivation remains for the parties to try and resolve their disputes by mediation. This may prove disadvantageous for the wife in the long run who may not have a source of independent livelihood for running her life in the future.
4.       Appropriate place where mediation should be conducted.
The officials as well as the learned Government Advocate and other lawyers present unanimously recommended that the Mediation Cell should not be at the police station. The I.G. (Public Grievances) pointed out that the police officer before whom the report is lodged lack proper training for conducting mediations sessions. Also if the police officer refrains from arresting the accused persons pursuant to the wife's FIR, by attempting to mediate in the dispute between the parties, even if it is a case of no injury, and even where he is only acting in accordance with the general directions of the Court, questions about his integrity are unnecessarily raised.
Moreover it is pointed out by the Secretary of the Legal Services Authority that now Mediation or Conciliation Centres have been established in all the District Courts. We, therefore, think that the mediation proceedings should be carried out in the said Mediation Centre.
5.       Need for time frame for concluding the mediation proceedings.
The I.G. (Public Grievances) and others present rightly pointed out that a time frame must be laid down for concluding the mediation proceedings as when an aggrieved wife approaches the police for relief, because she has been subjected to cruelty. If the matter is unduly prolonged in the mediation process, the delay could act as a shield to protect the accused from facing the penalty of law, causing frustration and bitterness for the aggrieved wife. Notice should as far as possible be served personally on the accused and the parties should be directed to appear before the Mediation Centre within a week or 10 days of the lodging of the report by the aggrieved wife or family members. Thereafter we think, that as far as possible, the mediation proceedings should be concluded within two months of the first appearance of both the parties before the Mediation Centre.
6.       Who should be the members of the mediation cell in the district?
The Mediation Cell in the district should be headed by the Secretary of the Legal Services Authority in the district, (at present, the Civil Judge, Senior Division has been made the Secretary), other panel or retainer lawyers appointed by the District Legal Services Authority, other lawyers, who volunteer for giving free services before the Mediation centre, especially female lawyers should also be made members of the Mediation Cell. It is also desirable to have three or four social workers (especially female) in the Cell. A female police officer of the rank of Dy. S.P. may also be appointed an ex-officio member of the Mediation Cell.
7.       Procedure to be followed by the police when a report of a cognizable offence under section 498A IPC or allied provisions is reported.
The report regarding commission of cognizable offence under section 498A IPC or other allied sections may be lodged at the concerned police station where the incident takes place or at the 'Mahila Thana' especially created in the district for investigation of such cases. The police officer concerned will get the aggrieved woman medically examined for injuries if the same are present. If the report has been lodged at some police station other than the Mahila Thana, the injury report and relevant police papers shall be forwarded to the Mahila Thana for investigation of the case, and in appropriate cases the investigating police officer at the Mahila Thana may refer the matter to the mediation centre in the Civil Court, and direct the complainant to be present at the mediation centre on a fixed date 7 to 10 days thereafter. The accused should as far as possible also be personally given notice to appear before the mediation centre on the date fixed. We would also like the presence of trained social workers (especially female) or legal aid panel lawyers to be present at the Mahila Thana for counselling the aggrieved woman and her family members for first trying to solve their dispute by mediation, when the case is registered at the mahila thana. The notice to the husband and other family members should mention that in cases the husband or the family members of the aggrieved wife fail to appear on the date fixed or on future dates, as directed by the Mediation Centre or fail to comply with any condition that may be imposed by the police officer or Mediation Centre, steps shall be taken for arresting the accused. The accused husband or other in-laws should be directed to report before the police officer on a date two months after the date of first appearance before the Mediation Centre and inform the Police Officer about the progress in the mediation. The in-charge of the mediation proceeding may also direct the husband or other family members to appear before the Police Officer at an earlier date fixed in case mediation has failed or it has been successfully concluded and the parties concerned shall appear before the Police Officer on the said date. It would also be open to the complainant wife to inform the police officer about the progress (or lack of it) of the mediation process. The notice should also clarify that in case mediation is pronounced as unsuccessful at an earlier date, and information is given by either party or the Mediation centre to the Police Officer, he may require the presence of the accused husband or his relations at an earlier date. If mediation has been successfully concluded, it will be open to the Police Officer to submit a final report in the matter. In cases, where it has not been successfully concluded and the Police Officer is of the view that arrest may not be necessary in a particular case, he may direct the accused persons to obtain bail from the Competent Court. In case, he is of the opinion that the arrest is necessitated at a subsequent stage, it will be open to the Police Officer to take such accused persons in custody. He should of course record his reason for making the said arrest as provided under section 41 (1) (b) (ii).
8.       Necessity of training to mediators.
We endorse the opinion of the intervening lawyers, the learned Government Advocate, Sri Ashok Mehta, Organizing Secretary of the Mediation Centre of the Allahabad High Court and the Government officials present, including the Secretary of the Legal Services Authority, that training for mediators is a sine qua non for effective mediation. The Organizing Secretary of the Allahabad High Court Mediation Centre (AHMC) and Secretary of the U.P. Legal Services Authority (UPLSA) stated that the centre and authority are prepared to impart training to the mediators. We welcome this offer and direct that there should be co-ordination between the AHMC and UPLSA for giving effect to this offer. By and by as the State Government is able to create a cadre of trainers for mediation, their services may also be utilised for training mediators in the districts.
We think training is necessary because the responses to our queries from the subordinate district courts reveal the poor success rate in the cases referred by the High Court or where the concerned subordinate court has itself initiated the process of mediation. By contrast the success rate at the Mediation Centre in the Allahabad High Court, which has independent trained mediators (usually lawyers) is much higher. The first requirement for successful mediation is the patience on the part of the mediator, and his willingness to give sufficient time to the contesting parties and especially to the wife to express her bottled up grievances. Thereafter, in a disinterested manner, the mediator should encourage the parties to come up with solutions, giving useful suggestions for bringing about reconciliation, as the mediator cannot impose his solution on the parties.
The guidelines hereinabove have been spelt out by the Court because of the specific request of the officials and lawyers present to spell out the terms of the same, as guidance for the State government (esp. the home department), the Legal Services Authority and the police for issuing appropriate circulars or government orders.
(9) Should offences under section 498-A IPC be made compoundable?
We have received considerable feedback from subordinate judicial authorities that unless the offence under section 498-A IPC is made compoundable, much benefit cannot be derived by trying to bring about mediation between the parties. A dilemma then arises before the concerned Court, (which cannot close the trial because the spouses have compromised their dispute) or even before the aggrieved wife, if she decides to settle her dispute with her spouse and in-laws either by agreeing to stay with them or to part amicably, usually after receiving some compensation.
Even if she is no more interested in repeatedly visiting the court for prosecuting the accused, in the absence of provisions for compounding the offence, she has willy nilly to perjure by making a false statement that her initial report was untrue or lodged under influence of X or Y. If on the basis of this statement the trial Court acquits the husband and his family members, and the aggrieved wife returns to her matrimonial home, in the cases where she is again maltreated, if she lodges a fresh report, its reliability will be open to question.
