No interim maintenance to wife, if, wife not ready to live

Section 24 in The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

Sunita Sharma

Vs

Upendra Kumar Sharma

Date:3 March, 2008

ORDER

1. This Civil Revision application is directed against the order dated 23-7-1996 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court. Patna, in Matrimonial Case No. 46 of 1995, whereby and whereunder the Court below rejected the application filed by the petitioner under Section24of the Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act' for short) claiming alimony pendent lite for her maintenance and for the maintenance of minor son. The plaintiff-opposite party filed Matrimonial Case No. 46 of 1995 against the petitioner for a decree for restitution of conjugal rights and for a direction to the petitioner to return to her matrimonial home and on failure of the petitioner, the marriage may be dissolved by a decree of divorce.


2. The suit was contested by the petitioner by filing written statement stating, inter alia, that she is willing to live with her husband provided proper security is given to her as she was ill-treated by the plaintiff-opposite party and his parents, while she was living with the opposite party. During the pendency of the aforesaid case, the petitioner filed a petition dated 3-6-1996 praying for alimony pendente file which application was opposed by the plaintiff-opposite party on the ground that he is a student and has no source of income. The Court below disposed of the application by the impugned order dated 23-7-1996. The Court below came to the finding that there is no evidence on behalf of the plaintiff-opposite party to prima facie prove that the petitioner-wife is working as teacher in the school and she has no source of independent income and she is fully dependent for her maintenance on her parents. The Court below further came to the finding that the plaintiff-opposite party has also no independent source of income and he is still prosecuting his studies and dependent on his father. On that ground that petition filed by the petitioner was rejected. So far the maintenance to the minor child is concerned, the Court below held that since no separate application claiming maintenance of the child was filed, therefore, no order can be passed. Hence, this Civil revision application.


3. Mr. S. K. Verma, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, assailed the impugned order as being illegal and wholly without jurisdiction. Learned counsel submitted that the Court below has committed grave error of law insofar, as it held that the plaintiff-opposite party having no independent source of income is not liabte to pay maintenance to the wife according to the learned counsel, in no event, the husband can be exonerated from his liability to maintain his wife and minor children. He put reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases (i) Smt. Urmila Devi v Hari Prakash Bansal, AIR 1988 Punj & Har 84, (ii) Gurmali Singh v. Bhuchari, AIR 1980 Punj & Har  120. Learned counsel further submitted that the Court below has failed to appreciate the settle law that no separate application with regard to maintenance of child is required and even on the basis of affidavit, such order can be passed. In support of his contention, learned counsel referred to the decisions in the cases of (i) Manoj Kumar Jaiswal v. Smt. Lila Jaiswal, AIR 1987 Cal 230 and (ii) Durga Pada Banerjee v. Smt. Sushmitta Banerjee. (1991) 2 Pat LJR 215. Learned counsel lastly submitted that it was not disputed that the plaintiff husband is able person capable of working and in such event, he is bound to maintain the wife and minor children. Learned counsel referred to the decisions in the cases, reported in.( 1995) 2 Pat LJ Reports, 199 and in 1997 Patna Law Reports 129. On the other hand, Mr. Farooque Ahmad Khan, learned counsel for the husband-opposite party submitted that the main suit filed by the plaintiff opposite party has been disposed of in terms of the judgment dated 13th June 996 and a decree for restitution of conjugal rights has been passed. The learned counsel submitted that even-after the decree the petitioner-wife did not resume her conjugal life. The Court below decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff-husband. According to the learned counsel, therefore, the question of payment of maintenance to the wife does not arise and by reason of passing of the decree, the application became infructuous. Learned counsel submitted that when the main suit stood disposed of, then the application under Section 24 of the Act does not survive. In this connection, the learned counsel relied upon the decision in the case of Nirmala Devi v. Ramdas. AIR 1973 Punj and Har48. Learned counsel then submitted that admittedly the opposite party-husband is studying and he has not finished his study. Learned counsel submitted that it is not a case where the husband is able to work, but is not working; rather it is a case where he has been studying and for doing work, he will have to leave his studies. 

According to the learned counsel. therefore, the principles of the law, can vassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not apply. In support of his contention, he has cited two decisions, one of Allahabad High Court in the case, of Smt. Preeti Archana Sharma. v. Ravindra Kumar Sharma, AIR I979. All 29 and another of Mysore High Court in the case of  N. Subramanyam v. M. G. Saraswathi, AIR 1964 Mysore 38.


4. Before appreciating the rival contentions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it would be useful too took into the provision of Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act which is quoted below:--
     '24. Maintenance, pendente lite and expenses of proceedings: -- Where in any proceeding under
     this     Act is appears to the Court that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no 
     independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding, it
     may on the application of the wife or the husband, order the respondent to pay the petitioner the
     expenses of the proceeding such sum as, having: regard to the petitioner's own income and the
     income of the respondent, it may seem to the Court to be reasonable."


5. From the aforesaid provision, it is manifest that the object of this section is to enable the husband or wife, as the case may be, who has no independent income sufficient for his or her maintenance or for him the expenses of any legal proceeding under the Act to obtain maintenance and the expenses pendente lite, so that the proceeding may be conducted without any hardship.


6. I wish to first discuss the point raised by Mr. Farooque Ahmad Khan learned counsel for the opposite party-husband that by reason of the disposed of the main suit, the petition claiming maintenance pcndente lite and, legal expenses does not survive and has become infructuous. The learned counsel submitted that the plaintiff opposite party filed the suit for decree of restitution  of conjugal right and in the event of failure on the part of the petitioner-wife to, resume conjugal life, marriage was dissolved by decree of divorce and in the concilialion proceeding the petitioner refused to live with him on the ground that her husband was not in service. According to the learned counsel, the suit has been ultimately disposed of by the judgment whereby a decree for restitution of conjugal right has been passed in favour of the opposite party husband and the petitioner was directed to resume matrimonial cohabitation. Under sick circumstances, the petitioner would not be entitled to pendente lite alimony and legal expenses. 1 have occasion to go through a copy of the judgment passed in the suit which was supplied by the counsel. From perusal of the judgment, it appears that the learned Principal Judge, Family Court has considered the evidence in detail and came to the finding that the respondent wife failed to return back to her in-laws' home despite repeated requests and even after legal notice. The reason for not coming back to her husband's house is obvious from the order passed by the Court below on the date when the suit was fixed for reconciliation. The order passed by the Court below on 8-12-1995 is worth to be quoted hereunder:-
     "8-12-95. Since the suit is fixed for reconciliation and the parties are present, I took up
     reconciliation matter. The petitioner-husband is ready to keep the respondent-wife but the latter says
     that since the petitioner is not doing any service, she does not want to live at her Sasural and that she
     will not live with the petitioner until he does some job. The petitioner says that he is a student and
     the respondent should cooperate with him so that he may prosecute, his study properly but this
     entreaty of the petitioner did not seem to have any effect on the respondent. It is, therefore, obvious
     that the reconciliation has failed."


