Sunday, July 8, 2012

Police or Court can not impound Passport - Nanda Vs CBI


                                                       Supreme Court of India

CASE NO.:Appeal (crl.) 179 of 2008

PETITIONER:SURESH NANDA

Vs

RESPONDENT:C.B.I.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/01/2008

BENCH:
P.P. NAOLEKAR & MARKANDEY KATJU

JUDGMENT:

JUDGMENT


O R D E R
[ ARISING OUT OF S.L.P.(CRL.) 3408 OF 2007 ]

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant claims to be a non-resident Indian settled in United Kingdom for the last 23 years. The passport of the appellant as well as other documents were seized by the respondent from 4, Prithviraj Road, New Delhi in a search conducted on 10.10.2006 when the appellant was on a visit to India. The said search and seizure was pursuant to an F.I.R. dated 9.10.2006 registered on the basis of a sting operation carried out by a news portal in the year 2001. The passport seized during the search was retained by the C.B.I. officials. An application was moved by the appellant before the Special Judge, C.B.I., Patiala House Courts, New Delhi praying for release of his passport so that he can travel abroad to London and Dubai for a period of 15 days. The learned Special Judge, by order dated 15.1.2007, directed the release of the passport to the appellant by imposing upon him certain conditions. Aggrieved against the order passed by the learned Special Judge, C.B.I., the respondent preferred a Criminal Revision before the High Court. The High Court, by order dated 5.2.2007, reversed the order of the learned Special Judge and refused to release the passport to the appellant. Aggrieved against the order of the High Court, present appeal, by special leave, has been preferred by the appellant.

3. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the power and jurisdiction to impound the passport of any individual has to be exercised under the Passports Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as The Act ). He specifically referred to sub-section (3)(e) of Section 10 of the Act which reads as under: (3) The passport authority may impound or cause to be impounded or revoke a passport or travel document -

(e) if proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by the holder of the passport or travel document are pending before a criminal court in India:

Reference was also made to Section 10A of the Act which has been introduced by Act 17/2002 w.e.f. 17.10.2001.

4. Learned senior counsel for the appellant also placed reliance on the decision of 5- Judge Bench of this Court in Satwant Singh Sawhney Vs. D. Ramarathnam, Asstt. Passport Officer (1967) 3 SCR 525 wherein in para 31, it was held as under:

31: For the reasons mentioned above, we would accept the view of Kerala, Bombay and Mysore High Courts in preference to that expressed by the Delhi High Court. It follows that under Article 21 of the Constitution no person can be deprived of his right to travel except according to procedure established by law. It is not disputed that no law was made by the State regulating or depriving persons of such a right.

5. A similar view is reiterated in the decision rendered by 7-Judge Bench of this Court in Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India and another (1978) 1 SCC 248 wherein at page 280, it was held as under:

....Now, it has been held by this Court in Satwant Singh's case (supra) that 'personal liberty' within the meaning of Article 21 includes within its ambit the right to go abroad and consequently no person can be deprived of this right except according to procedure prescribed by law. Prior to the enactment of the Passports Act, 1967, there was no law regulating the right of a person to go abroad and that was the reason why the order of the Passport Officer refusing to issue passport to the petitioner in Satwant Singh's case (supra) was struck down as invalid. It will be seen at once from the language of Article 21 that the protection it secures is a limited one. It safeguards the right to go abroad against executive interference which is not supported by law; and law here means 'enacted law' or 'State law' (Vide A.K. Gopalan's case). Thus, no person can be deprived of his right to go abroad unless there is a law made by the State prescribing the procedure for so depriving him and the deprivation is effected strictly in accordance with such procedure.....

6. On the other hand, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the respondent submitted that the passport was seized and impounded by exercising the powers under Section 102 read with Sections 165 and 104 of Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Cr.P.C. ). He further contended that the power to retain and impound the passport has been rightly exercised by the respondent as there is an order dated 3.11.2006 passed by the learned Special Judge for C.B.I. exercising the power under Section 104 of Cr.P.C.

7. Sub-section (3)(e) of Section 10 of the Act provides for impounding of a passport if proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by the holder of the passport or travel document are pending before a criminal court in India. Thus, the Passport Authority has the power to impound the passport under the Act. Section 102 of Cr.P.C. gives powers to the police officer to seize any property which may be alleged or suspected to have been stolen or which may be found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence. Sub-section (5) of Section 165 of Cr.P.C. provides that the copies of record made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) shall forthwith be sent to the nearest Magistrate empowered to take cognizance to the offence whereas Section 104 of Cr.P.C. authorizes the court to impound any document or thing produced before it under the Code. Section 165 of Cr.P.C. does not speak about the passport which has been searched and seized as in the present case. It does not speak about the documents found in search, but copies of the records prepared under sub-section (1) and sub-section (3). Impound means to keep in custody of the law. There must be some distinct action which will show that documents or things have been impounded. According to the Oxford Dictionary impound means to take legal or formal possession. In the present case, the passport of the appellant is in possession of CBI right from the date it has been seized by the CBI. When we read Section 104 of Cr.P.C. and Section 10 of the Act together, under Cr.P.C., the Court is empowered to impound any document or thing produced before it whereas the Act speaks specifically of impounding of the passport.

8. Thus, the Act is a special Act relating to a matter of passport, whereas Section 104 of the Cr.P.C. authorizes the Court to impound document or thing produced before it. Where there is a special Act dealing with specific subject, resort should be had to that Act instead of general Act providing for the matter connected with the specific Act. As the Passports Act is a special act, the rule that general provision should yield to the specific provision is to be applied. See : Damji Valaji Shah & another Vs. L.I.C. of India & others [AIR 1966 SC 135]; Gobind Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar & others [1999(7) SCC 76]; and Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar and others [AIR 1999 SC 3125].

9. The Act being a specific Act whereas Section 104 of Cr.P.C. is a general provision for impounding any document or thing, it shall prevail over that Section in the Cr.P.C. as regards the passport. Thus, by necessary implication, the power of Court to impound any document or thing produced before it would exclude passport.

10. In the present case, no steps have been taken under Section 10 of the Act which provides for variation, impounding and revocation of the passports and travel documents. Section 10A of the Act which provides for an order to suspend with immediate effect any passport or travel document; such other appropriate order which may have the effect of rendering any passport or travel document invalid, for a period not exceeding four weeks, if the Central Government or any designated officer on its satisfaction holds that it is necessary in public interest to do without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Section 10 by approaching the Central Government or any designated officer. Therefore, it appears that the passport of the appellant cannot be impounded except by the Passport Authority in accordance with law. The retention of the passport by the respondent (CBI) has not been done in conformity with the provisions of law as there is no order of the passport authorities under Section 10(3)(e) or by the Central Government or any designated officer under Section 10A of the Act to impound the passport by the respondent exercising the powers vested under the Act.

11. Ld.  Addnl. Solicitor General has submitted that the police has power to seize a passport in view of Section 102(1) of the Cr.P.C. which states: Power of police officer to seize certain property:(1) Any police officer may seize any property which may be alleged or suspected to have been stolen, or which may be found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence .

In our opinion, while the police may have the power to seize a passport under Section 102(1) Cr.P.C, it does not have the power to impound the same. Impounding of a passport can only be done by the passport authority u/s 10(3) of the Passports Act, 1967.

12. It may be mentioned that there is a difference between seizing of a document and impounding a document. A seizure is made at a particular moment when a person or authority takes into his possession some property which was earlier not in his possession. Thus, seizure is done at a particular moment of time. However, if after seizing of a property or document the said property or document is retained for some period of time, then such retention amounts to impounding of the property/or document. In the Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar (2nd Edition), the word impound has been defined to mean to take possession of a document or thing for being held in custody in accordance with law . Thus, the word impounding really means retention of possession of a good or a document which has been seized.

13. Hence, while the police may have power to seize a passport u/s 102 Cr.P.C. if it is permissible within the authority given u/s  102 of Cr.P.C., it does not have power to retain or impound the same, because that can only be done by the passport authority under Section 10(3) of the Passports Act. Hence, if the police seizes a passport (which it has power to do u/s 102 Cr.P.C.), thereafter the police must send it along with a letter to the passport authority clearly stating that the seized passport deserves to be impounded for one of the reasons mentioned in Section 10(3) of the Act. It is thereafter the passport authority to decide whether to impound the passport or not. Since impounding of a passport has civil consequences, the passport authority must give an opportunity of hearing to the person concerned before impounding his passport. It is well settled that any order which has civil consequences must be passed after giving opportunity of hearing to a party vide State of Orissa Vs. Binapani Dei [Air 1967 SC 1269].

14. In the present case, neither the passport authority passed any order of impounding nor was any opportunity of hearing given to the appellant by the passport authority for impounding the document. It was only the CBI authority which has retained possession of the passport (which in substance amounts to impounding it) from October, 2006. In our opinion, this was clearly illegal. Under Section 10A of the Act retention by the Central Government can only be for four weeks. Thereafter it can only be retained by an order of the Passport authority under Section 10(3).

