Right to information(RTI) in public interest - State of UP Vs Raj Narain & Ors.

                                             SUPREME COURT OF INIDA
PETITIONER:
STATE OF U.P.

 Vs.

RESPONDENT:
RAJ NARAIN & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT24/01/1975

BENCH:
RAY, A.N. (CJ)
MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN
ALAGIRISWAMI, A.
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
UNTWALIA, N.L.


ACT:
Indian Evidence Act, ss. 123 and 162--Scope of.

HEADNOTE:
Section 123 of the Evidence Act states that no one shall  be permitted  to  give any evidence  derived  from  unpublished official records relating to any affair of State except with the permission of the Officer at the Head of the  Department concerned  who shall give or withhold such permission as  he thinks fit.  Section 162 provides that when a witness brings to Court a document in pursuance, of summons and then raises an  objection to its production or admissibility  the  Court has  to  determine  the validity of  the  objection  to  the production  or admissibility and for so doing the Court  can inspect  the document except in the cage of a  document  re-lating to the affairs of State or take such other  evidence as may be necessary to determine its admissibility.

In connection with his election petition the respondent made an  application  before the High Court  for  summoning  the Secretary, General Administration and Chief Secretary of the State  Government  and the head clerk of the office  of  the Superintendent of Police of the District for the  production of  the Blue Book entitled "rules and instructions  for  the protection  of the  Prime  Minister when  on  tour  or  in. travel", and certain other correspondence exchanged  between the  Government  of India and the State Government  in that connection.  The Home Secretary deputed one of his  officers to  go to the court alongwith the documents but  with  clear instructions  that he should claim privilege in  respect  of  those documents under s. 123 of Evidence Act.  No  affidavit of the Minister concerned or the Head of the Department was, however, filed, at that time.  In the course of  examination the  witness claimed privilege in respect of the  documents. The election petitioner thereupon contended that the Head of the Department had not filed an affidavit claiming privilege and that the documents did not relate to the affairs of  the State.  The  documents in respect of  which  privilege  was claimed  were seated and kept in the custody of  the  Court. When  the  matter  came up for hearing,  however,  the Home Secretary  to  the  State  Government, filed  an  affidavit claiming  privilege  for the documents.  In respect  of  the documents summoned from the office of the Superintendent  of Police an affidavit claiming privilege under s. 123 of  the Evidence Act was filed by the Superintendent of Police.

The  High Court held that (i) under s. 123 of  the  Evidence Act  the Minister or the, Head of the  Department  concerned must  file an affidavit in the first instance and  since  no such  affidavit  had been filed in the first  instance  the privilege was lost and the affidavit filed  later  claiming privilege  was of no avail, (ii) that it would  decide  the question  of  privilege only when permission  to  produce  a document had been withheld under s. 123; (iii) that the Blue Book  in respect of which privilege was claimed was  not  an unpublished  official record relating to the affairs of  the State because the Union Government had referred to a portion of  it in one of its affidavits and a member  of  Parliament had  referred  to  a particular rule of  the  Blue  Book  in Parliament;  (iv)  that  no  reasons  were  given  why  the disclosure   of  the  documents  would be  against   public interest; and (v) that it had power to inspect the documents in respect of which privilege was claimed.

Allowing the appeal to this Court, (per A. N. Ray, C.J.,  A.Alagiriswami, R..S. Sarkaria and N. L. Untwalia, JJ) :
HELD  : The foundation of the law behind ss. 123 and 162  of the Evidence Act is the same as in English Law.  It is that injury to public interest is the reason for  the  exclusion from  disclosure of documents whose contents, if  disclosed, would injure public and national interest.  Public  interest which demands that evidence be 23SC/75  withheld is to be weighed against the public interest in the administration of  justice  that  courts  should  have  the fullest  possible  access to all relevant  materials. When public interest outweighs the latter, the evidence cannot be admitted.  The Court will proprio motu exclude evidence, the production  of which is contrary to public interest.  It  is in   public   interest  that confidentiality   shall   be safeguarded.  Confidentiality is not a head of privilege. It is not that the contents contain material which it would  be damaging to the national interest to divulge but rather that the  documents would be of a class which demand  protection. [348E-H]

Evidence  is admissible and should be received by the  Court to  which it is tendered unless there is a legal reason  for its   rejection.    Admissibility   presupposes   relevancy. Admissibility  also  denotes the absence of  any  applicable  rule of exclusion.  Facts should not be received in evidence unless they are both relevant and admissible.  The principal rules of exclusion under which evidence becomes inadmissible are   two  fold  :  (1)  Evidence  of  relevant facts is inadmissible  when  its  reception  offends  against  public policy or a particular rule of law.  A party  is  sometimes estopped  from proving facts and these facts  are  therefore inadmissible; (2) Relevant facts are, subject to  recognized exceptions, inadmissible unless they are proved by the best or  the  prescribed  evidence.  Secrets  of  State.   State papers,  confidential official documents and  communications between  the  Government and its officers  or  between such officers  are  privileged from production on the  ground  of public policy or as being detrimental to the public interest or service. [343H; 344A-C]

Conway v. Rimmer & Anr. [1968] 1 A.E.R. 874 &[1968] A.C. 910; Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co. [1942] A.C. 642and Rogers v. Home Secretary [1973] A.C. 388, referred to.
(1)  It is now the well settled practice in our country that an objection is raised by an affidavit affirmed by the Head of the Department.  The Court may also require a Minister to affirm an  affidavit.  Where no affidavit  was  filed,  an affidavit could be directed to be filed later on. [349B]
(2)  It is for the Court to decide whether the affidavit  is clear in regard to objection about the nature of  documents. The  Court can direct further affidavit in that behalf If the  Court is satisfied with the affidavits, the Court will refuse disclosure.  If the Court, in spite of the affidavit, wishes to inspect the document the Court may do so. [349E] Grosvenor Hotel, London [1963] 3 A.E.R. 426, referred to.
(3)  In  the  present case it cannot be said that  the Blue Book  is a published document. Any publication of parts  of the Blue Book which may be described as an innocuous part of the document will not render the entire document a published document. [349H]
(4)  In  the instant case it is apparent that the  affidavit affirmed by the Chief Secretary is an affidavit objecting to the  production of the documents.  The oral evidence of  the witness  as  well  as the  aforesaid  affidavit  shows that objection was taken at the first instance. [349D]
(5)  If  the Court is satisfied with the affidavit  evidence that  the  document should be protected in  public  interest from  production the matter ends there.  If the Court  would yet like to satisfy itself, the Court may see the  document. Objection   as to  production as  well  as   admissibility contemplated in s. 162 of the Evidence Act is decided by the Court in the enquiry. [349B-C] 

State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh [1961] 2 S.C.R. 371, followed. Per Mathew, J. (Concurring) :
1(a)  The foundation of the so called privilege is that  the information  cannot  be disclosed without injury  to  public interest  and  not  that the  document is  confidential  or official,  which alone is no reason for its  non-production. [353C-D] Asiatic  Petroleum  Company Ltd. v. Anglo  Persian  Oil  Co. [1916] 1  K.B. 822 at 830; Conway v. Rimmer [1968]  1 All, E.R.  874  at 899 and Duncan v. Cammell Lavid &  Co.  [1942] A.C. 624, referred to.
(b)  A privilege normally belongs to the parties and can  be waived.   But  where  a fact is excluded  from evidence  by considerations of public policy, there is no power to  waive in the parties. [353F-G]
Murlidhar  Agarwal v. State of U.P. [1974] 2 S.C.C.  472  at 483, referred to. In  the instant case the mere fact that the witness  brought the  documents to Court in pursuance to the summons and  did not file a proper affidavit would not mean that the right to object to any evidence derived from an unpublished  official record relating to affairs of State had been for ever waived and  as  no  affidavit had been filed it  might  be  that  a legitimate inference could be made that the Minister or  the Head of the Department concerned permitted the production of the  document  or evidence being given derived from  it,  if there  was no other circumstance.  If the statement made  by the  witness that the document was a secret one and that  he had  no  been  permitted by the Head of  the  Department  to produce it, was not really an objection to the production of the document which could be taken cognizance of by the Court under  s. 162 of the Evidence Act, it was an  intimation  to the Court that the Head of the Department had not  permitted
the production of the document in Court or evidence  derived from  it  being given. Whatever else  the  statement  might indicate,  it  does  not  indicate  that  the  Head  of  the Department had permitted the production or disclosure of the document. [355D-F]
(2)  Section 123 enjoins upon the Court the duty to see that no  one  is  permitted to give any  evidence  derived from unpublished  official records relating to affairs  of  State unless permitted  by  the  officer  at  the  Head  of  the Department.   The Court therefore, had a duty not to  permit evidence derived from a secret document being given.  Before the  arguments were finally concluded and before  the  Court decided  the  question the Head of the Department  filed  an affidavit  objecting to the production of the  document  and stating  that  the document in question  related  to  secret affairs  of State, and the Court-should have considered  the validity of that objection under s. 162 of the Evidence Act.  [355G-A; 356A-B]