7. From the aforesaid order, it is clear that since beginning, the petitioner wife was not ready to live with her husband as he is not doing any service and is having no independent income. The Court below while passing the impugned order held that the opposite party husband has no independent source of income and is still prosecuting his study and is dependent on his father. "It is true mat even the husband has no independent source of income or earning, but is capable of earning being an able-bodied person lit enough to work is liable to maintain his wife and cannot deny payment of maintenance pendente lite. But in my considered opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, this civil revision application is not fit to be allowed. As noticed above knowing fully well that the opposite party husband was prosecuting his study, the marriage was solemnized, but the petitioner refused to live in the matrimonial House on the ground that the opposite party husband is not doing any service. It is also evident that the opposite party repeatedly requested the petitioner to live with him in his parents house, but she refused to do so. Ultimately, the opposite party instituted the suit for restitution of conjugal right and the suit was decreed, but even then the petitioner did not resume conjugal right. In such circumstances, the decisions upon which the petitioner put reliance does not apply.


8. It is well settled that the allowance of temporary alimony is not regarded as a matter of right, but is a matter within the judicious discretion of the Court and this Court in revision interferes only when the discretion has been perversely exercised by the Court below.


9. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, and particularly the finding arrived at by the Court below while disposing of the suit finally, I do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Court below.


10. This civil revision application is, accordingly, dismissed

NO MAINTENANCE TO WIFE, IF RCR BY HUSBAND SUCCEED

 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO.20 OF 2005

Smt.Manju Kamal Mehra
aged about 35 years, occ. Housewife,
Religion Hindu, resident of C/o G.K.
Chawla, G-1/23,Vijay Nagar, Marol-Maroshi
Road, Andheri (E), Mumbai-400 059. ….Appellant
V/s.

Mr.Kamal Pushkar Mehra,
aged about 40 years, occ.business,
Religion Hindu, residing of 107,
Janak Apartment, Samarth Ramdas Nagar,
Navghar Vasai (East), District.Thane ….Respondent
Mr.P.M. Havnur for the Appellant.
Mrs.B.P. Jakhade for the Respondent.
WITH
FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO.44 OF 2005

Mr.Kamal Pushkar Mehra,
aged about 40 years, occ.business,
Religion Hindu, residing of 107,
Janak Apartment, Samarth Ramdas Nagar,
Navghar Vasai (East), District.Thane ….Appellant
V/s.
Smt.Manju Kamal Mehra
aged about 35 years, occ. Housewife,
Religion Hindu, resident of C/o G.K.
Chawla, G-1/23,Vijay Nagar, Marol-Maroshi
Road, Andheri (E), Mumbai-400 059. ….Respondent
Mrs.B.P. Jakhade for the Appellant.
Mr.P.M. Havnur for the Respondent.


CORAM : B.H. MARLAPALLE & S.J. VAZIFDAR, JJ.

DATE : 18TH JULY, 2009.


ORAL JUDGMENT ( PER B.H. MARLAPALLE, J.) :-
1. Both these appeals filed by the respective spouses arise from a common judgment and order dated 31.12.2004 passed by the Family Court at Pune in Petition No.A-978 of 2002 and hence they are being decided by this common judgment.


2. The parties were married at Mumbai on 12.7.1994 as per Hindu rites and they co-habitated at Dahisar where a daughter by name Aishwarya was born to the couple on 21.12.1995. As per the husband, the wife did not return to the matrimonial home after the daughter was borne. The husband claims that the wife abandoned the matrimonial home, whereas it is the case of the wife that she was thrown out of the matrimonial home before the birth of the child that is some time in September, 1995. In July, 1996, the wife’s younger sister Anju was married and the husband along with his family member attended the said marriage. The couple stayed together from 22 nd to 26th July, 1996 in the house of the wife’s parents but after 26th July, 1996, the wife did not return to the matrimonial home. It appears that the wife was working with M/s.R.G. Stone Hospital and she claimed that she left the said job from 4.5.1998. The husband issued a legal notice on 30.4.2001 (Exhibit-23, which was reply on 10.5.2001, Exhibit-24). Second legal notice was issued on 8.6.2001 (Exhibit-25, which was replied on 15.6.2001, Exhibit-26). Third legal notice was issued on 12.6.2001 (Exhibit-27) and consequently a joint meeting between the two parties on 6.5.2002 to resolve matrimonial dispute was held. It was decided in the said meeting that both the parties should forget the past and start staying together. The wife conveyed that she was ready and willing to co-habit with the Petitioner and her father also supported the same plea and stated that his daughter must return to the matrimonial home at Dahisar. Despite the settlement, there was no cohabitation between the parties and therefore, Petition No.A-978 of 2002 was moved by the husband to seek a decree of restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The said Petition was opposed by the wife. The following issues were framed by the Family Court and answered accordingly in the impugned judgment :-

ISSUES FINDINGS
     1) Does the Petitioner proves that the Respondent has without any reasonable excuse withdrawn
      from his society ? Yes
     2) Whether the Petitioner is entitled to a decree of restitution of conjugal rights ? Yes
     3) Whether the Petitioner is entitled for maintenance Yes @ Rs. from the Petitioner for herself or the   
     child ? 2500/- per month for
     4) If yes, what should be the quantum ? herself & @ Rs.3000/- p.m. for the minor daughter.
     4-A) Whether the Respondent is entitled to Does not return of her streedhan from the Petitioner ?
     survive.
     5. What order and decree ? As per final order.


3. However, it appears that when Petition No.A-978 of 2002 was decided by the earlier judgment dated 30.4.2004, the Family Court had not recorded its findings on issue Nos.1 and 4-A. The said judgment was the subject matter of challenge in Family Court Appeal Nos. 94 of 2004 and 95 of 2004 and by a common judgment dated 18.8.2004, the Appeals were disposed off and the Petition filed by the husband was remanded to the Family Court to record its findings on issue Nos.1 and 4-A.