15. In our opinion, even the Court cannot impound a passport. Though, no doubt, Section 104 Cr.P.C. states that the Court may, if it thinks fit, impound any document or thing produced before it, in our opinion, this provision will only enable the Court to impound any document or thing other than a passport. This is because impounding a passport is provided for in Section 10(3) of the Passports Act. The Passports Act is a special law while the Cr.P.C. is a general law. It is well settled that the special law prevails over the general law vide G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretation (9th Edition pg. 133). This principle is expressed in the maxim Generalia specialibus non derogant . Hence, impounding of a passport cannot be done by the Court under Section 104 Cr.P.C. though it can impound any other document or thing.

16. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and direct the respondent to hand over the passport to the appellant within a week from today. However, it shall be open to the respondent to approach the Passport Authorities u/s 10 or the authorities u/s 10A of the Act for impounding the passport of the appellant in accordance with law.

17. We, however, make it clear that we are not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case and are not deciding whether the passport can be impounded as a condition for grant of bail.

18. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.

Saturday, July 7, 2012

Publicising in the newspapers about Husband is Cruelty by wife

                                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4905   OF 2012
                                 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 16528 of 2007)

Vishwanath S/o Sitaram Agrawal                 .....……..Appellant

                                   Versus

Sau. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal                 ………Respondent


                         J U D G M E N T

DIPAK MISRA, J.

      Leave granted.

2.    The marriage between appellant and respondent  was  solemnized on 30th of April, 1979 as per Hindu rites at Akola. In the Wedlock, 2 sons, namely, Vishal and Rahul, were born on 23.9.1982 and 1.11.1984 respectively. As the appellant-husband felt that there was total discord in their marital life and compatibility looked like a mirage, he filed a petition for divorce u/s 13(1) (ia) of HMA, 1955 (for brevity 'the Act').

3. It was the case of the appellant before the court of first instance that the respondent-wife did not know how to conduct herself as a wife and daughter-in-law and despite persuasion, her behavioural pattern remained unchanged. The birth of the children had no impact on her conduct and everything worsened with the efflux of time. The behaviour of the respondent with the relatives and guests who used to come to their house was far from being desirable and, in fact, it exhibited arrogance and lack of culture and, in a way, endangered the social reputation of the family. That apart, she did not have the slightest respect for her mother-in-law. Despite the old lady being a patient of diabetes and hyper tension, it could not invoke any sympathy from the respondent and hence, there was total absence of care or concern.

4. As pleaded, in the month of March, 1990, there was a dacoity in the house where the appellant was staying and, therefore, they shifted to ginning factory and eventually, on 17.3.1991, shifted to their own 3 storeyed building situate in Gandhi Chowk. Even with passage of time, instead of bringing maturity in attitude of the respondent, it brought a sense of established selfishness and non-concern for children. Whim and irrationality reigned in her day-to-day behaviour and frequent quarrels became a daily affair. As misfortune would have it, on 23.1.1994, the mother of appellant died and freer atmosphere at home gave immense independence to respondent to make life of the appellant more troublesome. The appellant and his father were compelled to do their personal work as entire attention of servants was diverted in a compulsive manner towards her.

Her immature perception of life reached its zenith when on certain occasions she used to hide keys of the motorcycle and close gate so that appellant could not go to office of factory to look after business. Frequent phone calls were made to factory solely for the purpose of abusing and causing mental agony to appellant. As asserted, appellant and his sons used to sleep on 2nd floor whereas respondent used to sleep in bedroom on 3rd floor and their relationship slowly but constantly got estranged. As cruelty became intolerable, appellant visited his in-laws and disclosed the same but it had no effect on her behaviour. Eventually, on 1.5.1995, respondent was left at house of her parents at Akola and the appellant stayed in his house with the two sons.

As the factual matrix would unveil, on 24.7.1995, a notice issued by her advocate was published in the daily "Lokmat" stating, inter alia, that the appellant is a womanizer and addicted to liquor. On 11.10.1995, at 4.00p.m., the respondent came to the house of the appellant at Gandhi Chowk and abused the father, the children and the appellant. She, in fact, created a violent atmosphere in the house as well as in the office by damaging the property and causing mental torture to the appellant and also to the family members which compelled the appellant to lodge a complaint at the Police Station, Chopda.

It was alleged that she had brought gund as & certain women to cause that incident. The said untoward incident brought A.S.P., Jalgaon, to spot. The publication in newspaper and later incident both occurred during pendency of divorce petition & they were incorporated by way of amendment. On aforesaid basis, it was contended that respondent treated appellant with cruelty & hence, he was entitled to a decree for divorce

5. The asseverations made in the petition were controverted by the respondent stating that she was always respectful and cordial to her in-laws, relatives and the guests as was expected from a cultured daughter-in-law. They led a happy married life for 16 years and at no point of time she showed any arrogance or any behaviour which could remotely suggest any kind of cruelty. She attended to her mother-in-law all the time with a sense of committed service and at no point of time there was any dissatisfaction on her part.

She disputed allegation that she had hidden keys of motorcycle or closed gate or repeatedly called appellant on phone at the office to abuse him or to disturb him in his work. It is her stand that the appellant owns an oil mill, ginning factory and a petrol pump at Chopda and had sold certain non-agricultural land by demarcating it into small plots. The appellant, as alleged, joined computer classes which were run by one Neeta Gujarathi in the name and style of "Om Computer Services" and gradually appellant started spending much of his time at computer centre instead of attending to his own business in factory. When the respondent became aware of the intimacy, she took serious objection to same and there from their relationship became bitter.

6. It was alleged by respondent that she was disturbed after knowing about involvement of appellant with another lady despite having an established family life and 2 adolescent sons and, therefore, she was compelled to make phone calls to make enquiries about his whereabouts. As interference by respondent was not appreciated by appellant, he took respondent on 1.5.1995 to Akola and left her at her parental house and never cared to bring her back to her matrimonial home. Her willingness to come back and stay with husband and children could not get fructified because of the totally indifferent attitude shown by appellant.

Her attempts to see the children in the school became an exercise in futility, as the husband, who is a trustee of school, managed to ensure that the boys did not meet her. It was further alleged that the said Neeta lived with him as his mistress and when the respondent came to know about it, she went to Chopda to ascertain the same and coming to know that Neeta was in the house of the appellant, she made an effort to enter into the house but she was assaulted. This resulted in gathering of people of the locality and the appellant-husband, as a counter-blast, lodged a complaint at the police station. The DSP arrived at the scene and found that Neeta was inside the house and thereafter she was taken back to her house by the police. Because of involvement of appellant with said Neeta, he had concocted story of cruelty and filed petition for divorce.

7. The learned trial Judge framed as many as four issues. The two vital issues were whether the appellant had been able to prove the alleged cruelty and whether he was entitled to take disadvantage of his own wrong. The appellant, in order to prove the allegation of cruelty, examined ten witnesses and on behalf of the respondent, eight witnesses were examined.

The learned trial Judge, analysing the evidence on record, came to hold that there was conjugal relationship till 1.5.1995; that there was no substantial material on record to demonstrate that the respondent had behaved with immaturity immediately after marriage; that in the absence of cogent evidence, it was difficult to hold that the respondent had troubled the husband and his parents; that the evidence of PW-3, Ramesh, was not worthy of acceptance as he is close and an interested witness; that the allegation that whenever she used to go to her parental home, she was granting leave to the servants was not acceptable; that the appellant should have examined some of the servants including the maid servant but for some reason or other had withheld the best evidence; that the plea that the respondent was not looking after her mother-in-law who was suffering from paralysis from 1984 has not been proven; that the allegation that the respondent was hiding the uniforms of the children and not treating them well had not been proven because the version of Vishal could not be accepted as he was staying with the father and, therefore, it was natural for him to speak in favour of the father; that the stand that the respondent was hiding the keys of the motorcycle and crumpling the ironed clothes of the appellant did not constitute mental cruelty as the said acts, being childish, were enjoyed by the appellant-husband; that the factum of abuse by the respondent on telephone had not been established by adducing reliable evidence; that the respondent and the appellant were sleeping on the third floor of the house and hence, she was sleeping with him in the bedroom and the allegation that he was deprived of sexual satisfaction from 1991 was unacceptable; that from the witnesses cited on behalf of the respondent, it was demonstrable that her behaviour towards her sons and in-laws was extremely good; that even if the allegations made by the appellant were accepted to have been established to some extent, it could only be considered as normal wear and tear of the marital life; that the plea of mental cruelty had not been proven as none of the allegations had been established by adducing acceptable, consistent and cogent evidence; that the notice published in the daily "Lokmat" on 28.7.1995 and the later incident dated 11.10.1995 being incidents subsequent to the filing of the petition for divorce, the same were not to be taken intoconsideration.