Crompton  Ltd. v. Custom & Excise Commrs. [1972] 2 Q.B.  102 at 134 and Conway v. Rimmar & Anr. [1968] A.C. 910, referred to.
(3)  There  is no substance in the argument that  since  the Blue Book had been published in parts, it must be deemed  to have been published as a whole, and, therefore, the document could  not  be regarded as an  unpublished  official  record relating  to  affairs  of,  State.  If some  parts  of  the document  which are innocuous have been published,  it does not  follow  that  the whole document  has  been  published.
Since  the  High Court did not inspect the  Blue  Book,  the statement  by the Court that the materials contained in  the file  produced by the Superintendent of Police  were  taken from the Blue Book was not warranted. [362B-C; E]
(4)  The mere label given to a document by the executive  is not conclusive in respect     of  the  question  whether  it relates  to affairs of State or not.  If the  disclosure  of the  contents  of  the document  would  not  damage  public interest  the executive cannot label it in such a manner  as to bring it within the class of documents which are normally entitled to protection. [362E-F]
5(a) It is difficult to see how the Court can find,  without conducting an enquiry as regards the possible effect of  the disclosure  of the document upon public  interest,  that  a document  is  one  relating  to  affairs  of  State  as,  ex hypothesis,  a document can relate to affairs of State only if its disclosure will injure public interest. But in cases where  the documents do not belong to the noxious class  and yet their disclosure would be injurious to public  interest, the inquiry to be conducted under s. 162 is an enquiry into the  validity of the objection that the document is  an  un-published official record relating to affairs of State and. therefore,  permission to give evidence derived from  it  is declined. [357H; 358A-B]
(b)  Section  162 visualises an inquiry into that  objection and empowers the Court to take evidence for deciding whether the  objection is  valid.  The  Court,  therefore,  has  to consider  two things : (i) whether the document  relates  to secret affairs  of State; and (ii) whether the  refusal  to permit evidence  derived  from it being given was  in  the public interest. [358C]
(c)  Even though the Head of the Department refused to grant permission, it was open to the Court to go into the question after  examining  the  document and find  out  whether,  the disclosure  of the document would be  injurious  to  public interest and the expression "as be thinks fit" in the latter part  of s. 123 need not deter the Court from  deciding  the question afresh as s. 162 authorities the Court to determine the validity of the objection finally. [358F] State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh [1961] 2 S.C.R. 371, followed.
(d)  When  a question of national security is  involved  the Court  may not be the proper forum to weigh the  matter  and that is the reason why a Minister's certificate is taken  as conclusive.   As  the executive is  solely  responsible  for national  security,  including foreign relations,  no  other organ  could  judge  so well of  such  matters.   Therefore, documents  in  relation to these matters might fall  into  a class which per se might require protection. [359B-C]
(e)  But  the executive is not the organ solely  responsible for  public interest.  There are other elements.   One such element is the administration of justice.  The claim of  the executive  to exclude evidence is more likely to operate  to subserve  a  partial  interest, viewed exclusively  from  a narrow departmental angle.  It is impossible for it to  see or give equal weight to another matter, namely, that justice should be  done and seen to be done.  When there  are more aspects of public interest to be considered the Court  will, with  reference  to the pending litigation, be in  a  better position  to  decide  where the weight of  public  interest predominates.  It seems reasonable to assume that a Court is better qualified than the Minister to measure the importance of  the  public interest in the case before it.   Once con-siderations of national security are left out. there are few matters of _public interest which cannot safely be discussed in public. [139C-D; F-G]
Arguments for the Appellant The principle behind s. 123 is the overriding and  paramount character  of public interest and injury to public  interest is  the sole foundation of the section.  In cases where the document  in question obviously relates to affairs of  State it  is the duty of the Court to prevent the  production and admission of the document in evidence suo motu to  safeguard public interest Matters of State referred to in the  second clause of  s. 162  are identical  with  affairs  of  State mentioned in s. 123.  An objection against the production of document should be raised in the form of an affidavit by the Minister  or the Secretary.  When an affidavit was  made  by the Secretary, the Court may, in a proper case, require  the affidavit  of  the  Minister.  If  the affidavit  is  found unsatisfactory a further affidavit may be called, and in  a proper case  the  person making  the  affidavit  should  be summoned to face an examination to the relevant point. Here too this Court did not consider that any party can raise the objection and it is the duty of the Court to act suo moru in cases  where the documents in question obviously  relate  to affairs  of  State.   Therefore, the Court  cannot  hold  an inquiry  into the possible injury to public interest. That is  a matter for the authority to decide.  But the Court  is bound  to  hold  a preliminary enquiry  and  determine  the validity  of  the objections which necessarily involves  an inquiry into the question as to whether the evidence relates to  an affair of State under s. 123.  In this inquiry  the Court  has  to determine the character  and  class  of  the document.   The provisions of s. 162 make a  departure from English  law  in  one material particular and  that  is  the authority  given to the Court to hold a preliminary  enquiry into  the  character of the document.  Under s. 162  of  the Evidence Act the Court has the overriding power to  disallow a  claim of privilege raised by the State in respect  of  an unpublished document pertaining to matters of State, but  in its  discretion  the Court will exercise its power  only  in exceptional circumstances when public interest demands, that is,  when  the public interest  served  by  the  disclosure clearly outweighs that served by the nondisclosure.  In this case  the  Chief Secretary filed an  affidavit whereas  the Minister would have done it.  This claim of privilege is not rejected on account of this procedural defect.

Arguments for the Respondent
in  the  present  case the affidavit was not  filed  at  the relevant  time,  nor is it clear that the Secretary  or  the Minister of the Department concerned ever applied their mind at the relevant time.  The Supreme Court in Sukhdeo  Singh's case held that  the objection to the production or admissibility of document of which privilege is claimed, should be taken by himself by means  of  an affidavit.  Section 162 of  the  Evidence  Act indicates  that  the objection should be filed on  the date which  is fixed for the production of document so  that  the Court  may  decide  the validity of  such  objection. Such objection must be by, means of an affidavit.  In A mar Chand Butail v. Union of India the Supreme Court held that as  the affidavit  was not filed, no privilege could be  claimed. This Court also looked to the document and on merits it  was held  that  the  document  was not  such  document   whose, disclosure  was not in the public interest.  On that  ground also,  the  claim  for privilege  was  disallowed.   In  the present case the question does not arise as the summons  was issued to the Head of the Department who was asked to appear in  person or through some other officer authorised  by  him for  the  purpose  of  giving-evidence and  for   producing documents.  The Head of the Department was, therefore, under obligation  to comply with the summons of the Court  and  to file  his  affidavit if he wanted to claim  privilege.  The High Court was right in drawing inference from non-filing of the  affidavit of  the.  Head of  the Department  that  no privilege was claimed. The Court has a right to look to the document  itself  and  take a decision as  to whether  the document  concerned  was such which at all  related  to  any affairs  of the State. The Court has the power of having  a judicial  review  over the  opinion  of  the  Head  of  the Department.

JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1596 of 1974.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order 
dated the 20th March, 1974 of the Allahabad High

Court in Election Petition No. 5 of 1971.
Niren De, Attorney General of India, B. D. Agarwala, and  0.
P. Rana, for the appellant. Shanti Bhushan and J. P. Goyal, for respondent no. 1.
Yogeshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga and S. P. Bagga for respondent no. 2.

The  Judgment  of A. N. Ray, C.J., A.  Alagiriswami,  R.  S. Sarkaria and N. L. Untwalia, JJ, was delivered by A. N. Ray,
C.J. K. K. Mathew, J. gave his separate Opinion.
RAY,  C.J.-

This  is  an appeal by  special  leave  from  the judgment dated 20 March, 1974 of the learned Single Judge of the  High Court at Allahabad, holding that no privilege  can be claimed by the Government of Uttar Pradesh under  section 123 of the Evidence Act in respect of what is described  for the  sake of brevity to be the Blue Book summoned  from  the Government  of Uttar Pradesh and certain documents  summoned from  the  Superintendent  of  Police, Rae  Bareli,   Uttar Pradesh. Shri Raj Narain, the petitioner in Eelection Petition No.  of 1971. in the High Court of Allahabad, made an application on 27 July, 1973 for summoning certain witnesses along with documents  mentioned  in the application.  The summons  was inter alia for the following witnesses along with  following documents First the Secretary, General Administration, State of  Uttar Pradesh  Lucknow  or  any  officer  authorised by  him  was summoned  to produce inter alia (a) circulars received from the  Home  Ministry and the Defence Ministry  of  the  Union Government regarding the security and tour  arrangements  of Shrimati Indira Nehru  Gandhi, 'the respondent  in Election Petition for the tour programmes  of Rae  Bareli District on 1, 24 and 25 February., 1971 or  any general   order  for  security arrangement;  and 
(b)  All correspondence  between  the  State  Government   and  the Government  of India and between the Chief Minister and  the Prime  Minister regarding Police arrangement for meeting  of the  Prime  Minister by State Government and  in  regard  to their expenses.
(a)  Second,  the  Chief  Secretary,:  Government  of  Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow was also summoned along with inter alia the documents, namely, circulars received from the Home Ministry and  Defence Ministry of the Union Government regarding  the security  and  tour arrangements of  Shrimati  Indira  Nehru Gandhi for the tour programmes of Rae Bareli District for 1, 24 and 25 February, 1971; (b) All correspondence between the State Government and the Government of India and between the Chief  Minister  and  the  Prime  Minister,  regarding  the arrangement of Police for the arrangement of meeting for the Prime  Minister by State Government and in regard  to  their expenses.


Third, the Head Clerk of the office of the Superintendent of Police of District Rae Bareli was summoned along with  inter alia  the following (a) all documents relating to  the tour program  of  Shkimati Indira Nehru Gandhi  of  District  Rae Bareli for 1 and 25 February, 1971; (b) all  the  documents relating  to  arrangement  of  Police  and  other   security measures adopted by the Police and all documents relating to expenses  incurred on the Police personnel, arrangements  of the  Police,  arrangements  for  constructions of  Rostrum, fixation  of  loudspeakers and other  arrangements  through Superintendent of Police, District Rae Bareli.

On  3  September,  1973  the  summons  was  issued  to  the Secretary, General Administration.  The summons was endorsed to the Confidential Department by the General Department  on 3  September,  1973 as will appear from paragraph 5  of  the affidavit  of  R. K. Kaul, Commissioner  and  Secretary  in-charge.   On 5 September, 1973 there was an  application  by the Chief Standing Counsel on behalf of the Chief Secretary, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow for clarification to the effect that the  Chief  Secretary is not personally required  to  appear pursuant to the summons.  The learned Judge made an order on that day that the Chief Secretary need not personally attend and that the papers might be sent through some officer.   On 6   September,  1973  S.  S. Saxena,   Under   Secretary, Confidential  Department,  was deputed by R. K.  Kaul, Home Secretary as well as Secretary, Confidential Department,  to go  to the High Court with the documents  summoned  and  to claim  privilege.  This will appear from the application  of S. S. Saxena dated 19 September, 1973.

In paragraph 4 of the said application it is stated that  in compliance  with  the summons issued by the High  Court  the Home  Secretary  deputed the applicant Saxena to go  to  the Court  with the documents summoned with  clear instructions that  privilege  is to be claimed under section 123  of  the Evidence Act in regard to the documents, namely, the Booklet issued by the Government of India containing Rules and
Instructions  for the protection of the Prune Minister when on  tour  and in travel, and  the  correspondence  exchanged between the two Governments and between the Chief  Minister, U.P.  and  the Prime  Minister  in  regard  to  the  Police arrangements for the meetings of the Prime Minister.
Saxena was examined by the High Court on 10 September, 1973.

On 10 September, 1973 there was an application on behalf  of the  Election  Petitioner  that the claim  of  privilege  by Saxena evidence  be  rejected.  In the  application  it  is stated that  during  the course  of  his  statement  Saxena admitted  that certain  instructions were.  issued  by  the Central  Government for the arrangement of Prime  Minister's tour  which are secret and hence he is not in a position  to file  those  documents.  The witness  claimed  privilege  in respect  of  that document.  It is stated  by  the  election
petitioner  that  no affidavit claiming privilege  has been filed  by the Head of the Department and that the  documents do not relate to the affairs of the State.

On  11 September, 1973 there was an order as  follows.  The application of the election petitioner for rejection of  the claim  for privilege be put up for disposal.  The  arguments might take some time and therefore the papers should be left by  Saxena  in a sealed cover in the Court.   In  case  the objection  would be sustained, the witness Saxena. would  be informed to take back the sealed cover.