4. The husband examined himself and Kiran R.Vishvira, who is the partner of a firm by name M/s.Manav Mandir Builders. The wife examined herself and her father Gopal Kishan Chawla. She also examined Ajay Gulabchand Malpani, Treasurer of the Housing Society at Vasai and Dr.Manish Bansal, the Managing Director of R.G. Stone Hospital. Written arguments were submitted before the Family Court and the Petition filed by the husband came to be allowed in terms of the following order :-
“The Respondent is directed to restore conjugal rights with the Petitioner forthwith. The Petitioner is directed to pay Rs.2500/- per month towards maintenance of the respondent and Rs.3000/- per month towards maintenance of the minor daughter Aishwarya, in aggregate Rs.5500/- per month from the date of order till the Respondent restitutes his conjugal rights.


5. The husband has challenged the directions to pay the maintenance to the wife despite the fact that the decree under Section 9 of the said Act has been passed in his favour. Whereas the wife has challenged
the decree passed under Section 9 of the said Act and claimed that the Family Court did not consider the harassment and ill-treatment given to her in the matrimonial home and consequently she was justified in staying away from the husband.


6. Mrs.Jakhade, the learned counsel for the husband submitted that in Petition No.A-978 of 2002, the wife did not file any application for any maintenance either under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 or under Section 24 of the Act for maintenance pendant-lite. She also pointed out that the decree of restitution of conjugal rights was passed against the wife and surprisingly and equally shocking the Family Court directed the husband to pay maintenance to the wife and as per
Mrs.Jakhade, this order itself is self-contradictory and the decree for restitution of conjugal rights became a nullity as the wife continued to stay away from the husband and the husband was required to deposit the maintenance amount every month. Mr.Havnur, the learned counsel for the wife on the other hand submitted that the decree for restitution of conjugal rights was grossly erroneous and the Family Court was not justified, in the facts of this case, to record its findings in the affirmative on issue No.1 framed by it. He also submitted that as the wife was thrown out of her matrimonial home along with her daughter much before the daughter was born and she had to maintain herself and the daughter, the Family Court was justified in granting maintenance by the impugned order. We are, therefore, required to examine :-
     i) Whether the decree of conjugal rights passed under Section 9 of the Act in favour of the husband is sustainable and ;
     ii) Whether the Family Court was right in law to direct the husband to pay maintenance to the wife after it had passed a decree under Section 9 of the Act in favour of the husband and directed the wife to join the husband in the matrimonial home.


7. So far as the first issue is concerned, the Family Court has referred to the oral depositions of the husband, wife and her father. As is required in law, both the parties were referred to the Marriage Counsellor who submitted her first report on 17.10.2002 (at Exhibit-3). The said report indicated that both the parties had expressed their wish for reconciliation and for resumption of co-habitation, but the second report of the Marriage Counsellor dated 17.3.2003 (at Exhibit-14) was negative and it stated that reconciliation between the parties was not possible and they were agreeable for divorce but there was a dispute regarding the quantum of alimony. A joint meeting between them on 6.5.2002 with the intervention of a common family friend by name Mr.Jain and the reconciliation therein was not disputed between the parties and the wife had shown her willingness to live and co-habit with the husband. The father of the wife in his depositions before the Family Court also stated that he wished that his daughter could return to her matrimonial home at Dahisar. The deposition of the wife also went to show that despite various allegations made by her against the husband and his family members about cruelty and ill-treatment, she wanted to go and stay at Dahisar and she was keen to save her marriage. She had categorically stated in the pleadings as well as in her depositions that she was ready and willing to co-habit with the Petitioner and she also reiterated about the compromise and to bury the past. The husband had also assured the parents of the wife that he take her care. The Family Court therefore, held that the wife had condoned the acts of the alleged cruelty and ill-treatment. In paragraph 31 of the impugned judgment, the Family Court recorded its surprise about the wife in the following words :-
“31. It is very peculiar that the petitioner has filed this petition for restitution of conjugal rights and the respondent in her pleadings as well as in her evidence has deposed that she is also ready and willing to co-habit with the petitioner. The father of the respondent in his evidence has also deposed that he desires that the respondent co-habits with the petitioner. It is also an admitted fact that meeting of the family members was held with the common friend Mr.Jain house and it was agreed that they would live together. The father of the respondent has admitted in his cross- examination that a compromise was arrived at for the petitioner and the respondent to stay together. He also admitted that the petitioner does not own any property at Dahisar. During the pendency of the proceedings various attempts were made for the parties to resume their co- habitation in view of the desires of both the parties, but failed because the petitioner wants that the respondent should resume his conjugal rights at Vasai where he owns his ownership flat, and the respondent wants to return and stay at Dahisar, where she was living from the day after her marriage till she left the house.”

8. The Family Court recorded the finding that the wife was not justified and she had no good reason to stay away from her husband and she had withdrawn from the society of the husband without any  reasonable excuse. Having referred to the evidence placed before the Family Court by the respective parties, we are satisfied that these findings recorded by the Family Court cannot be faulted with and the decree of restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the said Act was rightly passed in favour of the husband. We are informed that till this date, the wife has not submitted to the said decree and she continues to stay with her parents. In fact the husband could have been justified in asking for dissolution of the marriage under Section 13(1-A) of the said Act on the ground that there was no resumption of co-habitation between the parties for one year or thereafter, after the decree under Section 9 of the said Act was passed, but he has not done so and the leaned counsel for the husband stated before us that the husband is keen to continue with the marriage and desires that his wife along with daughter Aishwarya to join the matrimonial home. We are also informed and it was the same case before the Family Court as well that the husband is willing to stay away from other family members in his ownership flat at Vasai. However, the wife insists that he should shift to a place in Andheri which is close to her parent’s house and also to the daughter’s school. Consequently the decree passed under Section 9 of the said Act has remained on paper.


9. So far as, issue No.1 maintenance is concerned, pending the proceedings before the Family Court at the behest of either of the parties, wife was entitled to apply for interim maintenance either under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 or under Section 24 of the Act. She did not submit any such application nor did she file a counter claim in the Petition filed by the husband. The Family Court in its second round of the judgment, held that the wife was not justified in staying away from her husband and directed her to submit to the decree under Section 9 of the Act. However while doing so, it proceeded to consider the expenditure incurred by the wife while she was staying away from her husband. The Court noted that the wife had no employment since May, 1998 on the basis of the evidence of Dr.Bansal, the Managing Director of R. G. Stone, Urological Research Institute, corroborated by the evidence of her father and thus she was without any source of income. The Court further observed as under :-
     “It can therefore be held that the Respondent has no source of income and hence the Respondent is
     entitled to claim maintenance for herself. As regards the daughter, it is moral, social and legal
     obligation of the Petitioner father to maintain her. The Petitioner has no where in his pleadings   
     stated    as to what he is doing and what is his income. But in reply to the interim application it is
     observed that it is an admitted fact that the Petitioner is dealing in shares. He has stated that his      
     average income is Rs.7000/- per month Hence considering the status of the parties and needs of the  
     Petitioner for herself and the minor daughter, and that the Petitioner has no other dependents upon
     him, the cost of living, it can be held that he is capable and able to pay Rs. 2500/- per month towards
     the maintenance for the wife and Rs.3000/- per month towards the maintenance for minor daughter, in
     aggregate Rs.5500/- per month from the date of order till the Respondent restitutes to his conjugal
     rights.”