8. The learned trial Judge further returned the finding that the appellant was going to learn computer and taking instructions from Neeta Gujarathi and the plea that she was engaged as a Computer Operator in his office was not believable as no appointment letter was produced; that the stand that she was paid Rs.1200/- per month was not worthy of any credence as she was operating a computer centre; that from the evidence of the witnesses of the respondent, namely, RW-3 to RW-5, it was clear that Neeta Gujarathi was living with the appellant in his house and he had developed intimacy with her and, therefore, the subsequent events, even if analysed, were to be so done on the said backdrop; that the allegation that there was a gathering and they were violent and broke the windows was really not proven by adducing credible evidence; that the testimony of the witnesses of the respondent clearly reveal that Neeta was inside the house of the appellant and effort was made to bring her out from the house and no damage was caused to the property; that on that day, the police had come in the mid night hours and taken out Neeta from the house of the appellant and left her at her house; that the notice which was published in "Lokmat" was to protect the interest of the sons in the property and basically pertained to the appellant's alienating the property; that the public notice was not unfounded or baseless and the question of defaming him and thereby causing any mental cruelty did not arise; that the allegations made in the application for grant of interim alimony that the appellant is a womanizer and is addicted to liquor cannot be considered for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that the husband was meted with cruelty; that the allegations made in the written statement having been found to be truthful, the same could not be said to have caused any mental cruelty; that the cumulative effect of the evidence brought on record was that no mental cruelty was ever caused by the respondent; and that the husband could not take advantage of his own wrong. Being of this view, the learned trial Judge dismissed the application with costs and also dismissed the application of the respondent-wife for grant of permanent alimony.

9. Grieved by the aforesaid decision, the appellant-husband preferred Civil Appeal No. 23 of 1999. The first appellate court appreciated the evidence, dealt with the findings returned by the trial court and eventually came to hold that the cumulative effect of the evidence and the material brought on record would go a long way to show that the appellant had failed to make out a case of mental cruelty to entitle him to obtain a decree for divorce. The aforesaid conclusion by the appellate court entailed dismissal of the appeal.

10. Being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate Judge, the husband preferred Second Appeal No. 683 of 2006 before the High Court. The learned single Judge of the High Court came to hold that there were concurrent findings of fact and no substantial question of law was involved. However, the learned single Judge observed that the sons of the parties had grown up and have been married; that the parties had no intention to patch up the matrimonial discord; and that the marriage had been irretrievably broken but that could not be considered by the High Court but only by the Apex Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. Expressing the aforesaid view, he did not admit the appeal and dismissed the same.

11. We have heard Mr. Arvind V. Sawant, learned senior counsel for the appellant-husband, and Mr. Vivek C. Solshe, learned counsel for therespondent-wife.

12. At the very outset, we would like to make it clear that though the learned single Judge of the High Court has expressed the view that the parties are at logger heads and have shown no inclination to patch the matrimonial rupture and the sons have grown up and got married and with the efflux of time, the relationship has been further shattered and hence, the marriage is irretrievably broken and only this Court can grant divorce in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution, yet we are not going to take recourse to the same and only address ourselves whether a case for divorce has really been made out.

13. At this juncture, we may note with profit that the learned senior counsel for the appellant exclusively rested his case on the foundation of mental cruelty. It is his submission that if the evidence of the husband and other witnesses are scrutinized in an apposite manner along with the stand and stance taken in the written statement, it will clearly reveal a case of mental cruelty regard being had to the social status of the appellant. It is urged by him that the trial court as well as the appellate court have not given any credence to the evidence of some of the witnesses on the ground that they are interested witnesses though they are the most natural witnesses who had witnessed the cruel behaviour meted to the appellant.

14. It is the submission of the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the court of first instance as well as the appellate court have failed to take into consideration certain material aspects of the evidence and the appreciation of evidence being absolutely perverse, the High Court would have been well advised to scan and scrutinize the same but it declined to admit the appeal on the ground that there are concurrent findings of fact. It is canvassed by him that this Court, in exercise of power under Article136 of the Constitution, can dislodge such concurrent findings of facts which are perverse, baseless, unreasonable and contrary to the material onrecord.

15. The learned counsel for the respondent, resisting the aforesaid submissions, contended that the view expressed by the High Court cannot be found fault with as the courts below have, at great length, discussed the evidence and appreciated the same with utmost prudence and objectivity and there is nothing on record to show that any material part of the evidence has been ignored or something extraneous to the record has been taken into consideration. It is highlighted by him that the stand put forth by the wife in her written statement having been established, the same cannot be construed to have constituted mental cruelty. Lastly, it is put forth that the appellant has created a dent in the institution of marriage and made a maladroit effort to take advantage of his own wrong which should not beallowed.

16. First, we shall advert to what actually constitutes 'mental cruelty' and whether in the case at hand, the plea of mental cruelty has been established and thereafter proceed to address whether the courts below have adopted an approach which is perverse, unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence on record and totally unacceptable to invite the discretion of this Court in exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution to dislodge the same.

17. The expression 'cruelty' has an inseparable nexus with human conductor human behaviour. It is always dependent upon the social strata or the milieu to which the parties belong, their ways of life, relationship, temperaments and emotions that have been conditioned by their social status. In Sirajmohamedkhan Janmohamadkhan v. Hafizunnisa Yasinkhan and another[1], a two-Judge Bench approved the concept of legal cruelty as expounded in Sm. Pancho v. Ram Prasad[2] wherein it was stated thus: - "Conception of legal cruelty undergoes changes according to the changes and advancement of social concept and standards of living. With the advancement of our social conceptions, this feature has obtained legislative recognition that a second marriage is a sufficient ground for separate residence and separate maintenance.

Moreover, to establish legal cruelty, it is not necessary that physical violence should be used. Continuous ill-treatment, cessation of marital intercourse, studied neglect, indifference on the part of the husband, and an assertion on the part of the husband that the wife is unchaste are all factors which may undermine the health of a wife." It is apt to note here that the said observations were made while dealing with the Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act (19 of 1946). This Court, after reproducing the passage, has observed that the learned Judge has put his finger on the correct aspect and object of mental cruelty.

18. In Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi[3], while dealing with 'cruelty' under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act, this Court observed that the said provision does not define 'cruelty' and the same could not be defined. The' cruelty' may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, the court will have no problem to determine it. It is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental, the problem presents difficulty. Thereafter, the Bench proceeded to state as follows: - "First, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of the cruel treatment. Second, the impact of such treatment on the mind of the spouse. Whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. There may, however, be cases where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted."

19. After so stating, this Court observed about the marked change in life in modern times and the sea change in matrimonial duties and responsibilities. It has been observed that when a spouse makes a complaint about treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the court should not search for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatized as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance.

Their Lordships referred to the observations made in Sheldon v. Sheldon [4]wherein Lord Denning stated, "the categories of cruelty are not closed". Thereafter, the Bench proceeded to state thus: - "Each case may be different. We deal with the conduct of human beings who are not generally similar. Among the human beings there is no limit to the kind of conduct which may constitute cruelty. New type of cruelty may crop up in any case depending upon the human behaviour, capacity or incapability to tolerate the conduct complained of. Such is the wonderful (sic) realm of cruelty.

These preliminary observations are intended to emphasise that the court in matrimonial cases is not concerned with ideals in family life. The court has only to understand the spouses concerned as nature made them, and consider their particular grievance. As Lord Ried observed in Gollins v. Gollins[5] : In matrimonial affairs we are not dealing with objective standards, it is not a matrimonial offence to fall below the standard of the reasonable man (or the reasonable woman). We are dealing with this man or this woman."

20. In V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (Mrs.)[6], a two-Judge Bench referred to the amendment that had taken place in Sections 10 and 13(1)(ia) after the Hindu Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 and proceeded to hold that the earlier requirement that such cruelty has caused a reasonable apprehension in the mind of a spouse that it would be harmful or injurious for him/her to live with the other one is no longer the requirement. Thereafter, this Court proceeded to deal with what constitutes mental cruelty as contemplated in Section 13(1)(ia) and observed that mental cruelty in the said provision can broadly be defined as that conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would make it not possible for that party to live with the other.

To put it differently, the mental cruelty must be of such a nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together. The situation must be such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with the other party. It was further observed, while arriving at such conclusion, that regard must be had to the social status, educational level of the parties, the society they move in, the possibility or otherwise of the parties ever living together in case they are already living apart and all other relevant facts and circumstances.

What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case and it has to be determined in each case keeping in view the facts and circumstances of that case. That apart, the accusations and allegations have to be scrutinized in the context in which they are made. Be it noted, in the said case, this Court quoted extensively from the allegations made in the written statement and the evidence brought on record and came to hold that the said allegations and counter allegations were not in the realm of ordinary plea of defence and did amount to mental cruelty.

21. In Praveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta[7], it has been held that mental cruelty is a state of mind and feeling with one of the spouses due to behaviour or behavioural pattern by the other. Mental cruelty cannot be established by direct evidence and it is necessarily a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of the case. A feeling of anguish, disappointment, and frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of the other can only be appreciated on assessing the attending facts and circumstances in which the two partners of matrimonial life have been living. The facts and circumstances are to be assessed emerging from the evidence on record and thereafter, a fair inference has to be drawn whether the petitioner in the divorce petition has been subjected to mental cruelty due to the conduct of the other.

22. In Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijaykumar Bhate[8], it has been opined that a conscious and deliberate statement levelled with pungency and that too placed on record, through the written statement, cannot be so lightly ignored or brushed aside.

23. In A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur[9], it has been ruled that the question of mental cruelty has to be considered in the light of the norms of marital ties of the particular society to which the parties belong, their social values, status and environment in which they live. If from the conduct of the spouse, it is established and/or an inference can legitimately be drawn that the treatment of the spouse is such that it causes an apprehension in the mind of the other spouse about his or her mental welfare, then the same would amount to cruelty. While dealing with the concept of mental cruelty, enquiry must begin as to the nature of cruel treatment and the impact of such treatment in the mind of the spouse. It has to be seen whether the conduct is such that no reasonable person would tolerate it.

