Wednesday, July 18, 2012

gross abuse of dowry and 498a - Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta & Ors Vs State Of Maharashtra


                                            IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                                           CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                                            CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 891 of 2004

Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta & Ors ...Appellants


Vs

State Of Maharashtra ...Respondent


Author: . B Chauhan
Bench: P. Sathasivam, B.S. Chauhan

JUDGMENT: Dated on 11 November, 2010

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.
1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay, dated 29.4.2004, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 865 of 1987, by which the High Court has reversed the judgment and order of the Trial Court acquitting the appellants of the charges under Sections 306/34 and 498A/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called as `IPC').

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that appellant No.1 got married to one Neeru Gupta (hereinafter called as `the deceased') on 1.12.1978 by way of an arranged marriage. Out of the said wedlock, a female child named Mili was born in 1981. There had been some disputes between the husband and wife on petty matters. Neeru committed suicide on 28.9.1985 by hanging herself in the bathroom when all the other family members had gone outside. Rajesh (PW.2), brother of the deceased, filed a complaint dated 30.9.1985, against the appellants i.e. the husband and parents in law of the deceased, alleging that they had been demanding dowry and had given ill treatment to the deceased, and that is why Neeru committed suicide. The police investigated the matter and filed the charge sheet against all the three appellants on 9.1.1986 under Section 306 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC. The prosecution examined a large number of witnesses to substantiate its case. After the conclusion of the trial, the Sessions Court vide its judgment and order dated 21.5.1987, held that the deceased had committed suicide. However, no role could be attributed to any of the appellants for the same, and the prosecution failed to prove any of the charges beyond reasonable doubt against the appellants. The witnesses examined by the prosecution improved their version with regard to claims of the alleged demands, particularly in respect of the gold ornaments and ill treatment of the deceased. The Trial Court came to the conclusion that the deceased was suffering from epilepsy, psychosis and depression and had been getting regular treatment for the same. Therefore, it was not a case of dowry demand or treating her with cruelty.

3. Being aggrieved, the State of Maharashtra preferred Criminal Appeal No.865 of 1987 before the High Court of Bombay and the High Court reversed the order of acquittal, convicted the appellants vide its judgment and order dated 29.4.2004 and imposed the punishment of 3 years RI on the husband, appellant No.1, and 2 years on the other appellants i.e. the in-laws of the deceased. Hence, this appeal.

4. Shri K.T.S Tulsi, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, has submitted that the High Court failed to appreciate the medical evidence and depositions of the prosecution witnesses in the right perspective, as the same could not establish conclusively that the suicide by the deceased could be attributed to the appellants to any extent. It was a clear cut case of suicide because of depression, as the deceased had been suffering from epilepsy and other mental disorders. The deceased had developed an illicit relationship with a family friend, Kake, and a letter written by the said Kake had been in the possession of the other family members and, therefore, they had informed her parents and brother about the said illicit relationship. The medical evidence, particularly, the deposition of Dr. Daulatram Nekumal Gurbani (PW.10) made it clear that the deceased had been suffering from serious depression and such a patient often develops suicidal tendencies. The deceased had also made an attempt earlier to commit suicide in 1985 and she had been taken to the local hospital. Subsequently, she had also been treated at Kanpur. The findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court that there was neither any demand of gold ornaments or any kind of dowry, nor had the deceased been subjected to cruelty, could not be held to be perverse by the High Court to bring home the charges against the appellants under Sections 306 or 498A IPC. The parents-in-law of the deceased were not living at Kalyan, as the appellant No.2 had been transferred to Kurudwadi in 1983 and the deceased was living with her husband i.e. appellant No.1, at Kalyan. The High Court committed an error in shifting the burden of proof to the defence as the court observed that the defence failed to prove its version. In fact the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the failure of the defence to prove the defence version cannot be a ground for conviction. More so, as there has been no abetment to suicide, the provisions of Section 306 IPC could not be attracted. Thus, in view of above, the appeal deserves to be allowed.

5. On the contrary, Shri Sushil Karanjakar, learned counsel appearing for the State has vehemently opposed the appeal contending that the High Court's judgment is based on cogent reasons and on a proper appreciation of the evidence on record. The High Court has correctly reached the conclusion that the findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court were perverse. The High Court is the final court of facts, its findings do not deserve to be disturbed by this Court in a routine manner. There is sufficient evidence on record to prove the demand of dowry and abetment to suicide. Therefore, no interference is required by this Court with the findings of fact recorded by the High Court. The appeal lacks merit and, thus, is liable to be dismissed.

6. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

7. Before proceeding further, it may be pertinent to mention here that Shri K.T.S Tulsi, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, has informed us that appellant No.3, Sou. Pushamalati Sambhudayal Gupta died in the month of February, 2010. In view thereof, the appeal by appellant No.3 stands abated and we only have to consider the case of appellant Nos. 1 and 2, i.e., the husband and the father-in-law of the deceased.

8. The Trial Court after appreciating the depositions of the witnesses and examining the documentary evidence on record came to the conclusion that the alleged demand of gold ornaments or ill- treatment of the deceased could not be established and none of the letters produced by the prosecution has been suggestive of either of ill-treatment or demand of dowry. None of the prosecution witnesses, i.e. the family members of the deceased, made such allegations either while lodging the FIR or in their statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called `Cr.P.C.'). Such allegations had been made for the first time while making statements before the court during trial. There were material contradictions and improvements, which were not mere elaborations of their statements already made. Thus, their statements in regard to those allegations were liable to be discarded.

9. The High Court reversed the findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court, mainly relying upon the evidence of Dr. Daulatram Nekumal Gurubani (PW.10), as he had deposed that when he had examined the deceased, she told him that she had been deprived of love and affection by her family members. She had no faith in any member of her family. He had also opined that it was not a case of psychosis, but the deceased had been suffering from a mental disorder. The High Court also reached the conclusion that the defence failed to establish that the deceased was suffering from epilepsy before her marriage. The stay of the deceased along with her parents in a Guest House for two-three days after going from Kanpur to Kalyan has also been taken by the High Court as a circumstance adverse to the appellants. The High Court also came to the conclusions that the intimacy between the deceased and Kake did not mean that she had illicit relationship with Kake; and there had been a demand of a gold chain by appellant No.3.

10. As the High Court has reversed the order of acquittal and taken a view contrary to the view taken by the Trial Court, we have taken upon ourselves the task of appreciation of evidence and considered the legal and factual issues involved in the case.

11. Letters written by the parties to each other:
(A) A large number of letters had been placed on record before the Trial Court by both the parties. Letter dated 24.2.1979 (Ext.P-26), written by the deceased to her husband, about 3 months after the marriage reveals that there was no problem in the relationship between the husband and wife. In fact, it suggests that they had deep love and affection for each other.
(B) Letter dated 3.4.1985, written by appellant no. 2 to the father of the deceased, makes it evident that something had gone wrong and the behaviour of the deceased had been totally unwarranted, as it revealed that she had gone out of the house i.e. on the main road, half-naked and she had brought disrepute to the family of her in-laws. However, they had been tolerating such behaviour. She had lowered their prestige so much that they had not been able to show their faces to anyone. It suggested an illicit relationship between the deceased and one family friend, Kake. It also suggested that the deceased wanted to live with the said Kake, as she had developed love for him and she was willing to elope with him. It also suggested that it was wrong on the part of Smt. Shanti (mother of the deceased) to have been giving wrong advice to the deceased and making false allegations that her in- laws were not treating her properly. According to this letter, the deceased had declared that she was no longer interested in Sunil, her husband, as she did not like him any more and in the end appellant No.2 had expressed great concern about his grand daughter Mili and stated that he was willing to keep her in a hostel so that she could be spared humiliation because of the illicit relationship between the deceased and Kake. The author of the letter suggested to the father of the deceased that he should call the deceased to Kanpur as there could be some untoward/disastrous incident in future.
(C) The undated letter (Ext. P-2) purported to have been written by Kake to the deceased, gives an impression that the deceased had not only deep intimacy, but something more with Kake. Kake was also in possession of some of her photographs which he claimed to be his fortune and said that the same would not be returned to her as she had requested and would be burnt only with the end of his life. This letter also suggested that he had the opportunity to have a physical relationship with her.
(D) There are several other letters on record showing that after the development of the intimacy between Kake and the deceased, both families were disturbed and attempts had been made from both the sides to patch up the matter. However, none of the letters suggests any demand of dowry or ill treatment to the deceased amounting to cruelty by the appellants.
(E) The letter dated 7.7.1985 written by the complainant, Rajesh, brother of the deceased to appellant No.1, is suggestive in nature. It suggests that appellant no. 1 should try to save the prestige of the family at any cost and forget all that had happened in the past, as the deceased was willing to improve herself and accept any advice given by her husband. Another letter dated 9.7.1985, written by the informant, Rajesh, brother of the deceased to the appellant No.2 revealed that the entire family of the deceased had been making serious attempts at re-conciliation. Even in this letter there was not even a whisper/mention of any demand of dowry or of ill treatment.
(F) The letter dated 18.7.1985 written by the father of the deceased to his son Rajesh (PW.2) from Kalyan made it clear that the author along with the deceased had gone to Kalyan to meet the family of the appellants, and they were not welcomed by the mother-in-law of the deceased at the initial stage. They had been staying in Modern Guest House in the same colony. Appellant No.1, the husband of the deceased suggested that the deceased should meet her mother-in-law and apologies, which was accepted by the deceased. The deceased met her mother-in-law and apologized. After some time, the mother-in- law became quiet and calm and started behaving properly and all the appellants treated them well.
(G) The un-dated letter (Ex.P-21) written by the deceased to her father revealed that her mother-in-law wanted her to separate herself from the other members of the family and her parents. It also gave the impression that her mother-in-law was asking for a gold chain ("zanzir ke liye keh rahi thi") and created problems for her in meeting her husband and daughter. After the arrival of her brother-in-law to Kalyan, the behaviour of her mother-in-law had improved a lot, but her husband being busy in his practice and did not have sufficient time to be with her.
(H) From the original record, a letter dated 1.4.1985 (Ext. 16), by the mother-in-law to the father of the deceased seems to have been written after losing hope completely and concluding that the deceased had become incorrigible. The said letter suggests that the relationship between the deceased and her husband had come to an end. The deceased had become a woman of bad character. They had tolerated her to a great extent. The deceased had been tutored by her mother; she had been misbehaving with them and it had become difficult for them to tolerate her any more. The deceased had been using abusive language to all the family members. She had lowered their reputation and they had been very unlucky to have such a daughter-in-law. As she wanted to live with Kake and not with her husband, they did not want to have any relationship with her. [Appellant No. 3 had denied writing the said letter].
(I) Another letter dated 22.5.1985, is on record written by Jai Narain Gupta from Sandila, U.P. (who seems to be relative of the deceased) wherein a suggestion had been made to patch up the matter. The author has drawn the inference that the problems were being created for the deceased, and she has been treated with cruelty as her in-laws did not receive dowry according to their expectations, though, there is no allegation that there has been any demand of dowry and for not giving the same.
(J) The undated letter written by the deceased to her aunt Manorma Gupta at Barabanki does not suggest anything against the accused, as the deceased had written that everything was fine and that she would discuss things when they met. The undated letter written by her aunt in reply, suggests that there was something amiss. She had mentioned that the whole family was very disturbed, but they were not able to suggest any solution. There was nothing to worry or fear as all of them were with the deceased and she also told the deceased to face things with courage, as she had equal rights to stay in the house and to fight for justice.