10. In the case of Chand Bhawan v. Jawaharlal Dhawan, (1993) 3 SCC 406, on the rights of the wife to receive any maintenance either under Section 18 of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act or under Section 24 of the said Act, the Supreme Court stated as under :-
     “23. The preamble to the Hindu Marriage Act suggests that it is an Act to amend and codify the law  
     relating to marriage among Hindus. Though it speaks only of the law relating to marriage, yet the Act
     itself lays down rules relating to the solemnization and requirements of a valid Hindu marriage as  
     well as restitution of conjugal rights, judicial separation, nullity of marriage, divorce, legitimacy of  
     children and other allied matters. Where the statute expressly codifies the law, the court as a  
     general    rule, is not  at liberty to go outside the law so created, just on the basis that before its 
     enactment another law prevailed. Now the other law in the context which prevailed prior to that was
     the uncodified Hindu law on the subject. Prior to the year 1955 or 1956 maintenance could be
     claimed by a Hindu wife through court intervention and with the aid of the case-law 10 developed.
     Now with effect from December 21, 1956, the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act is in force and
     that too in a codified form. Its preamble too suggests that it is an Act to amend and codify the law
     relating to adoptions and maintenance among Hindus. Section 18(1) of the Hindu Adoptions and
     Maintenance Act, 1956 entitles a Hindu wife to claim maintenance from her husband during her
     lifetime. Sub-section (2) of Section 18 grants her the right to  live separately, without forfeiting her
     claim to maintenance, if he is guilty of any of the misbehaviours enumerated therein or on account of
     his being in one of objectionable conditions as mentioned therein. So while sustaining her marriage
     and preserving her marital status, the wife is entitled to claim maintenance from her husband. On the
     other hand, under the Hindu Marriage Act, in contrast, her claim for maintenance pendente lite is
     durated (sic) on the pendency of a litigation of the kind envisaged under sections 9 to 14 of the Hindu
     Marriage Act, and her claim to permanent maintenance or alimony is based on the supposition that
     either her marital status has been strained or affected by passing a decree for restitution of conjugal
     rights or judicial separation in favour or against her, or her marriage stands dissolved by a decree of
     nullity or divorce, with or without her consent. Thus when her marital status is to be affected or
     disrupted the court does so by passing a decree for or against her. On or at the time of the happening
     of that event, the court being seisin of the matter, invokes its ancillary or incidental power to grant
     permanent alimony. Not only that, the court retains the jurisdiction at subsequent stages to fulfil this
     incidental or ancillary obligation when moved by an application on that behalf by a party entitled to
     relief. The court further retains the power to change or alter the order in view of the changed
     circumstances. Thus the whole exercise is within the gammit (sic gamut) of a diseased or a broken
     marriage. And in order to avoid conflict of perceptions the legislature while codifying the Hindu
     Marriage Act preserved the right of permanent maintenance in favour of the husband or the wife, as
     the case may be, dependent on the court passing a decree of the kind as envisaged under Sections 9 to
     14 of the Act. In other words without the marital status being affected or disrupted by the matrimonial
     court under the Hindu Marriage Act the claim of permanent alimony was not to be valid as ancillary
     or incidental to such affectation or disruption. The wife’s claim to maintenance necessarily has then
     to be agitated under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 which is a legislative measure
     later  in point of time than the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, though part of the same socio-legal
     scheme revolutionizing the law applicable to Hindus.”


11. In the case B.P. Achala Anand v. S. Appi Reddy and another, AIR 2005, SC 986, a three Judge Bench held that Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act confers a right on a wife to be maintained by her husband during her lifetime and such a right for maintenance is an incident of the status or estate of matrimony and a Hindu is under a legal obligation to maintain his wife. Section 25 of the Act enables the Court to pass an order for providing alimony and maintenance in favour of the
divorced wife. The Court further observed that on the status of the wife being terminated by a decree for divorce under the Act, rights of divorced wife seem to be cribbed, confined and cabined by the provisions of and to the rights available Sections 25 and 27 of the said Act.


12. When the husband has succeeded in obtaining a decree of restitution of conjugal rights against the wife, it is implied that the wife was required to join the company of the husband at her matrimonial home and therefore, there is no question of maintenance at least from the date of the said order. If the wife is directed to be paid maintenance despite the said decree, reluctance of the wife to join the husband would be further strengthened and she would be encouraged to stay away from the husband despite the decree passed by the Court. The decree for restitution of conjugal rights would be rendered inoperative and for such an act of the wife, the husband would be penalized to pay the maintenance to the wife, who does not subject to the decree passed by the Court. Such a direction would be incentive to frustrate the decree passed under Section 9 of the Act. It is well settled that if such a decree is passed at the instance of the wife and against the husband, the Court would be justified in directing the husband to pay maintenance to the wife till he resumes cohabitation with her or calls upon her to join him at the matrimonial home pursuant to the decree passed by the Court in her favour. Such is not a case before us. We are, therefore, satisfied that the Family Court acted without jurisdiction in directing the husband to pay maintenance at least from the date when the impugned order was passed and therefore, the impugned order to that extent is required to be set aside. However, we are not inclined to interfere in the maintenance granted to the daughter.


13. In the premises, Family Court Appeal No.20 of 2005 fails and the same is hereby dismissed. Family Court Appeal No.44 of 2005 succeeds partly and the directions to pay an amount of Rs.2500/- per month by way of  the maintenance to the wife are hereby quashed and set-aside. Undoubtedly till the wife resumes cohabitation with the husband, the order for access passed by this Court dated 20.10.2006 shall continue to operate.

14. The parties to bear their own costs.
(S.J.VAZIFDAR, J.)

(B.H.MARLAPALLE, J.)