The Apex Court in Ramgopal v. State of M.P., 2010 SCALE 711 observed that an offence under section 498-A IPC is essentially private in nature, and it should be made compoundable if the parties are willing to amicably settle their dispute. Directions were given to the Law Commission of India to consider the matter and to make appropriate recommendations to the Government to bring about suitable amendments in the statute.
In Rajeev Verma v. State of U.P., 2004 Cri.L.J. 2956, which was a decision given by a bench in which one of us (Amar Saran J) was a member, a similar suggestion was made to the Law Commission of U.P. to recommend to the State government to make the offence under section 498-A IPC compoundable with the permission of the Court under section 320 Cr.P.C.
The reasons for the suggestion were that such FIRs are often lodged in the heat of the moment, without reflection after a sudden quarrel, and sometimes as a result of wrong advice or influences. But the complaining wife, who usually has no source of independent livelihood (as a key problem in our society is the lack of economic and social empowerment of women) and is unable to provide for herself in the future, may have to suffer later if the relationship with her husband is irrevocably ruptured due to the hasty filing of the criminal case, particularly in view of the fact that the offence is non-compoundable.
To meet this situation B.S. Joshi v State of Haryana, AIR 2003 SC 1386, Manoj Sharma v State, 2008 SC(Suppl) 1171, and Madan Mohan Abbot v State of Punjab, AIR 2008 SC 1969 recommended quashing of the complaint in proceedings under section 482 Cr.P.C or in the writ jurisdiction where the aggrieved wife compounded the offence. In the latter case it was observed that where the dispute is purely personal in nature, (i.e. the element of the offence being a crime against society is secondary), and the wife decides to compound the offence, as there would be little likelihood of conviction, quashing of the offence should not be refused on the hyper-technical view that the offence was non-compoundable "as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the Courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilized in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation"
The following passage in paragraph 12 in G.V. Rao v L.H.V. Prasad, AIR 2000 SC 2474 has been cited with approval in B.S. Joshi:
"There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. The marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counseled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a Court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their "young" days in chasing their "cases" in different Courts."
In Rajeev Verma however relying on B.S. Joshi it was mentioned that whilst the trial could be quashed in an application under section 482 Cr.P.C or under Article 226, being a fruitless prosecution where there was little likelihood of conviction as the parties had settled their dispute, but the proper forum for deciding the matter whether the compromise application was voluntary and bona fide or whether it was coerced was the lower court which could decide whether it was a fit case for granting permission to the wife to compound the offence under section 320(2) Cr.P.C. This was only possible if the offence under s. 498-A IPC was made compoundable with the permission of the Court.
A good option for providing recompense to the maltreated woman is "The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005" which provides for a gamut of civil rights for the aggrieved woman who has entered into a domestic relationship with a man, with or without marriage. Such civil rights include "Protection orders" (section 18) prohibiting the respondent from committing any act of violence, visiting the place of work, operating the common bank locker, making telephonic contact etc. "Residence orders" (section 19), which restrain the respondent from dispossessing a woman from the shared household, or from alienating or renouncing his rights to the property or by directing him to remove himself, or by providing alternate accommodation to the aggrieved woman at the existing level.
By providing "monetary reliefs" (sections 20 and 22) by paying for loss of earnings or medical expenses, or loss due to destruction of property by domestic violence, or for maintenance of the woman and her dependent children, or by payment of compensation for causing injuries (including mental torture). "Custody orders" (section 21) for custody of the child to the woman (including visiting rights) for the respondent. Criminal proceedings under this Act have been allowed only as a last resort, under section 31 when the respondent commits a breach of a protection order, or where at the stage of framing charges for breach of the protection order he finds that an offence under section 498-A IPC has also been committed by the respondent.
The Act also provides under section 14 for the Magistrate to send a matter for "counselling" before a registered "service provider," who is qualified to provide counselling in such matters to the contesting parties or to provide shelter etc. to the aggrieved woman.
In the counter-affidavit dated 12.8.11 filed on behalf of the Home Secretary, U.P., it has specifically been mentioned that the State government has given its consent to the Union of India to make offences under section 498-A IPC compoundable, and the letter of the Home (Police) Section-9 to the Union Home Ministry dated 4.2.10 has been annexed.
Whereas we appreciate this positive attitude of the State government in not objecting to section 498-A IPC being made a compoundable offence. However we find that Andhra Pradesh, by Act 11 of 2003 (w.e.f 1.8.03) has added section 498 A (wrongly described as 494 A) after section 494 in the table in section 320(2) Cr.P.C. and has permitted the woman subjected to cruelty to compound the offence with the permission of the Court, but added a proviso that a minimum period of three months be allowed to elapse from the date of application for compromise before a Court can accept the request, provided any of the parties do not withdraw in the intervening period. The U.P. government may consider bringing out a similar amendment, as it has already expressed its opinion that the offence under section 498-A IPC be made compoundable.
Before parting we must clarify that the Court is of the firm view that acts of cruelty or violence against women have neither ceased, nor have they been reduced, and the special provision for meeting this problem must be retained in the statute book. We quote with approval the view expressed in paragraph 11 of the recent Law Commission of India, Consultation Paper-cum-Questionnaire regarding section 498-A of IPC
"While the Commission is appreciative of the need to discourage unjustified and frivolous complaints and the scourge of over-implication, it is not inclined to take a view that dilutes the efficacy of s. 498-A to the extent of defeating its purpose especially having regard to the fact that atrocities against women are on the increase. A balanced and holistic view has to be taken on weighing the pros and cons. There is no doubt a need to address the misuse situations and arrive at a rational solution - legislative or otherwise."
List this case on 8.11.2011 before the regular bench to be headed by one of us (Hon'ble Amar Saran J)
The State government through the Chief Secretary, U.P., the Principal Secretary, (Home), U.P., Secretary Law/ L.R. U.P., Director General Police U.P., and Member-Secretary, U.P. Legal Services Authority may issue appropriate guidelines or circulars for laying down a system for proceeding in matters where reports are lodged of commission of offences under section 498 A IPC where immediate arrests may not be necessary, for laying down the appropriate criteria in this regard, and for sending the matters for mediation before the mediation cells in the Civil Courts, in accordance with the aforesaid directions of this Court. The Principal Secretary, (Finance), U.P. may apprise the Court as to the provision for finance for appointing social workers/panel lawyers at the Mahila Thanas, for ensuring that appropriate training is given to the social workers, legal aid lawyers, and concerned police officers for facilitating the mediation process, for making available adequate infrastructure/ manpower at the mediation cells in the Civil Courts, and for meeting expenses on other contingencies. Let the aforesaid authorities submit their compliance reports within 4 weeks. We would also like reports from all the Secretaries of the District Legal Services Authorities to submit their compliance reports (through the District Judges) for getting the aforementioned minor matters relating to offences under section 498 A IPC settled through mediation and the difficulties they encounter or forsee in complying with the directions of this Court by the next listing. The State government is also directed to submit its report on the next listing on the suggestion of the Court to take steps for making the offence under section 498-A IPC compoundable with the permission of Court by amending section 320 Cr.P.C in U.P. as has been done in the case of Andhra Pradesh. Registrar-General is directed to forward copies of this order within a week to the Chief Secretary, Principal Secretary, (Home), Law Secretary/LR, U.P., Principal Secretary (Finance), U.P., D.G.P., U.P., Member-Secretary, U.P., Legal Services Authority, U.P., Secretaries/ Civil Judges (Senior Division) through District Judges in all districts in U.P., Sri Ashok Mehta, Organizing Secretary, Allahabad High Court, Mediation Centre, Sri Pankaj Naqvi, and Sister Sheeba Jose, Advocates for the intervenors, Government Advocate, U.P. and other advocates and officials present in the hearing on 8.8.11 for information and compliance.