12. Depositions of Prosecution witnesses (Relevant parts): (I) Dr. Mohan Kulkarni, a practicing doctor residing in the same building (PW.1)
I know both accused Nos. 2 and 3 used to occasionally visit their block at Waldhuni (Kalyan) after transfer of accused No.2 at Kurduwadi.....I have no any personal knowledge about the relations in between accused No.1 and his deceased wife.....It is true that I was told by accused No.1 some four or five month before the incident that his wife Guddi was getting the attacks of epileptic fits. The ailment of epileptic fits is of neurological problems. I say that these medicines namely used in neurological problems as gardenal, have their side effects on the patient. E.C.T. (Electro Convulsive Therapy) treatment is given to mental patients of some sort. If a person shows abnormal signs then he is branded as a mental patient. I say that those who have tendency of mental depression they tend to commit suicide. It is true that mental disorder in some cases creates mental depression.
(II) Rajesh (PW.2) (Brother of the deceased)- "It is true that there was nothing wrong in between the accused and Neeru till the delivery of a female child and everything was smooth and cordial, in between them...... I cannot say why it is not disclosed specifically in my complaint that as accused no.3 instructed Neeru to fetch golden ornaments on account of my marriage ceremony, my father presented with four golden bangles in the ceremony....... I cannot say why it is not stated in my complaint that after the birth of her daughter we presented Neeru with two golden ear rings and golden chain of two tolas because those were demanded by her husband's family members..... As I did not remember the exact account of the remaining ornaments presented to Neeru by us as and when demanded by her in laws. I did not narrate about them in the complaint. Except my words I have no documentary evidence to show how many golden ornaments were presented to Neeru and when......There is no reference to golden chain any other letters except letter (Exh.21) sent by Neeru to my parents and myself. That golden chain we give to Neeru in 1985 was weighing 2 and = tolas..... The only reference about the golden chain asked for by accused no.3 appears in letter (Exh.21) sent by Neeru to us after she was reached at her in laws place on 24.8.1985.
(III) Manorma (PW.7) Aunt of deceased. She told me that accused persons had demanded a golden chain from her and hence she was not being called back now shown inland letter dated 10.7.1985 which is written by me to Neeru alias Guddi at Kanpur.....I have not stated before the police that when I met Neeru in March 1985 she told me that accused persons were demanding more golden ornaments from her and that they were keeping her starving and were not allowing her to meet her daughter Mili, and that she was craving to meet Mili. As I was not well at that time I forgot to narrate the things before the police. I have told this fact for the first time to the court...... I have not written specifically in my two letters (Exh.39 and 40) addressed to my brother and sister in law that Neeru told me that she was subjected to physical assault by the accused and that she was kept starving by the accused and further accused demanded golden ornaments from her.
(IV) Ramkishan Gupta (PW.8) Father of deceased- "I then arranged for a golden chain and sent Rajesh along with Neeru with a golden chain to Kalyan on 24.8.1985. Rajesh handed over golden chain to accused, and left Neeru in her in laws house and returned back to Kanpur. After 15 days we received a telegram sent by brother of accused no.1 Pradeep Kumar that all was well in the house at Kalyan. On 29.9.1985 we received a phone call informing us the said news of death of Neeru..... I have not stated in letter (Exh.23/1) that while we were standing out side the house of accused and requesting them to accept Neeru, accused no.3 demanded a golden chain from us and refused to allow Neeru to see her daughter in side the house, because Rajesh already knew all these things at Kanpur. I have no documentary evidence except my words to show that I had written to my sister Manorama and to my brother that accused persons were demanding......I have not stated in either of my two statements before the police that when accused no.3 came to attend the wedding of my son Rajesh she demanded golden ornaments for herself (Accused no.3). I have not stated in either of my two statements before the police that even after the delivery of Neeru in 1981 none of the accused persons came to Kanpur to visit her. I have not stated in my first statement dated 1.10.1985 before the police that when Neeru came for delivery at Kanpur she informed us that accused no.3 was demanding golden ornaments from her.....I have not stated in either of my two statements specifically that when I and my wife went to the house of accused on 17.2.1985 we met all three accused at the entrance and all of them asked me whether I had brought golden ornaments or had come empty handed, and that they had already asked Rajesh to bring along golden ornaments and whereupon I told all three accused that I had not brought along golden ornaments as I was not having them and where upon all three accused pointed out towards Neeru and said as to how all those accused had driven Neeru to such a condition and that they would further make her condition miserable. I have not stated in either of my two statements before the police that when Neeru returned back to our house in March 1985 she told us that all accused told her that till their demand for cash and ornaments was not made, they would not allow Mili to go along with Neeru. I have not stated in either of my two statements before the police that when accused nos.2 and 3 had come to attend the marriage ceremony at Kanpur in the month of March 1985 accused nos.2 and 3 did not allow me to meet Mili. I had not stated in either of my two statements before the police that when Rajesh brought back Neeru in the month of June 1985 at Kanpur Neeru told me that she was not allowed to meet her daughter Mili in the house of her husband and accused no.3 asked her if she had brought golden chain or not." (V) Daulatram Nekumal Gurubani (PW.10), Doctor- "In the mid of February, 1985 accused No.1 told me that his wife has become aggressive and was not co-operative and also used to become violent. When I reached the house of accused No.1, there I met accused No.2 and Accused No.3. I examined Neerubai, the wife of accused No.1. She was lying in store room and was not in a mood to talk anything with me even she become aggressive with me in the sense she was not co- operative with me. Accused No.1 told Neerubai that I was psychotherapist of Thane Mental Hospital and then Neeru asked me whether I treated my wife in the same way she was being treated by her husband accused No.1. She showed me injury marks bruises on her both knees and a small injury on the lower lip and also bruises on the back. She also told me that she was beaten by her family members and by a ward boy of hospital. She also told me that she had been maltreated by her husband, by her mother in law. She also told me that, her ornaments were being worn by accused No.3. On seeing the injury marks on her person I talked with accused No.1 and asked for details. Accused No.1 told me that as Neeru had become violent and we were controlling her it was possible that she sustained small bruises..... Accused No.1 told me that his wife was suffering from epileptic fits since before her marriage and that she was on Geroin tablets. I told him that there were side effects of this drug and the drug should be stopped after 3 years. He told me that she was on drug for so many years and she is maintained on that drugs. I told him to continue with above tablets and consult Neurologist if she is suffering from the above ailments. I visited her place for 4 times in the same month i.e. February, 1985. During all those visits I never found any signs of epileptic fits......
Cross examination:
I started my practice in January 1985 at Ulhasnagar and handed the case of Neeru in February 1985 after I passed my M.D. Degree in Psychiatry in July 1984 though I joined mental hospital at Thane as Medical Officer......I agree that even in major epilepsy this medicine Geroin is prescribed. It will not be correct to say that because I prescribed medicine Geroin I was convinced that the patient was suffering from major epilepsy. Even though I knew that drug Geroin carried side effect yet I prescribed it though I knew she had no sign of epilepsy because once the drug is started it cannot be abruptly discontinued otherwise the patient may get fits. I stick to the proposition that if an anti- convulsent drugs such as Geroin is given for long period and withdrawn abruptly then she may get convulsions. I am backed by authority. Clinical examination alone cannot decide whether a patient is suffering from epilepsy or not. Patient of epilepsy may have a grand-mal or petit-mal. It is true that dose of Geroin daily is more in case of grand-mal than in the case of petit-mal. It is true that a maximum dose of Geroin tablets is 4 tablets 3 times a day. I agree that brain scan, EEG and X- ray of all the skull are required for investigations in cases of epilepsy....
It is true that drugs at Sr. Nos. 1 to 5 prescribed by me to Mrs. Neeru wife Exh.46 are normally prescribed in a case of epilepsy with psychoses and in depressive state....I have prescribed to Neeru E.C.T. treatment.....It is not stated in my prescription letter (Exh.46) that if the drug as Sr. Nos. 1 to 5 prescribed to Neeru do not work out, then E.C.T. therapy should be started to her, though verbally told her so. It is true that I have not specifically stated in my prescription letter (Exh.46) at any time during my visits to Mrs. Neeru on 4 or 5 occasions that as the drugs at Sr.Nos. 1 to 5 in (Exh.46) were working, E.C.T. therapy was not essential.....I have not stated in my police statement that the room in which Neeru was found was an unkept room or a store room. I have not stated before the police that when I was introduced to Neeru as a psychiatrist, Neeru asked me whether I treat my wife in the same way as she was treated by her husband. I have not stated before the police that before Neeru was examined by me she told me that she was harassed by accused persons and that her ornaments were worn by accused No.3......I have not stated before the police that I examined Neeru and found that there was not any gross psychological problem but she was mentally disturbed and I found that she had no faith in any of the members of the family and I found that she was deprived of love, affection and sympathy of her family members. I have not stated before the police that accused No.1 told me she was also epileptic but I did not find any signs and symptoms of that disease with her. I have not stated before the police that I requested accused No.1 where was the X-ray of skull and other investigation papers and accused No.1 told me that his wife was suffering of epileptic fits since before her marriage and that she was on geroin tablet. I have not stated before the police that I told him that there were side effects of this drug and the drug should be stopped after 3 years..... I agree that Mrs. Neeru did not meet me in April 1985 but she brought the letter of April 1985 of Dr. S. Mahendru in the month of June 1985. I have not stated before the police that Neeru either met me in April 1985 or in June 1985. Beyond my word there is no any other evidence to show that in September 1985 accused Nos. 1 and 2 came to me. I have not stated before the police that both accused Nos. 1 and 2 later on told me that Neeru committed suicide and that they needed certificate about her mental condition.....
(VI) Dr. Ramesh Kumar Mahendru (PW.12) - Doctor from Kanpur :
Xxx  .....I say that the experts prescribed E.C.T. (Electro Convulsive treatment) in cases of retarded
depression and, manic depressive psychosis. I am shown the chart today by the learned Defence counsel in which the prescription of medicines advised by Dr. Gurubani for Niru and by me are practically same except with a difference that the medicines mentioned at Sr.No.4 does not potentiate as anti depressants but it prevents the reactions caused by the medicines stated at Sr.No.3 in the chart.....Narco therapy is a kind of suggestive psycho therapy under the influence of narcotic drugs such as barbiturates.

13. The above referred letters and the depositions of the witnesses have to be understood/appreciated within the four corners of law, particularly dealing with the issues of reversal of the order of acquittal by the appellate court and discrepancies/improvement/embellishment and contradictions in the statements of the witnesses.