On 12 September, 1973 an application was filed by Ram  Sewak Lal Sinha on an affidavit that the Superintendent of Police. Rae  Bareli  claimed  privilege  under-section 123  of  the Evidence-Act.  The witness was discharged.  On behalf of the election  petitioner it was said that an objection would  be
filed  to make a request that the Superintendent of  Police, Rae  Bareli  be produced before the Court for  cross  exami-nation.  The election petitioner filed the objection to  the affidavit  claiming  privilege by  the  Superintendent   of Police, Rae Bareli.

On  13 September,  1973  the  learned Judge  ordered that arguments on   the  question of privilege would be heard  on 19 September, 1973. S.  S.  Saxena  filed  an  application supported by an affidavit of R. K. Kaul.  The deponent R. K. Kaul  in his affidavit affirmed on 19 September,1973  stated that the documents summoned are unpublished official records relating  to affairs of the State and their disclosure will
be  prejudicial to public interest for the reasons  set  out therein.  The secrecy of security arrangement was one of the reasons mentioned.  Another reason was that arrangements  of the  security  of  the Prime Minister, the  maintenance  of public order and law and order on the occasion of the visits of the Prime Minister are essentially in nature such that to make  them public would frustrate the object intended to  be served by these Rules and Instructions.

On  20 September 1973 the case was listed for arguments  for deciding   preliminary issues and  on  the   question   of privilege. on 20 September, 1973 an objection was made that the  Chief Standing Counsel had no locus standi to  file  an objection  claiming  privilege. on 21  September,  1973  the arguments  in  the matter of privilege were  heard.    On 24 September, 1973 further arguments on the question of 340
privilege  were  adjourned  until  29  October,  1973.  


October,  1973 was holiday.  On 30 October,  1973  arguments were  not  concluded. On 30  October,  1973  the  Advocate General  appeared  and made a statement regarding  the Blue Book to the effect that the witness Saxena was authorised by the  Head  of the Department R. K. Kaul, Home  Secretary  to
bring the Blue Book to the Court and the documents  summoned by  the Court and the Head of the Department did not  permit Saxena to file the same.  The witness was permitted to show
to  the Court if the Court so needed.  Further arguments  on the  question of privilege were heard on 12, 13 and 14 days of March, 1974 The judgment was delivered on 20 March, 1974.

The learned Judge on 20 March, 1974 made an order as follows
       "No  privilege  can be claimed in  respect  of three  sets of paper allowed to  be  produced.
       The three sets of papers are as follows.  The first set consists of the Blue Book, viz., the circulars regarding the security arrangements of the tour programme of Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi  and  instructions  received  from  the Government  of India and the Prime  Minister's Secretariat  on  the  basis  of  which  Police arrangement  for constructions  of   Rostrum, fixation   of loudspeakers and    other arrangements were made, and the correspondence between the State Government & the  Government of India regarding the police arrangements for the  meetings  of  the  Prime  Minister.  The        second set also relates to circulars regarding security and  tour arrangements of  Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi for the tour programme  of        Rae  Bareli and correspondence  regarding  the arrangement of police for the meetings of  the        Prime  Minister. The third set summoned f rom  the   Head   Clerk  of  the  Office   of  the        Superintendent of Police relates to the same."

The  learned  Judge  expressed the  following  view.   Under section 123 of the Evidence Act the Minister or the head  of the department concerned must file an affidavit at the first instance.   No such  affidavit  was  filed  at  the   first instance.  The Court cannot exercise duty under section  123 of  the Evidence Act suo motu. The court can function only after a privilege has been claimed by affidavit.  It is only when  permission has been withheld under section 123 of  the Evidence  Act  that the Court will decide.   Saxena  in  his evidence  did  not  claim  privilege  even  after  the  Law Department  noted  in  the file  that  privilege  should  be  claimed  Saxena was allowed to bring the Blue  Book  without being sealed in a cover.  The head of the department  should have  sent  the Blue Book under sealed cover along  with  an application  and an affidavit to the effect  that  privilege was  being claimed.  No privilege was claimed at  the  first instance.

The learned Judge further held as follows.  The Blue Book is not  an  unpublished official record within the  meaning  of section  123 of the Evidence Act because Rule 71(6)  of  the Blue  Book  was  quoted  by a  Member  of  Parliament.  The Minister  did  not object or deny they correctness  of 'the quotation.  Rule 71(6) of the Blue Book has been filed  in  the election petition by the  respondent  to  the election  petition Extracts of Rule 71(6) of the  Blue Book were filed by the Union Government in a writ proceeding.  If a portion of the Blue Book had been disclosed, it was not an unpublished official record.  The respondent to the election petition  hid  no right to file even a portion of  the Blue Book in support of her defence.  When a portion of the Blue Book  had been used by her in her defence it cannot be said that  the  Blue  Book had not  been  admitted  in  evidence. Unless the Blue Book is shown to the election petitioner  he cannot show the correctness or otherwise of the said portion of  the Blue Book and cannot effectively  cross-examine  the witnesses  or respondent to the election petition.  Even  if it  be assumed that the Blue Book has not been admitted  in evidence  and  Kaul's affidavit could be taken into  consideration,  the Blue  Book is not  an  unpublished  official record.

With regard to documents summoned from the Superintendent of Police the  High Court said that because  these  owe  their existence  to  the  Blue  Book which  is  not  a  privileged document  and the Superintendent of Police did not give  any reason why the disclosure of the documents would be  against public  interest,   the   documents   summoned   from  the Superintendent of  Police  cannot  be privilege  documents either.

The  High Court further said that in view of the  decisions. of this Court in State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev  Singh(1); Amar  Chand  Butail  v. Union of India(2)  and the  English decision in Conway v. Rimmer & Anr. (3) the Court has. power to  inspect  the  document  regarding  which  privilege   is claimed.   But because the Blue Book is not  an  unpublished official  record, there is no necessity to inspect the Blue Book.

The  English decisions in Duncan v. Cammell Laird &  Co.(4); Conway v.  Rimmer  &  Anr.  (supra);  and  Rogers  v. Home Secretary(5)  surveyed the  earlier  law  on  the  rule  of exclusion  of  documents from production on  the  ground  of public policy or as being detrimental to the public interest or  service.   In  the Cammell  Laired  case  (supra)  the respondent objected to produce certain documents referred to
in  the Treasury Solicitors letter directing the  respondent not  to  produce the documents.  It was stated that  if  the letter was not accepted as sufficient to found a claim,  for privilege  the First  Lord  of  Admirality  would  make  an affidavit.   He  did  swear an affidavit.   On summons  for inspection  of the  documents it was held that  it  is  not uncommon in modern practice for the Minister's objection  to be  conveyed to the Court at any rate in the first  instance by an official of the department who produces a  certificate
which the Minister has signed stating what is necessary.  If the  Court  is not satisfied by this method the  Court cart request the Minister's personal attendance.
(1) (1961] 2 S.C.R. 371. (2) A.I.R. 1964 S.C.,1658.
(3)  [1968] 1 A.E.R- 874 : [1968] A C 910.
(5)  [1973] AC 388.
(4) [1942] A C- 642.
Grosvenor Hotel, London(1) group of cases turned on an order for  mutual discovery of documents and an affidavit  of  the respondent, the British Railway Board, objecting to  produce certain   documents.  The  applicant  challenged  that  the objection of the respondent to produce the document was  not properly  made.   The applicant asked for  leave  to  cross-examine  the Minister. The Minister was ordered to swear  a further affidavit.  That order of the learned-Chamber  Judge was  challenged in appeal.  The Court of Appeal  refused  to interfere  with  the  discretion exercised  by the  Chamber Judge.  The  Minister filed  a  further  affidavit. That affidavit  was again challenged before the  learned  Chamber Judge  as not being in compliance with, the order.  It was, held  that the affidavit was in compliance with  the  order.

The learned Judge held that Crown privilege is not merely  a procedural  matter and it may be enforced by the  courts  in the  interest of the State without the intervention  of  the executive,  though  normally the executive claims  it.  The matter was taken up to the Court of Appeal, which held  the order of the Chamber Judge.  It was observed that the nature of  prejudice to the public interest should be specified  in the Minister's affidavit except in case where the  prejudice is so obvious that it would be unnecessary to state it.
in  the Cammell Laird case (supra) the House of  Lords said that  documents are excluded from production  if  the  public interest  requires that they should be withheld.  Two  tests were propounded for such exclusion.  The first is in  regard to  the contents of the particular document.  The second  is the  fact  that  the document belongs to a  class  which  on grounds of public interest must as a class be withheld from
production.  This statement of law in the Cammell Laird case (supra)  was examined in Conway v. Rimmer & Anr. 

In  Conway v.  Rimmer  &  Anr. (supra) it was  held  that although  an objection  validly  taken to production on the ground that this would be injurious to the public interest is conclusive it  is important to remember that the decision  ruling  out such  document is the decision of the Judge.  The  reference to  'class' documents in the Cammell Laird case (supra)  was said in Conway v. Rimmer & Anr. (supra) to be, obiter.  The Minister's  claim  of privilege in the Cammell  Laird case (supra) was at a time of total war when the slightest escape to  the  public of the most innocent details of  the  latest design of submarine founders might be a source of danger  to the State.

In  Conway v. Rimmer & Anr. (supra) the test  propounded  in Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Anglo Persian Oil Co.  Ltd.(2) was adopted that the information cannot be disclosed without injury to the public interest and- not that  the  documents are  confidential  or official.  With regard  to  particular class  of documents for which privilege was claimed  it  was said  that the Court would weigh in the balance on  the  one side  the public interest to be protected and on  the  other the interest of the subject who wanted production of some
(1) (1963) 3 A E R 426:   (1964) 1 A E R 92 :(1964) 2 A E  R  674 and (1964) 3 A E R 354.
(2)  [1916] 1 K B 830.
documents which he believed would support his own or  defeat his adversary's case.  Both were said in Conway v. Rimmer  & Anr. case (supra) to be matters of public interest. In  this background it was held in Conway v. Rimmer  & Anr. (supra)  that a claim made by a Minister on the  basis that the  disclosure of the contents would be prejudicial to  the public interest must receive the greatest weight; but even here  the  Minister  should go as far  as  he  properly  can without  prejudicing the public interest in saying  why  the
contents  require  protection. In Conway v. Rimmer  & Anr.  (supra)  it was said "in such cases it would be rare  indeed for the court to overrule the Minister but it has the  legal power  to  do so, first inspecting the document  itself  and then  ordering its production".  As to the "class" cases  it was  said  in  Conway v. Rimmer &  Anr.  (supra)  that some documents  by  their  Very nature fall into  a class  which
requires  protection. These are  Cabinet  papers,  Foreign Office dispatches,  the security of the State,  high  level interdepartmental  minutes and correspondence and  documents pertaining  to the  general administration  of  the  naval, military  and air force services.  Such documents  would  be the  subject  of privilege by reason of their  contents  and also  by their 'class'.  No catalog can be compiled for  the 'class'  cases.   The reason is that it would be  wrong  and inimical  to  the functioning of the public service  if  the
public were  to learn of these high  level  communications, however  innocent  of  prejudice to  the  State  the  actual comments of any particular document might be,.