Order Date:- 30.9.2011 HSM.

Direction given to police & Magistrates on manner of remanding accused in offences punishable upto 7 years

Direction given to police & Magistrates on manner of remanding accused in offences punishable upto 7 years in accordance with newly introduced section


                        IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
                             Case: Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 17410 of 2011
Petitioner: Shaukin
Petitioner counsel: Mrs. Tabassum Hashimi, Ashwani Kumar Srivastava

Vs

Respondent: State of UP and others
Respondent counsel: Government Advocate

Hon'ble Amar Saran, J.
Hon'ble Kalimullah Khan, J.


1.A personal affidavit of the DGP, U.P. dated 11.10.11 has been filed and this Court is pleased to note that in compliance of our earlier order dated 15.9.11. the DGP, U.P. has issued a circular dated 3.10.11 addressed to all the regional IGs/ DIGs/ SSPs/SPs in-charge of all districts and departmental heads of other police units to strictly enforce the newly introduced amendments, viz. sub-section 41(1)(b) and section 41 A Cr.P.C and the directions contained in the order of this Court dated 15.9.11 in Cr. Misc Writ Petiton No. 17410 of 2011, Shaukeen v State and order dated 23.9.11 in Cr. Misc. Writ Petition No. 18661/ 2011, Ram Abhilash and others v State.


2. It was also pointed out in the circular that the investigating officers who file counter-affidavits before the High Court do not have any knowledge about these provisions and how they are to be applied.


3. The following observations in the order dated 15.9.11 have been quoted in the DGP's circular: "Let a copy of this order be forwarded to the DGP, U.P. within one week by the registry. The DGP may circulate this order to all police stations and investigating officers in U.P. with directions to ensure strict and honest compliance with the provisions of sections 41(1)(b) and 41 A Cr.P.C and to refrain from routinely arresting persons wanted in cases punishable by imprisonment up to 7 years, unless in particular cases the exceptional circumstances enumerated in section 41(1)(b) Cr.P.C. exist, after recording his reasons for arrest. Let the DGP submit his compliance report of this direction within three weeks."


4. Annexure 2 to the DGP's affidavit in compliance of our dated 15.9.11 also contains the following endorsement from all 72 districts in U.P.: "जनपद / थाना स्तर पर आदेश का अनुपालन कड़ाई से किया जा रहा है"


5. The directions were issued by DGP's circular dated 3.10.11 to subordinate police officials to clarify that ordinarily police shall not immediately arrest accused persons wanted in matters punishable with imprisonment upto 7 yrs This limitation was subject to exceptions mentioned in aforesaid amended sections


6. By the present order we proceed to explain the import and meaning of the amended provisions 41(1)(b) and 41a Cr.P.C, and to give some illustrations where accused could be arrested straightaway on the lodging of FIR, and other illustrations where immediate arrests may not be needed, because we think that in many cases the police is still routinely proceeding to arrest accused persons even if they are involved in offences punishable with up to 7 years imprisonment, in contravention of the express terms of sections 41(1)(b) or 41 A Cr.P.C.


7. It would be useful to extract the material provisions, sections 41(1)(b) and 41 A, which have been introduced by Act No. 5 of 2009, with effect from 1.11.2010 and also section 170(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, here :
41. When police may arrest without warrant. -- (1) Any police officer may without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest any person –

(a)------------------
(b) against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years whether with or without fine, if the following conditions are satisfied, namely:-
(i) the police office has reason to believe on the basis of such complaint, information, or suspicion that such person has committed the said offence;
(ii) the police office is satisfied that such arrest is necessary—

(a) to prevent such person from committing any further offence; or
(b) for proper investigation of the offence; or
(C) to prevent such person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tampering with such evidence in any manner; or
(d) to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to the police officer; or
(e) as unless such person is arrested, his presence in the Court whenever required cannot be ensured,
and the police officer shall record while making such arrest, his reasons in writing.
Provided that a police officer shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of this sub-section, record the reasons in writing for not making the arrest. –
41 A. Notice of appearance before police officer- (1) The police officer shall in all cases, where the arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of sub-section(1) of section 41, issue a notice directing the person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received,or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence, to appear before him or at such other place as may be specified in the notice.
(2) Where such a notice is issued to any person, it shall be the duty of the person to comply with the terms of the notice.
(3) Where such person complies and continues to comply with the notice, he shall not be arrested in respect of the offence referred to in the notice unless, for reasons to be recorded, the police officer is of the opinion that he ought to be arrested.
(4) Where such person, at any time, fails to comply with the terms of the notice or is unwilling to identify himself, the police officer may, subject to such orders as may have been passed by a competent court in this behalf, arrest him for the offence mentioned in the notice.
170. Cases to be sent to Magistrate when evidence is sufficient. -(1) If, upon an investigation under this Chapter, it appears to the officer in charge of the police station that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground as aforesaid, such officer shall forward the accused under custody to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a police report and to try the accused or commit him for trial, or if the offence is bailable and the accused is able to give security, shall take security from him for his appearance before such Magistrate on a day fixed and for his attendance from day to day before such Magistrate until otherwise directed.


8. The import of the said provisions is that normally where an accused has been named in the FIR, and the offence is punishable with upto 7 years imprisonment, the arrest of the accused may not be necessary at the initial stage and his attendance may be secured by issuing a notice to him to appear before the police officer under section 41 A Cr.P.C. In such cases it would be advisable to arrest the accused only after sufficient evidence of his involvement in the crime has been collected and the charge sheet needs to be submitted. Under section 170(1) Cr.P.C. it has been provided that on completion of investigation if sufficient evidence has been collected the accused shall be forwarded in custody to the Magistrate concerned, unless he has been released on bail (if the offence was bailable), in which event security may be taken for his appearance before the Magistrate. This practice of not arresting the accused straightaway and arresting them only after sufficient evidence has been collected is normally followed by the CBI, and CB (CID) in their investigations.