14. Material Contradictions:
While appreciating the evidence, court has to take into consideration whether contradictions/omissions had been of such magnitude that they may materially affect the trial. Minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters without effecting the core of the prosecution case should not be made a ground to reject the evidence in its entirety. The Trial Court, after going through the entire evidence, must form an opinion about the credibility of the witnesses and the appellate Court in normal course would not be justified in reviewing the same again without justifiable reasons. (Vide: State Represented by Inspector of Police v. Saravanan & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 152).

15. Where the omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt about the truthfulness of a witness and other witness also make material improvements before the court in order to make the evidence acceptable, it cannot be safe to rely upon such evidence. (Vide : State of Rajasthan v. Rajendra Singh, (2009) 11 SCC 106).

16. The discrepancies in the evidence of eye-witnesses, if found to be not minor in nature, may be a ground for disbelieving and discrediting their evidence. In such circumstances, witnesses may not inspire confidence and if their evidence is found to be in conflict and contradiction with other evidence or with the statement already recorded, in such a case it cannot be held that prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. (Vide: Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2009) 11 SCC 334).
17. In case, the complainant in the FIR or the witness in his statement under section 161 Cr.P.C., has not disclosed certain facts but meets the prosecution case first time before the court, such version lacks credence and is liable to be discarded. (Vide: State Represented by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu v. Sait @ Krishnakumar, (2008) 15 SCC 440).

18. In State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki & Anr., AIR 1981 SC 1390, while dealing with this issue, this Court observed as under: "In the depositions of witnesses there are always normal discrepancies, however honest and truthful they may be. These discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of the occurrence, and the like. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person.

19. The courts have to label the category to which a discrepancy belongs. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party's case, material discrepancies do so. (see: Syed Ibrahim v. 23
State of A.P., AIR 2006 SC 2908; and Arumugam v. State, AIR 2009 SC 331).

20. In Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh & Ors., (2004) 9 SCC 186, this Court examined the issue and held: "Exaggerations per se do not render the evidence brittle. But it can be one of the factors to test credibility of the prosecution version, when the entire evidence is put in a crucible for being tested on the touchstone of credibility.

21. While deciding such a case, the Court has to apply the aforesaid tests. Mere marginal variations in the statements cannot be dubbed as improvements as the same may be elaborations of the statement made by the witness earlier. The omissions which amount to contradictions in material particulars i.e. go to the root of the case/materially affect the trial or core of the prosecution's case, render the testimony of the witness liable to be discredited.

Appeal against Acquittal:
22. It is a well-established principle of law, consistently re-iterated and followed by this Court is that while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, an appellate court must consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. Even though the appellate court is entitled to consider, whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had placed the burden of proof incorrectly or failed to take into consideration any admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration evidence brought on record contrary to law; the appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. The trial court which has the benefit of watching the demeanor of the witnesses is the best judge of the credibility of the witnesses.

23. Every accused is presumed to be innocent unless his guilt is proved. The presumption of innocence is a human right. Subject to the statutory exceptions, the said principle forms the basis of criminal jurisprudence in India. The nature of the offence, its seriousness and gravity has to be taken into consideration.
The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused, and further, that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference with the decision of the Trial Court in a casual or cavalier manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for such interference.

24. In exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. A finding may also be said to be perverse if it is `against the weight of evidence', or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (See: Balak Ram & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1974 SC 2165; Shailendra Pratap & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 2003 SC 1104; Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 2006 SC 2500; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs.; Ors., AIR 2008 SC 2066; Arulvelu & Anr. v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206; Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 445); and Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189).

25. The instant case is required to be examined in light of the aforesaid legal principles. Undoubtedly, the record reveals that at an initial stage the relationship between husband and wife had been very cordial and they had love and affection for each other. At a later stage when family suspected an illicit relationship between the deceased and Kake, the appellants were very much disturbed. Both the families made serious attempts to re-concile and patch up the matter and the appellants agreed that the deceased may be given an opportunity to improve her behaviour. Thus, admittedly there was a doubt that the deceased had developed serious intimacy with Kake, which was much more than what happens in normal course with a family friend. Therefore, the finding recorded by the High Court that intimacy between them to the extent of having an illicit relationship was not there, loses its significance, for the reason that even the suspicion of such a matter becomes the talk of the town and the reputation of the family remains at stake. The protests on the part of the appellants even on a mere suspicion and asking the deceased to keep distance from Kake or improve her behaviour is not something which can be termed to be unwarranted or uncalled for.

26. There is ample evidence on record to suggest that deceased had been suffering from psychosis/mental dis-order. According to Dr. Daulatram Nekumal Gurubani (PW.10) the ailment was not of a very serious nature. However, the prescriptions given by Dr. Gurubani (PW.10) reveal that the deceased had been suffering from serious mental dis-order, otherwise such medicines could not have been prescribed by him. He has prescribed the deceased the medicine Geroin because he was convinced that the deceased was suffering from major epilepsy, in spite of the fact that he was fully aware that the said drug has side effects. He also deposed that mere clinical examination alone is not sufficient to decide whether the patient is suffering from epilepsy. He further deposed that such medicine can be given to a person suffering from grand-mal epilepsy. More so, had it not been the case of serious ailment of mental dis-order, question of prescribing and giving E.C.T. to the deceased could not arise.

27. There had been a lot of improvements and contradictions in his statements. The witness deposed for the first time in the court during the trial, that when he went to examine the deceased, she was found in an unkept room/store room and that he was introduced to the deceased as a Psychiatrist and that the deceased had asked him whether he treated his wife in the same way as she had been treated by her husband. None of this was mentioned in his statement recorded by the police. Nor it had been recorded therein that the deceased had told him that she was harassed by the appellants and her ornaments were taken away/worn by her mother in law (A.3). More so, he had not stated in his police statement that the deceased was merely mentally disturbed and not suffering from a gross psychological problem. Nor had he stated therein that the deceased had told him that she was not having any faith in any of her family members and she was deprived of their love, affection and sympathy. Such contradictions in his statements cannot be held to be mere explanations or elaborations of his version, but are tantamount to material contradictions or vital omissions. The Rules of appreciation of evidence requires that court should not draw conclusions by picking up an isolated sentence of a witness without adverting to the statement as a whole. In such a fact- situation, it is not safe to rely on his testimony for the simple reason that he had made a lot of improvements/embellishments while deposing in court and vital contradictions exist with his earlier recorded statement. Thus, no reliance can be placed on his depositions to hold that appellants had ill-treated the deceased or that appellant No.3 had taken away/worn her ornaments or that she had been deprived of their love and affection or that she was not suffering from epilepsy etc.

28. The deposition of Dr. Mohan Kulkarni (PW.1) reveals that E.C.T. treatment is given only to mental patients, who have mental depression and tend to commit suicide; the ailment of epileptic fits is a neurological problem. His statement also suggests that her in-laws had not been living with her after 1983, as the appellant No.2 stood transferred to Kurudwadi and had shifted to the said transferred place and her in-laws had been visiting Kalyan occasionally. This view stands fully corroborated by the deposition of Dr. Ramesh Kumar Mahendru (PW.12), Reader in Psychiatric Medicine, Mental Hospital, Kanpur, as referred to herein above. He had examined the deceased and prescribed medicines for manic depressive Psychosis. The prescription of this witness substantially remained the same as of Dr. Daulatram Nekumal Gurubani (PW.10). The cumulative effect of the medical evidence given by three Doctors leads us to the conclusion that deceased had been suffering from manic depression and certainly had some mental/epileptic/ psychosis problem.

29. So far as the other witnesses are concerned, they are the father, brother and aunt of the deceased. Thus, being close relatives, in such facts and circumstances they might have developed inimical feelings towards the appellants, since they came to the conclusion that the appellants were responsible for the death of the deceased. However, their depositions are full of contradictions and have marked improvements from their statements recorded earlier. The exaggerations and improvements are of such a nature that they make their whole statements in respect of the demand for gold ornaments and/or the ill-treatment of the deceased liable to total disregard on these counts. Gold ornaments had been given by the complainants to the deceased out of love and free will at the time of the marriage of Rajesh (PW.2) and at the time of delivery of her daughter Mili. Undoubtedly, Rajesh (PW.2) had alleged in the FIR that there had been demand of gold ornaments by the appellants without any details of the same, however, he could not furnish any explanation as why this fact had not been disclosed to the police when his statement and supplementary statement was recorded. Also no such inference can be drawn from any of the letters on record. Only one un-dated letter (Ext.P-21) written by the deceased to her father suggests that her mother in-law had been asking for a chain. More so, as the chain had been given by the complainants to the deceased just 2/3 months before her death, and there is no evidence that any further demand had been there, the issue became totally irrelevant in terms of proving the motive, and it cannot be presumed that any demand had been made. More so, even if it is presumed that there was some demand by appellant No.3, as she is no more, and her appeal stands abated, this issue becomes totally irrelevant for the reason that no such allegation had ever been made against the remaining two appellants.

30. So far as the stay of the deceased with her parents after coming from Kanpur to Kalyan at the guest house is concerned, admittedly at that time the relations between the parties were strained because of the suspicion that the deceased was having an illicit relationship with Kake. However, it has been admitted by Ramkishan (PW.8), father of the deceased, that subsequently the relations became normal and they were invited at the house of the appellants after the deceased tendered an apology to her mother-in- law. The said witness did not state in his statement before the police that when he went to see the appellants on 17.2.1985, they had asked him whether he had brought gold ornaments or had come empty handed or that he was told that the deceased would not be allowed to live there and they would make her condition even more miserable. Such an improvement was made while deposing in court and no explanation could be furnished by him as to why such vital facts were not stated by him at the time of recording his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. This statement is to be discarded as it is not safe to hold the appellants guilty of the offences alleged against them on such an improved version.

31. The deposition of Manorma (PW.7), aunt of the deceased is by no means different, as she had also made major contradictions and improvements in her statement made in court. She had not stated in her police statement that the appellants were demanding gold ornaments from the deceased and her family or that the appellants were keeping the deceased starving and were not allowing her to meet her daughter, Mili. The explanation furnished by her that she had not been feeling well and had forgotten to narrate such material facts, cannot be believed.

32. The statement of Rajesh (PW.2), the brother of the deceased is also full of contradictions and suffers from major improvements. The contradictions are of such a nature that they impair the whole of his evidence. The same cannot be held to be clarificatory. He was not in a position to state what ornaments his family had presented to the deceased on different occasions. More so, it was not even stated in his police statement that after the birth of Mili, his family had given gold ornaments as demanded by the appellants. He could not even furnish an explanation as to why the demand of a gold chain is not evident from any of the letters between the parties, except in the letter (Ext. P- 21).