COMPLAINT TO INFORMATION COMMISSION AGAINST PIO FOR DEEMED REFUSAL

BEFORE THE HON'BLE INFORMATION COMISSION:CITY

Between:


NAME
Address:

                                                                              ……Complaint


-A N D-                                                                
                  
SPIO
Address:                                                                  ....Respondent


                      COMPLAINT FILED U/S 18(1)(B) & (C) OF RTI ACT – 2005


I.   INDEX of DOCUMENTS(ENCLOSED)
     1). My RTI Application dated ??/??/?? u/s 6                    .......Exhibit A
     2). Speed/Regd  post receipt                                            .......Exhibit B



II.   FACTS
An application was filed seeking some information (Ex – A) faced with the refusal to divulge the said information and it is a deemed refusal on the part of the PIO.  Hence this complaint   



III.   PRAYER - RELIEF SOUGHT
1). Access to information as requested
2). To defray the costs and consequential damages entailed.
3). To levy penalties & violation of RTI provisions as provided u/s 20 of RTI ACT.

IV.   GROUNDS FOR PRAYER - RELIEF SOUGHT

1.      The PIO refused to furnish the information.
2.      The PIO did not respond to my application within or beyond the stipulated time limit,
         as required u/s 7(1)
3.      Application fee was not refunded as provided u/s 7(6). 
4.      The instant refusal is unreasonable, willfull &  malafide and hence attract the penal provisions
         under RTI Law


SELF VERIFICATION
I, XX XXXXX, S/o A A AAAA, hereby affirm and state that, the facts and circumstances mentioned herein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.



Place: CITY/TOWN                                                                              Sd/-                                              Date:dd/mm/year                                                                                NAME


Copy  To: 1) Respondent-PIO
                 2) FAA




Complaint agasint PIO, Complaint for deemed refusal, Complaint for no response by PIO,
Complaint under section 18(1) to information commission

Diaries can be sought under RTI from POLICE

1. Station house diary is the day to day register of complaints/information /VHF received

2. Police diary which is kept by the investigtion officer.

3. General diary is the what are information recevied with respect to all the cases what has
done, history of case etc.

4. Daily diary is a continuation of case diary

5. Case diary is the total compendium information relates to the criminal case which includes
the FIR, charge sheet,witnesses statement, the corbon copies of all the statements,
certificates, and the day to day activities and orders and develoments case till judgement,
until conlcusion of appeal.



As far as RTI is concerned you may sought the information as the above diaries are the public document

No maintenance for wife [ Qualified 498a salty-wife] filed U/s CrPC 125

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
CM(M) 1153/2008

KAVITA PRASAD                                                         ….. Petitioner

Through: Mr. S.D. Singh, Adv.

versus

RAM ASHRAY PRASAD                                           ….. Respondent
Through:


CORAM:HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA

O R D E R

01.10.2008
The petitioner who is an MBBS qualified Doctor and admittedly had been in practice before, claims that she was sitting at home despite being a qualified Doctor and does not work. The petitioner claimed maintenance against her husband who is in service. The Trial Court granted maintenance of Rs.4,000/- per month. This petition is made against observation of the Trial Court that she was working somewhere and earning around Rs.8,000 to 10,000/- PM and that the maintenance granted by the Trial Court was made subject to adjustment of the maintenance being received by her under Section 125. Since counsel for the petitioner states that petitioner is not working anywhere, despite being a qualified Doctor, I consider that as she is receiving maintenance from husband, the Court should not allow her experience and qualification to go waste. I consider that she should be directed to work as a honorary Doctor in some public welfare institute or school free of charges where she can take care of health of the poor people. Let her come to Court and give an undertaking that she was prepared to work without charging anything in any institution named by this Court around her house minimum 5 hours a day and 6 days a week, so long she receives maintenance from her husband on the plea of being unemployed.
List on 23rd October, 2008.

SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA,J
OCTOBER 01, 2008

Lawyers are not liable to consumer court

Lawyers are not laible to consumer court agaisnt their Clients

The State Commission, Delhi, by its order dated 10.3.2006 in Appeal No.1815 of 2000  held that the services rendered by the Lawyer would not come within the ambit of Section 2(1)(o) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, as the client executes the power of attorney authorizing the Counsel to do certain acts on his behalf and there is no term of contract as to the liability of the lawyer in case he fails to do any such act. The State Commission further observed that it is a unilateral contract executed by the client giving authority to the lawyer to appear and represent the matter on his behalf without any specific assurance or undertaking.

Landmark judgement by Jsutice M.B.Shah and Mrs Rajyalakshmi Rao

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION

NEW DELHI

REVISION PETITION NO. 1392 OF 2006
(From the order dated  10.3.2006 in Appeal No.1815/2000 of the State Commission,  Delhi)



D. K. Gandhi
PS, National Institute of
Communicable  Diseases,
22, Sham Nath Marg,
Delhi-110 054.                                            …    Petitioner

Vs.

M. Mathias,
20, Dhirpur,
Nirankari Colony,
Delhi-110 009                                           …      Respondent



BEFORE :

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M.B. SHAH, PRESIDENT
          MRS. RAJYALAKSHMI RAO, MEMBER


For the Petitioner                             …      In Person
                                                           

For the Respondent              …      In Person



Dated the  6th  August , 2007
O R D E R

M.B.SHAH, J. PRESIDENT.

                    The State Commission, Delhi, by its order dated 10.3.2006 in Appeal No.1815 of 2000  held that the services rendered by the Lawyer would not come within the ambit of Section 2(1)(o) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, as the client executes the power of attorney authorizing the Counsel to do certain acts on his behalf and there is no term of contract as to the liability of the lawyer in case he fails to do any such act. The State Commission further observed that it is a unilateral contract executed by the client giving authority to the lawyer to appear and represent the matter on his behalf without any specific assurance or undertaking.
                  
                   Against that order the Complainant has preferred this Revision Petition.

Findigns:
                    In our view, the reasoning given by the State Commission is totally erroneous. The ambit and scope of Section 2(1)(o) of the Consumer Protection Act  which defines ‘service’ is very wide and by this time  well established.   It covers all services except  rendering of services free of charge or a contract of personal service.  Undisputedly,  lawyers are rendering service.  They are charging fees.  It is not a contract of personal service.  Therefore, there is no reason to hold that they are not covered by the provisions  of the Consumer Protection Act,1986.   The State Commission approached the question totally in an erroneous manner by holding that by executing power of attorney the client authorizes the Lawyer to do certain acts on his behalf  and there is no term of contract as to the liability of the lawyer  in case  he fails to do such act.   It is to be stated that a Lawyer may not be responsible for the favourable outcome of a case as the result/out come does not depend upon only on lawyers’ work. But, if there is deficiency in rendering services promised, for which consideration in the form of fee is received by him, then the lawyers can be proceeded against under the Consumer Protection Act. Further, it is totally erroneous to hold that it is a unilateral contract  executed by the client  by giving authority to the lawyer  to appear and represent the matter. Apparently, it is a bilateral contract between the client and the lawyer, and, that too, on receipt of fees, lawyer would appear and represent the matter on behalf of his client. To hold that contract is unilateral is to ignore the fact that even after discussion the client may not engage the Advocate or the Advocate may refuse to accept the brief. Hence, such a contract can never be said to be unilateral. 