9. Where however the accused has not been named in the FIR, or at the time when the co-accused have been picked up, for example in a case of vehicle theft or recovery of other stolen goods, or where the co-accused has been arrested while committing a crime, and he names another accused as also having participated in the crime, whose custodial interrogation may be necessary and the police officer is of the opinion that the disclosure furnishes credible information or gives rise to reasonable suspicion for inferring that this accused whose arrest is sought could also be involved, or there are chances that such an accused would abscond or not respond to a notice under section 41A to appear, looking to the nature of the crime and the background of the particular accused, these maybe appropriate cases where immediate arrests may be needed. Likewise where the accused whose arrest is sought appears to be habitually engaged in committing crimes or appears to be participating in some organized crimes, and there is probability of the accused repeating the offence, these would also be circumstances where it may be necessary to arrest such accused without delay.


10. However in a case under section 498 A IPC where the wife subject to violence has gone back to her "maika" following the violence, it may not be necessary in a particular case to immediately arrest the husband and other family members who have been made accused in the FIR until adequate evidence has been collected, as she is unlikely to encounter violence when she is away from her "sasural." In E.C. Act offences again where the licences of a ration card dealer named in the FIR has been suspended, he may not have any opportunity to again indulge in blackmarketing or to commit a new offence under the E.C. Act. Here too arrests can be deferred until sufficient evidence to submit a charge sheet has been collected, when he needs to be produced before the trial court. But where the dealer is trying to obtain affidavits from ration card holders and it appears that he is trying to win over witnesses, then it may be open to the police to arrest him straight away. We have mentioned these examples as illustrations for situations where arrests may or not be immediately needed and they are by no means exhaustive.


11. It is with the objective of striking a balance on the need to provide the Constitutional protection from arbitrary arrest guaranteed under Article 21 and the restraint on arrests for offences punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years, subject to certain exceptions as provided for under section 41(1)(b) Cr.P.C. and the need of the police to carry out its investigation without interference, that we have refrained from passing blanket orders staying the arrests of the accused in all such cases.


12. But we do expect the police officer to record reasons in a bona fide and honest manner, why it has become necessary to arrest the accused in a particular case punishable with imprisonment with upto 7 years. The police officer should not mechanically and routinely write down in the case diary that there is likelihood of the accused running away, or presume that the accused would not respond to the notice to appear under section 41 A Cr.P.C, or that he would tamper with the evidence, unless there are strong reasons with concrete material for taking such a view, and this satisfaction along with the concrete reasons for taking the view need to be spelt out clearly in the case diary before the accused is arrested.


13. Thus strong reasons are needed for arresting an accused with respectable antecedents, who is an income tax payee with roots in the community, and a permanent abode, no history of earlier abscondance or non-cooperation with the police and who is not likely to tamper with the evidence or to again commit a crime unless he is immediately arrested.


14. The propriety, honesty and genuiness of the reasons given for arrests in particular cases punishable with imprisonment up to seven years and whether they conform to the requirements of sections 41(1)(b) and 41 A Cr.P.C. therefore need to be strictly monitored by the superior officers, i.e. C.O.s/ S.P.s/SSPs or DIGs in the districts, as has been emphasized in the DGP's circular dated 3.10.11. We make it clear that in the event that this Court finds that the accused who are wanted in cases punishable with up to 7 years imprisonment are being arrested in a routine and mechanical matter, without the existence of the conditions necessary for arresting them as mentioned in sections 41(1)(b) and 41 A Cr.P.C. this Court will have no hesitation in summoning the concerned police officers or even the superior police officers and they may even have to face contempt charges. For persistent unwarranted arrests in such matters in violation of the provisions of sections 41(1)(b) and 41 A and the DGP's circular dated 3.10.11. we may even recommend disciplinary action against such errant police officers to the DGP, U.P.

15. Section 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure also requires production of the case diary before the Magistrate before whom the accused is produced for remand.


16.Section 167(1) reads thus:
167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours. ----
(1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by section 57, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of sub-inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate.


17. As rightly pointed out in Bir Bhadra Pratap Singh v D.M., Azamgarh, 1959 Cri.L.J 685 the forwarding of case diary entries under section 167(1) Cr.P.C. is not an empty formality, and the Magistrate is not simply to "rubber stamp" the prayer of the police officer seeking remand of the accused, but he is to apply his judicial mind to satisfy himself that the requirements of law are met when the police produces an accused for remand. At the time of granting the remand we expect the Magistrate to examine the case diary for satisfying himself whether the police officer's reasons for immediate arrest in the cases punishable with imprisonment upto 7 years was held by him in a bona fide manner and whether the reasons for remand are restricted to the pre-conditions for arrest mentioned in the newly introduced sections 41(1)(b) and 41 A Cr.P.C. The Magistrate needs to closely examine as to how the police officer could reach a conclusion that unless the accused was arrested he would repeat the offence, or why without arrest the investigation could not proceed, or whether the particular accused was as a matter of fact likely to cause the evidence to disappear, or would tamper with the evidence, or the accused would try and influence witnesses, or without arrest the particular accused would not appear in Court.
These opinions of the police officer are to be based on concrete material and cannot be the mere ipse dixit of the officer. If he finds that no genuine reasons which accord with the requirements of sections 41(1)(b) and 41 A exist the Magistrate may even refuse to grant remand to the accused, and allow the accused to be released on a personal bond with a direction to appear before the competent court or before the police when called upon to do so, with or without security.


18. There would be no impediment in the Magistrate remanding the accused to judicial custody at later stages as authorized under section 41(1)(b)(ii)(e) and section 170(1) Cr.P.C. when the accused is produced before the Magistrate and the case diary shows that sufficient evidence for submitting a charge sheet has been collected. Needless to mention that in case the accused has already secured bail, then the police officer would be disentitled to arrest an accused person for seeking his remand because the charge sheet is to be submitted. The accused could then be summoned to appear by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence in exercise of powers under section 204 Cr.P.C.


19. If accused who are required in cases punishable with upto 7 years sentence are not routinely arrested by the police, or are granted bail by the lower court itself, without any undue delay in disposing of their bail applications, and in appropriate cases the facility of releasing the accused on interim bails on personal bonds pending consideration of their regular bails with or without security with a direction to appear when required is also extended to them, as has been laid down in the Apex Court Court in Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh V State of U.P., (2009) 4 SCC 437, the Full Bench in Amaravati and another v State of U.P., 2005 Cri.L.J. 755, and the Division Bench in Sheoraj Singh @ Chuttan v State of U.P. and others, 2009(65) ACC 781, considerable time of the High Court could be spent more productively in hearing single judge and two judge appeals, or bails in grave matters. At present we find that most of the High Court single and division benches on the criminal side are engaged in considering an inordinately large number of applications for bail, applications under section 482 Cr.P.C., and Division Bench criminal writ petitions in such matters punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years, which could easily be dealt with by the Magistrates and Sessions Courts.