33. The complainants have denied the receipt of letter dated 3.4.1985 written by the appellant No.2 to the father of the deceased, referred to hereinabove. However, appellants have produced correspondence with the post office and proved the postal stamp to show that the said letter had been sent by registered A.D. to Ramkishan Gupta (PW.8). The law in this regard is well settled. In Gujarat Electricity Board & Anr. v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani, AIR 1989 SC 1433, this court examined the issue regarding the presumption of service of letter sent by registered post under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and held as under: "There is a presumption of service of a letter sent under registered cover.... No doubt the presumption is rebuttable and it is open to the party concerned to place evidence before the court to rebut the presumption by showing that the address mentioned on the cover was incorrect or that the postal authorities never tendered the registered letter to him.....The burden to rebut the presumption lies on the party challenging the factum of service." (Emphasis added)
A similar view has been re-iterated by this court in Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (Administration), Bangalore v. V.K. Gururaj & Ors., (1996) 7 SCC 275; and Shimla Development Authority & Ors. v. Santosh Sharma (Smt.) & Anr., (1997) 2 SCC  637.
In Harihar Banerji v. Ramshashi Roy, AIR 1918 PC 102, a similar view had been taken by the Privy Council, referring to Illustration (f) of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In view of the above, it was the responsibility of the complainants to prove by adducing evidence of the official of the Post Office, Kanpur that the said letter had not been delivered to them. However, for the reasons best known to the prosecution such an exercise has not been undertaken.

34. The instant case is required to be examined from another angle also. The marriage took place on 1st December, 1978. The complainant party could not place any correspondence on record prior to February 1985 except letter dated 24th February, 1979 written by the deceased herself to her husband. However, it goes in favour of the appellants. Therefore, it is evident that the controversy arose only after the expiry of the period of more than 6 years from the date of marriage. It is quite possible that the dispute arose between the parties only because of the suspicion that the deceased had developed an illicit relationship with Kake. Had there been a demand of dowry or ill-treatment to her on any other ground by the appellants, there could have been some correspondence between the parties during the aforesaid long period of more than 6 years. None of the prosecution witnesses had made any allegation of any demand of dowry or ill treatment during the said earlier period. It is unnatural that after expiry of such a long period, the appellants suddenly became greedy and started demanding ornaments and for not meeting their demand, started ill treating the deceased to the extent that she had to commit suicide. Thus, the allegations made by the complainant party remained unnatural and improbable. More so, the demand had been only of a thin gold chain which could not be very expensive in those days, especially given the socio-economic status of all the parties. For the gold ornament worth such a petty amount after the expiry of a long period of about 6 = years, from the date of marriage, it is not natural that the appellants could treat the deceased with such cruelty that she was drawn to commit suicide.

35. It is a clear cut case of gross abuse of the dowry laws. We find it difficult to sustain the conviction of the appellants on the aforesaid counts based upon the inconsistent, embellished and improved statements of the witnesses, which materially contradict their respective statements recorded earlier. The High Court did not dislodge the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal. The High Court did not make any reference to the deposition of Dr. Daulatram Nekumal Gurubani (PW.10) in the cross-examination and dealt with the case very casually, adopting a very superficial approach to the whole matter and brushed aside the allegation of an illicit relationship for which there had been documentary evidence on record without recording any cogent reasons for the same. The High Court did not make any attempt to appreciate the evidence with accuracy and reversed the findings of the trial court which were based on the evidence on record and for which detailed reasons had been assigned.

36. In view of the above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay, dated 29.4.2004, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 865 of 1987 is set aside. The judgment and order of the Trial court in Sessions Case No. 25/1986 dated 21.5.1987 is hereby restored. The appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds stand discharged.

.................................J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)

.................................J.
(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

New Delhi,
November 11 , 2010

Spouse Silence is Cruelty - RAVI KUMAR Vs JULMIDEVI


                                                   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                                                    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                                                    CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 1868 OF 2007  



RAVI KUMAR                                                       ..Appellant(s)

Versus

JULMIDEVI                                                            ..Respondent(s)


J U D G M E N T
GANGULY, J.

1. The husband is in appeal before us impugning the Judgment and Order of the High Court in a Matrimonial Proceeding whereby the Judgment and Order of the District Judge, Mandi in Hindu Marriage Petition No.20 of 2002 dated 27.10.2004 was reversed by the High Court.

2. The marriage between the parties took place on 13.12.1988 according to Hindu rites and customs and in March, 1990 a girlchild was born to them. The husband alleged that after the birth of the girl child, his wife left for parental house atvillage Samlet and spent her period of maternity leave there.It was further alleged that his wife, who was working, onbeing transferred from Garli to Chauaku, stayed at Chauaku instead of in the matrimonial home which was only at a distance of 3 Kms. from the place of her posting. However, the husband admitted that in May, 1994, his wife came to his house for a short period and stayed there with him till the month of May, 1994. Thereafter, his wife is alleged to have permanently deserted him. The further allegation is that in September, 1996, he tried to bring his wife back to his residence for staying with him and his old parents but she refused to do so.

3. Ultimately, the appellant filed a proceeding under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for restitution of conjugal rights and that was contested by his wife. Ultimately a  compromise was arrived at before the Lok Adalat and the learned Sub-Judge, Sarkaghat presiding over the Lok Adalat passed an Order on 26-9-1998 treating the said petition under Section 9 as withdrawn, having ended in a compromise. The statements of the parties before the Lok Adalat were recorded and formed part of the decree. The statements, recorded before the Lok Adalat, may be set out hereinbelow:-

(a) Statement of appellant – Husband Stated that I shall provide room and kitchen for proper living to my wife Julmi Devi and I shall not trouble her in any manner.
(b) Statement of respondent – Wife Stated that I am prepared to live with my husband Shri Ravi Kumar,I shall live with my husband properly.

4. The allegation of the appellant is that his wife did not comply with the stand taken before the Lok Adalat by residing with him and continued to stay separately. The appellant, being frustrated thereby, filed a petition for a decree of divorce and dissolution of marriage on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. It was numbered as Petition No.20 of 2002.

5. Initially, the District Judge, Mandi made some unsuccessful efforts to bring about a reconciliation between the parties. Then the proceeding was ultimately tried and evidence was recorded and by a Judgment and an Order dated 27.10.2004, the learned District Judge granted a decree of divorce which was challenged by the respondent wife before the High Court and the High Court reversed the finding of the learned District Judge.

6. While reversing the finding of the learned District Judge, the High Court acted in exercise of its powers under Section 28 of the Act. In doing to, the High Court acted as a first Court of appeal, which is a Court, both on facts and law. The High Court noted the case of the parties and also the evidence which was adduced before the Trial Court.

7. Several questions cropped up in the course of hearing before the High Court. One of them being whether in view of filing of  a proceeding for restitution of conjugal rights, the appellant had condoned all alleged prior acts of cruelty of the wife. The High Court after considering some decisions came to a finding that by filing a petition under Section 9 of the Act, the appellant had condoned the earlier alleged acts of cruelty
of the respondent wife. Condonation is basically a question of fact. This Court finds that reasoning of the High Court on condonation in the facts of this case is correct.

8. After recording the said finding, the High Court noted that there is no specific allegation by the appellant of wife’s cruelty and in his deposition also husband does not refer to any specific instances of cruelty by his wife. In the absence of such specific allegations, the learned Trial Court was, in the opinion of the High Court, in error by granting a divorce on grounds of cruelty.

9. From the petition filed by the appellant husband, it appears that in paragraph 6 of the said petition, the proceeding under Section 9 of the Act has been referred to. After the said paragraph, this Court finds that in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 there is no specific allegation of cruelty against the wife. There are some vague allegations but no allegation with specific particulars has been given about the alleged cruelty of the  respondent wife. No specific case of desertion has been pleaded either.

10. It may be noted only after the amendment of the said Act by  the amending Act 68 of 1976, desertion per se became a ground for divorce. On the question of desertion, the High Court held that in order to prove a case of desertion, the party alleging desertion must not only prove that the other spouse was living separately but also must prove that there is an animus deserendi on the part of the wife and the husband must prove that he has not conducted himself in a way which furnishes reasonable cause for the wife to stay away from the matrimonial home.

11. Looking to the materials which have come on record in this case, it is clear that the wife had sufficient ground to live separately. In this case, the evidence of the daughter is very crucial.

12. The daughter in her evidence categorically stated that her father used to beat her mother. She denied that her mother abused her father but she repeatedly deposed that her father used to beat her mother and the reasons of which are not known to her.

13. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that Appellate Court did not have the occasion to appreciate the demeanour of the witnesses and the High Court acting as a First Appellate Court ought not to reverse a finding which was arrived at by the learned Trial Court.

14. It is difficult for this Court to accept the aforesaid contention. It cannot be disputed that while exercising its power under Section 28 of the said Act, the High Court, as the first Court of Appeal is both a Court of Law and also of facts.

15. The power of the Appellate Court as explained in Order 41 Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code shows that very wide powers have been conferred. Commenting on the width of this power, Mulla (CPC 15th Edn, p. 2647) commented that this rule is modelled on Order 59, rule 10(4) of the Supreme Court of Judicature in England. The learned author further commented that the object of this rule is to empower the appellate court
to do complete justice between the parties.

16. This Court is in respectful agreement with the aforesaid commentary of Mulla on order 41 Rule 33 with one rider. If there is a legal interdict, the rule will not apply ¬ (See S. Nazeer Ahmed vs. State Bank of Mysore – (2007) 11 SCC 75 and which has been followed in Samundra Devi & Ors. vs. Narendra Kaur & Ors.- AIR 2008 SC 3205 at para 19, p 3208).

17. Therefore, in exercise of its power, the First Appellate Court can come to a finding different from the one which has been arrived at by the Trial Court especially in a case where appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court is not proper. In the instant case, this Court finds that Trial Court has not properly appreciated the evidence of the child. It may be noticed here that the evidence of the child is very vital in the facts and circumstances of this case of matrimonial discord. In this case the child has clearly stated the cruelty of the appellant-husband towards his wife. Therefore, there is sufficient reason for the wife to stay apart. Under such circumstances one cannot say the wife is guilty of either cruelty or desertion.

18. It may be true that there is no definition of cruelty under the said Act. Actually such a definition is not possible. In matrimonial relationship, cruelty would obviously mean absence of mutual respect and understanding between the spouses which embitters the relationship and often leads to various outbursts of behaviour which can be termed as cruelty.

Sometime cruelty in a matrimonial relationship may take the form of violence, some time it may take a different form. At times, it may be just an attitude or an approach. Silence in some situations may amount to cruelty. Therefore, cruelty in matrimonial behaviour defies any definition and its category can never be closed. Whether husband is cruel to his wife or the wife is cruel to her husband has to be ascertained and judged by taking into account the entire facts and circumstances of the given case and not by any pre-determined rigid formula. Cruelty in matrimonial cases can be of infinite variety ¬ it may be subtle or even brutal and may be by gestures and words. That possibly explains why Lord Denning in Sheldon vs. Sheldon, [(1966) 2 All E.R. 257] held that categories of cruelty in matrimonial cases are never closed.

19. This Court is reminded of what was said by Lord Reid in Gollins vs. Gollins [(1963) 2 All. E.R. 966] about judging cruelty in matrimonial cases. The pertinent observations are:
“In matrimonial cases we are not concerned with the reasonable man, as we are in cases of negligence. We are dealing with this man and this woman and the fewer a priori assumptions we make about them the better. In cruelty cases one can hardly ever start with a presumption that the parties are reasonable people, because it is hard to imagine any cruelty case ever arising if both the spouses think and behave as reasonable people.”