In Rogers v. Homer Secretary (supra) witnesses were summoned to give evidence and to produce certain documents.  The Home Secretary gave a certificate objecting to the production  of documents.  There was an application for certiorari to quash the summons issued to the witnesses.  On behalf of the Home Secretary  it  was argued that the Court could of  its  own motion stop  evidence being  given  for  documents  to  be produced.  The Court said that the real question was whether the public interest would require that the documents  should not  be produced.  The Minister is an appropriate person  to assert public interest.  The public interest which  demands that the evidence be withheld has to be weighed against  the public interest in the administration of justice that courts should have  the fullest possible access  to  all  relevant material.  Once the public interest is found to demand that the evidence should be withheld then the evidence cannot  be admitted.   In proper cases the Court will exclude  evidence the  production  of  which, it sees is contrary  to  public interest.  In short, the position in law in an--' is that it is  ultimately for the court to decide whether or not it  is in   the  public  interest  that  the  document  should   be disclosed.   An  affidavit is necessary.  Courts  have some times held certain class of documents and information to  be
entitled   in  the  public  interest  to  be   immune from disclosure.

Evidence  is admissible and should be received by the  Court to  which it is tendered unless there is a legal reason  for its   rejection.    Admissibility   presupposes   relevancy. Admissibility  also  denotes the absence of  any  applicable rule of exclusion.  Facts should not be received in evidence unless they are both relevant and admissible.

The  principal rules  of  exclusion  under  which  evidence becomes  inadmissible  are  two-fold. First, evidence  of relevant  facts is inadmissible when its  reception  offends against  public  policy or a particular rule of  law. Some matters  are privileged from disclosure.  A party  is  some-times  estopped  from  proving facts  and  these  facts  are therefore  inadmissible.   The exclusion  of  evidence   of
opinion  and of extrinsic evidence of the contents  of some documents  is again a rule of law.  Second,  relevant  facts are,  subject to recognised exceptions inadmissible  unless they are proved by the best or the prescribed evidence.

A witness, though competent generally to give evidence,  may in certain cases claim privilege as a ground for refusing to disclose matter which is relevant to the issue.  Secrets  of state,    papers,   confidential  official   documents   and communications between .he Government and its officers  or- between such officers are privileged from production on  the ground of  public  policy or as being detrimental  to  the public interest or service.

The meaning of unpublished official records was discussed in the  Cammell Laird case (supra).  It was  argued-there that the documents could not be withheld because-they had already been  produced before the Tribunal of Enquiry into the loss of  the "Thetis'.  The House of Lords held that if  a  claim was validly made in other respects to, withhold documents in connection with the pending action on the, ground ,of public policy it would not be defeated by the  circumstances that they  had  been  given a limited  circulation at  such  an enquiry,  because special precautions might have been  taken to avoid injury and the tribunal's sittings might be secret. In Conway v. Rimmer & Anr. (supra) it was said that it would not  matter that some details of a document might have been disclosed  at an earlier enquiry.  It was said that if part of  a  document  is innocuous but part of it is  of  such  a nature that its disclosure would be undesirable  it  should seal  up  the latter part and order discovery of  the  rest, provided that this would not give a distorted or  misleading impression.

This  Court  in Sukhdev Singh's case (supra) held  that  the principle  behind  section 123 of the Evidence Act  is  the overriding  and paramount character of public  interest  and injury to  public interest is the sole  foundation  of  the section.  Section 123 states that no one shall be  permitted to  give  any  evidence derived  from  unpublished  official records  relating to_ any affairs of State except  with  the permission  of the Officer at the head  of  the  department concerned, who shall give or withhold such permission as  he thinks fit.  The expression "Affairs ,of State" in  section 123  was  explained  with reference to section 162  of  the Evidence  Act.  Section 162 is in three limbs.   The  first limb  states that a witness summoned to produce  a  document shall, if it is in his possession or power, bring it to  the Court, notwithstanding any objection which there may be  to its production or to its admissibility.  The validity of  an such objection shall decided by the Court.  The second limb of  section 162 says that the, Court,, if it sees  fit,  may 'inspect the document unless it refers to matters of  state, or  take  other evidence to enable it to  determine  on  its admissibility. 'the third limb speaks of  translation of documents which is  not  relevant here. 

In Sukhdev Singh's case (supra) this Court said that the first limb of section 162 required a witness to  produce a  document  to  bring it to the Court and  then  raise  an objection against its production or its admissibility.  The second limb refers to the objection both as  to  production and  admissibility.  Matters of State in the second limb  of section 162 were said by this Court in Sukhdev Singh's case (supra)  to  be identical with the  expression "affairs  of State?' in section 123.

In  Sukhdev  Singh's  case  (supra)  it  was  said  that  an objection against the production of document should be made in  the  form  Of  an  affidavit  by  the  Minister  or  the Secretary.  When an affidavit is made by the Secretary,  the Court  may, in a proper case, require the affidavit  of  the Minister.   If the  affidavit is  found  unsatisfactory,  a further  affidavit  may be called.  In a  proper  case,  the person making the  affidavit can be summoned to  face  an examination.   In Sukhdev Singh's case. (supra)  this  Court laid down these propositions.  First, it is a matter for the authority  to  decide  whether the  disclosure would  cause injury to public interest.  The Court would enquire into the question  as to whether the evidence sought to be  excluded from  production relates to an affair of State.   The  Court has  to  determine  the character and  class  of  documents. Second, the harmonious construction of sections 123 and  162 shows there is a power conferred on the Court under  section 162 to hold a preliminary enquiry into the character of  the document.   Third,  the  expression "affairs  of  State"  in section   123 is   not  capable   of  definition. Many illustrations  are possible.  "If the proper functioning  of the  public service would be impaired by the  disclosure  of any  document  or class of documents such document  or such class  of documents may also claim the status  of  documents relating  to  public affairs'. Fourth, the second  limb  of section  162  refers  to  the  objection  both as  to  the production  and  the admissibility of the  document.  Fifth, reading sections 123 and 162 together the Court cannot hold an enquiry into the possible injury to public interest which may  result  from the disclosure of  document  in  question. That is a matter for the authority concerned to decide.  But the  Court is competent and is bound to hold  a  preliminary enquiry  and determine the validity of the objection to  its production.  That  necessarily involves an enquiry into  the question as to whether the evidence relates to an affairs of State under section 123 or not.

in  Sukhdev  Singh's case (supra) this Court said  that  the power to inspect the documents cannot be exercised where the objection relates to a documents having reference to matters of  State and it is raised under section 123 (See  (1961)  2 S.C.R. at page 839).  The view expressed by this  Court  is that the Court is empowered to take other evidence to enable it  to determine the validity of the objection.  The  Court, it is said, can take other evidence in lieu of inspection of the  document  in  dealing with a privilege  claimed  or  an objection  raised even under section 123.  It is  said that the  Court  may take collateral evidence  to  determine  the character  or class of documents. 

In Sukhdev  Singh's case  (supra) it has also been. said that if the Court finds  that the document belongs to what is said to  be  the noxious class it will leave to the discretion of the head of the department whether to permit its production or not. The  concurring views in Sukhdev Singh's case  (supra) also expressed the opinion that under no circumstances the  court can  inspect  such  a document or  permit  giving  secondary
evidence of its contents.

In  Amar  Chand Butail's case (supra) the  appellant  called upon  the  respondents the Union and the  State  to  produce certain documents.  The respondents claimed privilege. This Court saw the documents and was satisfied that the claim for privilege was not justified.

In  Sukhdev  Singh's case (supra) the majority opinion  was given  by  Gajendragadkar, J. In Amar  Chand  Butail's case (supra)  Gagendragadkar,  C.J. spoke for  the Court  in  a unanimous  decision.  In the later case this Court  saw  the document.  

In Sukhdev Singh's case (supra) this Court said that an enquiry would be made by the 'Court as to objections to  produce document.  It is said that collateral  evidence could  be taken.  No oral evidence can be given of the con-tents of documents.  In finding out whether the document  is a noxious document which should be excluded from  production on  the .ground that it relates to affairs of State, it  may sometimes  be  difficult  for the  Court  to  determine  the character of the document without the court seeing it.  The subsequent   Constitution  Bench  decision  in Amar   Chand Butail's case- (supra) recognised the power of inspection by the Court of the document.

In  Slob-Divisional  Officer,  Mirzapur v.  Raja  Sri  Niwas Prasad Singh(1) this Court in a unanimous Constitution Bench decision  asked  the Compensation Officer to decide  in  the light  of the decisions of this Court whether the claim  for privilege raised by the State Government should be sustained or not.  This Court gave directions for filing of affidavits by  the heads of the department.  This direction  was  given about  10  years  after the  State  Government had  claimed privilege  in  certain proceedings.  In  the  Sub-Divisional Officer;   Mirzapur  case  (supra)  the   respondent   filed objections   to   draft   compensation  assessment   rolls. Compensation  was  awarded  to the  respondent.   The  State applied   for  reopening  of  the  objection   cases.  The respondent  asked  for production of  some  documents.  The State  claimed privilege.  The District Judge directed that compensation  cases  should be heard by  the  Sub-Divisional Officer.   The respondent's application for  discovery  and production  was rejected by the Compensation  Officer.  The District  Judge thereafter directed that compensation  cases should  be  heard  by the  Sub-Divisional  Officer.  The respondent  again  filed  applications for  discovery  and inspection  of these documents.  The State Government  again claimed  privilege.   The  respondent's  applications were rejected.   The  respondent  then  filed  a  petition  under Article   226  of  the Constitution  for  a   mandamus   to Compensation Officer to bear and determine the applications. The High Court said (1)  [1966] 2 SC R- 970, that the assessment rolls had become final and could not  be opened.   This Court on appeal quashed the order of the  Sub Divisional Officer whereby the respondent's applications for discovery and production had been rejected and directed the, Compensation  Officer  to  decide the  matter  on  a  proper affidavit by the State.

On  behalf of the election petitioner it was said  that  the first summons   addressed  to   the Secretary,   General Administration required him or an officer authorised by  him to  give  evidence and to produce  the documents  mentioned therein.   The second summons was addressed  to  the Home Secretary to give evidence on 12 September, 1973.  The third summons  was addressed to the Chief Secretary to  give evi-dence on  12 September,  1973  and  to  produce   certain documents.   The first summons, it is said on behalf of  the election  petitioner, related to the tour programmes of  the Prime Minister.  The election petitioner, it is said, wanted the documents for two reasons. First, that these  documents would  have  a bearing on allegations of  corrupt  practice, viz., exceeding the prescribed limits of election  expenses. The,   election   petitioner's  case is   that   rostrum, loudspeakers, decoration would be within the expenditure  of
the candidate. Second, the candidate had the assistance  of the  Gazetted  Officer for furthering the prospects  of  the candidate's election.