24. In Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit[10], it has been ruled that as to what constitutes mental cruelty for the purposes of Section 13(1)(ia) will not depend upon the numerical count of such incident or only on the continuous course of such conduct but one has to really go by the intensity, gravity and stigmatic impact of it when meted out even once and the deleterious effect of it on the mental attitude necessary for maintaining a conducive matrimonial home.

25. In Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh[11], this Court, after surveying the previous decisions and referring to the concept of cruelty, which includes mental cruelty, in English, American, Canadian and Australian cases, has observed that the human mind is extremely complex and human behaviour is equally complicated. Similarly, human ingenuity has no bound, therefore, to assimilate the entire human behaviour in one definition is almost impossible. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in the other case.

The concept of cruelty differs from person to person depending upon his upbringing, level of sensitivity, educational, family and cultural background, financial position, social status, customs, traditions, religious belief, human values and their value system. Apart from this, the concept of mental cruelty cannot remain static; it is bound to change with the passage of time, impact of modern culture through print and electronic media and value system, etc. etc. What may be mental cruelty now may not remain mental cruelty after a passage of time or vice versa. There can never be any straitjacket formula or fixed parameters for determining mental cruelty in matrimonial matters. The prudent and appropriate way to adjudicate the case would be to evaluate it on its peculiar facts and circumstances.

26. In Suman Kapur v. Sudhir Kapur[12], after referring to various decisions in the field, this Court took note of the fact that the wife had neglected to carry out the matrimonial obligations and further, during the pendency of the mediation proceeding, had sent a notice to the husband through her advocate alleging that he had another wife in USA whose identity was concealed. The said allegation was based on the fact that in his income-tax return, the husband mentioned the "Social Security Number" of his wife which did not belong to the wife, but to an American lady.

The husband offered an explanation that it was merely a typographical error and nothing else. The High Court had observed that taking undue advantage of the error in the "Social Security Number", the wife had gone to the extent of making serious allegation that the husband had married an American woman whose "Social Security Number" was wrongly typed in the income-tax return of the husband. This fact also weighed with this Court and was treated that the entire conduct of the wife did tantamount to mental cruelty.

27. Keeping in view the aforesaid enunciation of law pertaining to mental cruelty, it is to be scrutinized whether in the case at hand, there has been real mental cruelty or not, but, a significant one, the said scrutiny can only be done if the findings are perverse, unreasonable, against the material record or based on non-consideration of relevant materials. We may note here that the High Court has, in a singular line, declined to interfere with the judgment and decree of the courts below stating that they are based on concurrent findings of fact. The plea of perversity of approach though raised was not adverted to.

28. It is worth noting that this Court, in Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by L.Rs. and others[13], has held that while it is true that in a second appeal, a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. An issue pertaining to perversity comes within the ambit of substantial question of law. Similar view has been stated in Govindaraju v. Mariamman[14].

29. In Major Singh v. Rattan Singh (Dead) by LRs and others[15], it has been observed that when the courts below had rejected and disbelieved the evidence on unacceptable grounds, it is the duty of the High Court to consider whether the reasons given by the courts below are sustainable in law while hearing an appeal under Section 100 of the Code of CivilProcedure.

30. In Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao and another[16], it has been ruled that the High Court in a second appeal should not disturb the concurrent findings of fact unless it is shown that the findings recorded by the courts below are perverse being based on no evidence or that on the evidence on record, no reasonable person could have come to that conclusion. We may note here that solely because another view is possible on the basis of the evidence, the High Court would not be entitled to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This view of ours has been fortified by the decision of this Court in Abdul Raheem v. Karnataka Electricity Board & Ors. [17].

31. Having stated the law relating to mental cruelty and the dictum of this Court in respect of the jurisdiction of the High Court where concurrent findings of fact are assailed, as advised at present, we wills can the evidence whether the High Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it despite the plea of perversity being raised. Any finding which is not supported by evidence or inferences is drawn in a stretched and unacceptable manner can be said to be perverse.

This Court in exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution can interfere with concurrent findings of fact, if the conclusions recorded by the High Court are manifestly perverse and unsupported by the evidence on record. It has been so held in Alamelu and another v. State, Represented by Inspector of Police [18] and Heinz India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors.[19]

32. Presently, to the core issue, viz, whether the appellant-husband had made out a case for mental cruelty to entitle him to get a decree for divorce. At this juncture, we may un hesitantly state that the trial court as well as the first appellate court have disbelieved the evidence of most of the witnesses cited on behalf of the husband on the ground that they are interested witnesses. In a matrimonial dispute, it would be in appropriate to expect outsiders to come and depose. The family members and sometimes the relatives, friends and neighbours are the most natural witnesses. The veracity of the testimony is to be tested on objective parameters and not to be thrown overboard on the ground that the witnesses are related to either of the spouse. Exception has been taken by the courts below that the servants of the house should have been examined and that amounts to suppression of the best possible evidence.

That apart, the allegations made in the written statement, the dismissal of the case instituted by the wife under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, the non-judging of the material regard being had to the social status, the mental make-up, the milieu and the rejection of subsequent events on the count that they are subsequent to the filing of the petition for divorce and also giving flimsy reasons not to place reliance on the same, we are disposed to think, deserve to be tested on the anvil of "perversity of approach". Quite apart from the above, a significant question that emerges is whether the reasons ascribed by the courts below that the allegations made in the written statement alleging extra marital affair of the appellant-husband with Neeta Gujarathi has been established and, therefore, it would not constitute mental cruelty are perverse and unacceptable or justified on the basis of the evidence brought on record. These are the aspects which need to be scrutinized and appositely delved into.

33. The appellant-husband, examining himself as PW-1, has categorically stated that the wife used to hide the pressed clothes while he was getting ready to go to the factory. Sometimes she used to crumple the ironed clothes and hide the keys of the motorcycle or close the main gate. In the cross-examination, it is clearly stated that the wife was crumpling the ironed clothes, hiding the keys of the motorcycle and locking the gate to trouble him and the said incidents were taking place for a long time. This being the evidence on record, we are at a loss to find that the courts below could record a finding that the appellant used to enjoy the childish and fanciful behaviour of the wife pertaining to the aforesaid aspect.

This finding is definitely based on no evidence. Such a conclusion cannot be reached even by inference. If we allow ourselves to say so, even surmises and conjectures would not permit such a finding to be recorded. It is apt to note here that it does not require Solomon's wisdom to underst and the embarrassment and harassment that might have been felt by the husband. The level of disappointment on his part can be well visualised like a moon in a cloudless sky.

34. Now we shall advert to the allegation made in the written statement. The respondent-wife had made the allegation that the husband had an illicit relationship with Neeta Gujarathi. The learned trial Judge has opined that the said allegation having been proved cannot be treated to have caused mental cruelty. He has referred to various authorities of many High Courts. The heart of the matter is whether such an allegation has actually been proven by adducing acceptable evidence. It is worth noting that the respondent had filed a complaint, RCC No. 91/95, under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code against the husband. He was discharged in the said case. The said order has gone un assailed.

The learned trial Judge has expressed the view that Neeta Gujarathi was having a relationship with the husband on the basis that though the husband had admitted that she was working in his office yet he had not produced any appointment letter to show that she was appointed as a computer operator. The trial Judge has relied on the evidence of the wife. The wife in her evidence has stated in an extremely bald manner that whenever she had telephoned to the office in the factory, the husband was not there and further that the presence of Neeta Gujarathi was not liked by her in-laws and the elder son Vishal. On a careful reading of the judgment of the trial court, it is demonstrable that it has been persuaded to return such a finding on the basis of the incident that took place on 11.10.1995.

It is worth noting that the wife, who examined herself as RW-1, stated in her evidence that Vishal was deposing against her as the appellant had given him a scooter. The learned trial Judge has given immense credence to the version of the social worker who, on the date of the incident, had come to the house of the appellant where a large crowd had gathered and has deposed that she had seen Neetagoing and coming out of the house. The evidence of the wife, when studiedly scrutinized, would show that there was more of suspicion than any kind of truth in it. As has been stated earlier, the respondent had made an allegation that her son was influenced by the appellant-husband. The learned trial Judge as well as the appellate court have accepted the same. It is germane to note that Vishal, the elder son, was approximately 16years of age at the time of examination in court. There is remotely no suggestion to the said witness that when Neeta Gujarati used to go to the house, his grandfather expressed any kind of disapproval.

Thus, the whole thing seems to have rested on the incident of 11.10.1995. On that day, as the material on record would show, at 4.00 p.m., the wife arrived at the house of the husband. She has admitted that she wanted to see her father-in-law who was not keeping well. After she went in, her father-in-law got up from the chair and went upstairs. She was not permitted to go upstairs. It is testified by her that her father-in-law came down and slapped her. She has deposed about the gathering of people and publication in newspapers about the incident. Vishal, PW-5, has stated that the mother had pushed the grandfather from the chair.