20. The aforesaid passage was quoted with approval by this Court in Dastane vs. Dastane [(1975) 2 SCC 326]. About changing perception of cruelty in matrimonial cases, this Court observed in Shobha Rani vs. Madhukar Reddi – AIR 1988 SC 121 at page 123 of the report:
“It will be necessary to bear in mind that there has been a marked change in the life around us. In
matrimonial duties and responsibilities in particular, we find a sea change. They are of varying degrees from house to house or person to person. Therefore, when a spouse makes complaint about the treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the court should not search for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatised as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance. We, the judges and lawyers, therefore, should not import our own notions of life. We may not go in parallel with them. There may be a generation gap between us and the parties”.

21. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the judgment of the High court.

22. The appeal is dismissed. The parties are to bear their own costs.

(P. SATHASIVAM)
(ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)
New Delhi
February 9, 2010


ITEM NO.1B COURT NO.11 SECTION XIV
(For Judgment)
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 1868 OF 2007
RAVI KUMAR Appellant (s)
VERSUS
JULMI DEVI Respondent(s)
Date: 09/02/2010 This Appeal was called on for Judgment today.
For Appellant(s)
Mr. Sumit Kumar,Adv.
For Respondent(s)
Mr. Balraj Dewan,Adv.
Hon’ble Mr.Justice Asok Kumar Ganguly pronounced the Judgment of the Bench comprising Hon’ble Mr.Justice P.Sathasivam and His Lordship.
The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed Judgment. The parties are to bear their own costs.
(Satish K.Yadav) (Phoolan Wati Arora)
Court Master Court Master
(Signed reportable Judgment is placed on the file)

What is mental Cruelty - Maheswari Vs Manoharan




IN  THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED: 17.12.2007

CORAM:THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.RAVIRAJA PANDIAN and THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE CHITRA VENKATARAMAN

C.M.A.No.2959 of 2007

Maheswari                                         .. Appellant

Versus

M.Manoharan                                  .. Respondent

PRAYER: Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 19 of the Family Court Act against the judgment and decree dated 24.9.2007 made in F.C.O.P.No.1156 of 2005 on the file of the Principal Judge, Family Court, Chennai

For appellant : Ms.K.Damayanthi
For respondent : Mr.R.Shanmugam

JUDGMENT (Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHITRA VENKATARAMAN,J.) This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is by the respondent wife against the order of the Principal Judge, Family Court, Chennai, granting a decree for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

2. The respondent husband filed a petition under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, seeking dissolution of the marriage on the ground of cruelty and the attempts made to bring about a settlement and to restore matrimonial peace and bring about re-union yielded no fruitful result.

3. The allegations therein were denied by the appellant herein. She also filed a petition for maintenance in M.C.No.164 of 2005 seeking maintenance at Rs.5,000/- per month from the respondent herein from the date of the petition. By a common order dated 24th September 2007, while granting a decree of dissolution of marriage by divorce, the Family Court directed the respondent herein to pay a sum of Rs.2,000/- per
month as maintenance to the appellant herein from 30.3.2005.

4. Aggrieved of the said order, the wife has come on appeal questioning the correctness of the findings of the Family Court.

5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, taking us through the evidence and the documents marked, pointed out that the Court below erred in holding that the respondent husband had proved desertion and cruelty by the appellant. Learned counsel further pointed out that the appellant suffered miscarriage on more than two occasions, only due to the mental and physical torture caused by the respondent herein. She further pointed out that the respondent suffered from abdominal tuberclosis and that the appellant suffered miscarriage only on this ground. The allegations against the appellant were totally false and that the appellant was driven out of the matrimonial home by the cruel behaviour of the respondent. She pointed out that the desertion was only by the respondent and not by the appellant wife. The appellant also alleged that the respondent had an illicit relationship with one Manjula and that the Court below erred in ignoring the evidence of her parents and brothers. She pointed out that the petition for divorce was only on account of his intention to marry the said Manjula.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant impressed on the fact that the appellant stood by the respondent when he underwent treatment and had spent her earnings for his treatment.

7. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent, however, relied on the findings of the Court below in support of his cause for divorce.

8. Considering the allegations herein, in order to strike an amicable settlement and to re-unite the parties, this Court directed the parties to appear before this Court to ascertain the desire of both the parties to restore matrimonial peace. Although the appellant expressed her eagerness to continue her matrimonial relationship with the respondent, the respondent expressed his inability to join back his wife. However, after hearing the parties for some time, this Court granted time on 10.12.2007 for the parties to think about the pros and cons of their case and to come back with an amicable settlement for re-union. The matter was directed to be posted on 17.12.2007. However, even today the respondent expressed his inability to continue his matrimonial relationship with the appellant and prayed for divorce. Considering the persistent attitude of the parties herein in not sorting out the differences and re-unite, there being no purpose of continuing this relationship with a gap between the parties and not capable of bridging, the appeal was taken up for hearing on merits.

9. Heard the counsel for both sides.

10. It is seen that the marriage between the appellant and the respondent took place on 16.2.1997 in accordance with the Hindu rites and customs. The parties herein were living with the respondent’s family members at Chennai. It is stated that from the beginning of the matrimonial life, the respondent was kept at a distance by the appellant. It is further seen that the appellant had Tuberclosis in the intestine. It is the case of the respondent herein that despite his ill-health, the appellant herein forced the respondent to have relationship with her. It is also seen that in the first delivery, the child was a still born child. The appellant is doing her M.Phil.

11. The appellant herein placed reliance on the letters written by the respondent in Exs.P4 to P8 to prove that the matrimonial relationship between the parties was an amiable one and that the allegations as regards cruelty were totally unsustainable. The respondent, however, in his cross-examination, replied that they were written at the initial stage of the marriage. The Family Court Judge found that the appellant left the matrimonial home on 15.1.2005 with all her belongings when the respondent husband was away from the matrimonial home. The Court below pointed out that the appellant did not adduce sufficient evidence to show that she had taken steps for re-union. As to the allegations on illicit relationship of the respondent with one Manjula, the Court below pointed out that as per the evidence of the appellant, to sort out the issue, ten times panchayats were held. However, they did not yield the desired result. It was also stated that the said Manjula was working in P.W.2 Ravikumar’s company. The Court below pointed out that except the close relatives of the appellant, no other panchayatdars were examined to prove the contention as against the respondent in the panchayat that he wanted to marry the said Manjula. The Court below further pointed out that the witnesses P.Ws.4 and 6 pointed out that they did not know who Manjula was, and going by the evidence of P.W.4 and P.W.6, the Court below held that the appellant had failed to prove that her husband had illicit relationship with the said Manjula. The Court below pointed out that the respondent had not denied the fact that he was suffering from Tuberclosis and had his treatment and that the wife had suffered miscarriage more than twice. Going by the evidence, the Court below came to the conclusion that the allegation of illicit relationship of the husband with one Manjula amounted to mental cruelty and hence, the respondent had proved that the appellant had subjected the respondent to mental cruelty and hence granted the prayer for divorce.

12. A perusal of the evidence of the parties herein and the views expressed before this Court show that the allegations of illicit relationship had created a big gap in the relationship of the parties and that the respondent expressed his inability to reconcile and join back the appellant wife. As already seen, the appellant left the matrimonial home on 15.1.2005 when the respondent was away from the matrimonial home and that the appellant left the matrimonial home taking away all her things. Considering the efforts taken by this Court to arrive at a consensus and to settle the differences proving futile, and the nature of allegations made and the finding of the Court below, we do not find any justifiable ground to allow this appeal.

13. In this connection, in matters relating to matrimonial disharmony leading to filing of divorce petition where the parties have been living separately for a long number of years with no possibility of reunion, indicating the marriage irretrievably broken, the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2006) 4 SCC 558 (NAVEEN KOHLI Vs. NEELU KOHLI) and (2007) 4 SCC 511 (SAMAR GHOSH Vs. JAYA GHOSH) need to be noted.

14. In the decision reported in (2006) 4 SCC 558 (NAVEEN KOHLI Vs. NEELU KOHLI), where both the spouses had been living separately for a fairly long number of years and could not reconcile themselves to live together forgetting their past, the Apex Court confirmed the order of the Family Court to grant the decree of divorce. Though irretrievable marriage is not a ground for dissolution of marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Apex Court held that if after an endeavour to reconcile the parties, the breakdown is irreparable, then divorce should not be withheld. It further held that it would be unrealistic for the law not to take notice of that fact and it would be harmful to society and injurious to the interest of the parties. Where there being a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be surmised that the irretrievable bond is beyond repair. Marriage becomes a fiction, though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of parties. Taking note of the fact that the parties had been living separately for more than ten years and the number of proceedings initiated by one party to the other, the Apex Court found that the marriage between the parties was only in name. The marriage has been wrecked beyond the hope of salvage, public interest and interest of all concerned lies in the recognition of the fact and to declare defunct de jure what is already defunct de facto. To keep the sham is obviously conducive to immorality and potentially more prejudicial to the public interest than a dissolution of the marriage bond.

15. The Apex Court once again, in the decision reported in (2007) 4 SCC 511 (SAMAR GHOSH Vs. JAYA GHOSH), had an occasion to consider a similar situation. Referring to various case laws on the subject including (2006) 4 SCC 558 (NAVEEN KOHLI Vs. NEELU KOHLI) the Supreme Court held that “under the breakdown theory, divorce should be seen as a solution and an escape route out of a difficult situation. Such divorce is unconcerned with the wrongs of the past, but is concerned with bringing the parties and the children to terms with the new situation and developments by working out the most satisfactory basis upon which they may regulate their relationship in the changed circumstances.”

16. As to the various instances of mental cruelty, the Apex Court further observed that there can never be any straitjacket formula or fixed parameters for determining mental cruelty in matrimonial matters. Yet, the Apex Court, by way of illustration, listed out the instances of mental cruelty as follows:
“(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty.
(ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party.
(iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it makes the married life for the other spouse absolutely intolerable.
(iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty.
(v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse.
(vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be grave, substantial and weighty.
(vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect, indifference or total departure from the normal standard of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental cruelty.
(viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy, selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a ground for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.
(ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day-to-day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.
(x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behavior of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty.
(xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of sterilization without medical reasons and without the consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly, if the wife undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical reason or without the consent or knowledge of her husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental cruelty.
(xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty.
(xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty.
(xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty. ”

17. Taking note of all these circumstances in the aforesaid case and the fact that the parties were admittedly living separately for more than 16= years, the Apex Court felt that the irresistible conclusion would be that the matrimonial tie had ruptured beyond repair and hence, confirmed the order of the Family Court and granted divorce. Applying the said decision of the Apex Court to the facts of the case herein on the admitted fact that the parties have been living separate eversince 2005 and attempts made by the Court had further failed, we do agree with the view of the Family Court that the marriage had irretrievably broken beyond repair and that there is no possibility of bringing the couple together. Taking note of the circumstances herein and the irreconcilable differences between the parties, we do not find any ground or justification to disturb the order of the Court below. In these circumstances, we dismiss the appeal, thereby confirm the order of the Family Court passing a decree of divorce and dissolution of the marriage held on 16.2.1997. The appeal stands dismissed. No costs. Connected M.P.No.2 of 2007 is also dismissed. ksv To: The Principal Judge Family Court Chennai


Monday, July 16, 2012

Cruelty on husband made by wife - Amarjit Kaur Vs Harbhajan Singh and Another


                                                 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Amarjit Kaur

versus

Harbhajan Singh and Another

HON’BLE JUSTICE DORAISWAMY RAJU
AND
HON’BLE JUSTICE H. K. SEMA

23/10/2002

JUDGMENT:

1. The above appeals have been filed against the order of a learned single judge of theHigh Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated 10.11.2000 in civil revision No.5057/ 1998 and a subsequent order dated 7.12.2000 passed in a review application No.112-C-II/2000.