On  behalf  of the election petitioners  it  is  said that objection was taken with regard to certain documents in  the first summons on the ground that these were secret papers of the State, but no objection was-taken by an affidavit by the head of the department.  With regard to the other  documents which the Superintendent of Police was called to produce the contention on behalf of the election petitioner is that  the
Superintendent of Police is not the head of the  department and  either  the  Minister  or the  Secretary should have affirmed an affidavit.

Counsel  on  behalf of the election petitioner put  in  the forefront  that it was for the Court to decide whether  the disclosure  and production of documents by the State  would cause prejudice to public interest or whether non-disclosure of documents would cause harm to the interest of the subject and  to
the  public interest that justice  should  be done between  litigating parties.  This submission was  amplified by counsel for the election petitioner by submitting that it had  to  be  found  out at what stage  and  it what  manner privilege  was to be claimed and in what  circumstances  the Court could look into the document to determine the validity of  the claim to privilege raised under section  123. The, other  contention on behalf of the election  petitioner  was that  if  a part of the document was made public  by  lawful custodian  of  the  document the question  was whether  the document   could  still  be  regarded  a-,  an  unpublished document.  It was also said if there was a long document and if  parts  thereof  were noxious  and  therefore  privileged whether  the  unanimous part could still be brought  on  the record of the litigation.

Counsel  for the election petitioner leaned heavily  on  the decision  in Conway v. Rimmer & Anr. (supra) that the  Court is  to balance the rival interests of disclosure  and non-disclosure. the  first question which falls for decision is whether  the learned  Judge was right in holding that privilege  was  not claimed  by  filing  an affidavit  at  the  first  instance.

Counsel on behalf of the election petitioner submitted that in  a case in which evidence is sought to be led in  respect of  matters  derived from unpublished  records relating  to affairs  of  State at a stage, of the proceedings  when  the head of the department has not come into picture and has not had  an opportunity of exercising discretion  under  section 123 to claim privilege it will be the duty of the court.  to give  effect to section 123 and prevent evidence  being  led till  the head of the department has had the opportunity  of
claiming privilege. _But in case in which documents are sum-moned, it is said by counsel for the  election  petitioner, the opportunity of claiming privilege in a legal manner  has already been furnished when summons is received by the head of  the  department and if he does not claim  privilege  the court  is  under  no legal duty to ask him or  to  give  him another opportunity.

The documents in respect of which exclusion from  production is  claimed are the blue book being rules  and instructions for the protection of the Prime Minister when on tour and in travel.   Saxena  came to court and gave evidence  that  the blue  book was a document relating to the affairs  of  State and  was  not  to  be disclosed.   The Secretary  filed  an affidavit  on  20 September, 1973 and claimed  privilege  in respect  of  the blue book by submitting that  the  document related  to  affairs  of State and  should,  therefore,  be excluded from production.

The  several decisions to which reference has  already been made  establish  that  the  foundation of  the  law  behind sections  123 and 162 of the Evidence Act is the same as  in English  law.  It is that injury to public interest  is  the reason for the exclusion from disclosure of documents  whose contents  if  disclosed  would injure  public  and  national interest.   Public interest which demands that evidence  be withheld is to be weighed against the public interest in the administration of  justice  that  courts  should  have  the
fullest  possible  access to all relevant  materials. When public interest outweigh's the latter, the evidence  cannot be  admitted.  The court will proprio motu exclude  evidence the production of which is contrary to public interest.   It is   in  public  interest  that  confidentiality  shall   be safeguarded.   The  reason  is that  such  documents  become subject   to   privilege  by  reason   of   their   contents Confidentiality  is  not  a  head of  privilege.   It  is  a consideration to bear in mind. It is not that the  contents contain material which it would be damaging to the  national interest  to divulge but rather that the documents would  be of  class  which  demand protection.  (See  Rogers  v. Home Secretary  (supra) at p. 405). To illustrate the  class  of
documents  would  embrace  Cabinet  papers,  Foreign  Office dispatches,  papers regarding the security to the State  and high  level  interdepartmental minutes.   In  the  ultimate analysis the contents of the document are so described that it could be seen at once that in  the  public interest the documents are to  be  withheld. (See Merricks and Anr. v. Nott Bower & Anr.(1).

It  is now the well settled Practice in our country that  an objection is raised by an affidavit affirmed by the head  of the  department.  The Court may also reunite a Minister  to affirm an affidavit.  That will arise in the course of  the enquiry  by the Court as to whether the document  should  be withheld  from disclosure.  If the Court is  satisfied with the   affidavit  evidence,  that  the  document  should   be protected in public interest from production the matter ends there.  If the Court would yet like to satisfy  itself  the
Court may see the document.  This will be the inspection  of the,  document by the Court.  Objection as to production  as well  as  admissibility contemplated in section 162  of  the Evidence  Act  is  decided by the Court in  the  enquiry  as explained by this Court in Sukhdev Singh's case (supra). In  the  facts and circumstances of the present case  it  is apparent  that the affidavit affirmed by R. K. Kaul,  Chief
Secretary on 20 September, 1973 is an affidavit objecting to the  production  of  the documents.  The  oral evidence  of Saxena as  well  as  the  aforesaid  affidavit  shows that objection was taken at the first instance.

This  Court  has said that where no affidavit was  filed  an affidavit  could  be  directed to be filed  later  on.  The Grosvenor  Hotel, London group of cases (supra)  in  England shows  that if an affidavit is defective an opportunity  can be given to file a better affidavit.  It is for the court to decide whether the affidavit is clear in regard to objection about the nature of documents. The Court can direct further affidavit  in that behalf.  If the Court is  satisfied with the  affidavits  the Court will refuse disclosure.   If  the Court  in  spite  of the affidavit  wishes  to inspect  the document the Court may do so.

The next question is whether the learned Judge was right  in holding  that the blue book is not an  unpublished  official record.  On behalf of the election petitioner, it was- said that a part of the document was published by the Government, viz., paragraph 71(6) in a writ proceeding.  It is also said that the respondent to the election petition referred to the blue  book in the answer filed in the Court. in the  Canmell Laird  case, it was said that though some of the papers  had been  produced before the Tribunal of Enquiry  and  though reference was made to those papers in the Enquiry Report yet a privilege could be claimed.  Two reasons were given.  One is  that  special precaution may have been  taken  to  avoid public injury and  the  other  is  that  portions  of  the Tribunal's  sittings may have been secret.  In the  present case,  it cannot be, said that the blue book is a  published document.   Any publication of parts of the blue book  which may be described the innocuous part of the document will not render the entire document a published one.
(1) [1964] 1 A E R 717
8-423SCI/75

For  these  reasons, the judgment of the High Court  is  set aside.  The  learned judge will consider  the affidavit  a firmed by  R. K. Kaul.  The learned Judge  will  give,  an opportunity to the head of the department to file  affidavit in  respect of the documents summoned to be produced by  the Superintendent of Police.  The, learned Judge, will consider the  affidavits.  If the learned Judge will be satisfied  On the  affidavits that the documents require  protection from production, the matter will end there. If the learned Judge will feel inclined in spite of the affidavits to inspect the documents  to satisfy himself about the real nature  of  the documents, the learned Judge will be pleased to inspect  the same and pass appropriate orders thereafter,.  If the  Court will  find  on inspection that any part of  a document  is innocuous in the sense that it does not relate to affairs of State the Court could order disclosure of the innocuous part provided  that would  not give a  distorted  or  misleading impression.   Where  the  Court  orders  disclosure  of   an innocuous  part  as aforesaid the Court should seal  up  the other  parts  which  are said to be  noxious  because  their disclosure would be undesirable.  Parties will pay and bear their own costs.

MATHEW,  J. During the trial of the election petition  filed by respondent No. 1 against respondent No. 2, respondent No. 1 applied to the Court for summons to the Secretary, General Administration and the Chief Secretary, Government of U.P. and the Head Clerk, Office of the Superintendent of  Police,
Rai  Bareily,  for  production of  certain  documents.   In  pursuance  to  summons issued to  the  Secretary,  General Administration and the Chief Secretary, Government of  U.P., Mr.  S. S. Saxena appeared in court with the  documents  and objected to produce:
(1)   A blue   book  entitled "Rules  and Instructions  for  the  Protection  of   Prime Minister when on tour or in travel;
(2)   Correspondence exchanged between the two governments viz., the Government of India  and
the Government of U.P. in regard to the police arrangements  for  the meetings of  the  Prime Minister; and
(3)   Correspondence  exchanged  between  the Chief Minister, U.P. and the Prime Minister in
       regard to police arrangements for the meetings of the latter; without filing an affidavit of the Minister concerned or  of the head of the department. Saxena was  examined by Court on 10-9-1973.  The  1st res-pondent filed an application on that day praying that as no privilege was claimed by Saxena, he should be directed to produce these documents.  The Court passed an order on 11-9-1973  that  the  application be put  up  for  disposal.   As Saxena's  examination was not over on 10-9-1973,  the  Court kept  the documents in a sealed cover stating that  in case the  claim  for  privilege was sustained,  Saxena  would  be
informed  so,  that  he  could take  back  the   documents. Examination  of Saxena was over on 12-9-1973.  On that day, the,  Superintendent  of  Police,  Rai Bareily,  filed   an affidavit  claiming  privilege in respect of  the  documents summoned from his office.  The Court adjourned the  argument in  regard  to privilege and directed that it be  heard  the next  day.  On 13-9-1973 the Court adjourned the hearing  to 14-9-1973 on which date the hearing was. again adjourned  to 20-9-1973.    On  20-9-1973,  Saxena  filed  in   Court   an application  and  the Home Secretary to  the  Government  of U.P.,  Shri  R,  K.  Kaul, the head  of  the  department  in question an affidavit claiming privilege for the  documents. The argument was concluded on 14-3-1974 and the Court passed the  order on 20-3-1974 rejecting the claims for  privilege. This appeal, by special leave, is against that order. The   first  question  for  consideration  is  whether  the privilege was lost as no affidavit sworn by the Minister  in charge or the Head of the Department claiming privilege  was filed in the first instance.

In State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh(1) this Court held that the normal procedure to be followed when an officer  is summoned as witness to produce a document and when he  takes a  plea of privilege, is, for the Minister in charge or  the head of the department concerned to Me an affidavit  showing that  he had read and considered the document in respect  of which privilege is claimed and containing the general nature
of the document and the particular danger to which the State would  be,  exposed  by its disclosure.   According  to  the Court, this was required as a guarantee. that the  statement of  the  Minister or the head of the  department  which  the Court is asked to accept is one that has not been  expressed casually or lightly or as a matter of departmental  routine, but  is  one  put forward  with  the  solemnity  necessarily
attaching to a sworn statement.