                   Further, it is not necessary to refer to judgments on this well settled law, still, we would refer to the case of  Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, (1994) 1 SCC 243 , at pages 254-255, wherein the Apex Court  observed as under:
“The concept of service thus is very wide. How it (the concept of ‘service’) should be understood and what it means, depends on the context in which it has been used in any enactment. Clause ( o ) of the definition section defines it as under:
 “ ‘service’ means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service;”
It is in three parts. The main part is followed by inclusive clause and ends by exclusionary clause. The main clause itself is very wide. It applies to any service made available to potential users. The words ‘any’ and ‘potential’ are significant. Both are of wide amplitude. The word ‘any’ dictionarily means ‘one or some or all’. In Black’s Law Dictionary it is explained thus, “word ‘any’ has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate ‘all’ or ‘every’ as well as ‘some’ or ‘one’ and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject-matter of the statute”. The use of the word ‘any’ in the context it has been used in clause ( o ) indicates that it has been used in wider sense extending from one to all.

                   The Court held that the importance of the Act lies in promoting welfare of the society inasmuch as it attempts to remove the helplessness of a consumer as he faces against powerful business; “producers have secured power” to “rob the rest”.  The might of public bodies which are degenerating into storehouses of inaction where papers do not move from one desk to another as a matter of duty and responsibility but for extraneous consideration leaving the common man helpless and shocked.    

                    To what extent the aforesaid observations apply to various professions in the country is to be imagined and it is a matter of guess work.

                    Thereafter in the case of Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha and Others   - 1995 (6) SCC 651  the Apex Court discussed whether medical practitioner would be covered by the said definition.  For this purpose, it was observed that in the matter of professional liability, professions differ from other occupations for the reason that professions operate in spheres where success cannot be achieved in every case and very often success or failure depends upon factors beyond the professional man’s control.  In devising a rational approach to professional liability which must provide proper protection to the consumer while allowing for the factors mentioned above, the approach of the courts is to require that professional men should possess a certain minimum degree of competence and that they should exercise reasonable care in the discharge of their duties.  If there is negligence on the part of medical practitioner, the right of affected person to seek redress would be covered by the Act.  Medical practitioners would not be outside the purview of the provisions of the Act.
                   The same principle would apply in case of service to be rendered by a lawyer.
                  

                   Lastly, in Kishore Lal Vs. Chairman, Employees’ State Insurance Corpn. (2007) 4 SCC 579 the Apex  observed:

 “It has been held in numerous cases of this Court that jurisdiction of the Consumer Fora has to be construed liberally so as to bring many cases under it for their speedy disposal.  The Act being a beneficial legislation, it should receive a liberal construction”.


                   Finally in the  case  of Jacob Mathew  vs. State of Punjab – (2005) 6 SCC 1 (para 18) the Apex Court has held that in law of negligence, professionals such as lawyers, doctors, architects and others are included in the category of persons professing some special skill or skilled persons  generally and a professional may  be held  liable  for negligence on one of the two findings: either he was not possessed of the requisite skill which he professed to have possessed, or, he did not exercise, with reasonable competence in the given case, the skill which he did possess.          

                   Further, this Commission has taken a consistent view that if there is deficiency in service rendered by the Lawyers, complaint under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is maintainable.

                   For the reasons stated above, the impugned order passed by the State Commission is set aside and the matter is remitted to the State Commission for  deciding the same on merits in accordance with law.  The Appeal stands allowed accordingly.   There shall be no order as to costs.                
                                                                                           Sd/-
                                                              …………………………………….J.
                                                                                                  ( M.B.SHAH )
                                                                                                    PRESIDENT


                                                                                           Sd/-
                                                               ……………………………………...
                                                                                 (RAJYALAKSHMI RAO)
                                                                                                          MEMBER






Lawyers are not liable to consumer court agaisnt their Clients,
layman courts

CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT UNDER RTI

1. RTI is a service provider under Consumer Protection Act 1986. Information seeker under RTI is a consumer of public authority under Consumer Protection Act 1986. The is in addition to remedies available under Right to Information Act.  As such, District Consumer Forum and State/National Consumer Commissions have jurisdiction to try complaints relating to deficiency in service concerning RTI.


2. Non-supply of information or supply of defective, incomplete, misleading information, would amount to deficiency in service by the public authority under the Consumer Protection Act 1986.


3. Supply of information beyond time limit fixed by RTI Acts would also amount to deficiency in service by the public authority.


4. In State Commissions Payment of compensation, damages, expenses to information seeker is rare under RTI Act(based on the jduges), but in general it is allowed under Consumer Protection Act 1986 of which applicant(information seeker) can claim the same.


5. Information seeker under RTI can obtain appropriate directions to the public authority from Consumer Forum/ Commissions under the Consumer Protection Act 1986, for removing deficiency in service.


6. Provisions of Consumer Protection Act 1986 can reasonably be extended to first appeal since appeal is an extension of RTI application.


7. In State Commissions Payment of compensation, damages, expenses to information seeker is rarity under RTI Acts, while it is normally allowed under Consumer Protection Act 1986.


8. Applicants under earlier RTI Acts of various States and of Right to Information Act 2005 can avail this additional remedy against public authority.


9. Consumer Protection Act 1986 can also be invoked against SICs [specially for delay in decision] where fees are to be paid for second appeal/complaint. Some one can try this remedy against CIC and also SICs, where fees are not required to be paid for second appeal or complaint. 


10. CIC and all SICs can be proceeded against under Consumer Protection Act 1986 for deficiency in supply of their own information.