2. Heard Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned senior counsel for the appellant and Mr. K.Rajendra Choudhary, learned senior counsel for the respondent.

3. The appellant is the wife of the first respondent. The respondent – husband has filed a petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 “During the course of the submissions, it was suggested to the counsel for the petitioner and his client Smt. Amarjit Kaur whether they are willing to get DNA test of the male child namely Samarjit Singh. Before concluding, directions are also given to the trial court to order for conducting the DNA test of the male child who is in the custody of the petitioner and if the test goes against the petitioner, she will not be entitled to get any maintenance pendente lite for herself but she will definitely get the maintenance for the girl child whose maintenance is fixed at Rs. 1000/- per month.” *

4. Aggrieved, the wife moved an application by way of review and sought to bring to the notice of the court the decision reported in Goutam Kundu v. State of West Bengal and Anr., 1993 Indlaw SC 1165 The learned single judge, by a cryptic order, has chosen to reject the review application with costs, in a sum of Rs. 1000/- Hence, the above appeals.

5. The learned senior counsel for the appellant strenuously contended that the conduct of the parties which requires to be adjudicated in the main writ petition has no relevance, at the stage of granting interim or pendente lite maintenance and that the consideration in this regard has to be confined to the criteria specified in Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. It was also pointed out that imposition of a condition, which will operate as a isfeasance clause, to deprive the very maintenance order to be paid, particularly of the nature imposed in this case directing the conduct of DNA test of the male child in question is not warranted. Argued the learned counsel further that this Court in the decision in Goutam Kundu’s case (supra), declared the legal position as to the circumstances under which and the limitations to be observed in compelling anyone to give a sample of blood against his/her will for DNA analysis, keeping in view, the serious consequences flowing from the same, i.e., the branding of a child as a bastard and the mother as an unchaste woman. It was made clear therein that no adverse inference can be drawn against the person for his refusal. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, such an order could not and ought not to have been made at this stage and in the manner it has been done, by the court on its own imposing the same as a conditional direction affecting even the right to get pendent lite maintenance, without even their  being any formal application from the respondent – husband and justifying any such claim, in accordance with law.

6. Per contra, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent, relying on the
decision reported in Dwarika Prasad Satpathy v. Bidyut Prava Dixit and Anr., 1999 (8) JT 329 contended that in the matter of grant of maintenance, there is no impediment for the court to impose a condition of the nature and in case of refusal to cooperate to conduct the DNA test, make the defaulting party suffer consequences thereof. It was also urged that no exception could be taken to the course adopted by the learned single judge in the light of the serious dispute raised with reference to the parentage of one male child living with the wife. The learned counsel also contended that the discretion exercised by the learned single judge of the High Court on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, is not at all a matter which needs or calls for any interference in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

7. We have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel appearing on eitherside.

8. Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 empowers the court in any proceeding under the Act, if it appears to the court that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding, it may, on the application of any one of them order the other party to pay to the petitioner the expenses of the proceeding and monthly maintenance as may seem to be reasonable during the proceeding, having regard to also the income of both the petitioner and the respondent. Once the High Court, in this case, has come to the conclusion that the wife – appellant herein has to be provided with the litigation expenses and monthly maintenance, it is beyond comprehension as to how, de hors the criteria laid  down in the statutory provision itself, the court could have thought of imposing an extraneous condition, with a default clause which is likely to defeat the very claim which has been sustained by the court itself. Consideration as to the ultimate outcome of the main proceeding after regular trial would be wholly alien to assess the need or necessity for awarding interim maintenance, as long as the marriage, the dissolution of which has been sought, cannot be disputed, and the marital relationship of husband and wife subsisted. As noticed earlier, the relevant statutory consideration being only that either of the party, who was the petitioner in the application under Section 24 of the Act, has no  independent income sufficient for her or his support, for the grant of interim  maintenance, the same has to be granted and the discretion thereafter left with the court, in our view, is only with reference to reasonableness of the amount that could be awarded and not to impose any condition, which has self-defeating consequence. Therefore, we are unable to approve of the course adopted by the learned single judge, in this case.

9. Coming now to the nature of the condition imposed, though, it has been seriously contended for the appellant that no such condition could have been imposed to compel the undergoing of a DNA test of the male child, we do not propose to express any opinion on the legality or propriety of the court undertaking consideration at the appropriate stage, by the court competent, in the main petition of any application moved in an appropriate manner according to law, but we would confine our consideration to the limited aspect as to whether the High Court could have imposed such a condition at the stage of awarding interim maintenance pendente lite and that too without an application for the purpose from the other party, at the instance of the court by way of a suggestion put to the appellant in the course of consideration of the application for interim
maintenance. The law in the matter governing the consideration and passing of any order in respect of a claim for DNA test has sufficiently been laid down by this Court and if a party to a proceeding cannot be compelled against his/her wish to undergo any such test, we fail to see how the court on its own could have imposed a condition without any consideration whatsoever of any of the criteria laid down by this Court, by adopting a novel device of imposing it as a condition for the grant of the interim maintenance, with a
default clause, which as rightly contended for the appellant, will have the inevitable consequences of predetermining the claim about the parentage with serious consequences even at the preliminary stage. The procedure, thus, adopted by the High Court does not appear to be neither just nor reasonable or in conformity with the principles of law laid down by this Court and consequently the order is liable to be set aside. The decision in Dwarika Prasad Satpathy v. Bidyut Prava Dixit and Anr. (supra) relied for the respondent, in our view, has no relevance or application to the case on hand. That was a case wherein, in dealing with a claim for maintenance invoking the summary proceedings under Section 125 of the Cr. P.C., the husband attempted to defeat the claim made by the wife by asserting non performance of essential rites at the time of marriage, the factum of which as well as the parentage of the child could not be questioned. In the process of ascertaining the genuineness of the said stand, when the suggestion made to the husband to undergo DNA test was refused by him, and the court dealing with the application by summary proceedings chose to observe that the husband was disentitled to challenge the paternity of the child in the proceedings under Section 125 Cr. P.C., this Court declined to interfere with the order of the trial court on the question of prima facie satisfaction recorded as to the proof of marriage. We see absolutely no general principle of law laid down in this case which could be said to lend any support to the plea on behalf of the
respondent. We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the plea urged for the respondent that the case does not warrant our interference in these appeals, since, we find that a serious and flagrant violation of law has been committed by the High Court, in the matter disposing of the revision and review petition, and the same ought not to be allowed to get sanctified, with our approval, too.

10. The order passed rejecting the review application summarily despite the fact that a judgment of this Court relevant for the purpose has been brought to the notice of the court, without even expressing any view on the matter, by itself, is sufficient to set aside the order made on the review petition. It is really surprising that the court should have thought of awarding cost in a sum of Rs. 1000/- against the wife, who was before the court seeking for maintenance pendente lite.

11. The appeals are allowed. The order in so far as it relates to the offending condition relating to the DNA test is set aside. In other respects, the order in so far as it awards the litigation expenses and monthly maintenance is sustained. We make it clear that we are not expressing any opinion about the rights of the parties to seek for the relief for the DNA test or the evidentiary value of the same and the trial court shall be at liberty to consider the matter relating to such claims on their own merits, in accordance with law.
No costs.

Tuesday, July 10, 2012

Daughter-in-law has no right on in-laws (FIL or MIL) self acquired Property - Neetu Mittal Vs Kanta Mittal and Ors


                                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of Reserve: September 05, 2008


Date of Order : September 30, 2008

CM(M) 105/2006

30.09.2008

Neetu Mittal                                                                   ...Petitioner
Through: Ms. Radhika Chandrasekhar, Adv.

Versus

Kanta Mittal and Ors.                                                   ...Respondents
Through: Ms. Nandni Sahni, Adv. for R.1 and 2 Mr. Devendra Singh, Adv. for R.3

JUSTICE SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA
1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2. To be referred to the reporter or not ? Yes.
3. Whether judgment should be reported in Digest ? Yes. JUDGMENT:

1. The petitioner is aggrieved by an order dated 4th January, 2006 passed by the learned Additional Senior Judge allowing an appeal of the respondent against order dated 24.5.2005 of Civil Judge dismissing an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC.

2. The respondents had filed a suit making petitioner, their son and in-laws of the son as defendants wherein they prayed for permanent injunction. An application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 was made that the petitioner and other respondents be restrained from forcibly and illegally entering into their house
No. B-2/23, Phase-II, Ashok Vihar and from interfering with their peaceful living. The petitioner is wife of Sh. Vikas Mittal son of respondents, Smt. Kanta Mittal and Sh. Ram Kishan Mittal.

3. The learned Senior Civil Judge while allowing appeal observed that wife has a right to live in the matrimonial home after marriage but there was no specific definition of matrimonial home. However, matrimonial home was not just a building made of bricks and walls. It was a home/place comprising of sweetness of relations of family members and elders, full of blessing. In the matrimonial home, matrimonial rights and obligations are to be equally observed. Practically speaking, the residence of husband should be the home of the wife where both the spouses have equal right to reside.

4. The learned Senior Civil Jude found that in this case, the respondents were parents of Sh. Vikas Mittal and in-laws of Neetu Mittal (petitioner). They had separated from their son. The son had taken a flat in Rohini for his own residence and residence of his wife. The son and his wife had agreed to shift there on 10th May, 2005 under a compromise arrived at Police Station. However, the wife did not stay in the flat at Rohini. Her grievance was that flat was not habitable due to deficiency of fan, cooler, etc. Thereafter, she asserted that she had a right to live in her in-laws' house in Ashok Vihar and she wanted to forcibly live there which compelled respondents no. 1 and 2 to file the suit. The learned Senior Civil Judge found that the respondents were aged parents. They had shown by filing medical record that they were suffering from various ailments and at this age of their life they have a right to live peacefully at their home. Since the relations of petitioner were not cordial with them, there was every likelihood of breach of peace to the detriment to their mental and physical health. Due regards have to be given to their rights. It was a admitted fact that the respondents and petitioner could not live together under one roof with peace and harmony. The common use of dining and one kitchen would create further problems and a situation may come when parties may everyday land up at Police station or in the Court, fighting on minor issues.

5. Learned Sr. Civil Judge also observed that the respondents(parents) even apprehend danger to their lives and dignity, as per the complaint made by them to the Police. Under these circumstances, the learned Senior Civil Judge allowed the application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC and restrained the defendants (petitioner herein) from forcibly entering into their house and disturbing the peaceful possession of the respondents.

6. Counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner being wife of son of respondents no. 1 and 2 has a right to live in the matrimonial home and no injunction could legally have been issued by the learned Civil Judge. She referred to Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and argued that the right of women to live in the shared household was to be protected by every Court and the house of in-laws was a shared household and a matrimonial home and she had a right to live there.

7. In S.R. Batra vs. Taruna Batra AIR 2007 SC 1118, Supreme Court observed as under:

?16. There is no such law in India, like the British Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967 and in any case, the rights which may be available under any law can only be as against the husband and not against the father-in-law or mother-in-law.

17. Here, the house in question belongs to the mother-in-law of Smt. Taruna Batra and it does not belong to her husband Amit Batra. Hence, Smt. Taruna Batra cannot claim any right to live in the said house. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

27. Learned counsel for the respondent Smt. Taruna Batra has relied upon Section 19(1)(f) of the Act and claimed that she should be given an alternative accommodation. In our opinion, the claim for alternative accommodation can only be made against the husband and not against the husband's in-laws or other relatives.

28. As regards Section 17(1) of the Act, in our opinion the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a 'shared household' would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The property in question in the present case neither belongs to Amit Batra nor was it taken on rent by him nor is it a joint family property of which the husband Amit Batra is a member. It is the exclusive property of appellant no.2, mother of Amit Batra. Hence it cannot be called a 'shared household'.?

8. As observed by the Supreme Court, 'Matrimonial home' is not defined in any of the statutory provisions. However, phrase ?Matrimonial home? refers to the place which is dwelling house used by the parties, i.e., husband and wife or a place which was being used by husband and wife as the family residence. Matrimonial home is not necessarily the house of the parents of the husband. In fact the parents of the husband may allow him to live with them so long as their relations with the son (husband) are cordial and full of love and affection. But if the relations of the son or daughter-in-law with the parents of husband turn sour and are not cordial, the parents can turn them out of their house. The son can live in the house of parents as a matter of right only if the house is an ancestral house in which the son has a share and he can enforce the partition. Where the house is self-acquired house of the parents, son, whether married or unmarried, has no legal right to live in that house and he can live in that house only at the mercy of his parents upto the time the parents allow. Merely because the parents have allowed him to live in the house so long as his relations with the parents were cordial, does not mean that the parents have to bear his burden throughout the life.

9. Once a person gains majority, he becomes independent and parents have no liability to maintain him. It is different thing that out of love and affection, the parents may continue to support him even when he becomes financially independent or continue to help him even after his marriage. This help and support of parents to the son is available only out of their love and affection and out of mutual trust and understanding. There is no legal liability on the parents to continue to support a dis-obedient son or a son which becomes liability on them or a son who dis-respects or dis-regards them or becomes a source of nuisance for them or trouble for them. The parents can always forsake such a son and daughter-in-law and tell them to leave their house and lead their own life and let them live in peace. It is because of love, affection, mutual trust, respect and support that members of a joint family gain from each other that the parents keep supporting their sons and families of sons. In turn, the parents get equal support, love, affection and care. Where this mutual relationship of love, care, trust and support goes, the parents cannot be forced to keep a son or daughter in law with them nor there is any statutory provision which compels parents to suffer because of the acts of residence and his son or daughter in law. A woman has her rights of maintenance against her husband or sons/daughters. She can assert her rights, if any, against the property of her husband, but she cannot thrust herself against the parents of her husband, nor can claim a right to live in the house of parents of her husband, against their consult and wishes.

10. I therefore consider that the order passed by the learned Senior Civil Jude granting injunction does not suffer from any illegality and the petition is hereby dismissed.

September 30, 2008 SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA J. ak

Monday, July 9, 2012

Daughter-in-law has no right on in-laws (FIL or MIL) self acquired Property - S.R.Batra Vs Tarun Batra


                                                    Supreme Court of India
CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 5837 of 2006

PETITIONER:
S.R. Batra and Anr.

Vs

RESPONDENT:
Smt. Taruna Batra

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/12/2006
BENCH:

S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju
JUDGMENT:

                                                                     JUDGMENT

MARKANDEY KATJU, J.

Leave granted.

This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment of the Delhi High Court dated 17.1.2005 in C.M.M. No. 1367 of 2004 and C.MM. No. 1420 of 2004.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

The facts of the case are that respondent Smt. Taruna Batra was married to Amit Batra, son of the appellants, on 14.4.2000.

After the marriage respondent Taruna Batra started living with her husband Amit Batra in the house of the appellant no.2 in the second floor. It is not disputed that the said house which is at B-135, Ashok Vihar, Phase-I, Delhi belongs to the appellant no.2 and not to her son Amit Batra.

Amit Batra filed a divorce petition against his wife Taruna Batra, and it is alleged that as a counter blast to the divorce petition Smt. Taruna Batra filed an F.I.R. under Sections 406/498A/506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and got her father-in-law, mother-in-law, her husband and married sister-in-law arrested by the police and they were granted bail only after three days.

It is admitted that Smt. Taruna Batra had shifted to her parent's residence because of the dispute with her husband. She alleged that later on when she tried to enter the house of the appellant no.2 which is at property No. B-135, Ashok Vihar, Phase-I, Delhi she found the main entrance locked and hence she filed Suit No. 87/2003 for a mandatory injunction to enable her to enter the house. The case of the appellants was that before any order could be passed by the trial Judge on the suit filed by their daughter-in- law, Smt. Taruna Batra, along with her parents forcibly broke open the locks of the house at Ashok Vihar belonging to appellant No. 2, the mother- in-law of Smt. Taruna Batra. The appellants alleged that they have been terrorized by their daughter-in-law and for some time they had to stay in their office.

It is stated by the appellants that their son Amit Batra, husband of the respondent, had shifted to his own flat at Mohan Nagar, Ghaziabad before the above litigation between the parties had started.

The learned trial Judge decided both the applications for temporary injunction filed in suit no.87/2003 by the parties by his order on 4.3.2003. He held that the petitioner was in possession of the second floor of the property and he granted a temporary injunction restraining the appellants from interfering with the possession of Smt. Taruna Batra, respondent herein.

Against the aforesaid order the appellants filed an appeal before the Senior Civil Judge, Delhi who by his order dated 17.9.2004 held that Smt. Taruna Batra was not residing in the second floor of the premises in question. He also held that her husband Amit Batra was not living in the suit property and the matrimonial home could not be said to be a place where only wife was residing. He also held that Smt. Taruna Batra had no right to the properties other than that of her husband. Hence, he allowed the appeal and dismissed the temporary injunction application.

Aggrieved, Smt. Taruna Batra filed a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution which was disposed of by the impugned judgment. Hence, these appeals.

The learned Single Judge of the High Court in the impugned judgment held that the second floor of the property in question was the matrimonial home of Smt. Taruna Batra. He further held that even if her husband Amit Batra had shifted to Ghaziabad that would not make Ghaziabad the matrimonial home of Smt. Taruna Batra. The Learned Judge was of the view that mere change of the residence by the husband would not shift the matrimonial home from Ashok Vihar, particularly when the husband had filed a divorce petition against his wife. On this reasoning, the learned Judge of the High Court held that Smt. Taruna Batra was entitled to continue to reside in the second floor of B-135, Ashok Vihar, Phase-I, Delhi as that is her matrimonial home.

With respect, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court.

As held by this Court in B.R. Mehta v. Atma Devi and Ors., [1987] 4 SCC 183, whereas in England the rights of the spouses to the matrimonial home are governed by the Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967, no such right exists in India.

In the same decision it was observed "it may be that with change of situation and complex problems arising it is high time to give the wife or the husband a right of occupation in a truly matrimonial home, in case of the marriage breaking up or in case of strained relationship between the husband and the wife."

In our opinion, the above observation is merely an expression of hope and it does not lay down any law. It is only the legislature which can create a law and not the Court. The courts do not legislate, and whatever may be the personal view of a Judge, he cannot create or amend the law, and must maintain judicial restraint.

There is no such law in India, like the British Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967, and in any case, the rights which may be available under any law can only be as against the husband and not against the father-in-law or mother- in-law.

Here, the house in question belongs to the mother-in-law of Smt. Taruna Batra and it does not belong to her husband Amit Batra. Hence, Smt. Taruna Batra cannot claim any right to live in the said house.

Appellant No. 2, the mother-in-law of Smt. Taruna Batra has stated that she had taken a loan for acquiring the house and it is not a joint family property. We see no reason to disbelieve this statement.

Learned counsel for the respondent then relied upon the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. He stated that in view of the said Act respondent Smt. Taruna Batra cannot be dispossessed from the second floor of the property in question.

It may be noticed that the finding of the learned Senior Civil Judge that in fact Smt. Taruna Batra was not residing in the premises in question is a finding of fact which cannot be interfered with either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. Hence, Smt. Taruna Batra cannot claim any injunction restraining the appellants from dispossessing her from the property in question for the simple reason that she was not in possession at all of the said property and hence the question of dispossession does not arise.

Apart from the above, we are of the opinion that the house in question cannot be said to be a `shared household' within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act').

Section 2(s) states:

"`shared household` means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household".

Learned counsel for the respondent Smt. Taruna Batra has relied upon Sections 17 and 19(1) of the aforesaid Act, which state:

"17. (1)Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same.

(2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the respondent save in accordance with the procedure established by law.

19. (1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of section 12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order--

(a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household, whether or not the respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household;

(b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household;

(c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides;

(d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing off the shared household or encumbering the same;

(e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the shared household except with the leave of the Magistrate; or

(f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require:

Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against any person who is a woman".

Learned counsel for the respondent Smt. Taruna Batgra stated that the definition of shared household includes a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage had lived in a domestic relationship. He contended that since admittedly the respondent had lived in the property in question in the past, hence the said property is her shared household.

We cannot agree with this submission.

If the aforesaid submission is accepted, then it will mean that wherever the husband and wife lived together in the past that property becomes a shared household. It is quite possible that the husband and wife may have lived together in dozens of places e.g. with the husband's father, husband's paternal grand parents, his maternal parents, uncles, aunts, brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces etc. If the interpretation canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent is accepted, all these houses of the husband's relatives will be shared households and the wife can well insist in living in the all these houses of her husband's relatives merely because she had stayed with her husband for some time in those houses in the past. Such a view would lead to chaos and would be absurd.

It is well settled that any interpretation which leads to absurdity should not be accepted.

Learned counsel for the respondent Smt Taruna Batra has relied upon Section 19(1)(f) of the Act and claimed that she should be given an alternative accommodation. In our opinion, the claim for alternative accommodation can only be made against the husband and not against the husband's in-laws or other relatives.

As regards Section 17(1) of the Act, in our opinion the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a `shared household' would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The property in question in the present case neither belongs to Amit Batra nor was it taken on rent by him nor is it a joint family property of which the husband Amit Batra is a member. It is the exclusive property of appellant No. 2, mother of Amit Batra. Hence it cannot be called a `shared household'.

No doubt, the definition of `shared household' in Section 2(s) of the Act is not very happily worded, and appears to be the result of clumsy drafting, but we have to give it an interpretation which is sensible and which does not lead to chaos in society.