In response to the summons issued to the Secretary,  General Administration and the Chief Secretary, Government of  U.P., Saxeiia  was deputed to take the documents summoned  to  the Court and he stated in his evidence that he could not Me the blue  book  as it was marked ,secret, and  as he  was  not permitted by the Home Secretary to produce it in Court.   As no  affidavit  of  the Minister  or  of  the  Head  of  the
Department was filed claiming Privilege under s. 123 of  the Evidence Act in the first instance, the Court said that  the privilege  was lost and the affidavit filed on 20-9-1973  by Shri R. K. Kaul, Home Secretary, claiming privilege, was  of no avail.  The Court distinguished the decision in  Robinson v. State of South Australia(2) where their Lordships of  the Privy Council said that it would be contrary to the public
(1) [1961] 2 S C R 371.
(2) AIR 1931 PC 254.

interest  to deprive the state of a further  opportunity  of regularising  its  claim  for  protection  by  producing  an affidavit  of  the description already indicated  by  saying that   these  observations  have  no  application   as,   no affidavit,  albeit defective, was filed in this case in  the first instance.  The Court further observed that it was only when  a proper affidavit claiming privilege was  filed that the  Court  has  to find whether  the  document  related  to unpublished official record of affairs of State, that a duty was cast on the Minister to claim privilege and that, duty could  not  be performed by Court, nor would  the  Court  be justified  in suo motu ordering that the document should  be disclosed.   The  Court  then  quoted  a  passage  from  the decision of this Court in Sodhi Sukhdev Singh's case (supra) to  the  effect that court has no power to hold  an  enquiry into  the possible injury to the public interest  which  may result from  the disclosure of the document as  that  is  a matter for the authority concerned to decide but  that  the court  is competent and indeed bound to hold  a  preliminary enquiry and determine the validity of the objection and that necessarily  involves an enquiry into 'the question  whether the  document relates to an affair of state under s. 123  or not.

The  second ground on which the learned judge held  that  no privilege could be claimed in respect of the, Blue Book  was that since portions of it had in fact been published, it was not  an unpublished official record relating to  affairs  of state.  He  relied upon three circumstances  to  show that portions  of  the Blue Book were  published.   Firstly,  the Union Government had referred to a portion of it (Rule 71/6) in an affidavit filed in Court.  Secondly, respondent No.  2 had obtained a portion of the Blue Book (Rule 71/6) and  had
produced it in court along with her written statement in the case  and  thirdly  that Shri Jyotirmoy Bosu,  a  Member  of Parliament   had  referred  to this  particular   rule   in Parliament.

The  learned  Judge,  however, did not consider  or  decide whether  the  Blue  Book related to  any  affair  of  state, perhaps,  in  view  of his conclusion that  it was  not  an unpublished official record. Section 123 of the Evidence Act states        from unpublished official records relating  to        any   affairs  of  state,  except   with  the        permission  of the Officer at the head of  the        department   concerned,  who  shall  give   or        withhold such permission as be thinks fit."

Section 162 of the Evidence Act provides that when a witness brings to  court  a document in pursuance  to summons  and raises an objection to its production or admissibility,  the Court has to- determine the validity of the objection to the production or admissibility and, for so doing, the court can inspect  the  document except in the  case  of  a  document relating to affairs of state or, take such other evidence as
may be necessary to determine its admissibility.

Having regard to the view of the High Court that since the'. privilege  was not  claimed in the  first  instance  by  an affidavit  of the Minister or of the head of the  department concerned,  the privilege could not thereafter be  asserted and that no inquiry into the question whether the disclosure of  the  document would injure public interest can  be con-ducted by  the  court when privilege is  claimed,  it  is necessary  to  see  the scope of s. 123 and s. 162  of  the Evidence Act.

The ancient proposition that the public has a right to every man's  evidence has been reiterated by the Supreme Court  of U.S.A. in  its recent decision in United States  v.  Nixon. This  duty  and its equal application to the  executive  has never been doubted except in cases where it can legitimately claim that the evidence in its possession relates to  secret affairs  of state and cannot be disclosed without injury  to public interest. The  foundation  of  the so-called  privilege  is  that  the information  cannot  be disclosed without injury  to  public interest  and  not  that the  document is  confidential  or official which alone is no reason for its non-production(1).

In  Durcan  v. Cammel Lavid & Co.(2) Lord  Simon  said that withholding  of  documents  on the ground  that  their pub-lication  would  be contrary to the public interest  is  not properly to be regarded as a branch of the law of  privilege connected with discovery and that 'Crown privilege' is,  for this reason, not a happy expression.

Dealing  with  the topics of exclusion of  evidence  on  the ground of  estate interest, Cross says that  this  head  of exclusion  of evidence differs from privilege, as  privilege can be waived, but that an objection on the score of  public policy must be taken by the Judge if it is not raised by the parties or the Crown.(3)
Phipson  deals with the topic under  the  general  category "Evidence  excluded by public policy". He then lists as  an entirely  separate category: "Facts excluded by  privilege," and  deals  there  with the subject  of  legal professional communication, matrimonial communication, etc., topics dealt with by sections 124-131 of the Evidence Act(4).

A  privilege  normally belongs to the parties and  can  be waved.  But  where  a fact is excluded  from evidence  by considerations of public policy, there is no power to  waive in the parties see in this connection Murlidhar Aggarwal  v. State of U.P. (5).

Lord Reid in Beg v. Lewas(6) said that the expression 'Crown privilege is wrong and may be, misleading and that there  is no  question of any privilege in the ordinary sense  of  the word,  as the real question is whether the  public  interest requires that a document shall not be produced and,  whether the public interest is so strong as to override
(1)  gee Asiatic Petroleum Company Ltd. v Anglo Persian  Oil
Co.  [1916] 1 K B 822, at 830; and Conway v Rimmer (1968)  1
All ER 874, at 899.
(2) [1942] A-- C 624.       (3) "Evidence", 3rd ed p 251.
(4) "see Phipson on Evidence"
(5) [1974] 2 S7 C C 472, at 483.
(6)  [1973] A C at, 388.
the ordinary right and interest of a litigant that he  shall be  able  to  I  before a  court  of  justice  all  relevant
evidence.   In the same case, Lor Pearson observed that  the expression  'Crown privilege' is not accur though  sometimes convenient.  Lord Simon of Claisdale observed in that case :
       ".... .'Crown privilege' is a misnomer and apt        to be misleading.  'It refers to the rule that
       certain evidence is hadmissible on the  ground        that  its adduction would be contrary  to  the
       public interest.  It is not a privilege which        may  be  waived  by the Crown  (see  Marks  v.
       Bayfus, 25 Q.B.D. 494 at p. 500) or by  anyone        else.    The  Crown  has  prerogatives,  not
       previlege."
I  am  not quite sure whether, in this area, there  was  any antithesi  between prerogatives and privilege. I think  the source of this privilege was the prerogatives of the Crown.
       "The  source  of the  Crown'&  privilege   in        relation to production of documents in a suit
       between  subject   and  subject    (whether        production is sought from a party or from some
       other)  can,  no doubt, be  traced  to  the        prerogative right to prevent the disclosure of
       State  secrets,  or  even  of  preventing  the        escape of inconvenient intelligence, regarding
       Court intrigue.  As is pointed out in  Pollock        and  Maitland's  History of English  Law (2nd
       ed., Vol. I, p. 5 17), "the King has power  to        shield those who do unlawful acts in his name,
       and  can withdraw from the ordinary course  of        justice cases in which he has any concern.  If
       the King disseises A and transfers the land to        X,  then X when he is sued will say  that  he
       cannot answer without the King, and the action        will  be stayed until the King orders that  it
       shall  proceed." We find  similar  principles        applied to the non-disclosure of documents  in
       the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  
 In        the report of Layer's Case (1722), (16 How St.        Tr. p. 294) the Attorney General claimed that
       minutes of the Lords of the Council should not        be  produced; and Sir John Pratt L.C.J. sup-
       ported  the claim, additing that "it would  be        for  the disservice of the King to have  these
       things  disclosed".  We recall  Coke's  useful        principle  :  Nihil  quod  inconvenience  est
       licitum.  It  is true that in  the  preceding        century the privilege was not upheld either in      Strafford's  case (1640) 3 How, St. Tr.  1382,        or in the case of Seven Bishops (1638) 12 How.        St. Tr. 183, but these decisions were made  in        peculiar circumstances."
       [see    "Documents   Privileged in    Public
       Interest"(1)]
But, with the growth of democratic government, the  interest of  the  Crown in these matters developed  into  and  became identified with public interest.
(1)  39 Law Quarterly Rev. 476, at pp 476-477.
        In the early days of the nineteenth  century,        when  principles of 'public  policy'  received
       broad and generous interpretation we find  the        privilege  of  documents recognized  on  the
       ground  of  public interest.   At  this  date,        public  policy and the interest of the  public
       were to all intents synonymous".        (see    "Documents   Privileged in    Public
       Interests" (supra)
The rule that the interest of the state must )not be put  in jeopardy by producing documents which would injure it is  in principle quite unconnected with the interests or claims  of particular parties in litigation and indeed, it is a  matter on which the judge should, if necessary, insist, even though no  objection.is taken at all. This would show  how  remote the  rule is from the branch of jurisprudence  relating,  to
discovery of documents or even to privilege(1).
So the mere fact that Saxena brought the documents to  court in  pursuance, to the summons and did not file an  affidavit of  the Minister or of the head of the department  concerned claiming  privilege would not mean that the right to  object to any evidence derived from an unpublished official  record relating to affair of state has been for ever waived.  As no affidavit  of the Minister or of the head of the  department claiming  privilege  had  been filed, it  might  be  that  a legitimate  inteference could be made that the Minister  or
the   head  of the  department  concerned   permitted  the production  of the document or evidence being given  derived from  it, if there was no other circumstance. But,  Saxena stated that the Blue Book was a secret document and he  had not been permitted by the head of the department to  produce it.   Though that statement was not really an  objection  to the  production  of  the  document  which  could  be   taken cognizance of by the court under s. 162 of the Evidence Act, it  was  an  intimation to the Court that the  head  of  the department had not permitted the production of the  document in Court or evidence.derived from it being given.   Whatever else the statement might indicate, it does not indicate that the  head of the department had permitted the production  or the  disclosure of the document.  In other words,  from  the statement of Saxena that the document was a 'secret' one and that  he  was not permitted to produce it in  court,  it  is impossible  to infer that the Minister or the head  of  the department  bad  permitted the document to  be produced  in court or evidence derived from it being given. Section  123 enjoins  upon  the  court the duty to see  that  no  one  is permitted  to  give any evidence  derived  from  unpublished official  records  relating  to  affairs  of  state   unless permitted by the officer at the head of the department.  The
court, therefore, had a duty, if the Blue Book  related  to secret affairs of state, not to permit evidence derived from it being given.  And, in fact, 'the Court did not allow  the production  of the  document, for, we find a  note  in  the proceedings  of  the  Court on 10-9-1973  stating  that  the "question  about  the production of this document  in  Court shall be decided after argument of the parties on the  point is finally

(1)see : J.K.S. Simon, "Evidence Excluded by  Consideration of State Interest",
(1955) Cambridge L Journal, 62.
heard".   And before the arguments were  finally  concluded, Kaul,  the officer at the head of the  department,  filed  an affidavit  claiming privilege. As the privilege  could  not have  been  waived,  and as, before  the  objection  to  the production of the document raised by Saxena-whether  tenable in  law  or not-was decided by the Court, an  affidavit  was filed  by Kaul objecting to the production of  the  document
and stating that the document in question related to  secret affairs  of  state,  the Court should  have  considered  the validity of that objection under S. 162 of the Evidence Act. In Crompton Ltd. v. Customs & Excise Comrs. (C.A.) (1), Lord Denning M.R. said that if a document is the subject of Crown Privilege,  it cannot be adduced by either of  the  parties, that even if neither of the parties takes the objection, the
Attorney General can come to the Court and take it and that the  judge himself must take the objection if it appears  to him  that the production of the document would be  injurious to public interest.  In Copway v. Binger & Anther(2) it  was observed :
       "I  do not doubt that it is proper to  prevent        the  use of any document, wherever  it  comes
       from,  if  disclosure of its  contents  would        really  injure the national interest and I  do
       not  doubt  that it is proper to prevent  any        witness  whoever be may be,  from  disclosing
       facts which in the national interest ought not        to be disclosed. Moreover, it is the duty  of
       the court to do this without the intervention        of any Minister, if possible serious injury to
       the national interest is ,really apparent.