DIRECTIONS:

20.We therefore direct the Magistrates that when accused punishable with upto 7 years imprisonment are produced before them remands may be granted to accused only after the Magistrates satisfy themselves that the application for remand by the police officer has been made in a bona fide manner and the reasons for seeking remand mentioned in the case diary are in accordance with the requirements of sections 41(1)(b) and 41 A Cr.P.C. and there is concrete material in existence to substantiate the ground mentioned for seeking remand. Even where the accused himself surrenders or where investigation has been completed and the Magistrate needs to take the accused in judicial custody as provided under section 170(1) and section 41(1)(b)(ii)(e) Cr.P.C, prolonged imprisonment at this initial stage, when the accused has not been adjudged guilty may not be called for, and the Magistrates and Sessions Courts are to consider the bails expeditiously and not to mechanically refuse the same, especially in short sentence cases punishable with upto 7 years imprisonment unless the allegations are grave and there is any legal impediment in allowing the bail, as laid down in Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh V State of U.P., (2009) 4 SCC 437, and Sheoraj Singh @ Chuttan v State of U.P. and others, 2009(65) ACC 781. The facility of releasing the accused on interim bail pending consideration of their regular bails may also be accorded by the Magistrates and Sessions Judges in appropriate cases.


21. The Magistrate may also furnish information to the Registrar of the High Court through the District Judge, in case he is satisfied that a particular police officer has been persistently arresting accused in cases punishable with upto 7 year terms, in a mechanical or mala fide and dishonest manner, in contravention of the requirements of sections 41(1)(b) and 41 A, and thereafter the matter may be placed by the Registrar in this case, so that appropriate directions may be issued to the DGP to take action against such errant police officer for his persistent default or this Court may initiate contempt proceedings against the defaulting police officer.


22. The District Judges should also be directed to impress upon the remand Magistrates not to routinely grant remands to police officers seeking remand for accused if the pre-conditions for granting the remands mentioned in sections 41(1)(b) and 41 A Cr.P.C. are not disclosed in cases punishable with 7 year terms, or where the police officer appears to be seeking remand for an accused in a mala fide manner in the absence of concrete material. The issue of compliance with sections 41(1)(b) and 41 A Cr.P.C and the directions of this Court in this regard may also be discussed in the monthly meetings of the District Judges with the administration and the superior police officials.


23. We are also of the view that the Registrar General may issue a circular within a period of one month with directions to the Sessions Courts and Magistrates to monitor and oversee the applications for remand sought by the arresting police officers and to comply with the other directions mentioned herein above.


24. The DGP, U.P. is directed to send a status report with better particulars by the next listing as to the extent to which arrests are only being effected in cases punishable with upto 7 years imprisonment strictly in accordance with the conditions mentioned in sections 41(1)(b) and 41 A Cr.P.C. We are not satisfied by the mechanical incantation of the words by the police of 72 U.P. districts: "जनपद / थाना स्तर पर आदेश का अनुपालन कड़ाई से किया जा रहा है."


25.As already indicated above we are of the view that by routinely mentioning in the case diary that a particular condition referred to in sections 41(1)(b) or 41 A Cr.P.C. has been met for seeking police remand, would not provide adequate reason for effecting the arrest. The DGP is also directed to circulate the present order to all subordinate police officers.


26. We are also of the view that the UP Legal Services Authority be directed to bring out pamphlets for distribution in the legal literacy camps etc., or even issue news paper announcement with headings such as "सात साल तक की सजा पाने वाले अभियुक्तों को राहत," informing the public that henceforth accused wanted in cases punishable with upto 7 years imprisonment would get relief and not be routinely arrested because of the recent amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure, which has been enforced from 1.11.2010.


27. Let a copy of this order be sent to the DGP, U.P., Member Secretary, U.P. SLSA and District Judges in all districts of U.P. for compliance and communication to all the concerned judicial magistrates before whom the accused are produced for remand by the police officers within ten days.


28. Let a copy of this order be also furnished to the learned Government Advocate forthwith.


29. Let a compliance report be submitted by the DGP, U.P., Member Secretary, U.P. SLSA and District Judges by the next listing. The said authorities may also indicate the difficulties if any, faced in complying with the aforesaid directions.


List on 14.12.2011.
Dated: 11.10.2011
Ishrat

Bail granted by Court


The discretionary power of the Court to grant bail is judicial power and is given by established
principles.

Before granting bail....
the Court must consider the seriousness of the charge,
the nature of the evidence,
the severity of the punishment prescribed for the offences and
in some cases the character, means and the status of the accused.


The following special grounds for release must be mentioned in the application:
Condition and state of accommodation;
whether there is a possibility of eviction in case bail is not granted;
Whether he is likely to lose his job;
How refusal of bail would create hardship to the dependent members of the family;
How keeping in custody would affect the poor state of health and treatment.


General objections by POLICE @ time of  bail  against  accused [ for bargaining bribes]
The accused will not appear at his trial;
He will interfere with witnesses or material evidence;
He will commit further offences while on bail;
Police enquiries are not complete;
Further charges might follow;
Stolen properties have not been recovered;
The co-accused are absconding;
The weapons with which the crime was committed has not been recovered.
Normally the police make an application for the remand of the accused.
In such an application they give their reasons for further detention of the accused in custody. The
reasons given by the police must be refuted to the extent possible.



Conditions for Bail
The Magistrate may grant a bail:
Without any condition
Subject to special conditions;
Subject to bond with or without sureties.
Special conditions usually state that the accused person must report to the police station at
specified times or surrender his passport.
One can challenge in a Court any unreasonable condition imposed by the Magistrate.
If the Court refuses to change the conditions, the accused person can reject them.
But in that case he will not be released until his appeal is heard and disposed of in his favour.

Bail granted by the Magistrate


If a person is arrested for a non-bailable offence, and there exists a reasonable ground to believe the
guilt of the person, he may not be granted bail by the police officer.
In such cases the accused person must give a written application to the court to grant bail. The court must grant bail unless he is charged with a crime punishable with death or life-imprisonment.
In such cases only the sessions or the High Court can grant bail.

Bail can be granted by POLICE

How to get released immediately from police custody?


Bail for Bailable Cases
In warrant cases, find out the directions endorsed in the warrant and execute a bond with sureties
If the offence charges is bailable and the arrest is made without warrant, ask the police officer in
charge of the police station to grant you bail after executing a bond.  The police officer has the discretion to release a person on his executing a bond without sureties.(Sec.71 CrPC)

In the case of bailable offences, granting of bail is a matter of legal right. This means that bail
cannot be refused and shall be granted by a police officer in charge of a police station having the
accused in his custody. The release may be ordered on the accused executing a bond, even without
sureties.