The truthfulness of the said aspect need not be dwelled upon. The fact remains that the testimony of the wife that the father-in-law did not like the visit of Neeta does not appear to be true. Had it been so, he would not have behaved in the manner as deposed by the wife. That apart, common sense does not give consent to the theory that both, the father of the husband and his son, Vishal, abandoned normal perception of life and acceded to the illicit intimacy with Neeta. It is interesting to note that she has deposed that it was published in the papers that the daughter-in-law was slapped by the father-in-law and Neeta Gujarathi was recovered from house but eventually police lodged a case against husband, the father-in-law and other relatives u/s 498A IPC

We really fail to fathom how from this incident and some cryptic evidence on record, it can be concluded that the respondent-wife had established that the husband had an extra marital relationship with Neeta Gujarathi. That apart, in the application for grant of interim maintenance, she had pleaded that the husband was a womaniser and drunkard. This pleading was wholly unwarranted and, in fact, amounts to a deliberate assault on the character. Thus, we have no scintilla of doubt that the uncalled for allegations are bound to create mental agony and anguish in the mind of the husband.

35. Another aspect needs to be taken note of. She had made allegation about the demand of dowry. RCC No. 133/95 was instituted under Section498A of the Indian Penal Code against the husband, father-in-law and other relatives. They have been acquitted in that case. The said decision of acquittal has not been assailed before the higher forum. Hence, the allegation on this count was incorrect and untruthful and it can unhesitatingly be stated that such an act creates mental trauma in the mind of the husband as no one would like to face a criminal proceeding of this nature on baseless and untruthful allegations.

36. Presently to subsequent events. The courts below have opined that publication of notice in daily "Lokmat" and occurrence that took place on 11.10.1995 could not be considered as said events occurred after filing of petition for divorce. Thereafter, courts below have proceeded to deal with effect of the said events on the assumption that they can be taken into consideration. As far as the first incident is concerned, a view has been expressed that the notice was published by the wife to safeguard interests of the children, and the second one was a reaction on the part of the wife relating to relationship of the husband with Neeta Gujrathi.

We have already referred to the second incident and expressed the view that the said incident does not establish that there was an extra marital relationship between Neeta and the appellant. We have referred to the said incident as we are of the considered opinion that the subsequent events can be taken into consideration. In this context, we may profitably refer to the observations made by a three-Judge Bench in the case of A. Jayachandra (supra) :- "The matter can be looked at from another angle. If acts subsequent to the filing of the divorce petition can be looked into to infer condo nation of the aberrations, acts subsequent to the filing of the petition can be taken note of to show a pattern in the behaviour and conduct."

37. We may also usefully refer to observations made in Suman Kapur(supra) wherein wife had made a maladroit effort to take advantage of a typographical error in written statement and issued a notice to husband alleging that he had another wife in USA. Thus, this Court has expressed opinion that subsequent events can be considered.

38. Keeping in view the aforesaid pronouncement of law, we shall first appreciate the impact of the notice published in the "Lokmat". The relevant part of the said notice, as published in the newspaper, reads as follows: - "Shri Vishwanath Sitaram Agrawal is having vices of womanizing, drinking liquor and other bad habits. He is having monthly income of Rs.10 lacs, but due to several vices, he is short of fund. Therefore, he has started selling the property. He has sold some properties. My client has tried to make him understand which is of no use and on the contrary, he has beaten my client very badly and has driven her away and dropped her to Akola at her parent's house.

In the property of Shri Vishwanath Sitaram Agrawal my client and her two sons are having shares in the capacity of members of joint family and Shri Vishwanath Sitaram Agrawal has no right to dispose of the property on any ground."Immense emphasis has been given on the fact that after publication of the notice, the husband had filed a caveat in the court. The factual matrix would reveal that the husband comes from a respectable family engaged in business. At the time of publication of notice, the sons were quite grown up.

The respondent-wife did not bother to think what impact it would have on the reputation of the husband and what mental discomfort it would cause. It is manifest from the material on record that the children were staying with the father. They were studying in the school and the father was taking care of everything. Such a publication in the newspaper having good circulation can cause trauma, agony and anguish in the mind of any reasonable man. The explanation given by the wife to the effect that she wanted to protect the interests of the children, as we perceive, is absolutely incredible and implausible. The filing of a caveat is wholly inconsequential. In fact, it can decidedly be said that it was mala fide and the motive was to demolish the reputation of the husband in the society by naming him as a womaniser, drunkard and a man of bad habits.

39. At this stage, we may fruitfully reminisce a poignant passage from N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane[20] wherein Chandrachud, J. (as his Lordshipthen was) observed thus: - "The court has to deal, not with an ideal husband and an ideal wife (assuming any such exist) but with the particular man and woman before it. The ideal couple or a near-ideal one will probably have no occasion to go to a matrimonial court for, even if they may not be able to drown their differences, their ideal attitudes may help them overlook or gloss over mutual faults and failures."

40. Regard being had to the aforesaid, we have to evaluate the instances. In our considered opinion, a normal reasonable man is bound to feel the sting and the pungency. The conduct and circumstances make it graphically clear that the respondent-wife had really humiliated him and caused mental cruelty. Her conduct clearly exposits that it has resulted in causing agony and anguish in the mind of the husband. She had publicised in the newspapers that he was a womaniser and a drunkard. She had made wild allegations about his character. She had made an effort to prosecute him in criminal litigations which she had failed to prove. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, agony and frustration of the husband is obvious.

It can be stated with certitude that the cumulative effect of the evidence brought on record clearly establish a sustained attitude of causing humiliation and calculated torture on the part of the wife to make the life of the husband miserable. The husband felt humiliated both in private and public life. Indubitably, it created a dent in his reputation which is not only the salt of life, but also the purest treasure and the most precious perfume of life. It is extremely delicate and a cherished value this side of the grave. It is a revenue generator for the present as well as for the posterity. Thus analysed, it would not be out of place to state that his brain and the bones must have felt the chill of humiliation.

The dreams sweetly grafted with sanguine fondness with the passage of time reached the Ever tine disaster, possibly, with a vow not to melt. The cathartic effect looked like a distant mirage. The cruel behaviour of the wife has frozen the emotions and snuffed out the bright candle of feeling of the husband because he has been treated as an un person. Thus, analysed, it is abundantly clear that with this mental pain, agony and suffering, the husband cannot be asked to put up with the conduct of the wife and to continue to live with her. Therefore, he is entitled to a decree fordivorce.

41. Presently, we shall deal with the aspect pertaining to the grant of permanent alimony. The court of first instance has rejected the application filed by the respondent-wife as no decree for divorce was granted and there was no severance of marital status. We refrain from commenting on the said view as we have opined that the husband is entitled to a decree for divorce. Permanent alimony is to be granted taking into consideration the social status, the conduct of the parties, the way of living of the spouse and such other ancillary aspects. During the course of hearing of the matter, we have heard the learned counsel for the parties on this aspect. After taking instructions from the respective parties, they have addressed us.

The ld. sr. counsel for appellant has submitted that till 21.2.2012, an amount of Rs.17,60,000/- has been paid towards maintenance to wife as directed by courts below and hence, that should be deducted from amount to be fixed. He has further submitted that permanent alimony should be fixed at Rs.25 lacs. The ld. counsel for respondent, while insisting for affirmance of decisions of High Court as well as by courts below, has submitted that amount that has already been paid should not be taken into consideration as same has been paid within a span of no. of years and deduction would affect future sustenance. He has emphasised on the income of the husband, the progress in the business, the inflation in the cost of living and the way of life the respondent is expected to lead. He has also canvassed that the age factor and the medical aid and assistance that are likely to be needed should be considered and the permanent alimony should be fixed at Rs.75 lacs.

42. In our considered opinion, amount that has already been paid to respondent-wife towards alimony is to be ignored as same had been paid by virtue of interim orders passed by courts. It is not expected that the respondent-wife has sustained herself without spending said money. Keeping in view totality of circumstances and social strata from which parties come from and regard being had to business prospects of appellant, permanent alimony of Rs.50 lacs(rupees fifty lacs only) should be fixed and, accordingly, we so do. The said amount of Rs.50 lacs (rupees fifty lacs only) shall be deposited byway of bank draft before trial court within a period of 4 months and same shall be handed over to respondent-wife on proper identification.

43. Consequently, appeal is allowed, judgments & decrees of courts below are set aside & a decree for divorce in favour of appellant is granted. Further, husband shall pay Rs.50 lacs (fifty lacs only) towards permanent alimony to wife in manner as directed hereinabove. The parties shall bear their respective costs.

............................................J. [Deepak Verma]

............................................J. [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi;
July 04, 2012

Tuesday, July 3, 2012

Recorded-conversation-on-CD-is-admissible-evidence-in-Family



                               IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

Notice of Motion No.8 of 2010
IN
Suit No.16 of 2008

Mrs.Havovi Kersi Sethna                                                  … … Plaintiff

V/s.

Mr.Kersi Gustad Sethna                                                … … Defendant
Mr.Narayan Suvarna i/by Mrs.Ansuya Dutt for Plaintiff.
Ms.Taubon F. Irani for Defendant.