Landmark Judgement:

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION

NEW DELHI

REVISION PETITION NO.  1975 OF 2005
(Against the order dated 1.10.05 in Appeal No.244/04  of the State Commission, Karnataka)


Dr. S.P. Thirumala Rao
Consultant Physician
No.1138/3, Narayanasastry Road
Devaraja Mohalla                                                                                                       ........ Petitioner
Mysore – 570 001      
                                      Vs.
Municipal Commissioner
Mysore City Municipal Corporation
Sayyaji Rao Road.
Mysore – 570 024                                                                                                      …….Respondent

BEFORE:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K. BATTA,
PRESIDING MEMBER
HON’BLE MR. S.K. NAIK, MEMBER

For the Petitioner                      :           Mr. Aditya Narain, Advocate
                                                            Ms. Astha Tyagi, Advocate

For the Respondent                  :            NEMO

Pronounced on : 28th  May, 2009
ORDER
                  

The District Forum had dealt with the objections raised by the opposite party regarding bar of jurisdiction of Courts under Section 10 of the Act as also the overriding affect of the Act.  The State Commission in the impugned order did not at all refer to the findings of the District Forum on the said issues but allowed the appeal only on the ground that once the complainant had already availed remedy under the said Act and appeal is provided therein, the complainant cannot maintain a complaint under the CP Act. We may at this stage point out that the findings of the District Forum with reference to Section 10 & 11 are supported by reasons which do not call for any interference. In fact, the view taken by the District Forum is in consonance with the rulings of this Commission in the case of Smt. Kalawati (Supra) and Smt. Ushal Rani Aggarwal (Supra). We entirely agree with the reasoning of District Forum on this aspect.  Though, the said Act provides for penalties under Section 9 of the said Act on the competent authority, yet, the Act does not provide for any remedy to the consumers who have sought information under the said Act for deficiency of service in the nature of compensation or damages for not furnishing the informations ought to which they are entitled to get under the said Act.  Section 3 of the CPA provides additional remedy in addition to the remedies provided under other Acts and it is not in derogation of any provisions of any law.  The Consumer Fora has, therefore, jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in respect of deficiency of service in the given facts especially when information sought was not furnished.  The competent authority was required to give information within 15 days of the application in terms of Section 5 of the said Act.  However, the said information was not furnished. The complainant had approached the District Forum claiming compensation/damages for deficiency of service.  Even though, further remedy may be available to the applicant in case information is not supplied in terms of Section 5 of the Act within 15 days, yet, there is no bar to approach the District Forum for deficiency of service.  The remedy under the said Act would take care of disciplinary action and penalty against the competent authority in not furnishing the information but no remedy is provided under the said Act to the applicant seeking information therein if information sought is not provided resulting in deficiency of service on that count.  The applicant had paid a fee of Rs.10/- for seeking the said information.  The case of the applicant would fall within the scope and ambit of Section 2(i)(o) of CP Act, which provides that service means service of any description which is made available to potential users, which include purveying of news or supplying of other information. The complainant had availed of the services under the said Act for consideration by paying fee and had sought information under the said Act, which was not supplied to him, which amounts to deficiency of service.  The complainant is, thus, a consumer vis-à-vis information sought on payment under the said Act.   In our view, therefore, the State Commission was wrong while holding that once the complainant had availed the remedy against which appeal was provided, he could not maintain a complaint under the CP Act. 
For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order of the State Commission is liable to be set aside and the order of the District Forum is restored. In the facts and circumstances, we shall leave the parties to bear their own cost.
                                                                                    …………………..………J
                                                                                                        (R.K. BATTA)
                                                                                      ( PRESIDING MEMBER)

                                                                                  ……………….……………
                                                                                                           (S.K. NAIK)
                                                                                                               MEMBER
k

COMPLAINT agasint PIO for misleading information

BEFORE THE HON'BLE INFORMATION COMISSION: CITY

Between:

Complainant
Address:
City/town                                                                           ...…Complainant


PIO
O/o: Respondent 1
City/town                                                                               .....Respondent 1

PIO
O/o: Respondent 2
City/town                                                                               .....Respondent 2



COMPLAINT FILED U/S 18 OF RTI ACT – 2005


I.   INDEX of DOCUMENTS(ENCLOSED)
1). My RTI Application dated   u/s 6               ……Exhibit A
2) Speed/Regd  Post Article                            ……Exhibit B
3). The PIO response u/s 6(3)                         ……Exhibit C
3). The PIO Response from other Public Authority (Respondent 2)
Lr. No. RTI/E.O-1/2010, dated 20/12/10                     ...…Exhibit C


II.   FACTS
The Complainant who needed some information from the first respondent filed an application (Exhibit - A). The PIO-first respondent, forwarded the application u/s 6(3) to PIO-second respondent (Ex - B).  The PIO of second respondent furnished her responses through her reply letter (Ex - C) to the 10 queries raised. Some of the PIO’s responses indicate that PIO is the wrong address/custodian of the information asked as such, apparently sec 6(3) referral is a mis-direction to a wrong destination some other responses are clearly false and misleading. Hence this complaint.


III.   PRAYER - RELIEF SOUGHT
1). To issue directions for disclosure of information asked.
2). To defray the costs and consequential damages entailed.
3). To levy penalties and violation of RTI provisions as provided u/s 20 of RTI ACT.



IV.   GROUNDS FOR PRAYER - RELIEF SOUGHT
1). The PIO-first respondent is the principal custodian of the records pertaining to the information asked[he being the chairperson of the committee.] However, PIO passed the buck to other Public Authourity who declared that he held no information for most of the questions asked, namely questions ??????

2). The PIO-second respondent furnished false and misleading information to
questions ??????, by giving irrelevant, unrelated and unsolicited information.

3). The two Public Authourities indulged in a game of buck passing instead of displaying any due diligence for compliance.

4). The response from both Public Authouriteis displaying gross ignorance about the information as asked.
5). To cover up their ignorance and opacity they restored to buck passing and  pillar-to-post referrals.

6). Both the functionaries failed to apprise the complainant about the onward appellate procedures and processes as provided required u/s 7(8) (ii) and (iii).



SELF VERIFICATION


I, XX XXXXX, S/o A A AAAA, hereby affirm and state that, the facts and circumstances mentioned herein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.