       "I  do  not  accept that in  so important  a        matter,  it  could properly  play  about with
       formalities  or  regard  itself  as   entering        forbidden territory merely because a door  had
       not been formally locked."

The  question then arises as to what exactly is the  meaning of the expression "affairs of state".
According  to  Phipson(3), witnesses may not be  asked,  and will not be allowed, to state facts or to produce  documents the  disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the  public service,  and  this exclusion is not  confined to  official communications or  documents, but extends  to  all  others likely to prejudice the public interest, even when  relating to commercial matters. He thinks that it is the duty of the court to prevent disclosure of facts where serious injury to the  national  interest would possibly be. caused,  that  in deciding whether a claim for Crown privilege should apply to a  document,  there are two kinds of public interest  to  be considered  by the  court, and they are :  (1)  the  public interest  that harm shall not be done to the nation  or  the public service;  and  (2)  the  public  interest  that  the administration of  justice shall not be frustrated  by  the withholding  of documents which must be produced if  justice is to be done; and that if a judge decided that, on balance, the
(1)  [1972] 2 Q.B 102, at 134.
(3)  "Phipson on Evidence", 11th ed. p. 240.
 (2) [1968] A.C. 910.

documents probably ought to be produced, it would  generally be, best that he should see them before ordering production. Cross says(1) that relevant evidence must be excluded if its reception  would be contrary to state interest;  but  "state interest"  is  an  ominously  vague  expression  and  it  is necessary to turn to the decided cases in order to ascertain the  extent  to  which this objection to  the  reception  of
relevant evidence has been taken.  According to him, broadly speaking, the decisions fall under two heads-those in  which evidence  has been excluded because its disclosure would  be injurious  to national security (an expression which may  be taken  to  include  national  defence  and  good  diplomatic relations),  and those in which evidence has  been  excluded because  its  reception  would be injurious  to  some  other
national  interest  and  that although the  first  group  of decisions  has not excited much comment, some of  the  cases included  in  the  second  may be  thought  to indicate  an excessive concern for unnecessary secrecy.

In  Sodhi Sukhdev Singh's case (supra) this Court held that there  are  three views possible on the matter.   The  first view is that it is the head of the department who decides to which  class  the  document belongs.  If  he  comes  to  the conclusion  that  the  document is  innocent,  he  can give permission to its production.  If, however, he comes to  the conclusion  that the document is noxious, he  will  withhold that permission.  In any case, the Court does not materially come  into the picture.  The second view is that it  is  for the court to determine the character of the document and  if necessary  to enquire into the possible consequence  of  its
disclosure.  On this view, the jurisdiction of the court  is very much wider.  A third view which does not accept  either of  the  two extreme positions would be that the  court  can determine  the character of the document and if it comes  to the  conclusion  that the document belongs  to the  noxious class, it  may leave it to the head of  the  department  to decide whether its production should be permitted  or not, for,  it  is not the policy of s. 123 that in  the  case  of every  noxious document  the head of  the  department must always withhold  permission. The  Court  seems  to have accepted the third view as the correct one and has said

       "Thus, our conclusion is that reading ss.  123        and  162 together the Court  cannot  hold  an
       enquiry  into  the possible injury  to  public        interest which may result from the  disclosure
       of the document in question.  That is a matter        for the authority concerned to decide; but the
       Court  is competent, and indeed is  bound,  to        hold  a preliminary enquiry and determine  the
       validity of the objections to its  production,        and that necessarily involves an enquiry into        the  question  as  to  whether  the   evidence        relates to an affairs of State under s. 123 or        not."

As  it was held in that case that the Court has no power  to inspect  the document, it is difficult to see how the  Court can  find,  without  conducting an enquiry as regards  the possible  effect  of  the disclosure of  the  document upon public interest, that a document is one relating to  affairs of state as, ex- hypothesis a document can relate to affairs of state only if its disclosure will injure public interest. It  might  be that there are certain  classes  of  documents which are per se noxio s in the sense
(1) "Evidence" 3rd  ed, p. 252.

that, without conducting an enquiry, it might be possible to say that by virtue of their character their disclosure would be  injurious  to  public interest.   But  there  are  other documents  which do not belong to the noxious class and  yet their disclosure would be injurious to public interest.  The enquiry to be conducted under s. 162 is an enquiry into  the validity   of  the  objection  that  the  document   is   an unpublished official record relaing to affairs of state  and therefore,  permission to give evidence derived from  it  is
declined.  The objection would be that the document  relates to  secret  affairs of state and its  disclosure  cannot  be permitted;  for, why should the officer at the head  of  the department  raise  an  objection  to  the  production  of  a document  if  he is prepared to permit its  disclosure even though it relates to secret affairs of state ? Section  162 visualises  an enquiry into that objection and empowers  the court to take evidence for deciding whether the objection is valid.  The court, therefore, has to consider two  things; hether the document relates to secret affairs of state; and whether the refusal to permit evidence derived from it being given  was  in the public interest.  No  doubt,  the,  words used-in  s.  123  "as  he thinks  fit" confer an  absolute discretion on the head of the department to give or withhold such  permission.   As I said, it is only  if the  officer refuses  to  permit the disclosure of a  document  that  any question  can arise in a court and then s. 162 of  the Evi-dence Act will govern the situation.  An overriding power in express  terms is conferred on the court under  s.  162  to decide finally on the validity of the objection.  The  court will  disallow the objection if it comes to  the  conclusion that  the  document does not relate to affairs of  state  or that the public interest does not compel its  non-disclosure or that the public interest served by the administration  of justice in a particular case overrides all other aspects  of public interest.  This conclusion flows from the fact that in the first part of s. 162 of the Evidence Act there is  no limitation  on the scope of the court's decision, though  in the  second  part,  the mode of enquiry  is  hedged  in  by-conditions.   It is, therefore, clear that even  though  the head  of the department has refused to grant permission,  it is open to the court to go into the question after examining the  document  and find out whether the  disclosure  of  the document  would  be  injurious to public  interest  and  the expression "as he thinks fit" in the latter part of  section 123  need  not deter the court from  deciding  the  question afresh as  s. 162 authorises the court  to  determine  the validity  of  the  objection  finally  (see  the  concurring judgment of Subba Rao, J. in Sukhdev Singh's case).

It  is rather difficult to understand, after  a  court  has inquired into the objection and found that disclosure of the document would be injurious to public interest, what purpose would  be served by reserving to the head of the  department the power to permit its disclosure because, the question  to be  decided  by him would practically be the  same,  namely, whether the disclosure of the document would be injurious to public Interests question already decided by the court.   In other words, if injury to public interest is the  foundation
of  this  so-called  privilege,  when  once  the  court  has enquired into the question and found that the disclosure  of the document will injure public interest and therefore it is a  document  relating  to affairs of state, it would  be  a futile exercise  for  the  Minister  or  the  head  of  the department  to consider and decide whether  its  disclosure should be permitted as be would be making an enquiry  into  the identical question. It is  difficult  to imagine  that  a  head of the department  would  take  the responsibility to come to a conclusion different from that arrived  at  by a court as regards the effect  of  the dis-closure of the document on public interest unless he has  or can have a different concept of public interest. Few would question the necessity of the rule to exclude that whichwould  cause  serious prejudice to the state.   When  a question of national security is involved, the court may not be  the  proper forum to weigh the matter and  that  is  the reason why a Minister's certificate is taken as  conclusive.

"Those who are responsible for the national security must be
the sole judges of what national security requires"(1).   As the  executive is solely responsible for  national  security including  foreign relations, no other organ could judge  so well  of such matters. Therefore, documents in relation  to these  matters might fall into a class which per  se  might require  protection.   But the executive is  not  the  organ solely responsible for public interest.  It represents only an  important element in it; but there are  other  elements, One  such  element is the administration  of  justice.  The claim  of  the executive to have  exclusive  and  conclusive power  to  determine what is in public interest is  a  claim based on the assumption that the executive alone knows what is  best for the citizen.  C The claim of the  executive  to exclude  evidence  is more likely to operate to  subserve  a partial   interest,   viewed  exclusively  from   a   narrow departmental angle.  It is impossible for it to see or give equal weight to another matter, namely, that justice  should be done and seen to be done.  When there are more aspects of public interest  to  be considered, the  court  will, with reference to the pending litigation, be in a better position to decide where the weight of public interest predominates. The  power reserved to the court is a order production even though public interest is to some  'extent  prejudicially affected.  This amounts to a recognition that more than  one aspects  of public interest will have to be  surveyed.  The interests  of government' for which the Minister  speaks  do not  exhaust the whole public interest.  Another  aspect  of that  interest is  seen  in  the  need  for  impartial  ad-ministration of justice.  It seems reasonable to assume that a court is better qualified than the Minister to measure the importance  of the public interest in the case  before  it. The  court has to make an assessment of the relative  claims of  these different aspect of public interest. While  there are  overwhelming arguments for giving to the executive  the power  to  determine  what  matters  may  prejudice   public security,  those  arguments give no sanction to  giving  the executive  an exclusive power to determine what matters  may affect public interest.  Once considerations of  national security  are  left  out, there are few  matters  of  public interest  which cannot safely be discussed in  public.  The administration itself knows of many  classes of  security documents  ranging from those merely reserved  for  official use  to  those which  can be seen  only  by  a  handful  of Ministers of officials bound by oath of secrecy.