Bail for Non-Bailable Cases
In non-bailable cases, only the Court can order release of the accused person on bail. However, if the
police officer or the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is no sufficient material against the accused and that the complaint needs further investigation he may also release accused on  bail. (Sec.437 (2) Cr.P.C.)

Bail can be filed in person

If the accused-victim cannot afford an advocate he may make a written application to the judge.
For this he must get an application form from the prison staff and complete it as fully as possible giving
sufficient reasons to convince the judge of the need of granting bail.

Sunday, March 18, 2012

Bad lawyer / Bad liar and Bad Advocate Punished

                           IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI: NEW DELHI

CS(OS) 465/2007

SAVITA KHATRI ..... Plaintiff
Through: Mr. G.S. Khatri, Adv.

Versus

RAI SINGH TEWETHIA and ORS. ..... Defendants
Through: Mr. Rajender K. Panigrahi, Adv.

CORAM:
JUSTICE SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA

O R D E R
20.10.2009
IA No.13431/09

This application has been made under order 9 Rule 7 read with Section 151 CPC on behalf of the defendant for recalling the order dated 15th July, 2009 when the defendant and his counsel did not appear in the Court and the defendant was proceeded ex parte. The application is supported by affidavit of defendant no. 1 and affidavit of his counsel R.K.Panigrahi. In the application, it is stated by the defendant that counsel for the defendant in his diary noted a wrong date. Instead of 15th July, 2009, he noted 15th October, 2009 and therefore the counsel and the defendant could not appear before the Court on 15th July, 2009. Counsel visited the High Court website on 11th October, 2009 and then he found that next date in the case was 14th October, 2009 and case was also fixed on 15th July, 2009. It is stated that defendant has been bonafidely prosecuting and conducting the suit and non-appearance of the defendant and his counsel was due to above reason.


Counsel for the plaintiff has filed a reply to the application in the Court itself. Before filing reply to the application, counsel for the plaintiff moved an application under RTI to the Registry of High Court and sought information if any request for issuance of gate pass to the defendant for 15.7.09 was received by the Registry from his counsel. Under RTI, the information was given to the plaintiff that such a request was received from defendant's counsel for issuance of gate pass for 15.7.09 to the defendant by the Registry and a copy of the request was also furnished to the applicant/plaintiff. Along with the reply to defendant?s application, the plaintiff has filed the RTI information received and the copy of request forwarded by defendant?s counsel for issuance of gate pass to the defendant for 15.7.09. When the defendant?s counsel was confronted with this information and the copy of request made by him for issuance of gate pass to his client on 15.7.09 he said he was sorry for this.


It is obvious that the defendant's counsel deliberately, with the intention of misleading the Court and playing fraud with the Court, knowing that his client had appeared in the Court and watched the proceedings and he himself had noted right date in his diary, made this false application to the Court accompanied by his own false affidavit and false affidavit of his client/defendant no.1.


I consider that conduct of counsel for the defendant is unbecoming of an Advocate. It only looks that the Advocate has lost sense of professional  ethics. He mislead the litigant and even forged his dairy to show to the Court  that he had noted wrong date. He filed a false affidavit of himself and his client. He is liable to be prosecuted under Sections 182, 192, 196, 199 and 200 IPC. A complaint under Section 195 Cr.PC is liable to be filed against Advocate Rajender Kumar Panigrahi and defendant and both are liable to be prosecuted for above offences. Registrar General of High Court is directed to file a complaint against the Advocate as well as against defendant no.1 U/s 195 Cr.PC  for filing false affidavit in the Court and making false averments and  allegations, deliberately, in the Court. A letter be also written by Registrar General to the Bar Council for considering cancellation of license of Advocate Rajender Kumar Panigrahi as he is not fit to be an Advocate. The application under Section 9 Rule 7 CPC is hereby dismissed with costs of Rs.25,000/- on Advocate Rajender Kumar Panigrahi. The costs shall be paid by the Advocate himself because as it is the Advocate who advised his client wrongly and asked him to file a false affidavit. In case cost is not paid, the same shall be recovered by attachment of the assets of the Advocate.


The matter is listed for ex parte evidence on 23rd October, 2009 before the Joint Registrar and ex parte evidence be recorded on that date.

SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA,J
OCTOBER 20, 2009

Saturday, March 17, 2012

Submitting false evidence is contempt of court

                                                       In the Supreme Court of India
PETITIONER:
RITA MARKANDEY

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
SURJIT SINGH ARORA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/09/1996

BENCH:
MUKHERJEE M.K. (J)
BENCH:
MUKHERJEE M.K. (J)
ANAND, A.S. (J)


ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
M.K. MUKHERJEE. J.