CORAM : SMT.ROSHAN DALVI, J.
Date of reserving the order : 14th January 2011
Date of pronouncing the order : 28th January 2011


ORDER :

1. Parties are wife and husband. The Petition for divorce between the parties and other ancillary reliefs is pending trial. The wife, who is the Petitioner, is under cross-examination. The husband relies upon certain handwritten diaries of the wife as well as Compact Disk (CD) on which conversation between the wife and the husband has been recorded by the husband on certain dates. The husband has produced the transcriptt of the said conversation. The husband has applied for verification of the handwriting of his wife in the diaries and the voice of the wife in the taped conversation on the CDs. The wife admits the handwriting in her diaries. That can be produced in evidence. Hence the husband does not press the relief in that behalf. Aside from the diary, there is one line written by the wife on a certain menu of her catering service which is also admitted by the wife.


2. The parties are at dispute with regard to the taped conversation on the CDs. The husband has not yet filed his affidavit of documents. He has, therefore, not relied upon any specific document. The husband has, however, served upon the wife inter alia the CDs as well as the transcriptt. These are the documents referred to by the husband in paragraph 22 of his written statement. The reference runs thus:
On several occasions thereafter the Defendant had occasion to record the Plaintiff’s conversation where she has told the Defendant to leave her father s house, as she wanted a divorce.


It is contended on behalf of the wife that the taped conversation is not relied upon as a document. It is not referred to as a document and hence the husband cannot use it as a document in evidence. It is also contended by the wife that the affidavit of documents is not filed and the instrument on which the initial conversation was recorded is not produced. The husband could have recorded it on a tape recorder, audio cassette, MP-3 player, Dictaphone, computer or even on his mobile phone. That recording is not produced and inspection of that recording is not given and hence the wife contends that the CD and the transcriptt cannot be used by the husband.


3. The wife has neither admitted nor denied the conversation. The husband seeks to use it in her cross- examination.


4. The elementary principle of recording evidence must be first considered. Evidence consists of examination-in- chief and cross-examination. A party is required to offer for inspection and produce the documents relied upon by him in support of his case. This is required in his examination-in-chief. This contains the oral and documentary evidence.


5. Order VII Rule 14 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) deals with the documents of the Plaintiff and Order VIII Rule 1-A of the CPC with regard to the documents of the Defendant. The aforesaid orders and rules run thus:

14. Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies. (1) Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint.
(2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, where possible, state in whose possession or power it is.
(3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
(4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the cross-examination of the plaintiff s witnesses, or handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.
1-A. Duty of defendant to produce documents upon which relief is claimed or relied upon by him.- (1)Where the defendant bases his defence upon a document or relies upon any document in his possession or power, in support of his defence or claim for set-off or counter-claim, he shall enter such document in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the written statement is presented by him and shall, at the same time, deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the written statement.
(2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the defendant, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is.
(3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the defendant under this rule, but, is not so produced shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
(4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to documents-
(a) produced for the cross-examination of the plaintiff s witnesses, or
(b) handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.
Besides this, Order XIII deals inter alia with the production of documents. This relates to production by both the parties, the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Under Order XIII Rule 1 of the CPC, the original documents are required to be produced by the parties and received by the Court. Order XIII Rule 1 runs thus:
1. Original documents to be produced at or before the settlement of issues.-(1) The parties or their pleader shall produce on or before the settlement of issues, all the documentary evidence in original where the copies thereof have been filed alongwith plaint or written statement.
(2) The Court shall receive the documents so produced:
Provided that they are accompanied by an accurate list whereof prepared in such form as the High Court directs.
(3) Nothing in sub-rule (1) shall apply to documents-
(a) produced for the cross-examination of the witnesses of the other party; or
(b) handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.


6. It is important to note that in sub-rule (4) of Order VII Rule 14, sub-rule (4) Of Order VIII Rule 1-A and sub-rule (3) of Order XIII Rule 1 of the CPC, an exception is carved out for documents required to be produced for the cross-examination of the Plaintiff s witness under Order VII Rule 14 and Order VIII Rule 4 and for the cross-examination of the witnesses of the other party (that is either party) under Order XIII Rule 1.


7. This is the most necessary incident of the exercise of cross-examination. The very purpose of the cross- examination will be frustrated, if the documents with which a witness of the other side of the Plaintiff s witness is to be confronted is shown to or inspected by that party earlier. The Court is concerned with the determination of the truth. Truth has to emerge from the evidence on record. The skill of the cross-examiner brings forth the hitherto unknown truth on record. This takes place in a cross-examination. It would be a farce to notify the party who is being cross-examined of the questions that may be asked by the cross-examiner. Consequently, in the cross-examination of a party any document can be produced and the witness under cross- examination can be confronted therewith. Similarly any document can be produced to that end for the witness to refresh his or her memory.


8. The Defendant s Advocate seeks to bring out some facts in the cross-examination before the Court Commissioner. It is not known why the Defendant should have at all produced his CDs or even transcriptt thereof at a stage before his affidavit of examination-in-chief and his affidavit of documents is filed.


9. Of course, the Defendant would have to offer for inspection the documents which he would be relying upon to prove his case in his own evidence. Those are essentially the documents not required for the cross- examination of the Plaintiff or his or her witnesses only. The Defendant, however, has a right and an opportunity to disprove the Plaintiff s case. It is for the Plaintiff to prove his or her case. The Plaintiff has to prove that case by oral or documentary evidence. The Plaintiff would, therefore, have to rely upon and produce all the documents in support of such case. But the Plaintiff s witness, who is to be cross-examined upon the evidence of the Plaintiff to prove the case of the Plaintiff, can be shown any document produced by the Defendant for the first time in his or her cross- examination or for refreshing his or her memory. This is the specific allowance in sub-rule (4) of Order VII Rule 14 and Order VIII Rule 1-A.


10. However, the Defendant would have to prove the specific case made out by him in his pleadings which may be other than the case of the Plaintiff. It would be for the Defendant to produce oral and documentary evidence in support of such a case. Those documents would certainly have to be offered for inspection. Those documents would certainly have to be relied upon in the affidavit of documents. The Defendant would then alone be entitled to rely upon those documents in support of his case. This would apply to those issues, onus on which lies entirely on the Defendant.


11. But the Defendant has an additional right. That is the right of cross-examination of the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff s witnesses to disprove the case of the Plaintiff without proving his own case. The Defendant may not lead his oral evidence. The Defendant may not have to refer to rely upon, produce and offer for inspection his own documents, if he has no specific case that he might want to prove. The case of the Defendant would come up for proof after the Plaintiff has completed his or her evidence along with the evidence of his or her witnesses in support of the Plaintiff s case.


12. In this case, the Defendant may or may not have to prove the conversation to obtain any relief. He may require to only prove the conversation to disentitle the Plaintiff from obtaining the reliefs claimed by the Plaintiff.


13. For that purpose, the Defendant would be required to produce the taped conversation. The Defendant would be entitled to ask such question as he deems fit to the Plaintiff. It would be dependent upon the Plaintiff s answers that the Defendant may consider leading evidence himself or refrain from leading any evidence. The Defendant would then have to produce his oral evidence and the documentary evidence coupled with the affidavit of documents in support of his case. At that stage the Defendant, who requires to have the voice of the Plaintiff verified, would have to produce the CD and any other document, including the instrument on which the conversation was recorded. In fact, upon the CD and the transcriptt offered by the Defendant as his own documents to the Plaintiff, no notice to admit or deny the taped conversation is shown to have been given. That would have cleared the issue. Though Counsel on behalf of the Plaintiff has admitted the handwriting in the handwritten diaries and the menu, she has not made any such statement of admission specifically before the Court with regard to the taped conversation made available on the CD. Under those circumstances, her cross-examination on that aspect cannot be avoided and would have to be undertaken. It would be for the Plaintiff to admit or deny partly or fully the aforesaid averment in paragraph 22 of the written statement of the Defendant to avoid, or accept the cross-examination on that point. So much for the cross-examination of the Plaintiff and the reliance of the Defendant upon the taped conversation on the CDs.


14. So far as the CD itself is concerned as a documentary evidence, Counsel on behalf of the Defendant has relied upon the case of R.M. Malkani vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 157. In paragraph 14 of the judgment, the tape is held to be primary and direct evidence of what has been said and recorded. However, the CD sought to be relied upon by the Plaintiff is a copy obtained by the mechanical/electronic process of having the original tape recorded conversation uploaded on a computer from the original electronic record and copied on the CD. Such copy is, therefore, secondary evidence under Section 63 of the Evidence Act and, therefore, can be used only upon production of the original record of such taped conversation under Section 65B of the Evidence Act.


15. Further in the case of R.M. Malkani (supra), tape recorded conversation is held admissible if it is relevant, if the voice is identified and the accuracy of the tape recorded conversation is proved by eliminating the possibility of erasing the tape recorded conversation. It is observed to be comparable to a photograph of a relevant incident and hence admissible under Section 7 of the Evidence Act. In that case, there was no dispute about the identification of voices. The matter, which was tape-recorded was relevant to the issue. There was no controversy of any portion of the conversation being erased or mutilated. Party whose voice was recorded was given full opportunity to test the genuineness of the tape- recorded conversation. It was considered as a document admissible in evidence.