In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the order of Senior Civil Judge dismissing the injunction application of Smt. Taruna Batra is upheld. No costs.

Contempt Petition (C) No. 38/2006

In view of the judgment given above, the contempt petition stands dismissed.

Daughter-in-law has no right on in-laws (FIL or MIL) self acquired Property - - Hemaxi Atul Joshi Vs Muktaben Karsandas Joshi & Anr

                         IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

APPELLATE SIDE
APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 866 OF 2007
IN
S.C.SUIT NO. 3072 OF 2007
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1194 OF 2007

Smtl Hemaxi Atul Joshi                                             .........Appellant
(Org.Deft.No.1)

Vs.

Smt. Muktaben Karsandas Joshi & Anr.                      ......Respondents
(Resp.No.1 - org.Plff
& Resp.No.2 - org.
Defendant nO.2)

Mr.Jaydev Trivedi, Advocate, for the appellant.
Mr.Nitin Vhatkar, Advocate, a/w G.S.Hiranandani,Advocate
for respondent No.1.
Mr. Prajit S.Manjarekar, Advocate, for respondent No.2.

CORAM: J.H.BHATIA,J.
DATE: 5th December,2007.

1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.

2. Admittedly, the appellant, who is defendant No.1, was married to respondent No.2 sometime in the year 1996 and out of this wedlock, they have two children. After the marriage, they were living in the suit house with the other family  members. The relations between the husband and wife got strained and the Marriage Petition for divorce was filed by respondent No.2-husband against the present appellant before the Family Court at Bandra, Mumbai. Plaintiff/Respondent No.1, who is the mother of respondent No.2 and mother-in-law of the appellant, claims that she is the exclusive owner of the suit house and her son and daughter-in-law after the marriage, were living with her in her house. However, in the year 2002, the appellant and respondent No.2 purchased another flat at a short distance from her house and intermittently they also used to live there. Respondent No.1 claims that she and other family members had noticed illicit relationship of the appellant with some other person. This was objected to by her and therefore relations were strained. According to her, the daughter-in-law went to her parents’ place at Surat in May 2007 after the Divorce Petition was filed. However, in the last week of May, 2007, she came back to Mumbai and forcibly entered into the plaintiff’s house and started harassing the plaintiff and her family members. She also abused the plaintiff in filthy language and assaulted her. In view of these circumstances, she filed the suit for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from entering into and/or occupying and/or remaining in occupation of the suit premises belonging to her. She also took out a Notice of Motion seeking temporary injunction of the same nature. The application was opposed by the present appellant on the ground that the suit house is the matrimonial home and she is entitled to reside there in view of the Protection of Woman from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (in brief, “Domestic Violence Act”).

3. After hearing the parties, the learned Judge of the City Civil Court accepted the contention of the plaintiff and rejected the contention of the defendant No.1-appellant that it is a shared household for the appellant. The learned Judge held that the suit house being the exclusive property of the mother-in-law/plaintiff, the daughter-in-law cannot claim any legal right of residence. In the result, the Notice of Motion was allowed and the temporary injunction was granted against the defendant No.1-appellant. Hence, she has preferred the present Appeal.

4. On perusal of the pleadings of the parties and the impugned order, it becomes clear that the suit house was purchased by the plaintiff/mother-in-law sometime in 1975 and, admittedly, the suit house stands in her name alone. There is nothing to show that it is a joint family property of the plaintiff, her husband and the children. Admittedly, it is not the house belonging to the appellant or her husband. The learned trial Court relied upon an authority of the Supreme Court in S.R.Batra vs. Taruna Batra AIR 2007 SC 1118 wherein the

provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 came to be considered.

5. Section 19 of the Domestic Violence Act provides protection of residence to the aggrieved person.
Section 19(a) reads as under :-
   “19. Residence orders (1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of section 12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order -
(a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household, whether or not the respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household;”

Under Section 2(a) of the Domestic Violence Act, “aggrieved person” means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent”. . Section 2(q) defines “respondent” as any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act.

Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner. . Section 2(s) defines “shared household” as follows :-
     “shared household” means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or  along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household.”

5. The question is whether merely because the appellant/daughter-in-law was living along with husband in the household of her mother-in-law, she would get a legal right of residence in the house of mother-in-law. Admittedly, the appellant and her husband-respondent NO.2 had purchased another flat in December, 2002 jointly. It is not disputed that intermittently the husband and wife used to sleep and stay in that house. That house is at a walking distance of about 5 minutes from the suit house. The appellant can claim legal right in that house firstly, because it is the joint property of herself and her husband and secondly, because she was intermittently living or at least staying in that house along with her husband and children. As far as the suit house is concerned, it is not the property in which her husband has got any legal right and therefore she cannot claim that the suit house is the shared household within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Domestic Violence Act. After referring to the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act and some case law, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of S.R.Batra vs. Taruna Batra, observed as follows in para
16 of the Judgment :-
        “16. There is no such law in India, like the British Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967, and in any case, the rights which may be available under any law can only be as against the husband and not against the father-in-law or mother-in-law.” From this, it is clear that the wife may have rights only against the husband and not against father-in-law or mother-in-law. Their Lordships further observed as follows :-
        “28. As regards Section 17(1) of the Act, in our opinion the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household and a ‘shared household’ would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The property in question in the present case neither belongs to Amit Batra nor was it taken on rent by him nor is it a joint family property of which the husband is a member. It is the exclusive property of appellant No.2, mother of Amit Batra. Hence it cannot be called a ‘shared household’.

The facts in the case of S.R.Batra and the present matter are almost similar. Taking into consideration the legal position and the facts, the appellant cannot claim any legal right of residence in the house belonging to her mother-in-law. She can claim such right only in the house of her husband and incidentally in the present case, she and her husband jointly own another house at a short distance from the suit house. Taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances, the learned trial Court Judge was justified in passing the order of temporary injunction restraining the defendant-appellant from entering into the suit house and causing interference in possession of her mother-in-law on the suit house.

6. In the result, the Appeal stands dismissed.

7. As the Appeal itself is dismissed, the Civil

Application does not survive and stands disposed of accordingly.

(J.H.BHATIA,J.

Sunday, July 8, 2012

Police or Court can not impound Passport - Ismayil Vs Police, Trichy



                     BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

DATED: 18/01/2012

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.R.SHIVAKUMAR

CRL.R.C(MD)No.11 of 2012

and

M.P(MD)No.1 of 2012

M.Ismayil ..Petitioner

Vs

The Inspector of Police

Airport Police Station,

Trichy,

Crime No.396 of 2011. ..Respondent

Prayer

Criminal Revision case filed under Section 397 and 401 of Cr.P.C. to call for the records pertaining to the impugned order passed in Cr.M.P.No.1970 of 2011, on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No.VI, Trichy, dated 14.11.2011 and to set aside the same.

!For Petitioner ... M/s.N.Sankar Ganesh

^For Respondent ... Mrs.S.Prabha

Govt.Advocate(Crl.Side)

:ORDER

Mrs.S.Prabha, learned Government Advocate(Crl.Side) has taken notice on behalf of the respondent/Police. The Criminal Revision Case can be disposed of on a short point of interpretation of law and hence, this Court deems it appropriate to dispose of the Criminal Revision Case at the stage of admission itself, after hearing both sides and upon perusing the impugned order of the learned Judicial Magistrate and the connected papers produced by the petitioner in the form of typed-set of papers. The learned Government Advocate(Crl.Side) also concedes that the Criminal Revision Case can be disposed of in the manner pointed out above.

2. The petitioner is the sole accused in Cr.No.396 of 2011, registered on the file of the Airport Police Station, Trichy, for alleged offences under Section 419 and 420 IPC. Besides arresting the petitioner/accused in the said case, the respondent/Inspector of Police, Airport Police Station, Trichy also seized his passport bearing Passport Number H 8841154 and produced it in the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.VI, Trichy. The petitioner/accused was released on bail subsequently. Thereafter, he filed a petition under Section 451 Cr.P.C., praying for the return of his passport. The learned Judicial Magistrate, accepting the contention of the respondent that the petitioner/accused would flee from justice if the passport was released, dismissed the said petition, namely, Cr.M.P.No.1970 of 2011 by the impugned order dated 14.11.2011. It is surprising to note that the learned Judicial Magistrate, even after narrating the relevant passage in the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Suresh Nanda .vs. Central Bureau of Investigation reported in (2008) 1 MLJ(Crl)1195(SC)=(2008) 2 Supreme Court Cases(Crl)121, chose to dismiss the said petition.

3. In the above cited case, Honourable Supreme Court has stated that the Court does not have the power under Section 104 of Cr.P.C to impound the passport, that the police who seized the passport using its authority given under Section 102 Cr.P.C also cannot impound the same and that if the passport is to be impounded, it must be sent to the Passport Authority with a request for impounding the same. The learned Judicial Magistrate observed that the said observation made by the Supreme Court in the said judgment would not be applicable to the facts of this case. This Court wonders how the learned Judicial Magistrate could have distinguished the facts of the case from the facts of the case dealt with by the Supreme Court. Without elaborating as to how the case of the petitioner is distinguishable from the case dealt with by the Supreme Court, the learned Judicial Magistrate seems to have simply executed his pre-conceived decision to negative the claim made by the petitioner.

4. It is pertinent to note that the Honourable Supreme Court in clear and unambiguous terms has held that the authority to impound a passport is the Passport Authority and the police, who seizes it during the course of investigation and the court in which the same is produced do not have the power to impound and that if the passport is to be impounded, it should be sent to the Passport Authority along with a request to impound the passport. Any order passed by the Passport Authority can be challenged by the aggrieved party. In the case that was decided by the Supreme Court, the ultimate direction issued was that the police should send the passport along with a request to the Passport Authority for impounding it and the passport-holder could approach the passport Authority to get the same.

5. In this case, no violation of the provisions of the Passport Act has been alleged. Under such circumstances, had the learned Judicial Magistrate directed his Office or the Police to send the passport to the Passport Office where from the petitioner can obtain it by making necessary application, the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate would have been somewhat sustainable. But the learned Judicial Magistrate has gone to the extent of simply dismissing the petition on the premise that if the petitioner was given the passport, he would flee from justice. The said order of the learned Judicial Magistrate cannot withstand the scrutiny of this Court. It is totally unsustainable, besides being against the view expressed by the Honourable Supreme Court.

6.Hence, this Court comes to the conclusion that the Criminal Revision Case deserves to be allowed, with the result that the impugned order of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.VI, Trichy, dated 14.11.2011 made in Cr.M.P.No.1970 of 2011 in Cr.No.396 of 2011 shall be set aside and the said Cr.M.P shall stand allowed, directing return of the passport of the petitioner bearing Passport Number H 8841154. By way of clarification, it is made clear that this Order shall not come in the way of the Police separately applying to the Passport Authority for impounding the passport under the provisions of the Passport Act. The said liberty given to the police is not a licence either to the Police or to the Court to withhold the passport and refuse to hand it over to the petitioner in compliance with this Order. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.

vsn

To

1. The Inspector of Police

Airport Police Station,

Trichy.

2. The Additional Public Prosecutor,

Madurai Bench of Madras High Court,