The instant proceeding for contempt stems from a petition filed by Prakash Lal Sharma under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 before the Rent Controller, Chandigarh on September 9, 1985 seeking eviction of the respondent herein from one room and garage (hereinafter referred to as the 'suit premises') on the ground of House No. 1572 sector 18-D Chandigarh. The Rent Controller allowed the petition and aggrieved thereby the respondent filed an appeal which was dismissed. Against such dismissal he filed a revision petition in the High Court but without success. Thereafter, with the leave of this Court, he filed an appeal, being Civil Appeal No. 3056 of 1989 which was ultimately dismissed by this Court on October 5, 1994 with the following order:
"Delay condoned. We find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. However, as agreed to by both the learned counsel, time to hand over vacant possession to Smt. Rita Markandey in granted till 31st March 1995. This shall be subject to the usual undertaking to be filed by the appellant-tenant within four weeks from today."
On the respondent's failure to handover vacant possession of the suit premises on or before March 31, 1995 to Smt Rita Markanday (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner), the daughter of Prakash Lal Sharma, who had died in the meantime, in terms of the above order she put in an application for execution of the eviction order before the Rent Controller, Chandigarh in or about the month of May, 1995 On that application a notice was issued to the respondent asking him to show cause why the eviction order should not be executed. In showing cause the respondent asserted that he was in occupation of three rooms, one garage, one store, One kitchen, one bathroom and a toilet on the ground floor of the house in question and not only of the suit premises - and therefore the eviction sought for was impermissible. Other contentious issues of fact and law against the execution were also raised. Before, however, the matter could be further pursued by the Rent Controller, the petitioner filed the petition, out of which the instant proceeding arises. In paragraph 8 of the petition the petitioner has averred, inter alia as follow: "The contemnor was shown indulgence by this court by giving him 6 months time, but on the contrary he was by his conduct flagrantly misused rather abused, the indulgence of this Court firstly by gaining 4 weeks time to file an
undertaking and thereafter refusing to file the said undertaking and simultaneously contesting the execution application dated 29.5.1995 filed by the petitioner in return filing an objection
petition on 17.7.1995. This conduct of the contemnor/tenant Firstly gaining 4 weeks time from this
Court for filing an undertaking and thereafter refusing to file an undertaking is palpable act and
omission on the part of the Contemnor which amounts to willful disobedience of the order dated 5th
October, 1994 passed by this Court.
On the basis of the above averments the petitioner has contended that the respondent has committed contempt by fulfil disobedience of the order of this Court dated October 5, 1994. The other ground, canvassed by the petitioner in support of her contention that the respondent is liable to be punished for contempt, finds place in paragraph 12 of the petition which reads as under:
"That....... in the objection petition filed by the contemnor-respondent he has stated therein
that he is in occupation of three rooms, one garage, one store, one kitchen and a bathroom in addition to one toilet on the ground floor of the disputed house. This new plea of the petitioner is contrary to his pleadings before the Rent Controller right upto this Hon'ble Court in Appeal. This is a specific example of usurping of the property of peaceful and law abiding citizen by a contriving and scheming property dealer. This specific plea of the petitioner that he is in occupation of the above said three rooms and kitchen and toilets etc. as mentioned in his objection petition as contrary to his affidavit filed before this Hon'able Court on 10th March, 1989 in the Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 1117/89 the grant of which gave rise to Civil appeal No. 3056 of 1989. (The copy of the Supplementary Affidavit filed on 10.3.1989 filed before this Hon'able Court is annexed here to and marked as ANNEXURE R-4. In the para 3 thereof the appellant/tenant  has specifically stated that nor I have any other residential premises for my residence except one room and garage in the suit premises owned by the respondent herein. Therefore in these circumstances the respondent has belatedly taken possession of the other portion of the suit premises forcibly during the pendency of Appeal in the Supreme Court and has grossly misused the concession of stay orders given by this Hon'able Court during the course of litigation and subsequently now put up a new case at the time of objection petition"
According to the petitioner the respondent took such forcible possession to circumvent the implementation of the order of this Court dated October 5, 1994 and therefore it also amounts to contempt of Court.  After perusing the petition this Court issued a notice to the respondent asking him to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt of Court and in response there to the filed an affidavit pleading that the garage in question was vacated long back and possession of the same was delivered to the deceased landlord (Parkash Lal Sharma). His other plea is that as he had not filed any undertaking in terms of the order of this Court he could not held liable for contempt for not vacating the suit premises and that in absence of any such undertaking he was entitled to raise all legally permissible objections against the application for execution. Since the petitioner's Counsel strongly refuted the contention of the respondent that possession of the garage had been given long back and since the respondent did not disclose as to whether the room of the suit premises was vacated or not, this Court passed an order on October 11, 1995 directing the learned counsel for the respondent to report by October 16, 1995 as to whether the respondent had handed over vacant possession of the suit premises to the petitioner. When the matter was taken up for hearing on October 16, 1995, the respondent, who was present along with his Counsel, stated that he had vacated the suit premises and possession was delivered on October 14, 1995 to Shri Darshan Lal Wadhera, the power of attorney holder of the petitioner, in presence of Shri G. S. Arshi, Advocate, who had been appointed as the local Commissioner by the Rent Controller (Sub Judge First Class, Chandigarh). Mr Darshan Lal Wadhera, who was also present in Court, on the other hand asserted, through his learned counsel, that the possession had not been handed over to him and that though he was asked to put his lock on the garage - which he did - he was later made to open the lock again on the asking of the respondent on October 14, 1995 and that the possession of the room and garage had not been delivered him till date. In view of their contradictory stands, this Court directed both of them to file their respective affidavits by October 17, 1995 giving factual position and the sequence of events of October 14, 1995. The Rent Controller, Chandigarh was also asked to forward to this Court the copy of the report of the Commissioner appointed by him along with his comments regarding the handing over of the vacant possession of the suit premises. In compliance with the said direction both the parties filed their respective affidavits and the Rent Controller also submitted his report, along with a copy of the report of the Commissioner appointed by him. From the report of the Rent Controller it was found that the respondent did not hand over the possession of the suit premises to the petitioner till October 14, 1995 and that even before the local Commissioner he had tried to give possession of the garage only and not the room in question. The report further disclosed that the possession of the garage was also not delivered to the decree holder and the garage was again locked up by the respondent at 5.30 P.M. on October 14, 1995. In other words, the report fully supported the assertions of the constituted attorney of the petitioner. As from the report of the local Commissioner and the comments of the Rent Controller this Court was of the opinion, Primafacie, that the respondent had not only made an incorrect statement in this Court but also filed an affidavit falsely stating that he had handed over the vacant possession of the suit premises in compliance with the order of this Court dated October 5, 1994, a Rule was issued asking him to show cause why he should not a punished for contempt of Court an further why proceeding should not be initiated against him for committing perjury. The respondent, who was personally present in the Court along with his counsel, took notice of the Rule and prayed for two weeks time to file his reply thereto. The prayer was allowed and the matter was listed on November 10, 1995 for further proceedings on which date the respondent was directed to be personally present. On the date so fixed the respondent however did not appear personally as directed but Mr. Devender Verma, a learned Advocate appeared on his behalf. He submitted that the respondent had met with an accident and as such was not in a position to attend the Court. In support of this contention he filed some outdoor tickets of a hospital. As, from the outdoor tickets it was not possible to ascertain whether they referred to the respondent and as no application was filed on his behalf seeking adjournment or exemption from personal appearance and his Advocate-on Record was also not present and Shri Verma had not filed any vakalatnama on his behalf, this Court issued a bailable warrant in the sum of Rs 5,000/- with one surety of the like amount to ensure the presence/production of the respondent before this Court on November 24, 1995. pursuant to the said order the respondent was arrested on November 17, 1995 and released on bail after he had furnished personal bond and one Sandeep Bhardwaj furnished bail bonds on his behalf. The matter however could not be taken up for hearing on November 24, 1995 and was adjourned to February 6, 1996. In the meantime - on January 8, 1996 to be precise - the respondent filed an additional affidavit before this Court wherein he admitted that he committed a mistake in not handing over the possession of the suit premises to the landlord in terms of the order of this Court. He further submitted that he had no intention whatsoever to disobey the order of this Court and his mistake was attributable to wrong advice given to him. As regards the question as to whether he had delivered vacant possession of the suit premises he had this to say:-