16.The three provisos set out in that judgment are important. The conversation has to be relevant; this is a case for divorce in which the taped conversation is alleged to be relating to the Defendant having been told to leave the house of the Plaintiff s father as she wants a divorce. Upon that fact it becomes relevant to consider that document. The identification of the voice can be made initially by the Plaintiff herself by admitting that that was her voice in the conversation. If that is not done, the Defendant can identify the voice himself or through any other witness. If the Defendant or the Court requires, it may get the voice identified through an expert. That would not be required in every case. The forensic evidence, prayed for by the Plaintiff, would be required depending upon the facts of the case which would emerge in the cross- examination and depending upon the requirement of any identification or further identification. The accuracy of the tape-recorded conversation is of utmost importance since the document, which is a CD having tape-recorded conversation, is liable to eraser or mutilation. It would be for the Defendant to show that it was the original recording as mentioned by the Defendant himself. This could be done by producing the initial record or the original electronic record. This original electronic record, which is primary evidence, is the instrument on which the original conversation is recorded. The Defendant has not produced that evidence. That document would be contained in such an instrument. The Defendant has not shown the mechanical/electronic process by which the CD was obtained. The Defendant has relied upon the CD per se. That, being a copy, is secondary evidence. At the stage at which the CD is sought to be produced (that is in the cross-examination of the Plaintiff), the Defendant is permitted not to produce the original electronic record. The copy of such record, being the CD, can itself be used for confrontation in the cross-examination. Much will depend upon the answers in the cross-examination by the Plaintiff. If however, the Defendant desires to set up a specific case, for which the evidence is contained in the CD, he would be required to satisfy the aforesaid three tests, more specially the test of accuracy by producing the original electronic record.


17. It may be mentioned that the tape-recorded conversation can be heard by the Court itself by playing it over. It is observed in the case of R.M. Malkani (supra) that the Court would be acting on real evidence if it treats the intonation of the words in such tape-recording being played over to the Court bearing in mind that it could be altered while admitting it in evidence. That, of course, can be done as shall be seen in another case of Kerala High Court which shall be considered presently.


18. It may be mentioned that the Defendant could have produced the same evidence by a non-electronic mode by a manual human source. If a witness was present at the time of the conversation between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, the Defendant could have led oral evidence which could have been corroborated by the witness. In a tape-recorded conversation, the electronic mode substitutes the human evidence. This aspect has been well observed in paragraph 18 in the case of R.M. Malkani (supra) thus:
If the conversation were relayed on a microphone or an amplifier from the telephone and the police officers heard the same they would be able to give direct evidence of what they heard. Here the police officers gave direct evidence of what they saw and what they did and what they recorded as a result of voluntary permission granted by Dr.Motwani. The tape recorded conversation is contemporaneous relevant evidence and therefore it is admissible.


That judgment further held that Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution or Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code were also not offended by a tape- recorded evidence.


19. In the case of Pootholi Damodaran Nair vs. Babu, V.K., 2005 (2) ILR 145, the Kerala High Court considered the request of a party to play a magnetic tape produced in Court. The request was turned down by the District Munsiff. The order rejecting such request was set aside holding it to be an indiscretion of the Court. The tape and the transcriptt were marked in evidence upon the Defendant s son having taped the conversation containing discussion between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The tape was sought to be played in Court for the identification of the voice of the person whose voice it was professed to be and for establishing the authenticity and correctness of the recording. The learned District Munsiff rejected the application on the ground that it came after closing the evidence of the Petitioner, it was not brought out from proper custody and was not deposited in the official record. Holding that electronic record was a document under Section 3 of the Evidence Act in line with the Information Technology Act, 2000 and considering the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Ram Singh vs. Col. Ram Singh, AIR 1986 SC 3, it was held that tape record of the conversation and the transcriptt, which were rightly admitted and marked in evidence, were required to be examined by the Court to see their genuineness as the tape record was admissible under Section 7 of the Indian Evidence Act. The conditions laid down in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Singh (supra) were set out in that judgment. The very first condition is the identification of the voice in the tape record. It is rightly observed that where the voice is denied by the maker, it will require strict proof to determine whether it was really his voice.


20. The Defendant has not called upon the Plaintiff to admit or deny the voice. The Plaintiff has not admitted or denied the voice. Perhaps that would now be done in the cross-examination itself. That can be done even before the CD is marked in evidence because it is a document required to cross-examine the witness of the other side. If it is identified by the Plaintiff and admitted to be her voice, no further exercise need be done. If it is not identified by the Plaintiff, it can be identified by the Defendant. Upon such identification it would have to be marked in evidence. The verification of such identification would have to be done by the Court itself by playing the record, for which no application is yet made, but such an application has been allowed under that judgment. Of course, the accuracy of the statements would have to be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. The proof is in the domain of the Defendant either in the cross- examination of the Plaintiff or in his own evidence. The recorded conversation could be used even to contradict the Plaintiff s case, provided its accuracy is shown.


21. It must be mentioned that evidence is to be considered from three aspects; admissibility of evidence, recording of evidence and appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that tape recorded conversation is admissible in evidence. What must be of importance is how the tape recorded conversation is to be recorded as evidence and appreciated thereafter. Recording can be in the cross-examination of the other side and/or in the evidence of the recorder himself. The appreciation of evidence would require consideration of the aforesaid three requirements; identification, relevancy and accuracy. It is left to the Defendant to pass those tests. If the tests are not passed, the tape recorded conversation would be of no use in effect ultimately.


22. That has been held in the case of Tukaram S. Dighole vs. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, in Civil Appeal No.2928 of 2008 decided on 5th February 2010. In that case a cassette placed before the Court was discarded from evidence. This was the cassette stated to have been produced from the custody of an Election Commissioner s office. It was taken to be a public document. It was held that mere production of the audio cassette even certified by the Election Commissioner is not conclusive of the fact that what is contained in the cassette was true and correct. This is on par with the certified copy of any document produced from public record. Such a document would show that it was a document filed in the public office and is a true production of whatever was filed in the public office. It however cannot prove the truth of the contents of the document merely by the production of even its certified copy by the public office as held in the case of Om Prakash Berlia vs. United Trust of India, AIR 1983 Bombay 1.


23. In the case of Tukaram (supra), the Petitioner produced the VHS cassette on record. The Petitioner produced no evidence to indicate that the record was a true reproduction of its contents. In fact, the Petitioner did not produce any cogent evidence regarding the source and manner of the acquisition of the cassette and the authenticity of its contents. It was, therefore, held that it could not be read in evidence despite the fact that it could be a public document. This was, therefore, in the domain of appreciation of evidence. The authenticity of an electronic record such as a CD or a cassette would be determined by the proof of the original electronic record. This proof may be given by production of that record itself which can be compared with the CD produced by the party in a civil litigation such as the Defendant in this case or any other evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the Court would then consider, examine and appreciate. The standard of proof of such authenticity and accuracy of such an electronic record has been held in paragraph 20 of the judgment to be more stringent as compared to the other documentary evidence given its propensity for misuse by alteration, interpolation or mutilation. It is, therefore, directed to be received with caution. Consequently, in that case when the party who produced the record did not lead any evidence to prove that the cassette produced on record was a true reproduction of the original speeches by the Respondent or his agent, which he was incumbent to be proved either himself or through his witness who is the maker of the record, it was held not to be considered in evidence.


24. Counsel on behalf of the Plaintiff has relied upon the case of Lalji s/o Bansanarayan Choubey vs. Jiyalal Chanvan & anr. 2009(2) Maharashtra Law Journal 565 to contend that the actual tape recorder or the instrument on which it was recorded had to be produced and the CD had to be sealed and relied upon in the Defendant s affidavit of documents before any relief can be granted in this application. The Defendant has given a copy of the CD and its transcriptt to the Plaintiff. The exercise of giving inspection of the document, as required by the procedure established under the CPC, is completed. The Defendant is not required to file his affidavit of documents and rely upon any specific document during the Plaintiff s cross-examination. It would be in the discretion, sagacity and wisdom of the Defendant to prove the tape recorded conversation on the CD in the manner he deems fit, provided however that the accuracy of the conversation is proved to the satisfaction of the Court for it to be considered in evidence, the admissibility of the CD notwithstanding.


25. The requirement of sealing the recorded conversation would not be applicable in this case. That requirement is of essence in a criminal case where during investigation the conversation of a party is recorded by the investigating officer. He would certainly be required to seal the tape recorded conversation and keep it in a safe custody so as to play before the Court at the time of trial. When the Defendant himself has recorded the conversation of the Plaintiff as a party in a Civil Suit who is required to keep custody of his own documents, there is no question of the requirement of sealing. It has nevertheless to be shown to be accurate and untampered with. This is in line with the only requirement of the Court which is to ascertain the truth of the case of the parties. Once the Court is satisfied about the truth of the tape recorded conversation, it can be used in evidence to determine the case on merits. Consequently, the observation of the Court in paragraph 3 of the judgment in the case of Pootholi (supra) that the conversation of the witness on a tape recorder can be shown to the Court by producing the tape record in support of the assertion that certain statement was made in his presence rules out any further requirements and formalities except for showing the accuracy of the tape recorded conversation. In fact, the observation of the Court in paragraph 7 of the judgment concluding that the tape record was admissible as primary evidence with the aforesaid provisos of accuracy, identification and relevancy shows that it was on par with human evidence once it is replayed in the Court or proved by forensic evidence thus:

Each received it at the same time the one recording it in the human memory, the other upon a piece of tape.