Place: CITY                                                                     X XX XXXXX
Date:                                                                               COMPLAINANT


Copy  To: Respondent 1 PIO
                Respondent 2 PIO

COMPLAINT AGAINST PIO FOR refusing bluntly and categorically

BEFORE THE HON'BLE INFORMATION COMISSION:CITY

Between:


NAME
Address:
                                                                         ….Complaint

AND;

PIO-1
Address:
                                                                        ....Respondent 1

PIO-2
Address:
                                                                        ....Respondent 2

FAA
Address:
                                                                        ....Respondent 3



                            COMPLAINT FILED U/S 18(1)(B) & (C) OF RTI ACT – 2005


I.   INDEX of DOCUMENTS(ENCLOSED)

1). My RTI Application dated ??/??/?? u/s 6                           ......Exhibit A
2) Speed/Regd post Article                                                     ......Exhibit B
2). The PIO response letter No ?????? , dated ??/??/??          ......Exhibit C
3). My First Appeal dated ??/??/??     u/s 19(1)                      ......Exhibit D
4). PIO Response from other Public
Authority (Respondent) letter dated 30/12/10                         ......Exhibit E


II.   FACTS
The Appellant who needed some information forwaded the application to the other rmation from the First Public Authourity filed and application (Exhibit - A). The First PIO duly forwarded the application to the other Public Authourity(Respondent) by marking a copy to the appellant(Ex -B) with directions to contact them. After due compliance, there was no response from the other Public Authourities, thus resulting in the First Appeal (Ex- C).  Consequently, the other Public Authourity  u/s 6(3) that is (Respondent) through a letter(Ex- D) but refused to give access to the information as asked bluntly and categorically.  He also arrogated to himself and his organization in all the waivers exemptions and immunities provided in RTI Act with a view as to justify his non-disclosure. Hence this complaint.


III.   PRAYER - RELIEF SOUGHT
1). To issue directions for disclosure of information asked.
2). To defray the cost and consequential damages entailed.
3). To levy penalties & violation of RTI provisions as provided u/s 20 of RTI ACT.


IV.   GROUNDS FOR PRAYER - RELIEF SOUGHT
1). The Respondent, despite being declared a Public Authourity by concerned Regulatory body has repudiated his obligation and mis informed about his status.            

2). The Respondent, has wrongfully setaside my application for the reasons that it contained “a questionnaire” without any application of mind.

3). The Respondent, has brought a dispute of Public Interest into the issue which is totally out of context and against the Law.

4). The Respondent, without any basis for justification declared Organisation as immune to RTI Law.
         
5). In the same breadth, he claimed exemption provided by RTI law without any basis or clarifications.

6). The Respondent, failed to appraise appellant about the onward appellate procedures and processes as provided required u/s 7(8) (III)

7). The repudiation of obligation & denial of information or unreasonable, willfull &  malafide and hence attract the penal provisions of RTI Law notwithstanding the comprehense.


SELF VERIFICATION

I, XX XXXXX, S/o A A AAAA, hereby affirm and state that, the facts and circumstances mentioned herein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.



Place: CITY/TOWN                                                            NAME
Date:dd/mm/year                                                            COMPLAINANT



Copy  To: 1) PIO- 1
                 2) PIO- 2
                 3) FAA

DP3 Complaint against Father-in-Law and Mother-in-Law [ Dowry Givers and Abettors] to Court

IN THE HONOURABLE COURT OF CJM/CMM
Location (City/Village)

 O.P. No:         OF 2010

BETWEEN:

Mr.  ?????? S/o: ????????

Occ:?????, AGE:??,

R/o: ?????
                                                                                                       ….COMPLAINANT

                                                                  AND:

DP3 (Dowry Giver) S/o or W/o: ??????

Occ: ?????, AGE:?? ,

R/o:????? 
     

DP3 ( Abettor) S/o or W/o: ??????

Occ: ?????, AGE:?? ,

R/o:????? 
                                                                                                       ....ACCUSED

COMPLAINT FILED U/S 200 Cr.P.C.

Humble complaint petition filed on behalf of the abovenamed coplainant.

Nature of offence:                                      U/s 3 of DPA

Date/Time of occurance:                             ————
Place of offence:                                         ————

Jurisdiction of police Station:                       Local Police Station,    

List of Witness:                                           The Complainant

May it please your Honour, 

I, Name,  S/o ??????, the Complainant herein, Age: atttained Puberty, Occupation: Private employee, R/o #2728, A.P. - 498.  hereby state that respectfully submit that 

On Date  my wife Smt. 498a [aka: name ] filed a criminal complaint with FIR No.114/2010 & CC No. 170/2011 on the file of your [498a Bench] Police Station and Hon’ble Court of First Additional Metropolitan Magistrate respectively. The SHO/IO have reportedly investigated and verified the facts and filed a charge sheet. 


In the complaint Smt. 498a  the de facto complainant claimed that she had given a sum of 
Rs. 1,00,000 as dowry and  purportedly given to me during the marriage ceremony held on date  @ 498a marriage. The IO/SHO have reportedly investigated and verified the facts and filed a charge sheet with the memo of evidence these are part of your station records.  In your memo of evidence you have further affirmed and testified to a court of law to the fact of giving and taking of dowry and its related abetments by the concerned and named offenders.


In this connection it is submitted for you kind information that “dowry giving and its abetment” is a cognizable offence U/s 3 of DP Act, 1961. I need not emphasize or over state this aspect as your station authourities are not only well versed with penal code in general and specific case detail in particular. 


CAUSE OF ACTION

The cause of action for this Petition arose on ??????, when the respondent

            

JURISDICTION

The Petitioner as well as the Respondent were residing at ??????,   when the cause of action arose and thus this Hon’ble Court has jurisdiction to try and adjudicate this Petition.

VALUATION

The Petitioner is paying a court fee of Rs. 10/- which is sufficient as per the Act.

PRAYER

It is, therefore, prayed that your honour may be pleased direct the 498a Bench Police Station to take cognizance of the offence (s) against the accused  person(s) [498a FIL, MIL, BIL, SIL] and register FIR and they may be summoned to face the trial
.

Place: ??????                                 

Date:??????                                                                            Complainant

RTI 2 get your entire Case Dairy

                                                    RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT– 2005
                                                                    [Application u/s 6]



From                                     To
Name                                      Public Information Officer(State)–RTI
Adderess:                              O/o Station House Officer ,
Village           .                       ?????????? police Station,
City - Pin                               Village/City – Pin
---------------Date:                --------------------------------------------
Sir,


I am the accused/ victim in a false criminal case filed by my wife. In order to prepare my defence, I request the following certified copies from your records urgently:
·        Complaint
·        FIR
·        Witness List
·        Statement of witness
·        Memo of evidence
·        Charge Sheet
·        List of exhibits if any
·        Extracts from case and station diaries as relevant to the case


Also please arrange to furnish the following information:
1.      Limitation of period allowed to file the charge sheet under law.
2.      Time taken so far or till filing the charge sheet whichever is earlier.
3.      Whether discharge proceedings initiated for want of filing charge-sheet within prescribed time limit.
          If so furnish extract of discharge proceedings, If not reasons?
4.       If charge sheet was not field within prescribed time limit whether permission from competent     
          authority obtained in for delayed filing.

The needful information may please be arrange within prescribed time limit


Thanking you,                                                                       
                                                                                 Yours sincerely,

  
                                                                                      Sd/-
                                                                                   [NAME]