" It is respectfully submitted that on 14.10.95, itself the local Commissioner visited the contemner
and that from the report of the commissioner, it is quite clear that the contemner was absolutely willing to handover the vacant possession of the disputed premises and that it was the Attorney holder of the landlord, who did not produce the order of this Hon'able Court before the Commissioner. It is further respectfully submitted at this stage the Attorney holder of the landlord even put his own lock on the garage, which is admitted by him in their affidavit. It is further respectfully submitted that when the Commissioner left without resolving the problem of delivery, the contemner thereafter, immediately disassociated itself from the premises. It is further respectfully submitted that the disputed premises is very much in possession of the Attorney of the Landlord."
In terms of the earlier order of this Court when the matter was taken up for hearing on February 6, 1996 the respondent again absented himself and his learned counsel was also not present. In such circumstances the Court cancelled the bonds earlier furnished by the respondent and his surety and issued non-bailable warrant of arrest against the former. Both the respondent and Shri Sandeep Bhardwaj, who stood surety for him, were also asked to show cause why the amount of bonds furnished by them should not be forfeited. The Rent Controller was also asked to inform this Court on or before March 12, 1996 whether the respondent had handed over the vacant possession of the suit premises and he was directed that in case possession had not been delivered he should ensure that the possession was delivered to the petitioner, through police help, if necessary. In compliance with the said direction the Rent Controller submitted a report stating that the possession of the suit premises had been given to the decree-holder through her attorney Shri Darshan Wadhera on March 7, 1996 as per the order of this Court dated February 6, 1996. On the date fixed (March 12, 1996) the respondent, who was brought under arrest, submitted through his learned counsel that he would file an affidavit in compliance with order dated February 6, 1996 within two days and an additional affidavit explaining the circumstances for his absence on February 6, 1996. A further prayer was made on his behalf for releasing him on bail. Prayer of the respondent for filing of the affidavit was allowed and he was directed to be released on bail on his furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs. 10,000/- to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh. A fresh notice was also directed to be served upon surety Shri Sandeep Bhardwaj as the earlier notice could not be served. The affidavits were thereafter filed. On the next date fixed, that is on March 26, 1996, a prayer was made on behalf of the respondent seeking further time to file his affidavit and the prayer was allowed and the matter was fixed for April 17, 1996. Shri Bhardwaj also filed an affidavit explaining the circumstances for which the respondent could not be present personally on February 6, 1996. In his affidavit the respondent submitted that he could not appear on February 6, 1996 as he did not get timely information from his counsel. He further submitted that his absence on that date was bona fide and unintentional and he may be pardoned. The respondent also expressed sincere regrets, offered unconditional apology and prayed that a lenient view my be taken of his failings. From the above narration of facts it is evident that the appellant did not comply with the order of this Court dated October 5, 1994 and that his assertion in both his affidavits filed on September 28, 1995 and January 8, 1996 that he had handed over vacant possession of the suit premises to the petitioner on October 14, 1995 was false for, as the report of the Rent Controller- discloses, such possession was given only on March 7, 1996. The question, therefore, that now falls for our determination is whether the respondent is liable to be punished for contempt of this Court of his above commissions and omissions. Law is well settled that if any party gives an undertaking to the Court to vacate the premises from which he is liable to be evicted under the orders of the Court and there is a clear and deliberate breach thereof it amounts to civil contempt but since, in the present case, the respondent did not file any undertaking as envisaged in the order of this Court the question of his being punished for breach thereof does not arise. However, in our considered view even in a case where no such undertaking is given, a party to litigation may be held liable for such contempt if the Court is induced to sanction a particular course of action or inaction on the basis of the representation of such a party and the Court ultimately finds that the party never intended to act on such representation or such representation was false. In other words, if on the representation of the respondent herein the Court was persuaded to pass the order dated October 5, 1995 extending the time for vacation of the suit premises, he may be held guilty of contempt of Court, notwithstanding non furnishing of the undertaking, if it is found that the representation was false and the respondent never intended to act upon it. However, the respondent herein cannot be held liable for contempt on this score also for the order in question clearly indicates that it was passed on the basis of the agreement between the parties and not on the representation of the respondent made before the Court. It was the petitioner who agreed to the unconditional extension of time by four weeks for the respondent to vacate and subsequent extension of time on his giving an undertaking and this Court only embodied the terms of the agreement so arrived at, in the order. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the respondent cannot in any way be held liable for contempt for alleged breach of the above order. As regards the contention of the petitioner that by trespassing into some other portion of the house in question during the pendency of the appeal the respondent has committed contempt of Court, we are unable to accept the same: firstly because, the respondent's claim is that he has been in occupation thereof since long and this contentious issue cannot be decided solely on the basis of affidavits and secondly because the above issue does not fall within the limited scope of our enquiry in this proceeding which centres round the order dated October 5, 1994.
To seek an answer to the other question as to whether by making false statements before this Court in the affidavits filed, the respondent has committed criminal contempt, we may profitably refer to the judgment of this Court in Dhananjay Sharma Vs. State of Haryana 1995 (3) SCC 757, in which one of us (justice Dr. A.S. Anand) observed :
"Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short Act) defines criminal contempt as "the publication (whether by words, spoken or written or by signs or visible representation or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever to
(1) scandalise or tend to scandalise or lower or tend to lower the authority of any Court;
(2) prejudice or interfere or with the due course of judicial proceedings or
(3) interfere or tend to interfere with, or obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner. Thus, conduct which has the tendency to interfere with the administration of justice or the due course of judicial  proceedings amounts to the commission of criminal contempt. The swearing of false affidavits in judicial proceedings not only has the tendency of causing obstruction in the due course of judicial proceedings but has also the tendency to impede, obstruct and interfere with the administration of justice. The filing of false affidavits in judicial proceedings in any Court of law exposes the intention of the party concerned in perverting the course of justice. The due process of law cannot be permitted to be slighted nor the majesty of law be made a mockery of by such acts or conduct on the part of the parties to the litigation or even while appearing as witnesses. Anyone who makes an attempt to impede or undermine or obstruct the free flow of the unsoiled stream of justice by resorting to the filing of false evidence, commits criminal contempt liable to be dealt with in accordance with the Act"
.
The above observations dovetail into the facts of the instant case, for there cannot be any manner of doubt that by filing false affidavits the respondent had not only made deliberate attempts to impede the administration of justice but succeeded in his attempts in delaying the delivery of possession. We, therefore, hold the respondent guilty of criminal contempt of Court. That brings us to the question whether the respondent should be discharged in view of the unconditional apology he has offered in the affidavit he lastly filed in this Court or punished. We do not find the apology tendered by the respondent to be genuine and bona fide for in his earlier affidavit filed on January 8, 1996 he had also offered a similar unconditional apology but falsely reiterated that he had vacated the suit premises on November 14, 1995. The record however shows that following his arrest pursuant to the non-bailable warrant issued by this Court, the respondent was in custody for some days till he was released on bail under orders of this Court. Considering this aspect of the matter and fact that he was now handed over vacant possession of the suit premises, we do not wish to send him behind the bars again by imposing substantive sentence. At the same time we feel that he should be punished with fine not only for the wrong done by him but also to deter others from filing such false affidavits. We, therefore, sentence him to pay a fine or Rs. 2000/-, in default of payment of which he will suffer simple imprisonment for one month. The fine, if realised, shall be paid to the petitioner as compensation. The Rule is thus made absolute. As regards the notices issued for the forfeiture of the bonds executed by the respondent and his surety for the failure of the former to appear on a date fixed we do not wish to pursue the matter further for we find that the respondent has given a satisfactory explanation of his such absence. we also drop the case for proceeding against the respondent for perjury in view of the punishment imposed upon him in the contempt case.