Consequently, it has considered the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rama Reddy vs. V.V. Giri, AIR 1971 SC 1162 in which it was held that the previous statement recorded on tape could be used not only to corroborate the evidence given by the witness but also to contradict the evidence given before the Court as well as to test the veracity of the evidence and also to impeach his impartiality upon holding that it was primary and direct evidence admissible as to what has been said and picked up by the recorder. Further it is observed that the production of the tape recorded conversation to comply with the aforesaid provisos can be made in any mode:

There can be no straightjacket formula .


26. Therefore, it would be vain to suggest that because the CD was not sealed prior to its production, it cannot be admissible or used in evidence. This is a civil trial. The Defendant himself has recorded the conversation and produced the CD thereof. The Defendant could not have recorded it directly on the CD. The Plaintiff had to have an electronic process on an electronic instrument to record the conversation on the CD. It is for the Plaintiff to produce it. It is for the Court to consider and appreciate it. There is no question of sealing of a conversation recorded by a party to the civil lis himself. The sealing requirement is only in criminal trials. That is because the investigating officer records certain conversation either on a telephone to which a recorder has been appended or any other instrument to record the voice of a party under investigation. The investigating officer is required to keep such document, obtained in the course of his investigation safe from it being misused or tampered by anyone else until it is produced and used in the criminal trial. He must, therefore, seal what he has recorded and keep it safe from tampering for the examination by the Court. This would be just as he would seal any other property seized by him to be produced as an article in a criminal trial. This entire procedure is not required in a civil trial and hence the argument that because it is not sealed, it cannot be used in evidence is incorrect. The case of Lalji (supra) was of a criminal trial on a dishonoured cheque under Sections 138 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In that case origin of the conversation recorded was left doubtful. Consequently, the most important requirement of producing such an electronic record of accuracy was not satisfied. That aspect was in the domain of appreciation of evidence and not admissibility of evidence.


27. In the interesting case of R.K. Anand vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court, 2009(10) Scale 164 at page 220, the original electronic materials upon which the sting operation by a journalist was based was held not needed to have been taken in the Court custody. In that case in a sting operation a particular conversation between two persons was recorded. Based upon the electronic tape recorded conversation played before the Court, contempt notices came to be issued for subverting and interfering with the course of justice in a criminal trial. In that case the copies of the original sting recordings were called for and seen by the Court. The original microchips and the magnetic tapes were allowed to be retained in the custody of the journalist of the TV channel. Upon the case that that was an incorrect and fatal procedure, the Supreme Court considered the rationale behind it thus :

If the recordings on the microchips were fake from the start or if the microchips were morphed before notice was issued to the TV channel, those would come to the court in that condition and in that case the question whether the microchips were genuine or fake/morphed would be another issue. But once the High Court obtained their copies there was no possibility of any tampering with the microchips from that stage. Moreover, the High Court might have felt that the TV channel with its well equipped studio/laboratory would be a much better place for the handling and conservation of such electronic articles than the High Court Registry.

The Supreme Court, therefore, concluded that on the facts of the case, there was no lapse on the part of the High Court in leaving the microchips in the safe custody of the TV channel. It is, therefore, seen not to be straightjacket formula. Consequently, holding that all tape recorded conversation must be sealed without considering its intrinsic source or its custody with a party would be an exercise devoid of application of mind.

28. The dispute between the parties is not ambiguous to either of them. The ambit of evidence has, therefore, to be set out. The Defendant is entitled to rely upon the recorded conversation on the CD by the fact of production of the CD in the cross-examination of the Plaintiff. If the Plaintiff admits the contents, it would be read in evidence. If the Plaintiff disputes the contents, the Defendant would have to prove, by direct or circumstantial evidence in his own examination-in-chief, the accuracy of the recorded conversation. For that proof, the Defendant may produce the original electronic record itself. The Defendant may seek to play it before the Court to have the voice of the Plaintiff, hitherto disputed, identified in Court. The Defendant may himself identify the voice and get it produced in evidence and apply for playing it on record for the Court to appreciate the identified document being the recorded conversation on the CD. The Defendant may produce any other circumstantial evidence to prove the authenticity of the CD as he would for any other documentary evidence. The Defendant would also be entitled, but as a last resort, to have the forensic evidence to identify the voice of the Plaintiff by having the voice of the Plaintiff recorded as an admitted document and compared by an expert in the forensic laboratory to verify that voice with the voice on the taped conversation on the CDs.


29. It is argued on behalf of the Defendant that the Defendant has taken out the application well in advance for the forensic report to be obtained. The application is, of course, not premature. However, the application involves the requirement of recording of Plaintiff s voice and then comparing it with the already recorded voice on the CDs much as the verification of the admitted and disputed signatures of the parties would be. However, the Plaintiff may choose to admit the contents of the CD or whatever is stated in paragraph 22 of the Written Statement, the entire exercise sought by the Defendant would be avoided since admitted facts need not be proved. Since much would depend upon the Plaintiff s own evidence, the Plaintiff need not be taken through the exercise of having her voice recorded and then verified by the forensic expert at present. However, after the Plaintiff s cross-examination is completed and the Defendant considers production of CD as his own document and relies upon it in the affidavit of documents, the Defendant would be entitled to prove its accuracy through any of the aforesaid modes. For that purpose, the Defendant shall be entitled to prove the tape recorded conversation through the recording of the voice of the Plaintiff and having it verified by the forensic expert as prayed for by him in prayer (ii) of this Notice of Motion. Order accordingly

30.The Notice of Motion is disposed of accordingly.

(SMT.ROSHAN DALVI, J.)

Various Judgments on Registration of FIR


As per guidelines of various High Courts,  Supreme Court of India and Delhi Commissioner of Police circular that police duty is to register FIR immediately in case any cognizable offence is reported/received

a). In Badi Guravaiah Vs State of A.P.  1994 (2) Alt (Criminal)
“The delay will give room for concoction. Such delay will be taken into account if not explained properly”

b) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Kumari Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and others, reported in 2006 (2) SCC 677, while laying down guidelines for registration of F.I.R. has held:
“It is manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer incharge of a Police Station satisfying the requirements of Sec. 154(1) of the Code, the said Police Officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information.”

b). HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA in Criminal Appeal No. 1229 of 2002 in State of Haryana Vs  Bajan Lal.
“4. That the Police Officer mandatorily register a case on a complaint of a cognizable offence by the citizen under Section 154 of the Code are no more res-integra. The point of law been set at rest by this Court in the case of State of Haryana and others vs Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335.

b). HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA in Criminal Appeal No. 1229 of 2002 in title RAMESH KUMARI VS STATE(NCT OF DELHI) & ORS. Dated 21/02/2007 held in 2006(1) JCC 468 (Exhibit H):-
 “33. it is, therefore, manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a  cognizable offence is laid before an officer in charge of a police station satisfying the requirements of Section 154(1) of the Code, the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substances thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information.”

c). HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI in W.P.(Crl.)No. 1266 of 2007 dated 10/10/2007 held in para
“In all those cases where there is a refusal of registration of FIR, even where cognizable offence is reported, disciplinary action should be taken against such police officers. The Courts are unnecessary being burdened with complaints of writ petitions, where directionare sought for registration of FIRs.”

d). Ld. Commissioner of Police, Delhi vide circular no. 35/2007 dated 19/11/2007 issued instructions as under
“Keeping in view the above directions of Hon’ble High court and also as per procedure laid down u/s 154 Cr.P.C., First Information Report (FIR) should be recorded immediately on receipt of information of cognizable offence.”

e). HOB’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA in Writ Petitioner (CRL.) No. 68 of 2008 in title LALITA KUMARI Vs GOVT OF U.P. & ORS. Dated 14/07/2007 held in page 3:-
“In case F.I.Rs not registered within the aforementioned time, and/or aforementioned steps are not taken by the police, the concerned Magistrate would be justified in initiating contempt proceeding against such delinquent officers and punish them for violation of its orders if no sufficient cause is shown and awarding stringent punishment like sentence of imprisonment against them inasmuch as the Disciplinary Authority would be quite justified in initiating departmental proceeding and suspending them in contemplation of the same.”

h). The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Personal Point Vs State, reported in 1996 JCC 558 has held that
“F.I.R. has to be registered by police on receiving information about crime from any person including the accused. It is not at all necessary that F.I.R. would be registered only on complainant’s statement.”

i). In Gopal Vs State of UP 1977
“It is well settled principle of law that an F.I.R. has to be registered by police on receiving information of crime from any person including the accused.”

j) IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI, W.P (Crl.) No.1266 of 2007 in judgment of
Sonu & Ors Vs State of Delhi, decided on 10.10.2007 para (7)
“In all those cases where there is a refusal of registration of FIR, even where cognizable offence is reported, disciplinary action should be taken against such police officers. The Courts are unnecessary being burdened with complaints or writ petitions, where directions are sought for registration of FIRs”.

h) IN THE HIGH COURT OF Allahabad, Crl. Revision petition No.2308/2009 Roop Ram Vs Stae of UP.
as per CrPC s.154 and 156(3)-Judicial as said in Roop Ram Vs Stae of UP
“Besides above, non compliance of the above directions of this Court shall also be treated to be a deliberate defiance by the concerned authorities above mentioned constituting contempt of this Court and may be taken up before the Court concerned having jurisdiction in the matter, whenever it is brought to the notice of this Court”.