According to Wigmore, the extent to which this privilege has gone   beyond  "secrets  of  State"  in  the   military   or international sense is by
(1)  Lord  Parker of Weddington in The Zemora [1916] 2 A  C
77, at 107.
no means clearly defined and therefore its scope and bearing are  open to careful examination in the light of  logic  and policy.  According to him, in a community under a system  of representative government, there can be only few facts which require  to be kept secret with that solidity  which  defies even the inquiry of courts of justice. (1)
    In a government of responsibility  like  ours, where all the  agents  of  the public must be  responsible  for  their conduct,  there  can but few secrets.  The  people  of this country  have a right to know every public act,  everything, that is done in a public way, by their public functionaries.

They  are entitled to know the particulars of  every  public transaction in all its bearing.  The right to know, which is derived  from the concept of freedom of speech,  though  not absolute,  is  a  factor which should make  one  wary, when secrecy is claimed for transactions which can, at any  rate, have no repercussion on public security (2) . To cover with veil  secrecy  the common routine business, is not  in  the interest of the public.  Such secrecy can seldom be  legiti-mately desired.  It is generally desired for the purpose  of parties   and politics  or   personal   self-interest   or bureaucratic  routine. The responsibility of  officials  to explain  and  to justify their acts is the  chief  safeguard against oppression and corruption.

       "Whether it is the relations of the  Treasury to the Stock Exchange, or the dealings of ;the        Interior Department  with public  lands,  the        facts must constitutionally be demandable,        sooner or later, on the floor of Congress.  TO        concede  to  them a sacrosanct  secrecy  in  a        court  of  justice is to attribute to  them  a        character  which for other purposes  is  never        maintained  a character which appears to have        been  advanced  only when it happens  to have        served  some undisclosed interest to  obstruct        investigation into facts which might reveal  a        liability(3)"

To  justify  a privilege, secrecy must be  indispensable  to induce freedom of official communication or  efficiency  in the transaction of official business and it must be  further a  secrecy  which  has remained  or  would  have   remained inviolable  but for the compulsory disclosure. In how many transactions of official business is there ordinarily such a secrecy?  If there arises at any time a genuine instance  of such  otherwise  inviolate secrecy, let  the  necessity.  of maintaining it be determined on its merits (4).

Lord  Blanesburgh  said  in  Robinson  v.  State  of   South Australia (4) the privilege is a narrow one, most  sparingly to be exercised, that its foundation is that the information cannot be  disclosed  without injury A,  to the   public interests  and not that the documents are  confidential  or ,official which alone is no reason for their non-production. He further said that in view of the increasing extension  of state  activities  into  spheres of  trading,  business  and commerce, and of the claim of privilege in
(1)  see "Evidence", 3rd ed, Vol 8, p 788.
(2)  see  New york Times Co V. United States, 29 L  Ed 822,
403 U S 713.
(3)  gee "Wigrnore on Evidence", 3rd ed-, Vol 8, page 790.
(4)  [1931] A. C. 704 at 798.
relation  to liabilities arising therefrom, the courts must duly  safeguard genuine public interests and that they must see  to it that the scope of the admitted privilege  is  not extended in such litigation.

There  was  some  controversy as to whether  the  court  can inspect  the  document for the purpose  of  coming  to  the conclusion whether the document relates to affairs of state. In Sodhi Sukhdev Singh's case, this Court has said that  the court  has  no power  to inspect  the document.   In the, subsequent  case  (Amar Chand Butail v. Union of  India  and Others(1),  this  Court  held  that  the  normal  method  of claiming privilege was by an affidavit sworn by the head  of the  department and that, if no proper affidavit was  filed, the  claim for privilege was liable to be  rejected. But, this Court inspected the document to see whether it  related to  affairs of state.  It might be that the court wanted  to make sure that public interest is protected, but whatever be the reason, the court did exercise the power to inspect  the document.

In  England, it is now settled by the decision in CO  Rimmer (2)  that  there  is  residual power  in  court  to  decide disclosure  of a document is in the interest of  the  public purpose, if necessary, to inspect the document, and that the of  the,  head of the department that the  disclosure  would injure public interest is not final.

In Robinson's case, (Supra) the Privy Council took the view that  the court has power to inspect the (document in  order to decide the question whether it belongs to one category or the other.
It  is also  noteworthy that Lord Denning,  M.  R,  in  his dissenting  judgment  in the Court of Appeal  in  Conway  v. Rimmer has referred to the decision in Amar Chand Butail  v. Union of India and Others' (supra) and said that the Supreme Court of India also has come round to the view that there is a  residual  power  in the court to inspect  a document  to decide whether its production in court or disclosure  would be injurious to public interest.
Probably  the only circumstances in which a court  will  not insist on  inspection of the document is  that  stated  by
Vinson, C. J. in United States v. Revenolds(3) :
       "Regardless  of  how it is  articulated, some        like  formula  of compromise must  be  applied        here.   Judicial control over evidence  in  a        case  cannot  be abdicated to the  caprice  of        executive officers.  Yet we will not go so far        as  to  say that the court  may  automatically        require  a  complete disclosure to  the  judge        before the claim of privilege will be accepted        in  any case.  It may be possible  to  satisfy        the  court from all the circumstances  of  the        base,  that there is a reasonable danger that        compulsion  of evidence will  expose  military        matters  which,  in the interest of  national        security, should not be divulged When this  is        the case, the occasion for the privilege
       (1)   A I R 1964 SC 1658.
       (2)   [1968] 1 All E R 874.
       (3) [1952] 345 U S 1.
       362
       is  appropriate, and  the  court  should  not        jeopardize the security which the privilege is        meant   to  protect  by  insisting   upon   an        examination of the evidence, even by the judge        alone in chambers."
I  do  not  think  that  there is  much  substance  in  the contention  that since, the Blue Book had been published  in parts, it must be deemed to have been published as a  whole and,  therefore,  the document could not be regarded  as  an unpublished  official record relating to affairs  of  state. If some parts of the document which are innocuous have been published,  it does not follow that the whole  document  has been  published.   No  authority  has  been  cited  for  the proposition  that if a severable and innocuous portion of  a document  is published, the entire document shall be  deemed to have been published for the purpose of S. 123.
In  regard  to the  claim of  privilege  for  the  document summoned  from the office of the Superintendent  of  Police, Rai  Bareily,  the  High Court has only said  that  all  the instructions   contained  in  the  file  produced   by  the Superintendent of Police were the same as those contained i n the Blue Book and since no privilege in respect of the Blue Book  could be claimed, the Superintendent of  Police  could not claim any privilege, in respect of those documents.   It is difficult to under:stand how the High Court got the idea that   the   papers   brought  from  the   office   of  the Superintendent of  Police contained  only  instructions  or materials taken from the Blue Book.  Since the court did not inspect  the Blue Book, the statement by the court that  the materials   contained in   the  file  produced   by  the Superintendent of Police were ,taken from the Blue Book  was not warranted.
I am not satisfied that a mere label given to a document  by the  .executive  is conclusive in respect  of  the  question whether  it  relates  to affairs of state or  not.   If  the disclosure of the contents of the document would not  damage public interest,  the executive cannot label it in  such  a manner as to bring 'it within the class of documents  which ,are  normally entitled to protection. N6 doubt, "the very description-of the  documents in  the  class may  suffice sometimes  to show that they should not be produced such  as Cabinet  papers"  (see per  Lord Danning,  M.R.  in  In  reGrosvenor Hotel, London (No. 2) (1).  Harman, L. J.  said(2)
in  that  case : "the appellants' real point is  that  since Duncan's  Case(3)  there  has grown up a  practice  to lump documents  together  and  treat them as a  class  for  which privilege  is  claimed and  that  this  depends  on   dicta pronounced  on what is really a  different  subject-matter which are not binding on the court and are wrong."
In Conway v. Rimmer(4) Lord Reid said : "I do not doubt that there are certain classes of documents which ought not to be disclosed  whatever  their content may be" and referred  to cabinet  minutes  as belonging to that class. Lord  Upjohn
said(5) if  privilege is
(1) [1965] 1 Ch- 1210, at 1246.
(2) ibid  at p 1248.
(3) [1948] A: C-- 624.
(4) [1968] 1 All E R  874, at 888.
(5)  ibid at p 915.
claimed  for a document on the ground of 'class' the  judge,if he feels any doubt about the reason for its inclusion  asa  class  document,  should not hesitate  to  call  for  its production  for  his private inspection, and  to  order  and
limit  its  production if he thinks fit." In the  same case Lord  Hodson said(1) : "I do not regard  the  classification which  places  all  documents under the  heading  either  of contents  or class to be wholly satisfactory.  The plans  of warships,  as in Duncan's case and documents exemplified  by cabinet  minutes  are to be treated, I think,  as  cases  to which  Crown  privilege can be properly applied as  a  class without  the  necessity of the documents  being  considered individually. The documents in this case, class  documents though they  may be, are in a different  category,  seeking protection, not as State documents of political or strategic importance,  but,as requiring protection on the ground that 'candour' must be ensured." I would set aside the order of the High Court and direct  it to consider the matter afresh. The High Court will have  to consider  the question whether the documents in  respect  of which  privilege  had been claimed by Mr. R. K.  Kaul, Home Secretary and the Superintendent of Police relate to affairs of  state and whether public interest would  be injuriously affected by their disclosure. If the averments in the affidavits are not full or complete, the court will be at liberty to call for further affidavits.If,  on  the basis of the averments in the  affidavits,  the court is satisfied that the Blue Book belongs to a class  of documents,  like  the  minutes of  the proceedings  of the cabinet, which is per se entitled to protection, no  further question  will arise in respect of that document.   In such case,  no question of inspection of that document  by  court will  also arise.  If, however, the court is  not  satisfied that  the Blue Book does not belong to that class  and that averments in the affidavits and the evidence adduced are not sufficient to enable the Court to make up its mind that  its disclosure  will injure public interest, it will be open  to the court to inspect the document for deciding the  question whether  it  relates  to  affairs  of  state  and  that  its disclosure  will injure public interest.  In respect of  the other  documents,  the court will be at liberty  to  inspect them,  if  on  the  averments in  the affidavits  or  other evidence,  it is not able to come to a conclusion that they relate to affairs of state or not. if, on inspection, the court holds that any part of the Blue Book  or other document does not relate to affairs of  state and  that its disclosure would not injure  public  interest, the court will be free to (1)  bid at p. 905. disclose  that part and uphold the objection as regards  the rest   provided that  this  will  not give  a   misleading impression.  Lord Pearce said in Conway v. Rimmer(1) "if  part of a document is innocuous but part        is of such a nature that its disclosure  would        be  undesirable, it should seal up the  latter part and order discovery of the rest, provided        that  this  will not  give  a  distorted   or   misleading impression." 
The  principle of  the rule of  non-disclosure  of  records relating  to  affairs  of state is the concern for  public interest  and the rule will be applied no further  than  the attainment of that objective requires(2).
I would allow the appeal.
P.B.R.
Appeal allowed.
(1)  [1968] 1 All E.R. 874, at 911.
(2)  see Taylor on Evidence, p. 939.
365